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A N  ABSTRACT
ThTs thesis compares the legal aspects of public enterprise In India 
and Tanzania, with references to the United Kingdom. It considers the 
politico-economic philosophy adopted and practised by each country and the 
role of public enterprise In the pursuance of this philosophy. The study re­
lates to statutory and public corporations and government companies under the 
Indian Companies Act and the Tanganyika Companies Ordinance, respectively. 
The composition, functions and powers of the boards of management are exa­
mined and the present methods of control In form and content are reviewed.
The thesis also examines the relative role of statutory controls, direct controls 
by the Government, and Indirect controls through public agencies. It con­
siders the relationships of the boards of corporations and government companies 
with Ministers, and considers the various pressures which have been brought to 
bear upon these Institutions. It examines the methods which have been Invoked 
to establish the accountability of the public enterprises to Parliament. It has 
tried to strike a sensible balance between the need for autonomy and the need 
for effective public control.
The emphasis of the thesis has been on ministerial control as well as 
on Parliamentary control. The question of audit by the Comptroller and 
Auditor-General and the working of a Parliamentary Committee has also been 
discussed.
Although the Statutes and Orders creating statutory and public cor­
porations In both countries reveal that the principle of direct representation of 
workers has been completely Ignored, this thesis finds It  relevant to discuss the 
Idea of workers* participation In management In the light of present economic 
conditions. It examines the nature and extent of workers* participation In 
management, however popular as a philosophical value In the public sector,
Its applicability ought to depend on the objective conditions of an Individual 
enterprise.
The thesis concludes that, In order to maintain and Improve the public 
enterprise, It  w ill be necessary to clarify the fundamental principles of the Insti­
tution. It also makes a comparative analysis between Indian and the Tanzanian 
public enterprises. It suggests that legislation should clarify the legal relation­
ship between the Boards, Ministers and Parliament.
AMIT SEN, 
London.
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CHAPTER 1
LEGAL ASPECTS OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN  IN D IA  AND TA N ZA N IA :
A COMPARATIVE STUDY
2.
NATIONAL GOALS
The lite ra l and logTcal Interpretation of any Statutes and the decision 
on the legality of any measures are mainly the province of the lawyer. How­
ever, the lawyer Is i l l—fitted as compared with the political scientist, to Investi­
gate the areas between the statement of the aim and the measurement of the Impact 
of the policy; that Is the on-golng means by which policies are formulated and 
the processes bjfwhich they are Implemented. Consequently, the Intention of 
this section Is to outline the declared political Ideology and social philosophy 
adopted and practised by both India and Tanzania as well as their recent attempts 
to Implement the goals of their respective Constitutions.
3.
Some Political and Economic Assumptions behind the Constitution
1 .1 .  India
India has committed Itself to the creation of a "socialist pattern of 
society". No where In the Indian Constitution, which comprises 395 articles 
and 9 schedules and Is known to be the lengthiest Constitution In the world, 
has this expression found a definite place. It has been used In a document 
called *The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956* which set out the Industrial 
strategy of the government. But It cannot be denied that the Idea of building 
a ‘Socialist Society* was always very dear to the hearts of the founding fathers 
of modern Independent India.
The Indian Independence Act of 1947 passed by the British Parliament
provided for the handing over of power to an Indian Constituent Assembly which
OS
was regardedAsovereIgn for the purpose of framing a Constitution for India on 
15 August, 1947. Until the new State workedjier Constitution, the Govern­
ment of India A ct, 1935, would remain In force without the special powers 
granted by It to the Governor-Genera I .  Though the present Constitution was 
modelled on the 1935 Act and has borrowed over 100 articles from It ,  some pro­
visions of the Act were unacceptable and distasteful to the Indfan leaders.
The Constituent Assembly which was led by men of experience and
4 .
erudition, was entrusted wtth the task of framing an autochthonous  ^ Consti­
tution. The foundation of the Constitutional structure of the Assembly was
2laid by the Objectives Resolution moved by Jawaharlal Nehra. It said 
(Inter alia):
(1) The Constituent Assembly declares 
Its firm and solemn resolve to pro­
claim India as an Independent 
sovereign Republic and to draw up 
for her future governance a Consti­
tution;
(2) Where-ln shall be guaranteed and 
secured to a ll the people of India 
justice, social, economic and poli­
tical; equality of status, of oppor­
tunity, and before the law; freedom 
of thought, expression, belief, faith, 
worship, vocation, association and 
action, subje ct to law and public 
moral! ty.
1 .A*1 Autochthonous Constitution Is one which Is rooted In Its own native land 
and Its authority comes from the people but from nowhere else. This has 
been explained clearly by K .C .  Wheare In "The Constitutional Structure 
of the Commonwealth". In his words: "They (people) wish to be able 
to say that their Constitution has a force of law and, If  necessary, of 
supreme law within their territory through Its own native authority and 
not because It was enacted or authorised by the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom; that It Is, so to speak, ‘homegrown*, sprung from their own soli, 
and not Imported from the United Kingdom. They assert not the principle 
of autonomy only; they assert also a principle of something stronger, of 
self-sufficiency, of Constitutional autarky or to use a less familiar but 
accurate word, a principle of Constitutional autochthony, of being con­
stitutionally rooted In their own native soil." Page 89.
*  From the Greek word * aVroxowv -  ‘sprung from that land Itself* (OED). 
See London University thesis by O . Achlmn, "Autochtony & Its Implica­
tions", 1972.
2 . Constituent Assembly Debates, 13 December, 1946, Volume I, page 57.
The Inspiration behind the new Constitution was two-fold: the 
principles of "Western democracy* and, In particular, the British Parlia­
mentary system; and the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi. Gandhl*s In flu -
3
ence Is seen In the decision to make the new India a ‘Secular State*, 
based on the classic civic freedoms and not on the structure of the Hindu 
religion.
The Ideals Nehru held were Incorporated at his Insistence tn the
Directive Principles of State policy In Article 39 of Part IV of the Consti­
tution. These principles Include the obligation to ensure:
(a) that the Citizens, men and women equally, have the right to
an adequate means of livelihood;
(b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the 
Community are so distributed as best to subserve the common 
good;
(c) that the operation of the economic system does not result In 
the concentration of wealth and means of production to the 
common detriment.
The Directive principles are not enforceable but are Intended as a guide to 
government action. In fact, they Indicate the social and economic goals 
of the nation.
3 . Articles 25 to 28 of the Constitution.
6.
The Constituent Assembly Intended that the new Constitution should 
4
foster India's rebirth. Nearly every one In the Assembly was Fabian and
Laskt-tte enough to believe that "Socialism Is every day politics for social 
5
regeneration, and that 'democratic constitutions are . . .  Inseparably asso­
ciated with the drive towards economic equaltty.*^ The Constituent 
Assembly In the Objectives Resolution and the debate on It ,  established that 
the Constitution must be dedicated to some form of Socialism and to the 
social regeneration of India, and has agreed with the Congress Socialist 
Party's resolution of 1947 stating that "there could be no Socialism with­
out democracy". ^
The Constituent Assembly has also accepted certain fundamental 
concepts as being vita lly  essenttal for maintaining the stabjltty and progress 
of the country, and attempted to devise a political machine which would 
make It  possible to gtve practical effect to those concepts and Ideals.
On 26 November, 1949, the Constituent Assembly, In the name 
of the people of India, adopted and enacted the Constitution, and It came 
Into force on 26 January, 1950. Granville Austin's comment on the iype
4 . GranvtJIe Austtn: The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Natton, 
page 41.
5 . M . Beer: A Htstory of Brtttsh Soctallsm, page 281.
6. A . J .  Laskt: A Grammar of Politics, p. S3
7. Resolution adopted at Kanpur Conference on 28 February, 1947. The 
above paragraph containing notes 4 to 7, has been quoted from Austtn's 
"Indian Constttutton," page 41.
7 .
of Constitution the Assembly has created, was as follows:
What was of greatest Importance to most 
Assembly members, however, was not that 
Socialism be embodied In the Constitution, 
but a democratic Constitution with a 
socialist bias so as to allow the nation In 
the future to become as socialist as Its 
Citizens desired or Its need demanded.
Being, In general, Imbued with the goals, 
the humanitarian bases, and some of the 
techniques of social democratic thought, 
such was the type of Constitution that g 
Constituent Assembly members created.
However, the Constitution of India cannot be strictly classified as either
9
Capitalistic, Socialistic or Communistic. It Is democratic In character 
and It reflects the wishes, the hopes and the aspirations of the people of 
India. The Constitution, It could be said, Is a mixture of Idealistic 
social and economic provisions with articles of a practical, administrative 
and technical nature.
8 . G .  Austin: Indian Constitution -  Cornerstone of a Nation, o p .c lt., 
page 43.
9 . These terms refer to a social system which a Constitution wishes to establish: 
Capitalistic: A social system In which the means of production, distribution 
and exchange are wholly or substantially owned by private persons. 
Socialistic: . . .  the means of production, distribution, and exchange should 
be owned and controlled by the people, everyone should be given an equal 
opportunity to develop his talents, and the wealth of the community should 
be fairly distributed.
Communistic: . . .  type of system In which property Is vested In the commu­
nity, every Individual receiving what he needs and working according to 
his capacity.
The Ideals and objectives of the Constitution are enshrined In the 
Inspiring words of the Preamble to the Constitution. It reads:
W e, the people of India, having solemnly 
resolved to constitute India Into a sovereign 
Democratic Republic and to secure to a ll Its 
Citizens:
JUSTICE, social, economic and political;
LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, 
faith and worship;
EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; 
and to promote among them all 
FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the 
Individual and the Unity of the Nation.
It Is admitted that the Preamble Is not considered to be the opera*- 
ttve part of the Constitution as It does not confer any power or create any 
authority. It broadly Indicates the purpose and objects that It seeks to 
achieve and the Inconveniences that It strives to eradicate. The slgnl- 
ftcante of the Preamble has never been denied. At times It  plays a deci­
sive role In the Interpretation of the law and the Constitution. If the 
language of the articles and clauses are found to be conflicting and 
ambiguous, then a reference could be made to the Preamble because It 
contains a recital of the Intentions of those who framed the law and can, 
therefore, supply a sort of key to the understanding of Ideals which do not 
seem to be precisely expressed. Professor Willoughby, an eminent Con­
stitutional lawyer, put a great emphasis on this Idea and said that the 
"Preamble may not be relied upon for giving to the body of the Instrument 
a meaning other than that which its language: plainly Imports, but may be
resorted to tn cases of ambiguity, when the Intention of the framers does not 
clearly and definitely appear." ^
The same sentiment has been echoed In the case of Bhola Prasad 
v . King Emperor,  ^  ^ where It was said: "The Preamble of a statute Is a key 
to open the mind of the makers as to mischief which are to be remedied, and 
the objects which are to be accomplished by the provisions of the statute."
A  detailed account of basic human rights and ambitions of the 
Indian society are Incorporated In the chapters on Fundamental rights and 
Directive principles of state policy. They are Included In the Constitu­
tion In the hope and expectation that one day the tree of true liberty would 
12bloom Tn India.
The Directive Principles of State policy pronounced Tn Articles 
36 to 51 of the Constitution, define clearly the Welfare State and visualize 
the economic and social pattern of life to be achieved through proper plan­
ning. These principles are fundamental In the governance of the country.^ 
But the essence of the Directive principles Is found In Article 38, which,
10. W .W .  Willoughby: Principles of the Constitutional Law of the U .S . ,  
2nd Edn. (1938), page 43.
11. 1942 , 46 C . W . N .  (F .B.) ,  page 37.
]2 . G .  Austin: Indian Constitution, page 50.
13. Article 37 of the Constitution.
10.
echoing the Preamble, reads: ”The State shall strive to promote the welfare of 
the people by securing and protecting as effectively as It may a social order 
In which justice, social, economic and political shall Inform a ll the Institu­
tions of the national l ife .” As mentioned earlier, the Directive principles 
have moral rather than legal force. It Is expected that any measure to give 
effect to these principles would Invite a conflict between a fundamental right 
and a directive principle. As early as 1951, the Supreme Court said In one
of Its decisions that these principles have to conform to and run subservient
14to the fundamental rights. Nevertheless, the present attitude of the 
Indian judiciary towards these principles, Is to take cognizance of these socio­
economic objectives In the Interpretation of the articles of the Constitution.
In the case of Chandra Bhavan Boarding and Lodging Bangalore v . The State 
15
of Mysore & Ors, the Supreme Court observed:
Freedom of trade does not mean freedom to 
exploit. The provisions of the Constitution 
are not erected as barriers to progress. They 
provide a plan for orderly progress towards 
the social order contemplated by the Preamble 
to the Constitution. They do not permit any 
kind of slavery, social, economic or politi­
cal . It Is a fallacy to think that under our 
Constitution there are only rights and no 
duties. While rights conferred under Part 
III are fundamental, the directives given
14. State of Madras v. Champakam Doralrajan, A . l .R .  1951 S .C .  228.
15. 1970 2 S .C .R . ,  page 612, paras. B to E .
under Part IV are fundamental Tn the govern­
ance of the country. We see no conflict on 
the whole between the provisions contained 
In Part III and Part IV . They are comple­
mentary and supplementary to each other.
The provisions of Part IV enable the legis­
lature and the government to Impose various 
duties on the citizens. The provisions there­
in are deliberately made elastic because the 
duties to be Imposed on the citizens depend 
on the extent to which the directive prin­
ciples are Implemented. The mandate of 
the Constitution Is to build a welfare society 
In which justice, social, economic and poli­
tica l, shall Inform all Institutions of our 
national life . The hopes and aspirations 
aroused by the Constitution w ill be belled 
I f  the minimum needs of the lowest of our 
citizens are not met.
The conflict of judicial opinion as to the place of directive principles vts-a- 
vls fundamental rights Is now finally settled by the Twenty-fifth Constitution 
(Amendment) A ct, 1971. It declares that a law enacted for the purpose 
of Implementing any of the directive principles stated In clause (b) and (c) 
of Article 39 shall not be called tn question In any court on the ground that 
It Is Inconsistent with Articles 14, 19 and 31.
In the Chapter on Fundamental rights, the Articles 19, 20, 21, 22, 
23 and 24 have been placed under the caption "Rtght to Freedom” . Article 
19 expressly recognises the following seven rights: (1) right to freedom of 
speech and expression; (11) right to assemble peacefully and wtthout arms;
(111) right to form associations or untons; (iv) right to move within the terri­
tory of India; (v) right to reside and settle In any part of the territory of
Indla-j (vT) right to acquire, hold and dtspose of property; and (vtt) rtght 
to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. 
However, the Constitution also recognises that no fundamental right Is abso 
lute and each Is subjected to the reasonable restrictions Imposed under the 
authority of clauses 19 (2 ) to 19 (6) of the article In the Interest of the 
Integrity of India, security of the State, public order, etc.
These political and economic rights have been jealously pro­
tected by the Indian judiciary from any encroachment, and these rights
have been variously described by It  as paramount, ^  sacrosanct, ^
18 19Inalienable and Inviolable, and transcendental. But as the
government activity In the economic field has Increased In order to fu lfil 
Its socio-economic commitments, the clash between the Individual and the 
State has become Inevitable. Moreover, the State Intervention Is also 
considered essential In the sphere of social welfare on account of fear 
that without It social Injustice w ill be accentuated. This situation Im­
poses a heavier responsibility on the Indian judiciary as the ultimate 
arbiter of the provisions of the Constitution. It seems that judicial
16. A . K .  GopaIan v . State of Madras, 1950 S .C .R . ,  page 198.
17. State of Madras v. Champakam Doralrajan, 1951 S .C .R . ,  page 825
18. Ujjam Bal v. State of U .P . ,  Al A . I .R .  1962 , S .C.  1621.
19. Golak Nath v . The State of Punjab, A . I .R .  1967 S .C .  1643.
13.
thinking on thts point has undergone a change. In Sajjan Singh v . State of 
20Rajasthan/ M r. Justtce Mudholkar has been confronted with "an argument 
that I f  fundamental rtghts are regarded as unchangeable It w ill hamper legis­
lation which the changing needs of a dynamic society may call for In future." 
He said that :
It  Is possible that there may be an answer.
The rights enumerated In article 19(1) can 
be subjected to reasonable restrictions 
under clauses (2) to (6) of article 19 and 
the other fundamental rights -  or at least 
many of them -  can perhaps be adopted 
to meet the needs of a changing society 
with the aid of the dtrecttve principles.
For/ article 37, the second article In 
Part IV which deals with ‘directive 
principles* of State policy* Imposes a 
duty on the State to apply those direct­
ive principles In making laws. These 
principles are also fundamental In the 
governance of the country and the pro­
visions of Part 111 of the Constitution 
must be Interpreted harmoniously with 
those principles.
21In Golak Nath v . State of Punjab, the Supreme Court pronounced that 
the fundamental rights could not be taken away or abridged by means of 
amendment. In the above case, Chief Justice Subba Rao observed that 
the Constitution was flexible enough to accommodate future socio-economic
20. A . I .R .  1965 S .C .  864.
21. A . I .R .  1967 S .C.  1643.
22change without a formal amendment restrtcttng the fundamental rtght.
23
The recent dectston tn Kesavananda's case has empowered Parltament to 
amend each and every article of the Constitution by way of addition, vari­
ation, or repeal, so long as Tts fundamental features are not abrogated.
As long as this decision holds good, the government Ts ensured a smooth 
ride In Parltament If  and when an occaston would arise to by-pass or over­
ride any provisions of the Constitution Tn order to achieve the objectives 
mentioned earlter.
The rultng party Is the political machine through which the Ideals 
and objectives latd down tn a Constitution are Implemented. If the atms 
and goals of the party are Tn conflict with the goals of the Constitution, 
the latter becomes Ineffective and Inoperative. In other words, It loses 
Its authority and force. But-fvoi/vfllndependence^lndta has been governed 
by a single party, the Indian National Congress, and Tts declared objectives 
are Tn line with the spirit of the Constitution. As early as January, 1955, 
the Congress party has accepted ‘Soclqllsm1 as the party creed at a Party 
Conference at AvadI and was reiterated at Bhubaneswar In 1964 when theA
Party declared that :
22. Id. at 1670.
23. Kesavananda Bharat! v . State of Kerala, A . I .R .  1973 S .C . 1476.
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the object of the Indian NatTona! Congress 
Is the well being and advancement of the 
people of India bypeaceful and constitu­
tional means, of a Soclajst State based 
on parliamentary democracy In which 
there Is equality of opportunity and of 
political, economic and social rights 
and which alms at world peace and 
fellowship. 24
The elimination of exploitation, the putting an end to unemploy­
ment, the bringing of the opportune y for every Individual to get the gpdu- 
catlon suited to his capacity, a ll these are Items In the Socialist programmes 
which Indian Socialism !i s j  committed to promote and provide.
Jawabarlal Nehru, an ardent believer of Socialism, wrote tn an 
article that ” It Is only through a planned approach on Socialistic lines that 
steady progress can be attained though even that w ill take time. As this
25
process continues, the texture of our life and thinking gradually changes.11
The long journey on the road to social and economic progress which 
the people of India began under the charismatic leadership of Prime Minister 
Nehru was continued under the Stewardship of Prime Minister Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi. Mrs. Gandhi believed that the existence of poverty Is Incompat­
ible with the vision of a prosperous, democratic and just society Implied In
24. Quoted from Birch and Cole: Aslan Political System, page 272.
25. J . Nehru: The Basic Approach, Economic Review, 15 August, 1958.
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the concept of a Socialistic pattern of society. With a view to establishing 
such a society, she announced the 20-Polnt New Economic Programme on 
1 July, 1975, fo  ensure social juitlce, to relieve unemployment and to 
eradicate poverty. The 20-Polnt Economic Programme has been considered 
as a step forward In a new era for the poor and the destitute. The following 
are the 20-Potnts that make up this Programme:
Point 1: Meeting the challenge on the Price front. Steps are to be taken
to stimulate production, speed up procurement and streamline the 
distribution of essential commodities to check the prlce-rlse.
Point 2: Effective land reforms and distribution of surplus land among the
landless.
Point 3: Home-sltes to landless labourers.
Point 4: Banning of bonded labour. The barbarous practice of bonded
labour w ill be abolished and a ll contracts relating to such prac­
tice w ill be declared Illega l.
Point 5: Liquidation of rural Indebtedness.
Point 6: Enhanced minimum wages for agricultural labourers. The existing
legislation ( I .e .  Minimum Wages A ct, 1948) on minimum wages 
for agricultural labour Is to be reviewed for suitable enhancement 
of minimum wages.
Point 7: Expansion of Irrigation facilities.
Point 8: Greater supply of electric power.
Point 9: 
Potnt 10: 
Point 11:
Point 12: 
Point 13:
Point 14: 
Point 15:
Point 16: 
Point 17: 
Point 18:
Point 19:
Special measure for development of hand looms.
More adequate supply of controlled cloth.
Regulation of private ownership of urban land. It Is now proposed 
that Government should have the power to acquire a ll vacant land 
In excess of a celling (usually 500 sq.metres) after payment of a 
certain compensation to the present owners.
Checking of tax evasion In respect of urban property. 
Intensification of measures to check smuggling. Special laws 
are to be enacted for the seizure of smugglers* property. 
Liberalisation of Industrial licences.
Greater participation by workers In Industrial management. 
Schemes for workers* participation In the Industries, parti­
cularly at the shop floor level and production programmes, 
w ill be Introduced. Joint Worker-Management Councils 
w ill be Introduced tn each department of a large factory.
National permits for road transport operators.
Income tax exemption for people with moderate Incomes.
Relief for poor students who reside In hostels outside statutory 
rationing areas.
Provision of textbooks and writing no terlals to students at 
concessional rates.
Potnt 20: Wtdentng the scope of the Apprenttceshtp Act to provtde 
employment-ortented tratntng factltttes to educate young 
men; the provtstons of the Apprenttceshtp A ct, 1950, are 
to be suttably amended.
It cannot, however, be dented that some progress had been made stnce the
Introduction of the 20-Potnt Programme. There was a fall tn retatl prtces
and an tncrease tn the annual growth rate. "An atmosphere of self-con-
ftdence now prevails among the people. There ts Improved discipline and
26better performance tn all walks of life " , says the Statesman.
But before the programme could be fully Implemented, the Congress
Party, under the leadership of Mrs. Gandht, suffered a crushing defeat In the
2™
hands of the Janata Party, whfch was formed by the amalgamation of the five 
majoroj>p&^£cwpartles, at the general elections of March, 1977. Some 
observers feared that certain socialist programmes would be abandoned by the 
present government as the political phllosophi^advocated by the five parties, 
before the merger took place, diametrically opposite to each other.
This fear has no doubt caused anxiety and uncertainty. In order to clear 
the a ir of uncertainty, the Minister of Industry, George Fernandef,Issued a
26. The Statesman", 10 October, 1976.
27. The Satwantra party, the Jan Sangha, one faction of the Congress Party, 
Congress for Democracy and the Socialist Party.
19.
statement saying that "the future economic policy of the present government
28w ill be In conformity with the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956” .
This statement may be Interpreted as an Intention of the present Government 
to pursue the same economic policy where the public sector w ill play a doml 
nant role In the management of the economy, and also a rebuff to some mem­
bers of the government who passionately advocated the free economic system 
to help solve the present economic stagnation.
However, It would be premature to comment on the activities and 
Intention of the Janata Party now as It  has a long way to go.
28. *The Statesman*, 31 December, 1977.
1.2 . Tanzanta
An attempt w ill now be made to throw some Itght on the Tdeals 
and objecttves which the Tanzanian Constitution seeks to achieve.
Tanzania consists of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. The two countries 
joined together to form the United Republic of Tanzania on 25 A pril, 1964.
Tanganyika was a German colony from 1884 to 1918, and was 
administered by the United Kingdom under a League of Nations Mandate 
until 1946, and under United Nations Trusteeship until It attained Inde­
pendence In 1961.
Zanzibar was formerly a Sultanate and British Protectorate off 
the coast of Tanganyika, and became fully Independent on 9 December,
1963.
Tanganyika became Indepeclent on 9 December, 1961, under a 
29
"Westminster model" type of Constitution. The Constitution which
29. The main features of the model are: (1) Head of the State Is not the 
effective head of government; (11) the effective head Is a Prlme- 
Mlnlster; (111) the effective executive branch of government Is parlia­
mentary; (lv) Ministers must be members of the legislature; (v) M in i­
sters are collectively and Individually responsible to a freely elected 
and representative legislature. See for this, S .A . de Smith: 
i 1he New Commonwealthsxj\ ot I fe
came Into effect on that d ay , was tn many respects the ’’standard form"
Constttutton, butwtthout a Btll of Rights, evolved tn and produced by the
Colontal O fftce , tn consultatton wtth the country concerned, for countries
31achtevtng Independence wtthtn the Commonwealth.
In less than ten months after Independence, the Tanganyikan 
Nattonal Assembly passed a resolution for a republican Constitution with 
an executive President who was both head of State and head of government. 
A  new republican Constitution was enacted and came Into effect on the first 
anniversary of Independence on 9 December, 1962.
In accordance with the recommendations of a Presidential Com-
32mission set up In February, 1964, a new Interim Constitution was passed
by the National Assembly on 8 July, 1965, making Tanzania a one-party
state. The Constitution declares that "there shall be one political party 
33In Tanzania". The striking Innovation Is that the Constitution of 
Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) recently renamed the Revo­
lutionary Party, the single party In Tanganyika, Is set out In the First
30. S . I .  1961 N o . 2274, Schedule I I .
31 . J. McAuslan: The Republican Constitution of Tanganyika,
( \9 < A j  L C U Q  r o 2
32 . Act No .43 of 1965.
33. S .3(1) of the Constitution.
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Schedule to the Interim Republtcan Constttutton.
The recommendattons of the Prestdenttal Commtsston were tncluded 
tn the tntertm Constttutton, approved by the Nattonal Assembly on 8 July, 
1965. In summary, the Commtsston*s study:
1. Opened TANU membershtp to a ll Tanzantan 
ctttzens who adhered to the party's prtnctples 
and sought to make of the party a truly 
nattonal movement;
2 . rejected the proposed amalgamation of the 
TANU Nattonal Executive and the Nattonal 
Assembly but changed the composttton of 
the Nattonal Assembly and the method of 
tts electton and thus achteved a closer 
association between the Executtve Co’m rn  d te t-  
and the Nattonal Assembly;
3 . recommended that a ll members of the 
Nattonal Assembly be members of TANU;
4 . determtned that three (later changed to two) 
candtdates for parliamentary seats and local 
offtces be put forward to voters, these can­
dtdates chosen by dtstrtct commtttees and 
countersigned by the Nattonal Executtve;
5 . decreed that a ll members of Parltament be 
designated ex-offtcto delegates to annual 
party conventtons and that the Central 
Commtttee supervtse work of both party 
and Parltament;
6 . determined that a ll mtntsters and juntor 
mtntsters be made members of the Nattonal 
Assemb ly;
7 . designated the Nattonal Executtve of TANU  
on the matn land and the Afro-Shtrazt Party 
on Zanzibar to put forward one candtdate 
for prestdent and that name would be ap- 
proved by^electorate wtth^'yes” or "no"
vote on the same day that parliamentary 
electtons take place. If the majority 
voted "No" an alternative name was to 
be set forth;
8 . requtredCprestdenttal as well as^parlla- 
mentary election to follow upon any disso­
lution of p(Xr U-CKTA'ie/nsfc )
9 . provided for selection of a new president,
In event of the death of the Incumbent, 
by the National Assembly sitting as an 
"electoral college”;
10. provided that the C iv il Servants be per­
mitted to join TANU and made members 
of the Nattonal Assembly I f  so nominated 
by the president;
11. Co-ordinated work and membe rshlp of the 
National Executive and local authorities 
but made TANU and local authorities 
separate and distinct authorities;
12. decreed that relations between party and 
trade unions be co-ordinated but the trade 
unions be subordinate to party and govern­
ment. 34
In effect, the party has become the main Instrument to bring about 
any political, economic and social change. The Interim Constitution 
sanctions much political power to TA N U . TANU Is empowered to nomi­
nate the president, to approve the vice-presidential candidate, and to 
select the elective candidates for each national assembly seat. Govern­
ment officials are to take Into consideration the party demand. Cabinet
ministers must have the membership of the TANU National Executive and
34 . W.R .  Duggan & J. C lv llle: Tanzania & Nyerere, page 87.
24.
of the Central Committee. Almost all Important party members are also 
members of the National Assembly. TANU effectively controls leader­
ship of trade union, youth, and women's groups, as well as the news media.
Thus, TANU completely dominated the government and the people. With
35regard to TANU's position and role, Duggan and C lv lIIe  have this to say:
Within Tanzania today, TANU Is politi­
cally all-powerful and as such Is expected 
to be a principal agent of change. Its 
militancy, Its direction, Its goals -  a ll 
are controlled completely bytyerere and 
his principal lieutenants operating through 
their combined guidance of National Exe­
cutive and National Assembly. Further­
more, an Interlocking directorate operat­
ing at national, regional, and local 
levels makes National Assembly action 
and Implementation a concomitant of 
party action. Since It Is now recog­
nized constitutionally as the only legal 
political party on the mainland, TANU  
becomes also the primary Instigator of 
governmental policy In social, economic, 
and political fields. TANU also serves 
as what Nyerere chooses to call a 'two- 
way street ^'encouraging free flow of Ideas 
to and fro between bureaucracy and pub­
lic . TANU today Is considered to be 
one of thebest-organlzed, as well as 
most powerful, political parties In a ll 
Africa.
But the question Is: Can democracy exist In a one-party system? Nyerere 
believes that where there Is one-party system, the foundations of demo­
cracy can be firmer and the people can have more opportunity for a real
35. Ib id . ,  page 54.
chotce than tn a system of two or more parties each representing sectional 
36
Interests. In a two-party state the people are voting only for the
37party policy, not the Individual who w ill represent them. He goes on
to say that the one-party state Is more In accord with traditional tribal
methods of conducting affairs, namely the elders sat under a tree and talked 
38
until they agreed. When the word ‘government1 was mentioned, the
African thought of the chief; he did not, as does the Briton, think of a
39grand building In which a debate was taking place. The Important
thing today Is that the people are free to elect their personal representa- 
40
tlve . In fact, Nyerere sees a two-party state In a classless society
41as eventually being fatal to democracy. He also maintains that the 
one-party system Is helpful to bring about a change of top leadership 
without recourse to violent means.
"Perhaps that change of top leadership Is one advantage of our 
single -party system. If our party people fe lt that the top leadership
36 . J .K .  Nyerere: Freedom & Unity, page 200.
37 . J .K .  Nyerere: Freedom & S ocla Ilsm, page 75.
38. J .K ,  Nyerere: Freedom & Unity, page 195.
39 . J .K .  Nyerere: Ib id ., page 105.
4 0 . J .K .  Nyerere: Freedom & Socialism, page 19.
41 . J .K .  Nyerere: Ib id ., page 20.
should go, ft w tll go* You canft call ft treason. Some of our earlter
leaders have gone. I could go at any ttme. It would not be regarded 
42
astreason. " However, our observatton Ts that democracy ts working
and w ill contTnue to work Tn Tanzania as long as Nyerere remains at the 
apex of the leadership pyramid. If his successor lacks his charisma and 
sagacity, then It w ill be a difficult question to answer. We also com­
pletely agree with Duggan & ClvTlle when they say that "TAN U, not the
government, Ts the real center of power and decisions, and w ill continue
43to build a Socialist State” .
Now, we pay our attention to the provisions of the Interim Con­
stitution. The Preamble of the Republican Constitution Is a grand declara­
tion of the Ideals and objectives which the Tanzanian people have set before 
themselves and have the ambition to realise through the Instrumentality of 
the political structure which they have deliberately created for themselves.
It reads:
Whereas freedom, justice, fraternity and 
concord are founded upon the recognition 
of the equality of a ll men and of their 
Inherent dignity, and upon the recogni­
tion of the rights of a ll men to protection
42. P. Enaharo: "African Socialism”, A frica, 6 April, 1962 , page 61.
43. Duggan & C lvlIIe: Tanzania & Nyerere, op.cTt., page 196.
of life , liberty and property, to freedom of con­
science, freedom of expression and freedom of 
association, to participate In their own govern­
ment, and to receive a just return for their 
labours:
And when men are united together In a commu­
nity It Is their duty to respect the rights and 
dignity of their fellow men, to uphold the laws 
of the state, and to conduct the affairs of the 
state so that Its resources are preserved, devel­
oped and enjoyed for the benefit of Its citizens 
as a whole and so as to prevent the exploita­
tion of one man by another:
And whereas such rights are best maintained 
and protected and such duties are most equit­
ably disposed In a democratic society where 
the government Is responsible to a freely 
elected ^brllament representative of the 
people and where the Courts of law are free 
and Impartial.
The Interim Constitution, unlike the Indian Constitution, does not Incor­
porate a justiciable b ill of rights. It Is aframework within which the
government and the party can operate more or less freely Tn their self-
44Imposed task of national mobilisation.
Article II of the Constitution of TANU sets out the following 
political, social and economic objectives:
(a) To consolidate and maintain the Independence of this country 
and the freedom of Its people;
44. S .A .  de Smith: Constitutional & Administrative Law, page 28.
To safeguard the Inherent dignity of the Individual In accord­
ance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
To ensure that this country shall be governed by a democratic 
socialist government of the people;
To co-operate with a ll political parties In Africa engaged In 
the liberation of a ll Africa;
To see that the Government mobilize a ll the resources of this 
country towards the elimination of poverty, Ignorance and 
disease;
To see that the Government actively assists In the formation 
and maintenance of co-operative organisations;
To see that wherever possible the Government Itself directly 
participates In the economic development of this country;
To see that the Government gives equal opportunity to a ll 
men and women Irrespective of race, religion or status;
To see that the Government eradicates a ll types of exploit­
ation, Intimidation, discrimination, bribery and corruption; 
To see that the Government exercises effective control 
over the principal means of production and pursues poli­
cies which facilitate the way to collective ownership of 
the resources of this country;
To see that the Government co-operates with other States 
In Africa In bringing about African Unity;
(I) To see that the Government works tirelessly towards 
world peace and security through the United Nations 
Organisation.
It Is evident from the above objectives that Tanzania has adopted 
the establishment of an Afrtcan-style Socialist society as her national goal. 
African Socialism Is distinguished from Capitalism which seeks to build a 
happy society on the basis of exploitation of man by man; and It Is equally 
opposed to doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build Its happy society on
45a philosophy of Inevitable conflict between man and man. Nyerere 
goes on to elaborate that:
In a country like ours, development depends 
primarily on the efforts and hard work of our 
own people and on their enthuslgsm and be­
lief that they and their country w ill benefit 
from whatever they do. If the people do 
not have the reason to believe that the ob­
ject of their government Is the well-being  
of the people as a whole, why should they 
be expected to co-operate with that govern­
ment In Its activities?
In African society In particular this Is very 
Important. Traditionally, we lived as 
families, with Individuals supporting each 
other and helping each other on terms of 
equality. We recognized that each of 
us had a place In the community, and 
this place carried with It  rights to what­
ever food and shelter was available In
45. Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism, Nyerere, page 8 .
return for the use of whatever abilities and 
energies we had . . .  But the community was 
a unit In which every Individual was Import­
ant, and among which the goods available 
were shared without too great Inequality.
This attitude Is , basically, what we mean by 
saying that traditionally African society was 
a isoclallst society. And when we say 
that Tanzania Is aiming at building kAfrlcan 
Socialism* we mean that we Intend to adopt 
the same attitude In the new circumstances 
of a nation state which Is Increasingly using 
modem techniques of economic production 
. . .  But the purpose remains the same as In 
the traditional society. That Is, the w el­
fare of every Individual In the context of 
the needs of the society of which he Is a 
member . . .
If our determination to pursue this object­
ive annoys some people who might other­
wise have assisted us In our economic 
development, what are we supposed to do?
Abandon our objective? 46
The foundation and objective of African socialism Is the extended family.
A ll men are regarded as brethren -  as members of an ever-extending family.
It does not follow any particular pattern -  It  Is neither Marxism, nor Lenfrilsm
or Maoism -  It Is an exclusive system which Is particularly suited to Tan- 
47
zanla. President Nyerere believes that "Ujamaa” Is African socialism
46. Quoted from Duggan & C lv llle : Tanzania & Nyerere, page 90.
47. J .K .  Nyerere: Freedom & Socialism, page 340.
‘Ujamaa1 Tn the traditional Swahili means ”famlly-hood” , but Tn Its new 
rural sense It  means socialist, communal or co-operative village organisa­
tion of "between 250 and 600 families, where they can be provided with the 
basic necessities for development -  running water, education, medical care 
and easy access to markets. The next stage Is to turn these villages Into 
i socialist communities In which the families work together on common land,
run common marketing organisations, shops and workshops, and share the 
48
profits.” In the words of Nyerere -  "Ujamaa” villages are Intended
to be socialist organisations created by the people, and governed by those 
who live and work In them. An 11 Ujamaa” village Is a voluntary asso­
ciation of people who decide of their own free w ill to live together and
49work together for their common good. The acceptance of the concept 
of "Ujamaa” and Ujamaa's emphasis on human equality also means that 
Tanzania Is eager to build a classless society.
We atm at building a classless society for one 
reason. In no state Is there enough wealth 
to satisfy the desire of a single Individual for 
power and prestige. Consequently, the 
moment wealth Ts divorced from Its purpose, 
which Is the banishment of poverty, there 
develops a ruthless competition between the 
Individuals; each person tries to get more 
wealth. Simply so that he w ill have more
48. The Economist, 12 April, 1975, page 60.
49. J .K .  Nyerere: Freedom & Development, pages 36-37 .
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power, and more prestige than hts fellows.
Wealth becomes an Tnstrument of domlna- 
tton, a means of humiliating other people.
In his first Inaugural address as President, Nyerere declared that:
We are determined to build a country In 
which all her citizens are equal; where 
there Is no division Into rulers and ruled, 
rich and poor, educated and Illite ra te , 
those In distress and those In Idle comfort.
We determined that In this country a ll 
would be equal In dignity; a ll would 
have an equal right to respect, to the 
opportunity of acquiring a good educa­
tion and the necessities of life; and a ll 
her citizens should have an equal oppor­
tunity of serving their country to the 
limit of thetr ab ility . 51
This social objective was very near to the heart of Nyerere. Since Inde 
pendence the economic policies have been shaped and pursued In order to 
achieve this goal.
The Arusha Declaration of 1967 Is unmlstakeably a significant 
step towards socialism. It declares:
The Arusha Declaration lays down a policy 
of revolution by evolution; we shall become 
a socialist, self-reliant society through our 
growth. We cannot afford the destruction
50. J .K .  Nyerere: Freedom & Unity, page 207.
51. J .K .  Nyerece: Ib id ., page 178.
of the economic Instruments we now have 
nor a reduction tn our pfesent output . . .
Our change w ill,  therefore, be effected 
almost entirely by the emphasis of our 
new development and by the gradual 
conversion of existing Institutions Into 
others more In accordance with our 
philosophy. 52
Nyerere admits that the solutions to these problems are slow, depending on
the growth of socialist understanding and socialist attitudes among the people.
541b Is Is why Tanzania Is not yet a socialist society.
However, the Arusha Declaration has started with an affirmation 
of the TANU creed of building a democratic socialist state, and outline the 
party*s policies of socialism and self-reliance. It declares:
A true socialist state Is one In which all 
people are workers and In which neither 
capitalism nor feudalism exist . . .  The 
way to build and maintain socialism Is 
to ensure that the major means of pro­
duction are under the control and owner­
ship of the peasants and workers them­
selves through their Government and 
their co-operatives . . .  There cannot 
be true socialism without democracy.
We now Intend to bring about a revo­
lution which w ill ensure that wejmbver 
again victims . . .  55
52. J .K .  Nyerere: Ujamaa: Essays bn Socialism,, page 1.
53. J .K .  Nyerere: Freedom & Socialism, page 25.
54. J .K .  Nyerere: ’From Uhuru to Ujamaa” Africa Toddy, 1974, page 6 .
55. Quoted In East Africa Law Review ( 1971), page 231.
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President Nyerere saTd:
It was a declaration of Intent to Itve a cer­
tain ktpd of life and to act In a certain 
kind of manner for desired ends. The 
Ideology of the country was made expli­
c it by It; also the Introduction of ‘ leader­
ship1 qualifications, and the measures for 
public ownership, began a new series of ^  
deliberately socialist policy Initiatives.
Regarding the ‘ leadership code1, the Arusha Declaration points out
that :
Socialism Is a way of life and a socialist 
society cannot simply come Into exist­
ence . A  socialist society can only be 
built by those who believe In and who 
themselves practtse the principles of 
socialism . . .  The successful Imple­
mentation of socialist objectives de­
pends very much upon the leaders, 
because socialism Is a belief In a par­
ticular system of living, and It Is d iffi­
cult for leaders to promote Its growth^
If  they do not themselves accept I t .
So to call themselves socialists, the leaders must strictly follow the 
principles laid down In the Declaration.
The present Indication Is that the leaders under charismatic and
56. J .K .  Nyerere: Arusha Declaration, Freedom &SocfaIlsm, page 230.
57. Quoted from East African Law Journal, 1968, page 185.
dynamtc leadershtp of President Nyerere are making every effort to transform
the present society Into a socialist one.
It has been admitted by Nyerere himself that It has a long way to
go before a ll Its people can enjoy the benefits of a socialist /society. He
said:
We shall not create socialist societies over­
night because we have to start from where 
we are, we shall have to make compromises 
with capitalist money and skill, and we 
shall have to take risks In our develop­
ment. But I am convinced that Third 
World countries have the power to trans­
form themselves over time, Into socialist 
societies In which their peoples can live 
In harmony and co-operation as they 
work together for their common benefits.
In a remarkably frank assessment of a 10-year effort to build 
socialism In Tanzania, Nyerepe has concluded that his country Is certainly 
neither socialist nor self-reliant, and that the goal of making It  so Is not 
even In sight.
"Ten years after the Arusha Declaration ", writes Nyerere, 
In a document called "The Arusha Declaration 10 years after",
Tanzania Is certainly neither socialist nor 
self-reliant. The nature of exploitation 
has changed but It has not been altogether 
eliminated. There are still Inequalities
58. J .K .  Nyerere: Freedom & Develojanent, page 125.
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between ctttzens. Our democracy ts Im- 
perfect. A Itfe  of poverty ts sttll the ^  
expertence of the majority of our ctttzens.
Furthermore, he says:
Our Natton ts sttll economically dependent 
upon the vagaries of the wealthy and upon 
economic and political decisions taken by 
other peoples without our participation or 
consent. 60
Nyerere Is not very much disappointed by his failures, but he says that the
fact that :
Tanzania was not yet socialist was neither 
surprising nor alarming. No country In 
the world Is yet fully socialist, although 
many committed themselves to this philo­
sophy decades before Tanzania even be­
came Independent. 61
He continues that:
We have changed the direction of our 
national development so that our 
national resources are now being deliber­
ately directed toward the needs of this 
nation and Its people. 62
59. TheC
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
He warns hts people of very difficult economic problems ahead for 
three and four years and appeals to them to make^sustatned effort to augment 
production and to take seriously the need for national self-reliance. He 
says: ’’There Is a time for planting and a time for harvesting. I am afraid 
for us It  Is still time for planting.”
This statement can be seen as the most frank self-criticism by 
Nyerere of his own governments performance In the various fields. A l­
though Tanzania has not been able to achieve Its goals, /  : If  It does, 
Tanzania could well become a model for development In the Third World.
It Is against this social, political and economic background we
A.
must consider the role and the usefulness of the public enterprise In the 
management of the economy.
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2 . 1 .  The Decline of ”Latssez-Fatre” and the Rtse of State Enterprise
A  century ago many economists believed In a policy of ’Malssez- 
falre" which means that government Interference In Industry and commerce 
should be avoided except Insofar as It was necessary to break up private mono­
poly. This doctrine of non-intervention of government In economic affairs 
was wholeheartedly supported by the classical economists,  ^ who took up the 
theme from Adam Smith:
The statesman, who should attempt to direct 
private people In  what manner they ought 
to employ their capitals, would only load 
himself with a most unnecessary attention, 
but assume an authority which could safely 
be trusted, not only to no single person, 
but also to no council or senate whatever, 
and which would nowhere be so dangerous 
as In the hands of a man who had folly and 
presumption enough to fancy himself f it  to 
exercise I t . 2
They believed that the function of the government iwas to maintain law and 
order and defend the country from external Invasion, and the business of the 
Industry was to produce goods as cheaply as possible. Therefore, Interference
1. The classical period of economics ranges from Adam Smith's Wealth of 
Nations, which was published In 1776, to J .S .  M ill's  Principles of Poli­
tical Economy of 1848.
2 . Adam Smith: Wealth of Nations, Book IV , Chapter 2 .
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by Industry tn poltttcs was fatal to good government, and Interference by the 
state tn Industry was fatal to efficient production. The wisest course for a 
government to follow was to pursue a policy of "lalssez-falre”; to abstain 
from a blundering Intervention and leave Industry to Its own devices.
Although there was a great liberalising of economic activity,
especially Internationally, as a result of the acceptance of the doctrine of
"lalssez-falre", It has been shown that the state continued to Intervene In
order to protect the Individual, encourage some collective action and even
4
provide services Itself, and by 1914 the "lalssez-falre" philosophy was no
5
longer considered efficient In theory nor necessary In practice.
The twentieth century, especially from 1914 to 1945, has been a 
continuous period of war or preparation for war. A  modern war affects a ll 
principal nations and means seizure of everything by the State. A l l  pro­
ductive activity Is mobilised for a single purpose of defence. Every Industry 
gives up production for peacetime and concentrates on war materials. Agri­
culture loses Its manpower and foreign trade Is confined to essential commodities. 
In this situation, the State undertakes the tasks that are usually left In the
3 . A . Calrncross: Introduction to Economics, op .c l t . ,  page 595.
4 .  A . Skuse: Government Intervention and Industrial Policy, page 10.
5 . Ib id ., page 17.
hands of the private Individuals. In other words, the economic system that 
was formerly frde becomes entirely the business of the State. The essen­
tial function of the States becomes production and distribution. In every 
country the number of politicians and of economists who favour an extension 
of the economic function of the State has been continually growing, and 
especially after two World Wars such men were In the majority.
In 1919, Professor A . C .  Plgou of Cambridge In his "Economics of 
W elfare", put forward his entirely logical arguments In favour of State Inter­
vention In Industries of a monopolistic character. He discussed at great 
length the Inherent disadvantages of traditional political Institutions ( I . e .  
municipal and national representative assemblies) as Instruments for the con­
trol or the operation of monopolistic business enterprises, and Indicated that 
these bodies were primarily created for the purposes other than that of Inter­
vention In Industry. Plgou also pointed out that governmental areas being 
determined by non-commercial considerations, were often likely to prove un­
fit for Intervention with the working of an Industry. He finally concluded 
that modem developments In the structure and methods of governmental 
agencies have fitted these agencies for a degree of beneficial Intervention 
with Industry which would not have been justified In earlier times
6 . A .C .  Plgou: Economics of W elfare, page 299.
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In 1926, ,, J .M . Keynes supported the need of government
Interference Tn those services which were technically social, particularly 
for the control of savings and Investment, the business cycle, and the develop 
ment of a national population policy.^ He went on to say that:
I suggest, therefore, that progress lies In 
the growth and the recognition of seml- 
autonomous bodies within the State -  
bodies whose criterion of action within 
their own field Is soldy public good as 
they understand It ,  and from whose 
deliberations motives of private advan­
tage are excluded, though some place 
It may still be necessary to leave, un­
til the ambit of men*s altruism grows 
wider, to the separate advantages of 
particular groups, classes or faculties 
-  bodies which In the ordinary course 
of affairs are mainly autonomous w lHi- 
Tn their prescribed limitations, but are 
subject In the last resort to the sover­
eignty of the democracy through parlia­
ment. 8
Keynes concluded his essay with the remarks:
The full advantage of the natural 
tendencies of the day must be made; 
seml-autonomous corporations must 
be preferred to organs of the central 
government for which Ministers of ^
State were directly responsible.
7 . J .M .  Keynes: The End of Lalssez-Falre, page 46.
8 . J .M .  Keynes, Ib id ., page 47.
9 .  Ib id ., op .c l t . ,  page 45 .
Professor J .K . GalbratTh of Harvard University Is of the opinion
that :
certain of the retarded Industries are 
of peculiar Importance not alone for 
comfort, w ell-being , tranquility and 
happiness but also for continued exist­
ence. They provide shelter, health 
services and local transportation of 
people. Housing, particularly In a 
cold climate, medical attention and 
the means of reaching oneks place of 
employment are not frivolous needs.
He maintains that these Industries 
cannot function In the market system.
The only answer for these Industries 
Is full organisation under public 
ownership. He also points out that 
with the rise of the market and the 
planning systems, and the conse­
quent Inequality In development, 
the case for public ownership be­
comes much more general. 10
There Is considerable substance In the argument that, left to  Itself, the 
private sector Is unlikely to Invest In the development of public utilities 
as the government would. Naturally, development of these utilities has 
to be Initiated by the government.
Even a country like the United States of America, which has 
preached and practised the philosophy of private enterprise, coupled with 
a deep distrust of State Intervention In the economy, has finally burled the
10. J .K . Galbraith: Economies and the Public Purpose, pages 279-81.
doctrine of "lalssez-falre” by the massive body of social legislation passed 
after the Great Depression of the 1930‘s In the era of the ‘New D eal‘ . 
Federal and State social legislation, providing for unemployment Insurance, 
social security and many other aspects of minimum welfare, was supplemented 
by the acknowledgement of an active role of the State In guiding and regu­
lating the state of employment and business In the nation.  ^^
Almost every State today, bot^developed and undeveloped, has
emerged as an active participant, taking upon Itself the role of protector,
of controller, of guardian of the c itizen , and of entrepreneur. In fact,
there Is hardly any sphere of human activity today which Is not , In some
way or the other, controlled and regulated by the all-pow erfu l, a l l -
12embracing machine which Is the modern State.
11. W . Friedmann: The State & the Rule of Law tn a Mixed Economy, page 13.
12. S.S. Khera: Government In Business, page 3 .
2 .2 .  Functions of a Modern State
Professor W . Friedmann, a renowned, International jurist , has 
recognised the following positive functions of a modern State:
(I) State as Provider. In this role, the State makes Itself respon­
sible for the provision of social services so as to ensure a minimum
standard of living for a l l,  In mitigation of the free play of econo­
mic forces.
(II) State as Regulator: In this capacity, the State uses various
leverages of control, notably the power to regulate Investment 
In Industrial development, the volume and kind of Imports and 
exports through such means as exchange control and Import and 
Industrial licensing controls.
(ill) State as Entrepreneur. In this role, the State operates cer­
tain sectors of the economy, either through seml-autonomous 
government departments, or through State-owned corporations.
(iv) State as Umpire. The State must have standards and Institu­
tions which ensure minimum fairness, and the maintenance of a
reasonable balance between the different economic and social
13groups In the community.
13. W . Friedmann: The State and the Rule of Law In a Mixed Economy, page 3 .
A ll the countries today wtth a rare exception, are actively Involved
In Industrial and commercial management due to their political, economic and
social commitments, I .e .  commitment to socialism and to build a social welfare
14society. Hence, State enterprise Is a world-wide phenomenon. But the 
degree of government participation In the economic affairs differs from one 
country to another: In Communist countries such as the U .S .S .R ., the govern­
ment owns and controls almost a ll productive resources; In other countries, 
such as Peru, State enterprise Is relatively rare. Countries such as the 
United Kingdom, India, France and Tanzania are often described as "mixed 
economies", which means that both public and private enterprises coexist.
In fact, they w ill not b  rivals but w ill be complementary forces.
14. W . Friedmann: The State and the Rule of Law In a Mixed Economy, page 52
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2 .3  Reasons for State Parttctpatton
The following principal reasons could be put forward In order to 
justify the State participation In Industrial and economic affairs :
#U .ve  tXr2.
(I) The State participation may be essential whereAcertaln vital things 
which the Individual can never do , either because he has not the necessary 
strength to perform them, or because they would not pay him adequate returns; 
or again, because they require the co-operation of everybody, which can 
never be obtained merely by common consent. The State Is the person -
the entrepreneur -  who can undertake such tasks.
(II) State enterprise Is the principal Instrument by which countries that
suffer from a deficiency of private venture capital can undertake vital national
development tasks -  usually within the framework of a long-term development 
i 15plan;
(III)  There are certain functions regarded as vital for the nation, which 
cannot or w ill not be assured by private enterprise; ^
(Iv) Some Industries by their very nature, must be monopolies, such as 
supplies of gas, water, electricity, e tc .,  and since a private firm running
15. W . Friedmann: The State and the Rule of Law In a Mixed Economy, page 53.
16. Ib id ., page 53.
such a monopoly might charge exorbitant prices, It  Is sometimes felt that these 
services are better provided by the State;
(v) A  government may decide to take over or set up an Industry which 
It feels has some strategic and national Importance for the country;
(vt) State enterprise Is sometimes recommended on the grounds that I f  the 
government owns and controls several of the major Industries In a country, It 
can use this as a lever, I f  need be, to manipulate the economy as a whole;
(vll) Nationalisation Is sometimes suggested as a means of reducing In­
equality of wealth In a community;
(vlll) The other main Inspiration Is social and political philosophy.^
A government Is sometimes under obligation to enter directly Into Industrial 
and economic activity In order to achieve Its declared Ideological objectives.
17. W . Friedmann: Government Enterprise -  A  Comparative Analysis, page 305.
2.4 The Indian Experience
The politico-economic justice and social welfare are placed at 
the topi of the priority list of a democratic country. Every democracy, 
since the W ar, has witnessed an unprecedented and remarkable growth In 
the ‘public sector1. And India Is no exception. Public sector Is a broad
term used to describe a variety of State activities. The definition of the
French economist, Maurice Bye, Is appropriate. The public sector of the 
economy, he says,
may be most easily defined by a process of 
elimination. It excludes enterprises that 
are entirely operated by private Individ­
uals or groups. It also excludes economic 
enterprises that are owned by governmental 
units Inferior to the national government, 
like the departments and cities ( I .e .  local 
authorities^, and public services performed 
by agencies of the national government 
whose purposes are not mainly economic, 
like defense, education, and the admlnt- 
stratlon of justice. 18.
18. M . Bye, E . Elnandl & E . Rossi: Nationalisation In France and Ita ly ,
page 65.
2.5  The HtstorTcal Background
PlannTng was advocated Tn India much before Independence by 
Individuals, groups, the Congress Party as well as the government. The 
leaders of the NatTonal Congress Party fe lt that I f  a l l -  round progress was to 
be achteved, the development of Industry must be planned by government.
In August, 1937, the Indian NatTonal Congress established the NatTonal 
PlannTng Committee, under the Chatrmanshtp of Jawaharlal Nehru. The 
work of the Nattonal Planning Committee continued under the gutdance of 
Jawaharlal Nehru. Only tn 1949 thts Commtttee produced and pre­
sented Its matn report, as well as a number of subsidiary reports on spectflc 
sectors of the economy.
In fact, the first attempt at planning began Tn 1934. In this year,
Sir M . Vlsvesvaraya tn his ptoneertng work, Planned Economy for Indla/advo- 
cated the necessity for planntng and also latd down a ten-year programme of 
planned economtc development for the whole of Indta. But no definite 
action was taken by the then government.
In 1944, a few Tndustrtaltsts and economists In Bombay brought out a 
plan for the economic development of India which was popularly known as the 
•Bombay Plan*. At about the same time, the Indian Federation of labour put 
forward another plan, prepared by the late M .N .  Roy, called the ‘Peoples Plan*,
Tt was a ten-year plan and put special emphasts on agricultural development, 
mainly through nattonallsatton of land, and on the setting up of large-scale 
Industries to be owned by the State.
After World War I I ,  a new and separate Department of Planning
and Development was set up by the Government of India. A  new Industrial
policy was announced and the then Viceroy, Lord W avell, declared In 1945:
"Government has decided to take positive steps to encourage and promote
19Industrialisation of the country to the fullest extent possible."
19. Quoted from S.S. Khara^, Government Tn Business, page 8 .
2 .6  Governments Attitude to State Enterprise since Independence
However, It was after Independence that the Government of India 
set up the Planning Commission In March 1950, to prepare a plan for the most 
effective and balanced utilisation of the country's resources. The Com­
mission Is an advisory body. Legally, It has neither constitutional nor 
even statutory authority. The plans drawn up by the Commission are sub­
mitted to the National Development Council and the Cabinet, and when 
accepted, are placed before Parliament Itself. It Ts only after they are 
approved by Parliament, that they receive the necessary sanction.
In support of planning, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote:
Planning Is essential for steady progress 
because otherwise we waste our re­
sources which are very limited. Plan­
ning does not mean a mere collection 
of projects, or schemes, but a thought- 
out approach of how to strengthen the 
base and pace of progress, so that thg^ 
community advances on a ll fronts.
The concept of planned economy has given a significant role to 
State enterprises. Professor A .H . Hanson rightly remarked: "Public enter­
prise without a plan can achieve something; a plan without public enterprise
20 . Jawaharlal Nehru: The Basic Approach, Economic Review, 15 August, 
1958.
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Is Itkely to rematn on paper." Ganhtjt's vtew on State ownership of
baste Industries can be gathered from the following quotation. In 1946, he
stated: "I do not believe In armchair or armed socialism. I would have
State ownership where a large number of people ha ve to work together, the
ownership of the products of their labour, whether skilled or unskilled, w ill
22rest In them through the State."
Since Independence, India has been governed by a philosophy
23
of mixed economy and social welfare. In a mixed economy, the State 
usually assumes the role of entrepreneur and Is directly and actively en­
gaged In the economic and Industrial management.
In April 1948, the Government of India came out with their State­
ment on Industrial policy. The Government had enunciated In this document, 
the respective roles of State and private enterprise. It reads:
Adynamic national policy must, there­
fore, be directed to a continuous In­
crease In production by a ll possible 
means side by side with measures to 
secure Its equitable distribution. In
21. A .H . Hanson,: Public Enterprise and Economic Development, o p .c lt . ,  
page 183.
22. M .K . Gandhi: Cent Percent Swadeshi, Harljan W eekly, 1 September,
23. A . Ganguly: Public Corporation In a National Economy, page 65.
the present state of the nation's economy, 
when the mass of the people are below 
the subsistence level, the emphasis should 
be on the expansion of production, both 
agricultural and Industrial, and In parti­
cular, on the production of capital equip­
ment, of goods satisfying the basic needs 
of the people, and of commodities the 
export of which w ill Increase earnings 
of foreign exchange. The problem of 
State participation In Industry and the 
conditions In which private enterprise 
should be allowed to operate must be 
judged In this context. 24
Accordingly, the Industrti I field was classified Into three categories:
a) Strategic Industries which should be the exclusive monopoly of the 
State;
b) Key Industries, where existing private concerns would be allowed to
operate for the next ten years,e.*cz.f>'k b u t  n^e inherent right of the 
State to acquire any existing Industrial undertaking w ill a!wa)S remain, 
and will be exercised whenever public Interest requires It."
c) The remaining Industries, where private enterprise would be allowed 
to operate, subject to such government control and regulation as were 
considered necessary.
The political leaders did not rely on this policy document alone.
With a view to achieving the objectives, the framers of the Constitution In
24. Government of India, Statement of the Industrial Policy, April 1948#, 1.
clear and unequtvocal language, Inserted a spectftc provision Tn the Chapter
of Dtrecttve PrtncTples of State Poltcy which reads:
The State shall so direct Its policy, 
that (a) the ownership and control of 
material resources of the community 
are distributed to subserve the com­
mon good, and (b) the operation of 
the economic system shall not result 
In the concentration of wealth and 
means of production to the common 
detriment. 25
This provision naturally gave Impetus to public enterprise.
In April 1956, a new Industrial Policy Resolution was announced 
by the Government of India, In which the place of State enterprise wasflrmly 
secured. The Resolution declared:
The adoption of the Socialist pattern 
of society as the national o b jectlve, 
as well as the need for planned and 
rapid development, require that a ll 
Industries of basic and strategic Im­
portance, or In the nature of public 
utility services, should be In the 
public sector. Other Industries 
which are essential and require In­
vestment on a scale which only the 
State, In present circumstances, 
could provide, have also to be In 
the public sector. 26
25. Article 39 of the Indian Constitution.
26. Government of India, Resolution on Industrial Policy, dated 30 April, 
1956, 2 .
In order to realtse the objecttve of the SoctalTst pattern of society, the Reso­
lution stated:
These would provide the economic 
foundations for Increasing opportu­
nities for gainful employment and 
Improving living standards and work­
ing conditions for the mass of the 
people. Equally, It Is urgent to 
reduce disparities In Income and 
wealth which exist today, to pre­
vent private monopolies and the 
concentration of economic power 
In different fields In the hands of 
small numbers of Individuals.
Accordingly, the State w ill pro­
gressively assume a predominant 
and direct responsibility for setting 
up new Industrial undertakings and 
for developing transport facilities.
After considering a ll aspects of the problem, and In consultation 
with the Planning Commission, the Government of India divided Industries 
afresh Into three groups having regard to the part the State would play In 
each of them. In the first category w ill be the Industries such as Arms and 
Ammunition, Atomic energy, Coal,Transport, Iron and Steel, e tc ., the future 
development of which w ill be the exclusive responsibility of the State. The 
second category w ill consist of Industries such as Machine tools, Fertilizers, 
Chemical pulp, Road Transport, Sea Transport, e tc .,  which w ill be pro­
gressively State-owned and In which the State w ill therefore, generally 
take the Initiative In establishing new undertakings, but Tn which private
enterprise w ill also be expected to supplement the effort of the State. The 
thTrd category w tll Tnclude al! the rematntng Tnd us tries, and their future 
development w ill,  In general, be left to the Initiative and enterprise of 
the private sector.
The acceptance of the concept of cl welfare society, the Important 
Ingredients of which are Incorporated Into the text of the Constitution, gave 
another fillip  to State enterprises. The Constitution requires the Govern­
ment to secure:
a) The right of a ll Citizens to adequate means of livelihood-#
b) The right to work;
c) The right to education;
d) The right to receive assistance from the Government In the event of 
unemployment, old age, sickness, and accidents; and establish
e) human condltlonscf work and decent standard of living for a ll the 
w orkers.^
State enterprise Is, therefore, recognised as a useful Instrument 
of the modem welfare state for achieving Its welfare and development 
functions. The concept of State enterprise obtained substantial support 
from Professor J .K . Galbraith. He said that: "great social and economic 
tasks would, In the absence of public action, remain unperformed and these
27. Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Indian Constitution.
are of a magnttude or Tnvolve a risk or requtre and exerctse and TmagTnatTon
28whtch Ts beyond the scope of the prtvate sector.”
Professor W . FrTedmann tndtcated that the success of State enter­
prise In a mixed economy would depend upon a congenial political climate. 
He said that:
as the Welfare State assumes more and 
more economic functions the area of 
controversy widens as to the proper ad­
justment of the spheres of public and 
private enterprise. The mixed system 
of public and private enterprise In a 
democratic State can operate satis­
factorily only If  the major parties 
are agreed on fundamentals, and If  
matters of economic management 
are, to a large extent, kept out of ^  
the spheres of political controversy.
The concept of State enterprise has won recognition from both 
Socialist as well as Conservative thinkers. For those on the political 
‘right*, see State enterprises as guarantees that activities are carried on 
In accordance with sound "business and commercial principles, as the near­
est approximation to the private sector that the Government can create, while 
those on the ‘ left* see the State enterprise as a public body operating In the
28. From a report of A jlt Bhagat Memorial Lecture Series on "Socialism 
Tn rich countries and poor”, The Hindu, 10 February, 1975.
29. W . FrTedmann: Legal Theory, o p .c lt .,  pages 342-345.
publtc Interest and not merely for private profit.
In a mixed economy, the size and permanency of the State enter­
prises depend on the basic policies of the Government and Its political 
system. But one conclusion that holds good for a ll undeveloped countries
Is that State enterprises have an essential role to play In the development 
30process, and they are here to stay.
30 . A .H . Hanson: Public Enterprise and Economic Development, o p .c lt.,  
203.
2 .7  Legal Forms of State Enterprise
The forms of State enterprise have at the present time attained a 
considerable diversity and any classification must necessarily be somewhat 
artific ia l. The activities of the State are carried out In three principal 
legal forms:
(1) By departmental government enterprises, which have varying 
degrees of administrative and financial autonomy.
(2) By statutory corporations which are entrusted with a particular 
function and created by statute.
(3) By commercial companies which are controlled by State owner­
ship of shares, either directly or through a State-holding 
company.
If  State enterprises are to work efficiently, a right and appro 
prlate type of management should be chosen. Let us examine the relative 
merits of each of the above types.
2 .8  Departmental Management
The first State enterprises are often organised as Government 
Departments. Many countries have used the Departmental management 
system for Railways, Ports, Harbours, Commercial and Industrial monopolies 
of a re venue-raising character and even for manufacturing Industries. In 
India, Railways, the biggest State ent terprtse Is run departmentally and now 
Chlttaranjan Locomotive Works and the Integral Coach Factory and certain 
factories for the making of munitions and the supply of special defence needs 
are organised, financed and controlled In much the same way as any other 
Central Government department.
In Its ‘pure* form, It has the following attributes:
(1) The enterprise Is financed by annual appro­
priations from the Treasury and a l l ,  or a 
major share of Its revenues, are paid Into 
the Treasury;
(2) The enterprise Is subject to the budget, 
accounting and audit controls applicable 
to other Government departments;
(3) The permanent staff of the enterprise 
consists of C iv il Servants, and the 
methods by which they are recruited, 
and conditions of service under which 
they are employed, are ordinarily the 
same as for other C iv il Servants;
(4) The enterprise ts generally recognised 
as a major sub-division of one of the 
Central departments of the Government 
and Is subject to the direct control of 
the head of the department;
(5) Wherever this applies, In the legal 
system of the country concerned, the 
enterprise possesses the sovereign 
Immunity of the State and cannot be 
sued without the consent of the Govern 
ment. 31
With regard to point (5), India's position Is somewhat different.
32
Under the provision of the Constitution, the Union of India Is a legal person.
A t present, the liab ility of the Union of India to be sued Is determined by
Article 300, which reads:
The Government of India may sufe or be 
sued by the name of the Union of India 
and the Government of the State may 
sue or be sued by the name of the State 
and may, subject to any provisions 
which may be made by Act of Parlia­
ment or of the legislature of such 
State enacted by virtue of powers 
conferred by this Constitution, sue 
or be sued In relation to their re­
spective affairs In the like cases as 
the Dominion of India and the corre­
sponding provinces or the correspond­
ing Indian States might have sued or 
been sued If  this Constitution had 
not been enacted.
31. Report of the Seminar on Organisation and Administration of Public
Enterprises In the Industrial Field, Rangoon, United Nations, 1954, page 6 .
32 . Union of India v . Satyendra Nath, AIR 1955 ,  C a t.581.
The posttton continued to be the same under the Government of 
Indta A ct, 1915 (S.32) and Government of India A c t, 1935 (S .176):
1915 -  Section 32:
Every person shall have the same remedies 
against the Secretary of State-ln-Councll 
as he might have against the East India 
Company I f  the Government of India Act, 
1858 and this Act had not been passed.
1935 -  Section 176:
The Federation may sue or be sued by the 
name of the Federation and without preju­
dice to the subsequent provisions of the 
Chapter may, su b ject to any provisions 
which may be made by Act of the Federal 
or a Provincial Legislature enacted by 
virtue of powers conferred on that Legis­
lature by this A c t, sue and be sued In 
relation to their respective affairs In 
the like cases as the Secretary of State 
In Council might have sued or been 
sued If  this Act had not been passed.
These old Statutes have now been repealed.
What then Is the Itablltty of the Union or the States of India today? 
Under the ordinary law of Contract, the liability of the State Is the same as 
that of an Individual. This position Is regulated by Article 299(2) of the 
Constitution which states that neither the President nor the Governor nor 
any person executing a contract shall be liable. It Is the Central 
Government of India or the Government of a StaVe^rnay be sued for breach 
of any contract. The liability of the Government has been discussed In
64.
the followtng Chapter.
For maximum accountantItty thts form of operation Is considered 
the most suitable, but nowadays It Is less In favour because of the demand 
for more “businesslike1 enterprises. The department Is under strict M in i­
sterial control and the Minister Is answerable to the Cabinet and to Parlia­
ment for Its activities. The administration of the enterprise Is In the hands 
of Senior C iv il Servants and financial control rests with the Treasury. A  
clear relationship with other parts of the Government structure Is another 
advantage of this type of management.
In view of the above advantages, this type of management Is not 
popular as It suffers from very many disadvantages.
The Rangoon Seminar pointed out that :
Departmental management often breeds a 
tendency not to take losses seriously.
This has been particularly noticed In the 
Aslan region. Even In cases of continu­
ous losses, no serious attempt Is made to 
re-organlse or retrench or liquidate.
A t the same tim e , the consumer who may,
In  most cases, be the same person who 
Is the tax-payer, may suffer by having 
to pay high prices or by being subjected 
to Inefficient service. 33
33. Ib id ., page 15.
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The Seminar went on to add that:
It  fat Is adequately to take Into account 
certain distinguishing characteristics 
which clearly set most enterprises apart 
from the general run of government 
programmes, v iz . ,  (I) The govern­
ment Is dealing with the public In the 
manner of a businessman rather than a 
sovereign; (IT) Individual users, rather 
than the general tax-payer, are to pay 
fcfc the cost of the goods and services;
(ITT) expenditures necessarily fluctuate 
with consumer demand and cannot be 
predicted accurately or realistically 
kept within annual budgetary limita­
tions; and (iv) Operations are being 
conducted within areas In which there 
are well-established trade practices.
Under this form of organisation public 
enterprises have sometimes become 
synonymous with red-tape, delays,
Inadequate service and Insensitivity 
to consumer needs. 34
The other main weaknesses of the Departmental Management are the
following:
(I) The management cannot function autonomously. There cannot be 
enough flexib ility  In the Capital . structure; private capital can­
not be Invited If  needs arise.
(II) Trtie method of accounting that Is applied In the Departmental 
Management Is not suitable to economic enterprise as It does
34. Ib id ., page 6.
not present a clear ptcture of the operating position or 
results of working.
(Ill)  This type of management does not work on business principles 
and Is not flexib le. It cannot be free from political Inter­
ference .
(Iv) It has a ll defects of Government departments, such as delay, 
rigidity, lack of business experience and knowledge on the 
part of Government servants.
Despite Itsmanyjdefects as mentioned above, this form of manage­
ment Is not without supporters. A  distinguished author like Professor M .E . 
Dlmock remarked,
If  sufficient Improvements could be made 
among the departments In the direction 
of greater autonomy and flex ib ility , 
there wouldbe little or not justification 
for public corporations at a l l .  35
Another author, M r. J . Prasad, came to the conclusion that "the form of
public enterprise Is Immaterial and that what matters Is the spirit In which
36a public enterprise Is run.”
35 . M .E . Dlmock: "Government Corporations, a Focus of Policy and 
Administration”, American Political Science Review, V o l.X L III ,  
page 1163.
3 6 . J . Prasad: Nationalisation of Road Trans port In U .P ., Indian Journal 
of Public Administration, O ct. -  D e c ., 1956, page 336.
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To overcome some defects, though the Indian Railways are depart- 
mentally managed, many powers have been delegated to the Railways Admini­
stration . A  Board has been established for prompt decision and It  functions 
as a Ministry of the Government of India. The Railway Board has a Chair­
man, three members and a financial commissioner, a ll of whom technically
37have the status of a Secretary to the Government of India. The Consti­
tution of the Railway Board allows the Board full freedom In shaping and carry­
ing out the Railway policy and exercises a ll powers In respect of regulation,
construction, maintenance and operation of Railways. It has Its own flnan-
38c la l, administrative, accounting and auditing departments as w e ll.
The problem often arises I f  and when an attempt Is made to give
some freedom of flexib ility  and autonomy to a particular departmental
management because ’’strong pressures are brought to make It conform to
standard regulations and procedures. Since emphasis on uniformity Is a
»39
common characteristic of bureaucratic administration.
Professor A .H . Hanson has expressed his doubt about the departmental
37 . S .S. Khara: Government In Business, page 58.
38. Ibid.
39. Report of the Seminar on . . .  Public Enterprise, United Nations, o p .c lt .,  
page 8 .
organisation as a successful public enterprise. ' He observed:
Even In a developed country, with an In te lli­
gent and adaptable C iv il Service, the opera­
tion of making a genuine public enterprise 
out of a government department Is not one 
to be lightly undertaken; In an under­
developed country It Is often Impossible.
Special forms of organIstlon, therefore, 
are normally necessary, 40
But M r. A .D .  Gorwala did not reject the concept of deparmental manage
ment altogether: he admitted Its restricted role and rightly pointed out:
Departmental management must be the rare 
exception, not the general rule. In many 
ways It Is the direct negation of the require­
ments of autonomy. It militates against 
In itia tiv e , flexib ility  . . .  for departmental 
management means management by one or 
more Administrative Departments as part 
of their larger routine, Inevitably In con­
junction with the ^ In a n c e  Department as 
part of Its own routine, with an attempt 
In some Instances to minimise the routine 
aspects of the disposal by entrustment to 
a committee formed of departmental repre­
sentatives, but In every case against the 
background of the rules, regulations, and 
procedure Inseparab le from ordinary 
administration and of the plenary control 
of Minister and Parliament, also Insepa­
rable from that administration . . .
Nevertheless, In a few types, depart­
mental management Is Inevitable.
40 . A .H . Hanson: Public Enterprise and Economic Development, o p .c lt .,  
page 342.
These must be defined, Isolated and kept 
down to the minimum. 41
The main characteristics of the departmental management may be 
briefly recapitulated. At Its head Is a Minister who takes full responsib­
ility  for a ll acts of officials under him. Ultimate control Is political; 
the Minister Is a member of the Government and at each general election 
the electorate has an oppourtunlty to pass a verdict on how the government 
has discharged Its tesponslbllltles. Between elections, control Is exercised 
through Its representatives In Parliament -  at question time, In debate, and 
by the Investigations of the Estimates and Public Accounts Committees, the 
non-politico I control Is exercised by the Treasury, which keeps a close 
check on both the financial and staff of each department. Thus both the 
policy and day-to-day operations of a department are subject to scrutiny.
41 . A .D . Gorwala: Report on the Efficient Conduct of State Enterprise, 
pages 13-14.
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3.1 Introductory
In addition to the Government Departments under the direct control 
of Ministers, the delegation o f responsibilities by the Government to semT- 
autonomous b^bdles has b^ecome an Increasingly Important feature o f the 
central administrative system as Government has extended Its participation 
Tn social and economic ac tiv ity . These bodtes have been variously des­
cribed by writers as ‘Public Corporations*, * National Corporations*, ‘ Statu- 
tory Corporations*, *ParastataIs*, *QuasT-Govemment Bodtes*, ‘Seml-autono- 
mous authority* and *Publtc Boards*. Out of these expressions, the term 
‘Public Corporation* has, for one reason or another, emerged as the most 
fashionable In contemporary use though the term Is used wtth a variety of 
meantngs and content.^
In 1933, M r. Herbert Morrtson, the Chief Archttect of modem publtc
aorporattons, wrote that ’’We are seektng a combination of public ownership,
2
public accountability and business management for public ends.” He went 
on to say:
1. D .N .  Chester: Publtc Corporations and the Classification of Admini­
strative Bodies In Political Studies, V o l . l ,  page 34 .
2 . H . Morrison: Socialization & Transport (1933), page 149.
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It ts Important that, from the beginning, 
the publtc corporation should be regard­
ed by a ll, and should regard Itself, as a 
public concern. Its first business Is the 
competent conduct of the undertaking 
committed to Its charge In the public 
Interest. It must feel that It Is respon­
sible to the natlonaccordlngly , and that 
It cannot be the Instrument of this or  ^
that private or sectional Interest.
3 . Ib id ., page 156.
3 .2  Legal Definition and Characteristics of Public Corporations Tn General
It Is difficult to work out a precise definition that w ill reflect a ll 
the characteristics of the different types of public Corporations. Accord­
ing to Professor W . Friedmann, ’’all public Corporations have a dual nature;
they are Instruments of national policy, but they are autonomous units with
4
legal Independence and certain aspects of commercial undertakings” .
They are ’’clothed with the power of government but possessed of the f le x l-
5
btllty and Initiative of private enterprise” . Thus, the public Corpora­
tions are created with the objective of securing the best of both worlds: on 
the one hand, the world of energetic dynamic endeavour found In the pri­
vate enterprise system; on the other, the world of accountability to the 
public, to whom they belong and whom they serve.
Professor H,  Wade's statement seems to suggest a deflrttlon when he 
says: "The Public Corporation Is a hybrid >organlsm, showing some features 
of a government department and some of the features of a business company, 
and standing outside the ordinary framework of central and local govern­
ment.” ^ Professor J .F . Garner has described public Corporation as ”an
4 . W . Friedmann: Law and Social Changes In C ontemporary Britain, 
(1951), page 191.
5 . These words are from President Roosevelt's address to the American Con­
gress when he Introduced the b ill creating the Tennessee V a lley  Autho­
rity, D .E . Llllenthal, TVA, 1944, page 50.
6 A/» Z - Wade: Administrative Law ( 1 9 ,  page 30.
important third arm of government In addition to the traditional Instruments 
of the central executive and local authorities” and has defined a public cor­
poration as:
a legal entity established normally by Parlia­
ment and always under legal authority, usu­
a lly  In  the form of a spectal statute, charged 
with the duty of carrying out specified Govern­
mental functions In the national Interest, those 
functions being confined to a comparatively re­
stricted field, and subjected to some degree of 
control by the executive, while the corpora­
tion remains jurlstlcally an Independent entity 
not directly responsible to Parliament. 7
In one respect this definition Is open to criticism In that what functions are 
considered as "Governmental” depends on the traditions of the country or the 
political philosophy of the Individual making the distinction.
Public Corporation Is used here In the sense of an Institution created 
by an A c t of the Legislature and "operating a service on behalf of Govern­
ment but as an Independent legal entity with funds of Its own and largely
0
autonomous tn Its management.”
The principal characteristics of a public Corporation have been sum­
med up by Professor W . Friedmann In the following terms:
7 . J .F . Gam er:” Public Corporations In the United Kingdom” In Govern 
ment Enterprise, E d ., W . Friedmann, (1970) pages 4 -5 .
8 . W . Friedmann: The Public Corporation (1954), page 541.
First, each public Corporation Is separately 
established by statute, or Tn rare cases by 
charter; It Is an Individual not a type.
Second, the public Corporation Ts an Inde­
pendent Corporation with separate legal 
personality. Third, Its admtntstratlon 
Ts In the hands of an Independent govern­
ing board appointed by the government, 
not by representative groups or Interests.
Fourth, the employees of the Corporation 
are not C ivil Servcants. Fifth, none 
of the public Corporations has shares or 
shareholders. Sixth, all public Corpor­
ations are responsible to the government, 
through the competent Minister and they 
are subject to his general direction.
Through the government they are respon­
sible to Parliament. Seventh, a ll 
public Corporations have In their day- 
to-day operations the character of other 
private legal persons. They are fully 
(Table In law. Eighth, judtctal control 
over the public Corporations as regards 
the use of powers Ts exercised Tn the same 
manner as over other public authorities.
N inth, the public Corporations have a l­
together a dual nature. In their com­
mercial and managerial aspects they re­
semble commercial compantes and they 
have essentially private lawstatus. But 
Insofar as they fulfil public tasks on be­
half of the government and Parliament 
they are public authorities, and as such 
subject to control by the government, 
within the limits defined by statute and 
as developed by practtce and defined 
by the Courts. 9
It w ill be seen later that with regard to points one and five above, the post
tlon of the Indian and Tanzantan Corporations Is somewhat different.
9 . W . Friedmann: The Publtc Corporation (1954), pages 557-558.
The United Nattons Semtnar on the organisation and administration
of public enterprises ^  has set out the following essential characteristics of
a public Corporation:
(1) It Is wholly owned by the State.
(2) It Is generally created by or pursuant to a special law defining Its
powers, duties and Immunities and prescribing the form of management 
and Its relationship to established department and ministers.
(3) As a body Corporate, It Is a separate entity for legal purposes and can 
sue and be sued, enter Into contracts and acquire property In Its own 
name. Corporations conducting business In their own name have 
been generally given greater freedom In making contracts and ac­
quiring and disposing of property than ordinary Government depart­
ments.
(4) Except for appropriations to provide capital or to cover losses, a 
public Corporation Is usually Independently financed. It obtains 
Its funds from borrowing, either from the treasury or from the public, 
and from charging for Its services. It Is authorised to use and re-use 
Its revenues.
(5) It Is generally exempted from most regulatory and prohibiting statutes 
applicable to expenditure of public funds.
10. The Seminar was held In Rangoon from 26 March, 1954, under the aus­
pices of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East and the U .N .  
Technical Assistance Administration and the Internationa^* Institute of 
Administrative Sciences, page 9 .
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(6) It ts ordtnartly not subject to the budget, accounting and audit laws 
and procedures applicable to non-corporate agencies.
(7) In the majority of cases, employees of public Corporations are not 
C ivil Servants, and are recruited and remunerated under terms and 
conditions which the Corporation Itself determines.
This concept of a public Corporation has been hailed by Professor 
W .A . Robson as ”the most Important constitutional Innovation which has 
been evolved In Great Britain during the past fifty  years11. ^  He rightly 
observed that:
the underlying reason for the creation of the 
modem type of public Corporation Is the need 
for a high degree of freedom, boldness and 
enterprise In the management of undertakings 
of an Industrial or commercial character and 
the desire to escape from the caution and 
circumspection which Is considered typical 
of government departments. 12
But |J Is no doubt true that the degree of autonomiy of management enjoyed 
by the public Corporation depends on the political system and the attitude 
of the executive. Professor W . Friedmann has, It Is submitted, correctly 
pointed out that:
11. W .A . Robson: Nationalised Industry & Public Ownership (1962), 
page 77.
12. Ib id ., page 47 .
the most sertous stngle problem that has 
emerged tn the practical appltcatton of 
the theory of the public Corporation Is 
the tension between autonomy of manage­
ment and the tendency of the superior 
government authority, I . e .  the respon­
sible Minister, to Interfere with the 
operation of the enterprise for politi­
cal reasons. 13
This Institution has been more distinctly developed and more
14successfully applied In Britain than elsewhere. Many considered 
that the *bureaucratlc uniformity* of the C iv il Service and the irrespon­
sibility of the Joint Stock Companies were defects which the public Corpor 
atlon was able to avoid. The British Public Corporation has served as a
model for the numerous public enterprises constituted In other parts of the 
15
Commonwealth. Almost a ll public Corporations In India, with the 
exception of Damodar Va lley  Corporation which was modelled on the 
Tennessee Valley Authority, have closely resembled the British pattern. 
However, the Tanzanian Corporations do not follow the tame pattern.
But 'It should be mentioned here briefly that In certatn vita l respects the 
Indian statutes do differ from the British statutes. In the first place, the
13. W . Friedmann/ The State and the Rule of Law tn a Mixed Economy, 
page 58.
14. W . Friedmann: The Public Corporation, page 556.
15. W . Friedmann: The State and the Rule of Law In a Mixed Economy^
page 57.
power of the central government to provtde further capttal ts not restrtcted by
any Itmttatton other than what must be connected with the business of the
Corporation I ts e lf .^  In the second place, the power of the central
government to give directions to the Corporations Is generally not restric ted .^
And finally, the accounts of Indian Corporations unltke those of the British
commercial corporations, are audited not by commercial auditors but by the
18
Comptroller and Auditor General.
As the majority of the Indian public Corporations have closely 
followed the British model, It w ill be helpful for our purpose to outline the 
historical development of this modern Institution In the respective countries.
16. S. 10(2), A ir Corporations A ct, 1953.
17. S .34(1), 1AC A ct, 1953, S .2J, LIC A ct, 1956, S .48 , D .V .C .  A ct, 
1948. ’
18. S. 15(2), 1AC A ct, 1953, S .22(2), The O il and Natural Gas Com- 
mlsslon A c t, 1959.
3.3 Historical Development Yn Britain
|n Brttatn the publtc Corporation, as an Institution performing 
certain governmental, specialist, technical or cultural functions, with
19varying degrees of freedom from executive control, has been fam iliar. 
Some of them date back to the early years of the 19th century. For ex­
ample, the present development may be said to have started In 1834 when
19a
the Poor Law Commissioners were established. However, Professor
20Robson has classified them Into five different varieties.
Firstly, there are bodies entrusted with 
some regular governmental functions, e .g .  
the Public Trustee (Public Trustee A ct,
1906). Secondly, there are organs per­
forming technical and specialist functions 
such as the Medical Research Council 
(National Health Insurance A ct, 1928, 
now under, National Health Service Act,
1946). Thirdly, there are bodies con- 
cerned with cultural activities such as 
the British Council (Royal Charter, 1940).
Fourthly, there are bodies which are Inte- 
gral parts of certain departments but have 
an Individual and separate status such as
19. W .A . Robson: Problems of Nationalised Industry, (1952), pages 15-17. 
19a. G riffith  and Street: Principles of Administrative Law, page 283.
20. For a detailed discussion, see W .A . Robson: Nationalised Industry 
& Public Ownership, pages 46 -47 .
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the Commissioners for Crown Lands (Crown 
Lands Act, 1927, now under Land Commis­
sion A ct, 1967). Fifthly, there are newer
types of Corporations entrusted with the 
great socialized services and Industries.
T h e  new types of business or service corporations fa ll Into two classes -  
those established before 1945 and those that were set up after that date 
chiefly by the Labour Government during 1945-51 In pursuance of Its pro­
gramme of nationalisation. O f the pre-1945 Corporations, the Port of
21
London Authority, set up In 1908, Is considered to be the first prototype 
of a modern Corporation. It Is by statutory definition a body Corporate 
and was entrusted with the management of a local service of national Import­
ance and was, for that purpose, granted a high degree of autonomy. The 
Authority Is under a Statutory obligation to present Its annual reports to the
Minister and the Minister Is Its spokesman. In 1926, the Central Electricity
22
Board was set up under the Electricity Supply A ct, 1926, consisting of a 
Chairman and seven members, appointed by the responsible Minister. Now, 
electricity Is supplied by twelve Area Boards and the Central Electricity
Generating Board, set >up under the Electricity Acts, 1947 and 1957.
The British Broadcasting Corporation was established under Royal Charter 
Issued on 20 December, 1926. It Is a national organisation of International
21. Port of London A ct, 1908, S . l .
22. S . l .
Importance and enjoys substantial autonomy In the management of Its
affairs. Its television service started In 1936. Independent television
began In 1954 and Is now under the Independent Broadcasting Authority
established by the Television Acts of 1954 and 1964. In 1933, the London
23
Passenger Transport Board was created on the recommendations of M r. 
Herbert Morrison, a leading and Influential advocate of the public Corpor­
ation. The Railways were nationalised only In 1947 and are now admini­
stered by the British Railways Board established under the Transport Act, 1962. 
Since the Transport Act, 1968, there has been a National Freight Corporation 
to coordinate road and rail freight services and a National Bus Company oper­
ates nationalised bus services mainly In country areas. The very last Cor­
poration that was set up before the Second World War was the British O ver-
24seas Airways Corporation (1939).
After World War II some entire Industries and services were brought
under public ownership and control. They Included fuel (coal), power (gas
and electricity), Iron and steel, transport and communications, the Bank of
England, health and education. The main political driving force behind
the first kind of development has, of course, been the public ownership
25policies of successive Labour Governments.
23 . London Passenger Transport Act, 1933, S . l .
24 . British Overseas Airways Act, 1939, S . l .
25 . For a detailed discussion, see E. Barry: Nationalisation In British Politics.
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The C ivil Aviation Act, 1946, re-affirmed the existence of the 
British Overseas Airways Corporation and established British European A ir­
ways, both of which were brought under the unified control of the British 
Airways Board In 1973 by the C ivil Aviation A ct, 1973. In 1946, the Bank 
of England was nationalised and brought under public ownership by the Bank
of England A ct, 1946. In the same year, coal mining was placed under the
26National Coal Board. The Transport Act, 1947, brought under public
ownership the canals and Inland waterways, and also the chain of hotels and
27
restaurants owned by the Railways. Gas was nationalised Tn 1948 when
the Industry was placed under a Central Gas Council (now the British Gas
Corporation) and twelve Area Boards. In 1949, the Iron and steel Industry
28was brought under public ownership; It was denationalised by the Conserva­
tive Party Tn 1953, but re-natlonallsed by the Labour Government under the 
present British Steel Corporation A ct, passed Tn 1967. The Atomic 
Energy Authority, became a public Corporation under the Atomic
Energy Authority A ct, 1954. In 1969 the management of the Post Office
29
was reorganised under the Post Office Board.
26. Coal Industry Nationalization A ct, 1946.
27. The Gas A ct, 1948.
28. The Iron & Steel A ct, 1949.
29. The Post Office A ct, 1969.
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3 .4  HTstortcaI Development Tn Indta
Publtc corporations Tn Indta can claim a respectable anttqutty. The
publtc corporatton tn tts modern form ortgtnated tn the Bombay Port Trust created
30tn 1879 for the admtntstratton of the affatrs of the Port of Bombay. It was 
provtded tn the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879 that the Board shall be a body cor-
2
porate and have perpetual succession and shall sue and be sued tn tts own name.w 
Sectton 26 has empowered the Board to acqutre and hold movable and tmmovable 
property tn the name of the Board. The Board was under an obltgatton to pre­
sent a half-yearly statement of accounts duly audtted by such audttors as shall, 
from ttme to ttme, be appotnted by the Government. The Board was also en­
trusted wtth substanttal ftnanctal and legal autonomy. The remarkable success 
of the Port of Bombay trust had Tnfluenced the Government to establtsh stmtlar 
authortttes tn Calcutta and Madras tn 1890 and 1905, under the Port of Calcutta 
Trust Act, 1890, and the Port of Madras Trust Act, 1905, respectively.
After the Ftrst World War some publtc corporations wtth spectaltsed 
functtons were established. In 1923, the Indian Cotton Cess Act created the 
Indtan Central Cotton Commtttee. The Act authorised the creation of a fund 
for the Improvement and development of the growtng, markettng and manufacture 
of cotton tn Indta. The Coal Gradtng Board was set up under the Coal Grading
30. R.S. Arora: "Rtse of Publtc Corporatton tn Indta", (1961), Publtc Law, 
pages 362-363.
31 . SS .4-7.
Board A ct, 1925, for the grading of coal and for the grant of certificates for 
coal earmarked for export. In 1930, the Indian Lac Cess Committee was 
created under the Indian Lac Cess Act for Improvement, manufacture and 
marketing of lac. It Is Interesting to note that the Government of India 
Act, 1935, contained a fully-fledged Constitution for the establishment of
the Indian Railways Authority which was modelled on the British Corporations
32 33
and Boards. In 1942, the Indian Coffee Board, In 1944, the Indian
34
Central Coconut Committee, In 1946, the Indian Central Oilseeds Com-
35 36mlttee, and In 1947, the Indian Rubber Board were established. This
Is, In outline, the history of growtlh of public corporations In India before 
Independence. But In this study we propose to deal with the public corpor­
ations as they have developed after 1947, when India achieved her Independ 
ence after a long period of foreign domination. Soon after Independence,
In April 1948, the Government of India clearly defined Its Industrial policy
32. The Government of India A ct, 1935, Chapter V III  and the Eighth Schedule. 
38. The Coffee Market Expansion Act, 1942.
34. The Indian Coconut Committee Act, 1944.
35. The Indian Oilseeds Committee Act, 1946.
36 . The Rubber (Production and Marketing) A ct, 1947.
as follows:
The State has the Inherent rtghtto acqutre 
any exTsttng Industrial undertaking when­
ever the public Interests require It . . .
The management of State enterprises w ill, 
as a rule, be through the medium of pub­
lic corporations under the statutory con­
trol of the Central Government, who w ill 
assume such power as may be necessary to 
ensure this.
The year 1948 saw, as a result of this policy statement, an unprece­
dented growth of public corporations In India. The 1950 Constitution of India ,
which replaced the Constitution of 1935,has also recognised the Institution of
38public corporations. Article 19(b)(II) of the Constitution specifically 
refers to :
the carrying on by the State, or by a cor­
poration owned or controlled by the State, 
of any trade, business, Industry or service, 
whether to the exclusion complete or par­
tia l, of citizens or otherwise.
In Artie I *31(2 A ), Inserted by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, 
there Is a reference to corporations "owned or controlled by the State".
Until recently, the Government of India has favoured^publlc corporation 
as a form of state enterprise for economic, political and other reasons.
37. Government of India, Statement of the Industrial Policy, 6 April, 1948.
38. Inserted by the Constitution (First Amendment) A ct, 1951.
In order to get some Tdea of the publtc corporations so far established by the
Central Government, a chronological statement stating the purposes for which
they have been created Is given below:
(1) The Rehabilitation Financial Administration established under the 
Rehabilitation Finance Administration A ct, 1948. This was created 
for the purpose of giving financial assistance to displaced persons to 
enable them to settle In business or Industry.
(2) The Damodar Valley Corporation established under the Damodar Va lley  
Corporation Act^ 1948. The Corporation Is entrusted with the work of 
promotion and operation of Irrigation schemes, water supply, flood con­
trol, navigation, e tc . fn the Damodar River V a lley .
(3) The Industrial Finance Corporation established under the Industrial 
Finance Corporation A ct, 1948. This Corporation was created for 
making medium and long-term credit readily available to Industrial 
concerns as might need It ,  particularly In circumstances In which normal 
banking accommodation Is Inadequate.
(4) The Employees* State Insurance Corporation established under the 
Employees* State Insurance A c t, 1948. The Act was passed to pro­
vide certain benefits to employees, I .e .  sickness benefit, maternity 
benefit, disablement benefit, dependents* benefit and medical benefit.
(5) The Central Electricity Authority was set up under the Electricity  
(Supply) A ct, 1948, for a uniform expansion of electric power In India.
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(6) The Central Stlk Board established under the Central Stlk Board A ct,
1948, with a vtew to providing for the development under central 
control of raw stlk Tndustry.
(7) The Reserve Bank established under the Reserve Bank of Indta A ct, 1934, 
and the Reserve Bank (Transfer to Public Ownership) Act, 1948. After 
the nationalisation, Its administration was transferred to a body corpor­
ate . It has exclusive powers of control over the banking business In 
India.
(8) The Indian A ir Lines and the Atr-lndla International established under
the Indian A ir Corporations A ct, 1953. . )The purpose of their cre­
ation was to provide safe, efficient, adequate, economical and pro­
perly co-ordinated air transport service, whether Internal or Inter­
national at reasonable charges.
(9) The Tea Board was set up under the Tea Act, 1953. The Tea Act was 
passed with a view to providing for the control by the Union of the tea 
Industry and of the export of tea from India.
(10) The Coir Board was established under the Coir Industry A ct, 1953, 
to take over the control by the Union of the coir Industry.
(11) The State Bank was established under the State Bank of India A ct, 1955. 
The purpose of Its creation was to make provision for the rapid extension 
of rural credit facilities and to transfer to It the undertakings of the 
Imperial Bank of India.
Central Warehousing Corporation established under the Agriculture 
Produce (Development and Warehousing) Corporations A ct, 1956.
The functions of the Corporation are to acquire and build godowns and 
warehouses^ to run warehouses for the storage of agricultural produce, 
and to arrange facilities for the transportation of agricultural produce 
to and from warehouses.
The Life Insurance Corporation was established under the Life Insur­
ance Corporation A ct, 1956, to take over the life Insurance business 
from private hands and to carry on life Insurance business Inside and 
outside of India.
The River Boards were set up under the River Boards A ct, 1956. The 
Act was passed to provide for the establishment of River Boards for the 
regulation and development of Inter-state rivers and river valleys.
The O il and Natural Gas Commission was established under the O il 
and Natural Gas Commission A ct, 1959. The chtef functions of 
the Commission are carrying out geological surveys for exploration 
of petroleum, Implementation of programme for the development of 
petroleum resources and sale of petroleum products produced by It .
The Unit Trust of India was created under the Unit Trust Act of India 
A ct, 1963, because the Government wanted to Invest the funds of
certain public corporations In the trust and also It  was necessary to 
make special provisions for the benefit of private Investors.
(17) The Food Corporation was set up under the Food Corporation A ct, 1964. 
The purpose of Its creation was to undertake the purchase, storage, move­
ment, transport, distribution and sale of food grains and other food stuffs, 
and also to promote by such means as It thinks f it ,  the production of food, 
grains and other food stuffs.
The Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) A ct,
1969, transferred the fourteen Indian Banks to public ownership. The object 
of the Act was to make the banking system subserve national priorities and 
objectives, such as rapid growth In agriculture, small Industries and exports, 
raising of employment levels, encouragement of new entrepreneurs and the 
development of backward areas. The Fourteen Statutory Corporations have 
been created by the Government to take over the business of fourteen commer­
cial banks. Every corresponding new bank shall be a body corporate with 
perpetual succession and a common seal and shall sue and be sued In Its name.
3.5 A Classification of Publtc Corporations
A clear-cut and systematic classtftcatton of publtc corporations ts 
hardly possible. "Like flowers tn Sprtng”, says Str Arthur Street, ’’they have 
grown as vartously and profusely and wtth as little regard for conventional 
patterns. They are even less susceptible of orderly classtftcatton: wtth
39quast-governmental bodies, a new spectes often suggests a new genus” .
Thts observation applies tn the case of Indian Corporations as they differ from
each other a great deal tn thetr structure, ftnanctng and powers. Any attempt
at classifying them Is likely to be unsatisfactory. But the classification
suggested by various writers on the subject Is Instructive. Professor W .
Friedmann classified public corporations Into two types: "the Industrial
and commercial corporation, on the one hand, and the social service corpora- 
40tlon, on the other.” Later a third, termed the supervisory public corpor-
41atlon, was added. Professors G riffith  and Street suggested a threefold
division Into ’’managerial-economic bodies", "managerial-social bodies", and
39 . Sir A . Street: "Quasl-Govemment Bodies Since 1918 In  British
Government Since 1918, page 160.
40. W.Friedmann: 10 Mod. L.R . (1947) pages 236-237.
4 1 . W . Friedmann: "The Legal Status and Organization of the Public Corpor­
ation” In Law & Contemporary Problems, 1951, page 546.
"regulatory-soctaI bodies”, ^  Professor J .F . Garner,^3 as well as
44
D .N .  Chester, have accepted the classification suggested by Professor
W . Friedmann. If we add one other category, namely, development cor­
porations to the above, then a ll the Indian Public Corporations would fall 
Into one of these categories. Commercial corporations are distinguished 
from development corporations only In one respect that the former act on 
*bustness prtnctples* ( I .e .  to pay their own way) while the latter do not 
because the principal motive Is not always to make profit as there are other 
motives like public Interest, national planning for economic development, 
and other national policy considerations. However, the functions of 
these corporations w ill be discussed In a later Chapter.
Functionally, Indian Public Corporations maybe classified Into 
three classes: (1) Commercial and Industrial Corporations would Include 
the Reserve Bank of India (1948), A ir Corporations (1953), Life Insurance 
Corporation (1956), e tc . (11) Social Service Corporations Include The 
Employees* State Insurance Corporation established In 1948 to provide for
42 . G riffith  & Street: Principles of Administrative Law (1952), page 271.
43 . J .F . Gam er: "Public Corporation In U .K ." ,  Government Enterprise, 
(1970), page 6 .
44 . D .N .  Chester: Political Studies, V o l. I ,  (1953), page 34.
beneftts to employees Ts the only SocTal ServTce Corporation In India.
(Ill)  The Development Corporations would Include the Damodar Valley Cor­
poration, the River Boards, Central Warehousing Corporation, Food Corpor­
ation, Tea Board, Rubber Board, e tc . The Itegulatory Corporations such as 
Marketing Boards, etc.Kav<fbeen Included In this group. The Tariff Com­
mission was set up under the Tariff Commission A ct, 1951.
A brief sludy of the Constitutions of some of the outstanding Corpor­
ations w ill show that the Central Parliament has created different public 
corporations of varying models.
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3 .6  Charactertsttcs of IndTan Publtc Corpora ttons
In tts ‘pure1 form, the IndTan Publtc Corporatton has the followtng 
charactertsttcs:
(1) Statutory Body. A  publtc corporatton ts establtshed under an Act of
Parltament, t .e .  tt ts a statutory body wtth perpetual successton and a
45common seal and can sue and be sued tn tts own name. It ts unltke 
an ordtnary Corporatton or a Jotnt Stock Company, whtch comes tnto 
betng by fulftlltng genera! legal requtrements provtded tn the Company 
Law. It ts a legal enttty dtsttnct and separate from the State.
(2) Independent Govemtng Board: The bustness of a publtc corporatton ts 
conducted by an Tndependent Board. In practtce, a Mtntster ts gtven 
overall control of the Board. It ts the Mtntster who appotnts the mem­
bers of the Board, although the Act usually spectftes thetr general qualt-
ftcattons. The Act authortses a Mtntster to gtve the Board general 
46dtrecttons on matters whtch appear to htm to affect the nattonal 
interest. In the case of the State Bank of Indta, the members of 
Parltament are dtsqualtfted for membershtp of any govemtng Board.
But Mtntsters do stt on these Boards. The Mtntster of Labour ts the
45 . L . I .C .  A ct, S .3(2).
46 . D .V .C .  A ct, S .48 .
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47ex-offlcio Chairman of the Employees* State Insurance Corporation,
The Board enjoys freedom In day-to-day administration but some sub­
ordination to general policy.
(3) Self-Contained Finance. The finances of the public corporations are 
not set aside by the national budget, although they are not free from 
Treasury control. The public corporations which may be said to possess 
‘self-contained finance*, Include the Reserve Bank of India, the State 
Bank of India and the Life Insurance Corporation of India. Neverthe­
less, the corporations w ill have to comb back to the Treasury for more 
capital I f  and when It Is needed. But where a corporation Is not self- 
supporting, It  w ill be dependent on the Government for the source of
Its revenue, and can also borrow on the open market.
(4) Dlslntestedness. "The public corporation”, wrote M r. Herbert Morrison 
In 1933,
must be no mere capitalist business, the be-all 
and end-all of which Is profits and dividends, 
even though It w ill,  quite properly, be expect­
ed to pay Its way. It must have a different 
atmosphere at Its board table from that of share­
holders* meeting; Its board and Its officers 
must regard themselves as the high custodians 
of the public Interest. In selecting the Board, 
these considerations must be In the mind of 
the Minister. 48
E .S .I.  A ct, S .4 .
48 . H , Morrison: Socialization and Transport (1933), pages 156-157.
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Thus, Tn the case of the Ltfe Insurance Corporatton, the Principal 
Ftnance Secretary Tn the Government of IndTa was appoTnted con­
currently as the Chatrman of the Corporatton. Whatever advantages 
of co-ordtnatton may extst Tn such a scheme, Tt Ts clear that Tt Ts not 
a case of dtstnterestedness.
(5) No Shares and no shareholders. Professor W . FrTedmann says: 'The
Publtc Corporatton has no shares and no shareholders, etther prtvate
49 50or publtc” . The equtty Ts owned by the natTon. However, Tn
IndTa, many of the publtc corporattons have share capttal just Itke 
Jotnt Stock Compantes. In thts category, we ftnd the Industrtal 
Ftnance Corporatton, the Reserve Bank of IndTa, the State Bank of 
IndTa, and the Central Warehoustng Corporatton. There are, how­
ever, a number of publtc corporattons whtch do not possess any share 
capttal. Thts tncludes the Damodar Valley Corporatton, the Em­
ployees* State Insurance Corporatton, the Rehabtlttatton Ftnance 
Corporatton, the Atrltnes Corporatton and the Ltfe Insurance Corpor­
atton.
(6) Freedom from Ctvtl Servtce Regulattons. Professor Hodgetts potnted 
out that "one of the prtvtleges most chertshed by the managers of a 
publtc corporatton ts thetr freedom from Ctvtl Servtce regulattons tn
49 . W . FrTedmann: "The New Publtc Corporatton”, Modem L.R . (10 ),
(1947), page 256.
50 . W . Robson: Nattonaltsed Industry and Publtc Ownershtp (1962), page 66.
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dealtng wtth personnel". In the United Kingdom, the Boards are 
free from Treasury control over staffing and finance. They engage 
their own staff, arranging pay and conditions of service directly 
through employees* Trade Unions or associations. In India, C iv il 
Servants, In fact, are very often appointed as members of the Govern­
ing Boards of public corporations. For example, "In 1959, a ll three 
members of the Damodar Valley Corporation were Indian C iv il Service 
men, serving on the Board as part-time members , Including the 
Chairman” . ^
But the State Bank of India Is fully free In this respect. It may appoint 
such number of officers, advisers and employees as It considers necessary or 
desirable for the efficient performance of Its functions, and determine the 
t erms and conditions of their appointment and service.
The Life Insurance Corporation may make regulations regarding the method 
of recruitment of employees and agents and their terms and conditions of service 
with the prior approval of the Central Government.
In addition to the above characteristics, several statutes contain a pro­
vision that they should act on *buslness principles1 and ensure the public Interest. 
Thus, the State Bank of India A ct, 1955, says that "the Central Board In dls-
51. J .E . Hodgetts: "The Public Corporation In Canada", In the Public Cor- 
poratlon (1954), Friedmann (Ed.), page 78 .
52. S.S. Khera: Government In Business, page 81.
charging Its function shall act on business principles, regard being had to 
” 53
public Interest. But whether In practice It  Is being done or Is possible 
for a ll public enterprises to do so, Irrespective of their objective, Is Indeed 
a debatable or doubtful Issue. However, we w ill examine later the statu­
tory powers given to the Boards In the matter of financial responsibilities, 
such as Investment and pricing policies.
53. S .21. This aspect of ^business principles* and ‘public Interest*
received speiclal emphasis In the case of Air Corporations and the 
Life Insurance Corporation as w e ll.
3.7  Organisation and Management
We w ill now discuss the Constitutions of some Important Public Cor­
porations In India. The question arises: which ones and why?
There are some outstanding Corporations, such as the Reserve Bank of 
India, which Is the central bank of India; the State Bank of India Is the most 
Important commercial bank; the Life Insurance Corporation Is the only cor­
poration operating In the field of life Insurance; the Industrial Finance Cor­
poration provides medium and long-term loans to Industries* without consider­
ing them, our study w ill be far from complete. However, we have also In­
cluded the Employees* State Insurance Corporation, which Is the only Social 
Service Corporation In India. Besides these, we have also chosen for close 
study the A ir Corporations, the Food Corporation, the OH and Natural Gas 
Commission, the Damodar Valley Corporation, e tc . In fact, we have taken 
at least one from each type, namely, Industrial and Commercial, Social Ser­
vice and Development Corporations. Our study w ill be In two parts.
Firstly, we w ill discuss the statutory provisions and point out the anomalies 
that exist. Secondly, we w ill try to enrich the bare legal provisions with 
some account of what has actually happened In practice.
It w ill be seen that the Constitution of each corporation Is based on 
a functional basis. For example, the Damodar Valley Corporation closely
follows the pattern of the Tennessee Valley Authortty. The purpose of 
thts Corporatton ts exactly the same as that of the Tennessee Valley Autho­
r ity . Therefore, the same straijg+itforward Board has been chosen for the 
Damodar Va lley  Corporation. Other Corporations generally follow the 
British models.
Management Is the key to the success of a public corporation and 
personnel Is the key to successful management. The hierarchy In the manage­
ment, tn particular, Is most Important. To choose the right man at the top, 
to provide him with a suitable organisation, to supply him with adequate re­
sources, to grant him necessary freedom of action, especially on personnel 
administration, would Immensely Increase the chance of a successful opera­
tion. Since many Industries have been brought under public ownership, a 
great deal of responsibility has fallen on the Central Government to choose 
the right kind of management for their successful operation and public approval.
■ T *
S f c t L  Ccrrp> has a legal Identity and therefore, Ilka^company,
has a life of Its own, can own property, and sue and be sued In the Courts.
i
The^body has been variously described In the statutes as ^ Committee , Com-
54
mission, Board^ Corporation or Authority. The Acts establishing some
54. The Tea Board, the Airlines Corporation, the Employees1 State Insurance 
Corporation, the O il and Natural Gas Commission, the Damodar Valley  
Corporation, the Life Insurance Corporation, etc.
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Corporattons also make provtstons for a body known as Board of D tree tors,
or Central Board, ^  whtch may exerctse a ll powers and do a ll acts and
thtngs whtch may be exerctsed or done by the body ttself. The enacttng
statutes normally make provtstons also for an executtve commtttee and some
57
auxtltartes to tmplement the purposes of the enactment.
We w tll now dtscuss the Constttutton of the Central Management 
Authortty and then w tll constder the Advtsory Counctls.
(t) Central Management Board
There extsts a great deal of dtverstty tn the matter of organtsatton.
In the case of the Industrtal Ftnance Corporatton, management ts vested tn
a Board of Dtrectors, whtch, wtth the asststance of the Executtve Commtttee
and an executtve offtctal known as the Managtng Dtrector, may exerctse a ll
58the powers and do a ll the acts on behalf of the Corporatton. The Executtve
59
Commtttee can deal wtth any matter wtthtn the competence of the Board.
55. S .7(2) Reserve Bank A ct, 1934, and S .6 , Industrtal Ftnance Corporatton, 
1948.
56. S . 17(2), State Bank A ct, 1955.
57. S .30, SB I A ct, 1955, S .24 , FCI, 1964, S .19(1) LIC A c t, 1956.
58. S .6 , The Industrtal Ftnance Corporatton A ct, 1948.
59. Ib id ., S .7 .
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There Ts an Advisory Committee to assist the Corporation Tn the discharge of 
Its functions.^ The Board of Directors Is a composite body which consists 
of 12 members -  a managing director and three other directors nominated by 
the Central Government, two directors nominated by the Central Board of 
the Reserve Bank, four directors by other banks, and the remaining two 
elected by the other shareholders ( I .e .  Co-operative bank) of the Corpor­
a t io n .^
&oard oi  fc/tf Carfraration
ThejEmployees1 State Insurance), the only Social Service Corpora­
tion In India, consists of the Central Ministers of Labour and Health, one 
person representing each State of the Union, five persons representing the 
employees, two persons representing the medical profession, two persons
nominated by the Central Government, five persons representing the employees,
62
and two persons selected by the Central legislature. There Ts a standing
committee of the Corporation, which, subject to the general superintendence
63and control of the Corporation, Ts empowered to administer Its affairs.
There Is also a Medical Benefit Council to advise the Corporation and Its
60. $ .8 , The Industrial Finance Corporation A ct, 1948.
61. Ib id ., S .10.
62. The Employees* State Insurance Corporation A ct, 1948, S9(c) to (1).
63. Ib id ., Sec. 18.
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various authorities Tn matters relattng to the medtcal beneftt. The prtnctpa! 
offtcers of the Corporatton are the DTrector-General, Insurance Commissioner, 
Medtcal Commissioner, a Chief Accounts Officer and an Actuary, and a ll are 
appointed by the Central Government which also fixes their powers and duties.^ 
This Corporation Is presided over by a Mtntster of the Government of India
It Is Interesting to note that even the Constitutions of the two banking
corporations, namely the Reserve Bank and the State Bank, are not Identical.
In the case of the Reserve Bank of Indta, the Central Board of Directors Is
headed by a Governor, assisted by not more than four Deputy G overnors.^
There are also fourteen dtrectors and one Government o ffic ia l. A ll are
nominated by the Central Government. Four directors w ill represent the
68four local boards constituted under the A c t. The Governor and the
deputy Governors are fulltime salaried officers appointed for a renewable
69term of not more than five years. Other directors have been given a term 
of four years, and are eligible for re-nom ination.^ Subject to regulations
64. The Employees‘State Insurance Corporation A ct, 1948, SS.18 and 22
65. Ib id ., SS16 and 23.
66. Ib id ., S .4 .
67 . The Reserve Bank of India A c t, 1934, S .8 ( l) (a ) .
68 . Ib id ., S .8(l)(b ) to (c).
69 . Ib id ., SS.8(2) and 8(4).
70 . Ib id ., S .8(4).
made by the Board, the Governor and tn hts absence, the Deputy Governor 
nomtnated by htm, shall have powers of general superintendence and direction 
of the affairs and the business of the Bank, and may exercise a ll powers and do 
a ll acts and things which may be exercised or done by the B ank.^  The 
Central Board of the State Bank Is considerably larger than the Central Board 
of the Reserve Bank of India. This Is a statutory provision. We have not 
been able to find out the precise reason for this, but one can argue that, as 
the State Bank had3,814 branches at the end of 1975, whereas the 
Reserve B ank had one branch In every large city , for efficient management 
and supervision, the larger Corporation should have a larger board. The 
Central Board of the State Bank consists of a Chairman and Vice Chairman
72appointed by the Central Government In consultation with the Reserve Bank.
Other members of the Central Board of the Bank Include not more than two 
73Managing Directors appointed by the Central Board with the approval of
74
the Central Government , the Presidents of the Local Boards appointed 
under sub-section 5 of Section 21 of this A ct, nc* more than four directors
71 . Ib id ., S .7(3)
71a . Facts about the State Bank of India, published by the Bank In 1975.
72 . The State Bank of India A ct, 1955, S . l9 ( l ) (a ) .
73 . Ib id ., S .l9 ( l) (b ) .
74 . Ib id ., S .19(l)(bb).
75elected tn the prescribed manner by the shareholders, stx dtrectors nominated
by the Central Government In consultation with the Reserve Bank, from among
persons having special knowledge of the working of co-operative Institutions
and of rural economy or experience In commerce, Industry, banking and
fin a n c e ,^  one director to be nominated by the Central Government and one
77director to be nominated by the Reserve Bank.
The Constitution of the Damodar V a lley  Corporation, which was created 
for the development of the Damodar V a lley  and river In the States of Bihar and 
West Bengal, Is a straightforward one. The Corporation consists of a Chair­
man and two other members appointed by the Central Government after consult­
ation with the State Governments of Bihar and West Bengal,through the terrl-
78torles of which the Damodar river flows. An Important feature of this Cor­
poration Is that a ll the three members are full-tim e officers of the Corporation 
and the Corporation In a ll essentials closely follows the Tennessee Valley Autho­
rity mode 17 ^
The A ir Corporations A ct, 1953, created two public Corporations,
75. Ib id ., S• 19( 1)(c ).
76 . Ib id ., S .19 (l)(d ).
77 . Ib id ., S. 19(1)(e) & (f).
78 . The Damodar V a lley  Corporation A ct, 1948, S .4 .
79. R .V . Singh: Public Corporations In India, page 10.
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80namely IndTan Atr Ltnes and ATr Indta International. The ConstTtuttons 
of these two Corporations are simple. The general superintendence, direct­
ion and management of the affairs and business of each of the Corporations
81shall vest In a Board of Directors. The Board of Directors shall consist
of a Chairman to be appointed by the Central Government, and not less than
eight and not more than fourteen other directors to be appointed by the Central 
82
Government. The same person may be appointed to be the Chairman of
both the Corporations or Chairman of one and director of another. It Is also
provided that the same persons may be appointed to be directors of both the 
83Corporations. Each of the Corporations has a Managing Director appolnt-
84ed by I t ,  subject to the approval of the Central Government. As the situ­
ation stands In 1978, M r. P .C . Lai Ts the Chairman of the A ir India Inter­
national, but he Is neither the Chairman nor a member of the Board of the 
Indian Airlines Corporation. Therefore, at present, this Section Is not In 
operation.
The affairs of the Ltfe Insurance Corporation shall be managed by a
80. The Air Corporation A ct, 1953, S .3 (1).
81. Ib id ., S .4(1).
82. Ib id ., S .4(1 A ).
83. Ib id ., SS.4(1 A)(a) and 4 (lA )(b ).
84. Ib id ., S .8 ( l) .
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Board conststtng of such number of persons not exceeding fifteen as the
Central Government may think fit to appoint, and one of them shall be
85
appointed by the Central Government to be the Chairman of the Board.
The O il and Natural Gas Commission has a very simple organisa­
tional structure. The management Is entrusted to a Commission which con
slsts of a Chairman and not less than two, and not more than eight, other
86members appointed by the Central Government.
In the case of the Food Corporation, the relevant Act constitutes 
a Board of Directors consisting of the following: Chairman; One director 
representing each of the Ministries of Food, Finance and Co-operation; 
Managing Director of the Central Warehousing Corporation (ex-offlcio); 
Managing Director of the Food Corporation and six other directors. A ll 
the directors except the ex-officio director, are to be appointed by the 
Central G overnm ent.^
It Is significant to note that by far the largest number of Boards
88have Chairmen appointed by the Central Government. In addition to
85. The Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956^ S .4 (1 ).
86 . The O il and Natural Gas Commission, 1959, S .4 .
87 . The Food Corporation Act, 1964, S .7 ( l)0
88. S.4(1 ), D .V .C . Act, 4(1); A ir Corporations Act, S .8 (1 );R .B . A c t,
5.15(1); l»F.C» Act, 5 .8(a); E .S .I.  A ct, S.4; O  & N . G . Comm.
Act, S .7(l)(a ); F .C . I . A ct, etc.
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the Chairman, many statutes provide for the office of Vlce-Chatrman. In
the case of the Employees* State Insurance Corporation, the Central Minister
89for Health Is ex-officio Vice-Chairman of the Board. The Reserve Bank
Act makes provision for the posts of Deputy Governors. A Deputy Governor
has the right to attend any meeting of the Central Board and take part In Its
deliberations, but shall not be entitled to vote provtded that when the
Governor Is, for any reason^' unable to attend any such meetings, a Deputy
Governor authorised by him on this behalf In writing, may vote for him at 
90that meeting. Similar provision for the office of the Vice-Chairman
has been made In the State Bank A ct, and he Is to be appointed by the Central
Government In consultation with the Reserve Bank, and after consideration of
91the recommendations made by the Central Board In that behalf. The
Vice-Chairman shall preside at the meetings of the Central Board In the
absence of the Chairman and, subject to the general control of the Chairman,
exercise such powers and perform such duties as may be entrusted or delegated
92to him by the Central Board. The Chairman Is usually appointed for a
89. S .4(b).
90. The Reserve Bank of India A ct, 1934, S .8 (3 ).
91. S .B .I . A ct, 1955, S .l9 ( l) (a ) .
92. Ib id ., S .28(1).
period of 3 -4  years. But In the case of the A ir India, M r. P .C . Lai was 
appointed for a period of three years and he has been allowed to continue 
thereafter on the basis of extensions. The extension, no doubt, depends 
on the relationship between the Minister and the Chairman concerned.
The above provisions In the different statutes reveal that the Central 
Government exerciser a considerable control over the Board of Directors by 
retaining the power to appoint the members of the Board. The terms and 
conditions of service of the Chairmen and members of the Boards are speci­
fied In the rules framed by the Central Government. The arguments In Its 
favour are that as the members of the Board are appointed by the Central 
Government, they owe a duty and loyalty to the Government and they are 
expected to pursue a policy which w ill be In complete agreement with the 
Government's general economic and social policy. It could also be argued 
against It that the officers of Corporations may become places for 'favourite 
sons* and the appointments could be made without taking Into consideration 
the efficiency, Initiative and commercial judgment of the persons concerned. 
Another danger Is that too much Interference and Influence exerted by the 
Government officials might convert the Corporation, which Is supposed to be 
autonomous and flextble, Into a Government department. So this
would defeat the purpose of creating a public corporation.
One writer on the subject rightly remarked that ”the officers are 
not selected because of their Intimate knowledge of management or the
110.
problems of the Tndustry concerned but to represent the MTntstrtes or the depart- 
93
ments concerned. ” (The writer did not provide any evidence to this effect).
Various Committees have discouraged the Government from appointing too many
offlctals to the governing boards. On this subject, the Krishna Menon Com- 
94
mlttee recommended that :
the Secretary or any other senior official of 
the Ministry should not be appointed on a 
governing board, for they are not able to 
devote enough time to the problems of the 
undertakings and there Is also a blurring 
of responsibilities between his responsibi­
lities as Secretary of the Ministry and 
those by a member of the board. As 
Secretary, he has to advise the Minister 
In regard to the affairs of the undertakings, 
but as a member of the board, he becomes 
a party to the decision taken there on 
which he later sits In judgment. .The Com­
mittee have also suggested that the Chair­
man of the Board of Directors normally, 
at the time of his appointment, should 
be between thirty and forty years so that 
It does not become the practice that the 
Chairmanship of boards Is a kind of 
*berth* for retiring C iv il Servants or 
others, who are appointed to a post as 
part of a reward for any services they 
might have rendered to a political 
party.
93 . H .K . Paranjape: Evolving Patterns In the Organisation and Admin 1 
stratlon of Public Enterprises, 9 I .J .P .A . ,  page 396 (1963).
94. Report of the Sub-Committee of the Congress Party In Parliament 
Parliamentary Supervision over State Undertakings, page 12.
The Government declared tts tntentton to accept the report and de-
95ctded to Tmplement the following recommendations:
(a) Chairman or Managing Director, one of them only should be full time.
(b) Secretary of the Ministry or Department should not be appointed to the
Board of public enterprises.
(c) For purposes of co-ordination a representative of the administrative
Ministry and the Finance Ministry should be on the Board.
a.
(d) No officer who Is assigned secretariat duties should bejDlrector of 
more than 3 or 4 companies.
(e) Members of Parliament should not be appointed to the Boards of public 
enterprises.
(f) The Directors should no longer have the powers to withhold action on
any proposal or a decision taken by the Board for approval of the
Central Government. The Chairman alone should have the powers 
reserving a decision for the President.
In spite of the declaration, no positive step has yet been taken to
96Implement &  . On the contrary, In 1963-64, the Estimates Committee
95. Vide Answer to Unstarred Question N o .22. Government's decisions
on the Committee's recommendations, Lok Sabha Debates, N o .20, 1961, 
Appendix 1, Annexure 3 , pages 4 -6 .
96. The Estimate Committee's functions have been taken over by the Com 
mlttee on Public Undertakings since 1965. This has been dealt with 
later.
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stated Tn tts report that several undertakings were sttll headed by the Secre­
taries, and/or additional Secretaries on a part-time basis; that certain
f r f t
offlcers^to be on the boards of as many as eight undertaking^ and that the
97boards were generally dominated by the official element. A  similar 
observation has been made by the Study Team of the Administrative Reforms 
Commission In 1967. A detailed study of Its recommendations has been 
made In the Chapter on Government Companies In India. According to the 
study team, seventy percent of the directorships of the Government under­
takings were filled by the C iv il Servants on a part-time basis. In the case 
of public corporations, the ratio between the officials and non-offlclals 
varies from corporation to corporation. As for example, In the Life Insur­
ance Corporation, only one member Is a government official and the rest
98(fourteen) are non-offlclals. The only condition a non-offlclal member
is
has to satlsfy^jhat he w ill have no financial or any other Interest as Is likely
9
to affect prejudicially the performance of his functions as a member thereof. 
In the O il and Natural Gas Commission a ll the members are o ffic ia l. 
Officials and non-offlclal members are almost even In the A ir Corporations, 
Food Corporation and Central Warehousing Corporation. The Estimates
97 . Estimates Committee, 52nd Report ( III L .S .)  6 .1 1 .8 7  (1962-63).
98 . L1C Act, 1956, S .4(1).
99. Ib id ., S .4(2 ).
100. O & N .G .C .  A c t, 1959, S .4 .
Committee found out that out of 62 directorshipmemberships of these stx 
public corporations, 26 are held by the officials and 36 by n o n -o fflc la ls .^  
The Administrative Reforms Commission has repeated again that not more than 
two officials -  one from the controlling and the other from the Finance M in i­
stries -  should be appointed on the governing boards as the presence of a 
large number of representatives of Ministries on the boards results In their
acquiring the character of a government committee rather than of autono- 
102
mous bodies. The Government has accepted the recommendations
except that In exceptional cases and for good reasons, the number may be 
103
exceeded. However, our study does suggest that the Government has
not violated Its commitment yet as there was not any question raised by a 
member of Parliament In this respect. But It Is Important to bear In mind 
that the success of a public corporation depends on the managerial freedom 
and commercial judgment of the members of the governing board, heoce the 
Importance of right selection cannot be denied, and proper safeguard should 
also be provided so that the appointing authority cannot misuse this power 
of appointment.
101 • Estimates Committee, 52nd Report, pages 27-32 .
102. Report, supra at pages 96-97.
103. Bureau of Public Enterprises: A  Hand Book of Information on Public 
Enterprises, (1970), page 64.
104
Frtedmann nottced that tn countrtes like Brttaln, France and Indta:
the lack of autonomy has been felt In 
two respects. First, considerations 
of national prestige or disguised subsi­
dization prevent the Corporation from 
choosing freely their equipment accord­
ing to commercial criteria. A  w e ll-  
known example to support this conten­
tion was the pressure exercised some 
years ago on B .O .A .C . to purchase 
a large number of the excellently de­
signed but commercially doubtful 
VC 10s, In preference to the manage­
ment^ partial choice of American 
planes.
Another recent example Is that of the Concorde, which was designed and 
developed jointly by Britain and France. The commercial viability of this 
plane Is yet to be proved. ’’The second Is the political pressure, usually 
through the Minister, to keep prices or tariffs below a level of minimum renta 
b tllty . Railway tariffs are particularly exposed to this kind of pressure."
Professor A .H . Hanson does not rule out the political Interference 
altogether. He says: "Public enterprise cannot be separated from the
governmental system of which It Is a part or completely Insulated from social 
and political pressures."
104. W . Friedmann: The State and the Rule of Law In a Mixed Economy, 
(1971), page 58.
105. A .H . Hanson: Public Enterprise & the C ivil Service, page 459.
But M r. A .D . Gorwala ts of the opTnton that there ts no place 
on the board of an autonomous authortty for the representatives of Tnterests. 
Such a board ts not a forum for the settltng of points of difference among 
various Interests, each of which pulls Its own way; Its purpose being good 
management In the public Interest, Its responsibilities are not to any sectional 
groups but to the public as a whole.
M r. Paul >H. Appleby also admits that ”a departmental Secre­
tary cannot be an effective Chairman of a large number of Boards -  It  depends 
on his ability to think and act one way for a Corporation and another way for 
the Ministry proper . . .  Two hats are not likely to be worn with grace I f  they 
are too extremely un like .”
(tl) Term of O ffice
Members of the governing body of a public corporation are normally 
appointed for a limited period. It Is generally admitted that the strength of 
the governing board, to a great extent, depends on the period for which It Is 
appointed. In India, there Is no uniformity In respect of the tenure of the
106. Report of the Eff*clent Conduct of State Enterprises, by A .D . Gorwala, 
Government of India, Planning Commission (1951), pages 19-20.
107. Paul H . Appleby: Re-examlnatlon of India*s Administrative System with
special reference to Administration of Government^ Industrial and Com­
mercial Enterprises, (1956), page 39.
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members of the board. The Damodar Valley Corporation Act dtd not pre­
scribe any tenure of office, It merely says that "the conditions of service of
108members shall be according to the rules of the Corporation”, but under 
the DVC Rules, 1948, the Chairman, members, Secretary and Financial 
Adviser shall be appointed for such terms not exceeding five years as the 
Central Government may think fit and shall be eligible for re-appointment.
In accordance with the recommendation of the A .R .C . the Government has 
decided that the tenure of appointment of Chairman and full-tim e directors 
should be for a pertod of five years, subject to their performance being 
sa tlsfac tory. ^
109In the case of the Life Insurance Corporation, the Central Ware­
housing Corporation, and the O tl and Natural Gas Commission, and
H 2
the Food Corporation, the term of office of members and the manner of 
filling casual vacancies are to be prescribed by the Central Government
108. SS.5(2) & 59(1), D .V .C . A ct, 1948.
108a. A  Hand Book of Information on Public Enterprises, page 140.
109. S.48(2), L . I .C .  A ct, 1956.
110. S .5(1), Central Warehousing Corporation A ct, 1956.
111. S .5(1), O  & N .G .C .  Act, 1959.
112. S .7(4), F .C . I .  A ct, 1964.
117.
tn the exercise of thetr rule-making power. The A ir Corporations Act also 
prescribes no period of tenure but leaves It to the Government to decide when 
appointing the person. It says that the Chairman and other members of the 
Corporations shall ordinarily be entitled to hold office for the period speci­
fied In the order of appointment, unless the appointment Is terminated earlier
113by the Central Government.
114The Governor and the Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank and
115the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the State Bank hold office for such
term not exceeding five years as the Central Government may fix when appoint
Ing them and shall be eligible for re-appolntment. Certain other directors of
the Reserve Bank hold office for four years , but the Managing Director of
the State Bank holds office for five years, and the Government officials
118nominated by the Central Government tn both the Banks hold office durtng 
the pleasure of the Central Government.
113. S .5(1), A ir Corporations Act, 1953.
114. S .8(4), R .B .I. A c t, 1934.
115. S .2 0 (l), S .B .I.  A c t, 1955.
116. S .8(4), R .B .I. A c t, 1934.
117. S .20(2), S .B .I.  A ct, 1955.
118. S .8(4), R .B .I. A ct, S.20(4), S .B .I. ACT.
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The Industrial Ftnance Corporation Act specifies that an elected
119
director w ill hold office for four years. The Act also provides that such
an elected director cannot be a director for more than two full consecutive
terms. tn the case of the Employees* State Insurance Corporation, the
Minister for Labour ts the ex-officio Chairman, and the Minister of Health
Is the Vice-Chairman, ex-officio. Representatives of the employers, em-
120ployees, medical profession and Parliament hold office for four years.
Should the members of the Board be elected for a reasonable length
of time, It  Is expected that they may take Interest In their job and make a
real effort to achieve Its objectives. It could also be argued, rightly,
that I f  the members are appointed for a longer time, they may sit back and
do nothing. But the Committee on Public Undertakings have found out that
In Htndusthan Steel It  has happened that there were six Chairmen within a
period of eight years. According to them , the Chief Executive to get to
know the enterprise and make any contribution w ill need at least a period
121of three to four years In the enterprise, I f  not more.
Some provisions have been made In some Statutes allowing a member
119. S .11(2), I .F .C .  Act, 1948.
120. S .5(1), E .S . I .  A ct, 1948.
121. Twenty-Eighth Report of PCPU on Hlndusthan Steel, (III 2S), 1966.
119.
122of the Corporation to restgn hts offtce. Normally, tf the appointing
authority Is not satisfied with a member, It has to wait until the term runs 
out (for example, In the Hlndusthan Steel), but In a difficult case, pressure 
Is used to vacate before the expiration of his term of office. G enerally, 
the enactments creating public corporations specify provisions for the removal 
of a member from the board.
In the case of the Reserve Bank of India, extensive power has beoi
vested In the Central Government to remove the Governor, the Deputy
123Governor or any other Director and also members of local boards.
But In the case of the State Bank , the Central Government may, after con­
sultation with the Reserve Bank, remove from office the Chairman, V ic e -
124Chairman and any director nominated by them. The Central Board Is
empowered , with the approval of the Central Government, to remove from
125office a managing director. A member can also be removed from office,
I f  without leave from the Central Board he absents himself from three consecu­
tive meetings , and he becomes subject to any of the disqualifications specified
122. S .11(6), R .B .I. Act, 1934; S .5(1), A ir Corporations Act; S .9(3) 
F .C . I . A ct, 1964.
123. S .11(1), R .B .I. A ct, 1934.
124. S .24(1) & S .24(3), S .B .I. A c t, 1955.
125. Ib id ., S .24(2).
120.
126Tn the relevant Acts. The Air Corporattons Act provides that the
appointment of a member can be terminated earlier by the Central Govern-
* 127 ment.
The Damodar Valley Corporation Act covers wider fields for removal.
It Is provided that the Central Government may remove any member who refuses 
to act, abuses his position and becomes unsuitable generally to continue as a
128
membe r. A member may also be suspended pending an Inquiry against him,
but a reasonable opportunity should be given to submit his explanation to the 
129
charges against him.
We admit that our study has not been able to find a case whereAmem« 
ber has been removed from office before his period of tenure has expired. We 
believe that the usual practice Is that when a member does not get on well 
with the Minister he remains In office until his period of appointment expires. 
Occasionally, as In the case of the Hlndusthan Steel, a member Ts transferred 
from one Corporation to another until the official period of tenure comes to an 
end. The Government perhaps Is reluctant to use legal powers to remove a
126. S .11(2) & 11(3), R .B .I. A ct, S.13m, I .F .C . A c t, 1948, S .9 (l)(b ), 
F .C . l .  Act, 1964.
127. S .5(1), . ATr Corprs. A c t.,  1953.
128. S .51(1), D .V .C . A ct, 1948.
129. Ib id ., S .51 (3) and (4).
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member as this w tll Involve payment of compensation and bad publicity, 
which may be detrimental to the Interest of the Corporation concerned.
(Ill) The Size of the Board
The size of the governing board of a public corporation varies from 
corporation to corporation. Some statutes specifically mention the exact 
number of members, others only mention the maximum. The Damodar Va lley  
Act specifies that the Corporation shall consist of three members. A  similar 
provision has beBn found In the case of the State Bank of India A ct, the Central 
Warehousing Corporation A ct, the Employees* State Insurance A c t, and the Food 
Corporation A ct. These Acts have laid down as to how many members shall
constitute the respective governing board of the Corporations. But the A ir  
Corporations Act and the O il and Natural Gas Commission Act merely prescribe 
the maximum and minimum number of members that may be appointed to the 
Boards, Whereas the Life Insurance Act prescribes only the maximum.
It may be suggested that the mere size of a governing board w ill play 
a less significant role, so long as the members of the board are composed of 
men of genius, ability and energy, whose leadership Is v ita lly  Important for 
the success of an enterprise.
1) The State Bank has the largest board, which consists of Chairman, V ic e -  
Chairman, 2 Directors appointed by the Central Government, Presidents 
of local boards and some directors appointed by the shareholders, depend­
ing on the amount of shareholdings.
2) The Food Corporation and the Reserve Bank each has 11 members.
3) The A ir Corporations should have a minimum of 5 and maximum of 9 .
4) The O il and Natural Gas Commission consists of a minimum of 2 and 
maximum of 10.
5) The Life Insurance Act prescribes only a maximum number which ts 15.
6) The Damodar Va lley  Is the smallest of a l l,  which has 3 members.
(Iv) Disqualifications for Membership
No enactments creating public corporations prescribe any qualifications 
for a person to be appointed to the boards. Moreover, the A ir Corporation Act 
and the Life Insurance Act do not contain any express provision for disqualifica­
tions. Both the Acts contain a similar provision, which reads as follows:
(1) Before appointing a person to be a member, 
the Central Government shall satisfy Itself 
that the person w ill have no such financial 
or other Interest as Is likely to affect preju­
d icially  the exercise or performance by him 
of his functions as a member, and the Central 
Government shall also satisfy Itself from time 
to time with respect to every member that he 
has no such Interest; any person who Is, or
123.
. whom the Central Government proposes 
to appoTnt and who has consented to beya 
member shall, whenever requtred by the 
Central Government so to do, furntsh to 
Tt such tnformatTon as the Central Govern­
ment constders necessary for the perform- 
ance of tts duttes under thts sub-sectton.
(tt) A  member who Ts Tn any way dTrectly or
TndTrectly Tnterested Tn a contract made 
or proposed to be made by the Corpora-  
tTon shall, as soon as possTble after the 
relevant cTrcumstances have come to hTs 
knowledge, dTsclose the nature of hTs 
Tnterest to the Corpora tTon; and the mem­
ber shall not take part Tn any delTberatTon 
or dTscussTon of the CorporatTon wTth re­
spect to the contract. 131
A sTmTlar ; : i has been Inserted Tn the O tl and Natural Gas Commtsston
A ct. 132
As regards dtsqualTfTcatTons for membershTp, the enactments creatTng
the publTc corporatTons, iTke the Reserve Bank, the State Bank, the Damodar
133
Valley CorporatTon and the Food CorporatTon, contaTn express provTsTons.
130. S .4(2), L . I .C .  A ct, 1956; S .4(2), ATr Corprs. A ct, 1953.
131. S .4(3), L . I .C .  A ct, 1956; S .4 (3 ), A ir Corprs. A c t. ,  1953.
132. S .6 , O  & N .G .C .  Act, 1959.
133. S. 10, R .B .I. Act; S .22, S .B .I. Act; S .4(2), D .V .C .  Act; 
S .8 , F .C . I .  A ct.
124.
The Reserve Bank Act, dtsqualtftes from the directorship or membership of a 
local board any persons who are salaried officials of Government or employees 
of banks, or who are at any time or have been adjudged Insolvent or have sus­
pended their debts or have compounded with their creditors, or are found to be 
lunatics or have become of unsound mind or are or have been convicted of any
134offence Involving moral turpitude. The similar provisions have been In -
135corporated In the case of the State Bank and the Industrial Finance Corporation.
The Damodar Valley Corporation lays down that a person shall be dis­
qualified from being appointed or from continuing as a member of the Corpor­
ation I f  he Is a member of Parliament or a State legislature or has any direct 
or Indirect Interest In any contract with the Corporation, or In any work done
for It ,  except as a shareholder (other than a director) of a company having the
136
contract or doing the work. The Reserve Bank Act and the State Bank Act
further provide that ”the appointment, nomination or election as director or 
member of a Local Board or of a Local Committee of any person who Is a mem­
ber of Parliament or the Legislature of any State shall be void unless within two 
months of the date of his appointment, nomination or election he ceases to be a
134. S. 10(a) to (e), R .B .I. A ct.
135. S.22(b) to (g), S .B .I. Act; S. 12, I .F .C . A ct, 1948.
136. S .4(2), D .V .C . Act, 1948.
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member.”
As no posttlve qualtftcattons for membership have been laid down In 
any statutes, the appointing authority Is given an unfettered discretion, and 
appointments may be made on the basis of other Irrelevant qualifications, for 
example, political patronage, castelsm, favouritism, and so on. It Is ev i­
dent from the above statutory provisions that the Government has enormous 
powers In respect of appointments, removal, etc. Now we confront our­
selves with two questions. First, do we need a Board of Directors? Second, 
tvhat sort of persons are appointed to the Boards?
We believe that there are certain positive functions which only a 
board of directors can perform. They cannot be discharged so well either 
by Parliament or by Ministers, even If  they had the time to do so. For 
example, an effective board of directors Is expected to undertake the respon­
sibility of certain policy matters; the Internal planning and budgetary pro­
gramme; the organisational policies; the public relations, e tc . These are 
matters purely administrative and technical character which can only be dis­
charged by the competent board of directors.
With regard to our second question, the Governments desire to 
appoint persons with ab ility  and Integrity to the boards, Is made clear by
137. S .11(5), R .B .I. Act; S.22(3), S .B .I. A c t.
the Mtntster of Ftnance Tn ParlTament. The Minister, Tn answer to a written 
question enquiring which former M .P .s and Ministers have been appointed as 
Chairmen of Public Corporations, replied as follows:
No e x -M .P . and ex-Mlnlster Is serving as 
whole-tlme Chairman of Public Sector Cor­
porations. However, there are some part- 
time Chairmen who were ex-M .P .s  and ex - 
Mlnlsters but they have been drawn from 
public life with proven ability  In the fields 
of Industrial, commercial or financial enter­
prise or In administration or trade union ac ti­
v ity . They are:
M r. S .G . Momln: Central Warehousing 
Corporation.
M r. R.S. Panlnazarl: Cdton CorporatTon
of India.
M r. D . Sen: Jute CorporatTon of India.
M r. P .N . Kathju: Hlndusthan Salts Ltd.
With respect to the appointment of sitting M .P .s  as director of public 
corporations, the Minister has thts to say: "The Government has taken a deci­
sion not to appoint Members of Parliament to Boards of Directors of public 
enterprises."
The reasons for the decision not to appoint Members of Parliament to 
Boards of Directors of Public enterprises are the same as those given In the 
Krishna Me non Committee on State undertakings. Extracts from the reports 
of the Krishna Menon Committee are given below:
138. Lok Sabha Debates^ 9 March, 1973, V o l. 24, page 56.
The Member of Parliament concerned Ts part 
of the organ of public control and Ts the ex­
ponent of public criticism Tn Parliament.
As a Director or part of a concern‘s admini­
stration, he Is responsible for the conduct 
and affairs which Parliament, and there­
fore, he Is called upon to examine, c riti­
cise and judge. Having specialised and 
Inside knowledge, he can use It  In Parlia­
ment and elsewhere, when he has disagree­
ments with his colleagues on the Board and 
wishes to have a line apart from the team 
of which he Is a member. His colleagues 
who are not Members of Parliament like 
himself, cannot reply. They are ‘offi­
cials* -  employed In State undertakings.
His Parliamentary colleagues are also at 
a disadvantage because he purports to 
speak from expert and Inside knowledge.
The Minister finds himself In a very em­
barrassing position when the matter Is 
debated In the House.
There ts also further consideration -  for 
whom does he speak? (1) If he speaks 
for the Industry Tn Parliament he takes 
the place of the Minister; (2) If  he 
speaks for the Board as Managing 
Director or Chairman, being one him­
self, then he has greater facilities 
which other M .P .s do not have; (3)
If  he turns critic , he places everyone 
Including the Industry, In an adverse 
position.
It w ill be understood that such a Mem­
ber of Parliament, who Is not a Member 
of Government, cannot take over the 
functions and duties of a Minister. He 
cannot be a critic for the reasons stated 
above. Thus, he can neither defend 
nor criticise, for as Chairman or a 
Director of the Company concerned he
128.
has access to Information which others do 
not have and which he should not use.
Therefore, I f  a Member of Parliament Is 
Chairman, or even a Director, he would 
disqualify himself for participation .In dis­
cussions In regard to the concern he Is 
associated w ith, and there would be severe 
limitations In regard to his participation In 
debates on similar concerns or State con­
cerns as a whole. On the other hand, he 
cannot be obliged to sit In Parliament un­
concerned when the debate Is on matters 
of which he has knowledge. This, In 
effect, would prevent him from function­
ing fully as a Member of Parliament. If ,  
on the other hand, he were to use his posi­
tion and his kn ovvledge, then he places 
the concern of which he Is an active and 
responsible part and the Board at a great 
disadvantage as well as In a position of 
embarrassment. His colleagues and the 
concern are not represented In Parliament 
except through the Minister. Conflicts 
w ill arise as to whom the Minister repre­
sents. 139
It Is appropriate to mention here the Important recommendations 
that the Krishna Menon Committee made. The Krishna Menon Committee, 
which was set up In 1958, to consider the problems relating to State-owned 
corporations and companies and to suggest how a broad supervision may be 
maintained by Parliament without Interference In the day-to-day activities 
of the concerns, made a number of far-reaching suggestions covering the 
management of State enterprises, the Chairmanship and Directorships on
139. Lok Sabha Debates, 25 A pril, 1973, V o l. 27, pages 35 -37 .
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Board of Management, relattonshtps between Ministers and the Management 
of an undertaking and accountabtltty to Parltament.
It Ts grattfytng to note that a Cabtnet Sub-CommTttee, headed by 
M r. Morarjt Desat, carefully considered the KrTshna Me non Committee's 
Report and announced that the recommendattons were broadly acceptable 
to the Central Government.
As regards the problem of governmental control over the publtc enter­
prises, the KrTshna Menon Committee*s solution lies In the setting up of a third 
Committee of Parliament, something very similar to the Estimates Committee 
and the Public Accounts Committee that already exist. In accordance with 
the Committee's recommendation, the Committee on Public Undertakings was 
set up In M ay, 1964, to examine the working of Public Undertakings. The
functions of this Committee have been dealt with later.
N ext, the KrTshna Menon Committee suggests that the Chairman of 
this Board of Management, who has the ultimate responsibility, should have 
the power to overrule the Board or to exercise his discretion, without prior 
consultation of the Board, I f  he thinks that Tt Ts essential In the Interests of
141the Company. This certainly Introduces a good deal of arbitrariness
140. S .S . Khera: Government Tn Business, page 70.
141. Ibid.
and might have the result of completely crushtng the autonomy of the Boards
of Management and of maktng them mere tools Tn the hands of the Chatrman 
and through htm, the Mtntster. However, thts Ts an tntemal affair of an 
enterprise and the chances, therefore, to come out Tn the open are very slim.
On the Issue of the relationship between the Minister and the Chair­
man of such Boards, the Committee takes a pragmatic view . It says that:
Tt Ts neither possible nor advisable to lay 
down the occasions or the categories of 
occasions when a Minister should or 
should not Issue a directive or special 
directive. Obviously I f  such directives 
are Issued, the Minister must accept 
fuller responsibility appropriate to the 
content of the directive. In any event, 
his overall responsibility remains and he 
cannot divest himself of It  under cover 
of delegation by directives. This does 
not mean, however, that the Interfer­
ence of Ministers In the concern's day- 
to-day affairs or even In Its genera I 
policy for Internal planning should be 
the usual practice. 142
The question of Issuing directives has been discussed In a separate section 
later In this Chapter. We feel, however, the autonomy of State enter­
prises becomes more restricted under the Krishna Menon Committee's suggestions.
It Is a healthy sign that the M .P .s  are not only concerned with the 
sort of persons appointed to the Boards, but also anxious to know the terms
142. Krishna Me non Committee's Report on State Undertakings, page 17.
and conditions ftxed by the Government for appointment of Chairmen of
Public Undertakings. When a question was asked In Parliament In this 
respect, the Minister for Finance replied that:
Part-time Chairmen drawn from public life 
are allowed a monthly consolidated honor­
arium of Rs. 1000 /- or dally allowance at 
the rates applicable to M .P .S . Subject 
to a limit of Rs. 1000 /- p.m . They are 
also allowed travelling allowance, medi­
cal benefits, use of Company's car, tele­
phone and free accommodation, subject 
to a celling of 35% of the maximum of the 
sbhedule applicable to the Managing 
Director of the Company. The full-tim e  
Chairmen of public undertakings are 
allowed pay In the following scale:
Schedule A: 3500-125-4000. For ex­
ample, the Chairman of the Food Corpor­
ation, the OH and Natural Gas Com­
mission, e tc .; Schedule B:3000-125- 
3500 -  the Chairman of the National 
Coal Development Corporation, the 
National Industrial Development Cor­
poration, e tc .; Schedule C: 2500-100- 
3000, the Chairman of the National 
Projects Construction Corporation, the 
Indian Telephone Industries, e tc .;
Schedule D: 2000-100-2500, the Chair­
man of the National Small Industries 
Corporation, Hlndusthan Salts Ltd.
This classification Is made on the basis of their Importance to the economy
144
and the complexity of their problems.
143. Lok Sabha Debates, 4 M ay, 1973, V o l. 27, page 117.
144. A Hand Book of Information on Public Undertakings, page 141 .
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(v) Advisory Counctls
There Ts also a provtston Tn several publTc corporations for the settTng 
up of advTsory councTls. But no unTform pattern has been followed Tn thTs 
regard. We wTlI mentTon the statutory provTsTon first.
The Damodar V a lley  CorporatTon Act provTdes that the CorporatTon
may appoTnt one or more advTsory commTttees for the purpose of securtng the
effTcTent dtscharge of the functtons of the CorporatTon, and Tn partTcuIar for
securTng that these functTons are exercTsed wTth due regard to the ctrcumstances
145
and requirements of particular areas. The Industrial Finance CorporatTon
Act also lays down that there may be an advTsory committee to assist the
146CorporatTon Tn the discharging of Its functions. The Reserve Bank Act
contains a provision for the settTng up of four local boards for the Eastern,
Western, Northern and Southern areas. Each of these boards consists of 5
members nominated by the Central Government to represent the territorial
and economic Interests and the Interests of the co-operative and Indigenous
banks. Their function Is to advise the Central Board on such matters as may
be generally or specifically referred to Tt and to perform such duties as the
147Central Board may delegate to Tt. The Life Insurance Act says that
145. $ .1 0 , D.y.C. A c t/1 9 4 8 .
146. S .8 , I .F .C . A ct, 1948.
147. S .9(1) & 9(4), R .B .I. A ct, 1948.
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the CorporatTon may constttute for each zone an advtsory committee for the
purpose of advtstng the zona! manager tn respect of such matters as are re -
148ferred to Tt under the regulation made by the CorporatTon. In addition
to the advisory committee for each zone, the Corporation Ts empowered to
constitute for each zonal office an Employees and Agents Relations Committee,
which Ts to advise the zonal manager on matters which relate to the welfare of
the employees and agents of the Corporation, or which are likely to promote
149and secure amity and good relations between them and the Corporation.
The advisory committee of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation Is consti­
tuted by the Central Government, the function of which Is to advise the admlnl-
150stratlon on matters of policy. The Employees* State Insurance CorporatTon
Act provides for an advisory body on Its Medical Benefit Council, whose function
Is to advise the CorporatTon and Its various authorities In matters relating to the
151medical benefit and other connected matters. In addition to the above,
the body has the power and right of Investigation In relation to complaints
against medical practitioners In connection with medical treatment and 
152
attendance. The A ir Corporations Act, contains a provision for the
148. S .22(2), L . I .C .  A ct, 1956.
149. S .22(3), L . I .C .  Act, 1956.
150. S 5 , R .F .A . A ct, 1948.
151. 5 .1 8 , E .S .I.  A ct, 1948.
152. Ib id ., S .22.
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constitution of an Atr Transport Counctl conststtng of a ChaTrman and not more
153than 11 members appointed by the Central Government. The functtons
of the Council are to consider and Investigate any matter of significance con«
cernlng the air services, referred to It by either of the Corporations, Director-
General of C iv il Aviation, Director-General of Post and Telegraph, or the
Central Government, and to give advice and make recommendations about I t .
Such advice and recommendations are specifically contemplated In the matter
154of fare and freight rates and policy generally. The Act also lays down
that each of the Corporations shall constitute a Labour Relations Committee,
consisting of representatives of the Corporation and of Its employees, and It
shall be the duty of the Labour Relations Committee to advise the Corporation
on matters relating to the welfare of the employees, or which are likely to pro-
155mote and secure amity and good relations between the two.
In the case of the Food Corporation, the Committee or Committees are 
appointed by the Central Government In consultation with the Corporation.^^  
The functions of the Committees are to advise the Central Government or the 
Corporation In regard to any matter connected with the purposes of this Act In 
respect of which Its advice Is sought by the Central Government or, as the case
153. S .30, A ir Corprhs. A ct, 1953.
154. S .31 , Air Corprns. Act, 1953.
155. Ib id ., S .41(2).
156. S .1 1 ( 1 ) ,  F .C . I .  A ct, 1964.
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157may be, by the Corporation.
In accordance with section 10, the Damodar Valley Corporation has, 
In fact, constituted two advisory committees to examine the water potential 
of the Damodar Valley Corporation and suggest suitable plans for the use of 
resources for the best possible advantage of Irrigation, power and other pur­
poses, keeping In view the problem of flood control. However, It Is unfor-
158tunate that their report Is not available. Similarly, the Life Insurance
Corporation has also constituted advisory boards for the purpose of advising
159the Zonal Managers and Employees and Agents Relations Committee.
The A ir Corporations have fulfilled the legal requirements by appoint­
ing an advisory committee as well as a Labour Relations Committee. The 
Industrial Ftnance Corporation has also constituted an advisory committee to 
deal with any matter subject to the direction of the Board.
But the Food Corporation did not set up any advisory committee until 
1973. The Committee on Public Undertakings recommended In Its report of
157. $ .11(2 ), F .C . l .  A ct, 1964.
158. V .V .  Ramanadham: Control of Public Enterprise, page 260.
159. Ib id ., page 260.
160. Ibid.
161. Ibid.
1621973-74 on the Corporatton that the
Advtsory Commtttee may be set up at local 
level so that matters of local tnterests may 
be resolved tn consultatton wtth represent­
atives of a ll concerned by producers, co­
operatives, e tc . The Minister for Agri­
culture replied that advisory committees 
at regional level now exist In most of 
the States.
If this Committee performs Its functions satisfactorily, the existence 
of such a committee may be supported on the grounds of efficiency and public 
accountability.
162 . 42nd Report on the Food Corporation by CPU, 1973-74, page 42.
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4 .]  Legal Powers and Functions of the Corporation
We w ill now examine the powers and functions clauses of certain 
Important public corporations. The general pattern Is to set out a general 
"powers” clause followed by a clause specifying a number of particular acti­
vities which the public corporation w ill be empowered to carry out, without 
prejudice to the generality of the powers granted In the section as a whole.
The Damodar Valley Corporation A ct,  ^ The Life Insurance Corpor-
2 3atlon A ct, the O il and Natural Gas Commission A ct, and the Food Corpor-
4
atlon Act followed the same pattern of a general powers clause followed by 
a detailed account of specific powers, without prejudice to the scope of the 
general powers.
5
In the A ir Corporation A ct, the enumeration of specific powers 
clause Is preceded by a general powers clause running as follows:
1 . S .22(2), D .V .C . A ct, 1948.
2 . S .6(2), L . I .C .  A ct, 1956.
3 . S. 14(2), Q &  N .G .C .  A ct, 1959.
4 . S .13(2), F .C . I .  A ct, 1964.
5 . S .7(2), Air Corpns. A ct, 1953.
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Subject to the rules, tf any, made by the 
Central Government Tn this behalf, tt 
shall be the functton of each corporation 
to provtde safe, efficient^ adequate, 
economical and properly coordinated 
air transport services, whether Inter­
nal or International or both, and the 
Corporation shall so exercise their 
powers as to secure that the air trans­
port services are developed to the best 
advantage and, In particular, so exer­
cise those powers as to secure that the 
services are provided at reasonable 
charges. 6
The Rehabilitation Finance Administration A ct, the Industrial
Finance Act and the Reserve Bank A c t , do not provide any general powers 
clause but define the powers of the Corporations by way of enumeration only,^  
though under one of the enumerated heads the Corporation Is empowered 
"generally, to do a ll such matters and things as may be Incidental to or 
consequential upon the exercise of Its powers or the discharge of Its duties
g
under the A c t."
An attempt w ill now be made to mention the specific functions and 
powers of a few outstanding Indian Corporations.
6 . S .7(1), A ir Corpns. A ct, 1953.
7 . SS.12, 14 & 17, Re.Fln.Adm. A c t, 1948; SS.23, 25 & 29, I .F .C .  A ct,
1948; S .17, r.B . I .  Act, 1934.
8 . S .12(c), R .F .A . Act; S .23Q ), I .F .C .  Act; 5 .17(16), R .B .I. A ct,
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As has been satd earlier, the Damodar Va lley  Corporation was set up 
for the development of the Damodar Valley In the States of Bihar and West 
Bengal, so It  has been granted substantial powers In order to achieve this 
goal. The Damodar Valley Corporation Act specifically lays down that 
"the Corporation shall have the power to do anything which may be necessary
9
or expedient for the purpose of carrying out of the functions under this A c t."
The Industrial Finance Corporation provides medium and long-term 
credit to Industrial concernsr particularly In circumstances In which normal 
banking accommodation Is Inadequate. The 5 ervlces provided by It  Include 
the guaranteeing on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, loans 
raised by Industrial concerns, the underwriting of the Issue of stocks, shares, 
bonds or debentures and the granting of loans or advances or subscribing to 
debentures of Industrial concerns repayable within a specified p e r io d .^
In the case of default In repayment on the part of an Industrial concern, the 
Corporation Is empowered  ^  ^ to take over the management of the concern or 
sell and realise property pledged, mortgaged or hypothecated. It has also 
the power to ask for discharge In full forthwith of any loan granted by It In 
spite of any agreement to the contrary regarding the period of payment.
9 . S .22(1), D .V .C .  A ct, 1948.
10. S .23(1), I .F .C . A ct, 1948.
11. S .2 8 ( l) , Ibid.
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The Ltfe Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, has authorised the Corpor­
ation to carry on life Insurance business, to Invest funds In such manner as the 
Corporation may think fit and to take a ll such steps necessary or expedient for 
the protection and realisation of Investments, to acquire, hold and dispose of 
any property for the purpose of Its business, to transfer the whole or any part 
of the life Insurance business carried on outside India, to advance and lend 
money upon the security of any movable or Immovable property, to borrow or 
raise money and to carry on any other business which may be conveniently 
carried on In connection with Its business and calculated directly or Indirectly
to render profitable, and to do all such things as may be Incidental or condu-
12clve to the proper exercise of any of the powers of the Corporation. It
has also the power to modify contracts of life Insurances In certain cases
13entered Into before 19 January, 1956.
The Food Corporation Is empowered to undertake the purchase, storage,
14
movement, transport, distribution and sale of food grains and other foodstuffs, 
and with the previous approval of the Central Government, It  Is also authorised 
to promote by such means as It thinks fit the production of food grains and other 
foodstuffs, to set up, or assist In the setting up of, rice mills, jflour mills and
12. S .6 ( 1 ) & 6(2)(a) to ( l) ,  L . I .C .  A ct, 1956.
13. Ib id ., S .14.
14. 5 .13(1 ), F .C . I .  A c t, 1964.
other undertakings for the processtng of food gratns and other foodstuffs and
to discharge such other functions as may be prescribed or as are supplemental,
Incidental or consequential to any of the functions conferred on It under this 
15A ct. It has also the power to enter Into agreements for purchase of food 
grains after harvest.^  The Corporation Is also authorised to guarantee any 
loan borrowed by a grower of foodcrops and any other loan realised by a grower 
of foodcrops, which Is repayable within a period not exceeding five years. ^
The Employees1 State Insurance Corporation created by the Employees*
State Insurance Act, 1948^ Is to provide certain benefits for employees In case
18of sickness, maternity, and employment Injury, e tc . It has been empowered 
to promote measures for the Improvement of the health and welfare of Insured 
persons and for the rehabilitation and re-employment of Insured persons who 
have been disabled or Injured and may Incur In respect of such measures ex­
penditure from the funds of the Corporation within such limits as may be pre-
19scrtbed by the Central Government.
15. Ib id ., S. 13(2)(a) to (c).
16. Ib id ., S .2 9 ( l) .
17. Ib id ., SS.29(2) & 30.
18. $ .4 6 , E .S .l.  A ct, 1948.
19. Ib id ., S .28 (X I).
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The Atr Corporations A ct, 1953, has established two atr Corporations, 
namely, Indian Air Lines and A lr-Indla International, each of the Corporations 
Is empowered to operate any air transport service In their respective fields and 
to carry out a ll forms of aerial work, to acquire, hold and dispose of movable 
and Immovable property, to repair, overhaul, reconstruct, assemble or recon­
dition aircraft, to enter Into and perform a ll such contracts as are calculated 
to further the efficient performance of Its duties, to determine and levy fares 
and freight rates and other charges for or In respect of the carriage of passen­
gers and goods on air transport cervices, to take such steps to promote the 
Interests of the Corporation or to Improve the services, to take a ll such steps 
as may be necessary or convenient for, or may be Incidental to, the exercise
of any power, or the discharge of any function or duty conferred or Imposed 
20
on It  by this A ct. It Is also provided that these powers are not to be con­
strued as authorising the disregard by the Corporation of any law for the time 
21being In force.
The functions of the O il and Natural Gas Commlsfton as laid down 
by the O il and Natural Gas Commission Act, 1959, are to plan, promote, 
organise and Implement programmes for the development of petroleum resources
20. S .7(2)(a) to (I), AlrCorpns. Act, 1953.
21. Ib id ., S .7(3).
22and the production and sale of petroleum and petroleum products. The Act 
also lays down that the Commtsston may take such steps as It  thinks fit for the 
carrying out of geological and geophysical surveys for exploration of petroleum, 
for the carrying out of drilling to prove and estimate the reserves of petroleum, 
to undertake such other activities as may lead to the establishment of such re­
serves and Its refining, for the transport and disposal of natural gas and re­
finery gases, to undertake scientific Investigations, to undertake the collect­
ion and publication of statistics and iimonographs, to perform any other function
which Is supplemental, Incidental or consequential to any of the functions afore-
23said or which may be prescribed.
The powers and functions of the Banking Corporations have been pro­
vided In such detail In the enactments creating them that only a short summary 
can be attempted In this study. The Reserve Bank was brought under public 
ownership and control In 1948 by the Reserve Bank (Transfer to Public Owner­
ship) A c t, 1948. It was established with a view to regulating the Issue of
bank notes and the keeping of reserves In order to secure monetary stability
and to operate the currency and credit system of the country to Its advantage. 
The Bank Is a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal
22. S. 14(1), The O il & Natural Gas Commission A ct, 1959.
23. Ib id ., S. 14(2)(a) to (h ).
145.
and Tt may sue and be sued tn Tts own name. Since nationalisation, the
functions of the Reserve Bank were further enlarged by the Reserve Bank 
25
(Amendment ) Acts. The Act says that the:
Bank shall be authorised to carry on and 
transact the severa I kinds of business as 
specified below:- 26
( 1 ) the accepting of money on deposit 
without Interest from, and the collect­
ion of money for the Central Govern­
ment, the State Governments, local 
authorities, banks and any other per­
sons; the purchase, sale and redis­
count of bills of exchange and proml- 
sory notes; the purchase from and sale 
to scheduled banks of foreign exchange; 
the making to any scheduled bank or 
State co-operative bank, of loans and 
advances; the making to any State 
Financial Corporation established 
under the State Financial Corpora- 
tlons A c t, 1951, as well as I .F .C .  
of loans and advances repayable on 
the expiry of fixed periods not ex­
ceeding eighteen months from the 
date of such loan or advance; the 
making to any financial Institution 
notified by the Central Government 
In this behalf, of loans and advances; 
the making to the Unit Trust of loans 
and advances; the making to the
24. S .3(2), R .B .I. A c t, 1934.
25. The Reserve Bank (Amendment) Acts, 1949, 1951, 1953, 1955, 1956, 
1957, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1968, 1973, 1974.
26. Ibtd. ,  S . 17.
Warehousing Corporation, the Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, the Agricultural 
Refinance Corporation, the Development 
Bank, the Central Government and the 
State Governments of loans and advances; 
the purchase and sale of securities of the 
Central Government or a State Govern­
ment; the purchase and sale of shares In 
or the capital of the Agricultural Re­
finance Corporation, the Deposit Insur­
ance Corporation, the Development Bank, 
the State or any other bank or financial 
Institution notified by the Central Govef n 
ment In this behalf; the keeping of depo­
sits with the State Bank for such specific 
purposes as may be approved by the Cen­
tral Government; the custody of monies, 
securities and any other articles of value; 
the sale and realisation of a ll property 
which may In any way come Into the 
possession of the Bank; the acting as 
agent for the Central Government or 
any State Government or any local 
authority or the Industrial Finance 
Corporation; the purchase and sale of 
securities Issued by the Government 
of any country outside India; the open­
ing of an account with or the making of 
an agency agreement w ith, and the act­
ing as agent or correspondent of, a bank 
Incorporated In any country outside 
India; participation In any arrangement 
for the clearing and settlement of any 
amounts due from, or, to any person 
or authority on account of the external 
trade of India with any other country; 
the borrowing of money for a period 
not exceeding one month for the pur­
pose of the business of the Bank; the 
making and Issue of bank notes sub­
ject to the provisions of this Act; 
the exercise of powers and functions 
and the performance of duties entrusted
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to the Bank under this A ct, or under any 
other law for the ttme being In force; 
the provldtng offactlTtles for training In 
banking and for the promotion of re­
search, where, In the opinion of the 
Bank, such provision may facilitate  
the exercise of Its powers and functions, 
or the discharge of Its duties; generally, 
the doing of a ll such matters and things 
as may be Incidental to or consequential 
upon the exercise of Its powers or the 
discharge of Its duties under the A c t.
The State Bank of India wasdreated by the State Bank of India A ct,
1955gf which took over the assets and liabilities of the Imperial Bank of India.
It was established for the extension of banking facilities on a large scale,
more particularly In the rural and semt-urban areas and other public purposes*
The State Bank acts as the agent of the Reserve Bank for paying, receiving,
collecting and remitting money, bullion and securities on behalf of any
Government In India, and for undertaking and transacting any other business
27
which the Reserve Bank may from time to time entrust to I t .  I t  may enter
Into negotiations for acquiring the business, Including the assets and liabilities
28
of any banking Institution, with the sanction of the Central Government.
29The other types of business which the Bank Is empowered to transact are
27. S .32(l)(a ) & (b), The State Bank of Indta A ct, 1955.
28. Ib id ., S .35(1).
29 . Ib id ., S .33 .
the followtng:-
( 1 ) the advanctng and lendtng of money and the opentng of cash credtts 
upon the securtty such as stocks, funds, securtttes, debentures, goods, 
other assets, accepted btlls of exchange, promtssory notes, fully patd shares 
of compantes, e tc .; the selltng and realtsatton of the proceeds of sale of any 
promtsory notes, debentures, bonds, shares, e tc .; the drawtng, accepting, 
discounting, buying and selling of bills of exchange and other negotiable 
securities; the Investing of the funds of the State Bank upon any of the secu­
rities mentioned above; the keeping or maintenance of deposits or cash accounts 
with any banking Institution; the Issuing of demand drafts, telegraphic transfers 
and other kinds of remittances made payable out of Its own offices; the buying 
and selling of gold and silver whether coined or uncoined; the receiving of 
deposits and keeping cash accounts on such terms as amy be agreed upon; the 
receiving of a ll kinds of bonds, scrips, title deeds or valuables on deposit for 
safe custody; the acting as agent of any co-operative bank; the acting as 
agent for the Central Government or any State Government or any Corpora­
tion In Implementing any scheme for financing the constructing of dwelling 
houses; the underwriting of the Issues of any stocks, shares and debentures; 
the transacting of pecuniary agency business on commission; the entering Into 
contracts of Indemnity, suretyship or guarantee with specific security; the 
administration, whether alone or jointly^ of estates for any purpose as executor
or trustee; the buying of bills of exchange payable out of India; the borrow­
ing of money for the purpose of the Bank; the advancing or lending of money 
to, or the opening of cash credit In favour of, any company having a share 
capital which Is expressed In rupees or any Society registered under the Co­
operative Societies A ct, 1912; the advancing and lending of money to Courts 
of Wards upon the security of estates; the subscribing to buying, acquiring or 
holding, and the selling of any shares In or capital of any banking Institution; 
the subscribing to, buying, acquiring, holding or selling of any shares or debeni- 
tures of any financial Institution as may be notified by the Central Government; 
contributing to the Initia l capital of the Unit Trust of India; the advancing or 
lending money to, or discounting or purchase of any negotiable Instrument on 
behalf of persons engaged In such Industries as may be specified by the Central 
Board; the advancing or lending money to any co-operative housing society; 
the subsidising from time to time of the pension funds; the establishment and 
maintenance of superannuation pension, provident or other funds for the bene­
fit of the employees; the doing of any other kind of business which the Central 
Government may authorise; the performance of the functions entrusted to, or 
required of, the Bank by this Act or by any other law for the time being In 
force and generally, the doing of a ll such matters and things as may be In ­
cidental or subsidiary to the transacting of the various kinds of business, In ­
cluding foreign exchange business , specified In the Act The kinds of bus!-
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ness the State Bank cannot transact are provtded Tn detat! tn Sectton 34 of the 
State Bank of India A ct. 1955, e. g . the B ank shall not make loan or advance -
(a) upon the securtty of stock or shares
(b) upon the securtty of any tmmovab le property or the documents of the 
tttle relattng thereto, etc.
30A stmtlar provtston ts also found Tn the Reserve Bank A ct, 1934.
It should be potnted out that the Banktng Compantes (Acqutsttton and 
Transfer of Undertakings) A ct, 1969, whtch has established the fourteen public 
Corporations to take over the assets and liabilities of fourteen commercial banks, 
does not provide any detailed account of the powers andfunctlons, but does con-
31tain provisions for the appointment of a board of directors to manage the
32
affairs of each Corporation.
The above are the bare legal provisions of some of the outstanding 
Corporations* powers and functions, as outlined In the respective Statutes.
It Is true, no doubt, that an elaborate and detailed provision regarding the 
powers and functions w ill be of Immense value to members of the governing
30. S .19, R .B .I. A ct, 1934.
31. S. 10(2), The Banking Corn panles (Acquisition & Transfer of Under­
takings) Act, 1 969.
32. Ib id ., SS.7(1) to (4), S . 8  and S .9 .
board. However, we w tll now discuss whether these Corporations have been 
able to perform their functions satisfactorily for which they were set up by 
Parliament.;
The Reserve Bank of India, In addition to Its role as the Central bank 
of the country, Is the guardian of the State Bank of India, the Industrial Finance 
Corporation and the various commercial banks.
The Reserve Bank's power of supervision and control have greatly In­
creased since the passing of the Indian Banking Companies Act of 1934 and Its 
amendments In 1956 and 1962. Under the Reserve Bank (Amendment) A ct, 1956, 
the Reserve Bank was authorised to change the reserve ratios from 5 percent to 
2 0  percent, In the case of demand deposits, and from 2  per cent to 8  percent In 
the case of time deposits. Since the passing of the 1962 Amendment Act, the 
Schedule banks were required to maintain with the Reserve Bank an average 
dally balance of 3 percent of their total time and demand liabilities as against 
the previous requirement of 5 percent of demand and 2 percent of time liab ili­
ties. The cash reserve ratio was raised from 3 percent of the total of demand 
and time liabilities to 5 percent at the end of May, 1973, and further to 7 per­
cent In September. But again, from July, 1974, the banks are required to 
keep only 5 percent of their demand and time liabilities as cash reserve with 
the Reserve Bank. The Reserve Bank, since the passing of the Banking 
Companies A ct, has been vested with powers for both qualitative and selective
credtt controls whtch have been used, sTnce the mtddle of 1956, for the pur-
33pose of ensurtng controlled monetary expansion.
Section 135A Introduced by the Reserve Bank (Amendment) A ct, 1957,
provides:
( 1) Where the Reserve Bank Is satisfied that
(a) In the national Interest; or
(b) to prevent the affairs of any bankl-
Ing company being conducted In a 
manner detrimental to the Interests 
of the depositors or In any manner 
prejudicial to the Interests of the 
banking company; or
(c) to secure the proper management 
of any banking company generally;
It  Is necessary to Issue directions to bank­
ing companies generally or, to any bankf 
Ing company, tn particular, It may, from 
time to time, Issue such directions as It  
may deem f it ,  and the banking companies 
or the banking company, as the case may 
be, shall be bound to comply with such 
directions.
During the period Ju ly, 1971, to 1972, a directive was Issued to effect cer­
tain changes by the Reserve Bank In respect of the scheduled commercial 
banks1 advances against raw cotton and kapas, food grains, oilseeds and 
vegetable o il, Including Vanaspatl In the context of their respective supply 
positions and their effect on prices. In view of the difficult supply and price
33 . Theft - Informations t s . contained In a leaflet published by the Reserve 
Bank of India, In 1975.
position of food grains, oilseeds and edible otls during the period July, 1972,
to June, 1973, the Reserve Bank tightened the control on advances against
34these commodities by Issuing a fresh directive. Further, the Reserve Bank 
has played a significant role In the development of rural credit facilities.
Two giant funds were established by the Reserve Bank (Amendment) A ct, 1955, 
to make advances to co-operative credit Institutions:
(1) the National Agricultural Credit (Long-term operations) Fund In 
February, 1956; and
(2) the National Agricultural Credit (Stabilization) Fund In June, 1956.
On 30 June, 1975, these funds stood at Rs.125 crores and 15 crores respect- 
tve ly . 3 5
The State Bank undertakes ordinary commercial banking business and 
provides credit to agriculture, Industry, trade and commerce.
The Bank's assistance to agriculture both direct and Indirect, de­
clined from Rs. 122.37 crores In 1970 to Rs. 88 .77  crores In 1971, and there­
after, showed a rising trend and stood at Rs. 241.21 crores In 1975.
The number of small-scale Industries accounferose from 25 In 1956 
to 87,716 at the end of December, 1975, and the total finance provided by
34. Dwelt and Varma: Indian Economics, (1976), page 451.
35 . ^Leaflet* published by the R .B .I.
the State Bank Group to small-scale tndustrtes rose from R s.ll lakhs Tn 1956 
to Rs.320 crores at the end of December, 1975.
The Bank has opened 419 new offices In 1975 as against 375 offices 
In the preceding year, bringing the total number of offices to 3,814 at the 
end of 1975. O f the new offices, 334 were located In rural and semi-urban 
areas, 54 at urban and 31 at metropolitan centres. As many as 152 were 
located In areas with a population below 5 ,000 and 81 were In unbanked 
blocks. O f the 1.06,493 employees on the rolls of the Bank at the end of 
1975, 8 ,807 (8.3% ) belonged to scheduled castes and tribes ( I .e .  Untouch­
ables) . The share of candidates belonging to these communities In the fresh
36
Intake went up from 12.8%  In 1974 to 25 .5%  Tn 1975. This Is In line with
the Government's policy for the uplifting, of the Untouchables. However,
p>i(2c& Rj'
one 1mportan^Information Is missing Tn the leaflet which Is how much profit 
the Bank has made, and the rate of dividend declared In the year 1974-75.
The Industrial Finance Corporation was established for the purpose of 
making medium and long-term loans to Industrial concerns.
The authorised share capital of the Corporation Is twenty crores. The 
paid-up capital was raised to Rs.8.35 crores In 1964. It Is Important to note 
that the Corporation, In 1962, with a view to Increasing Its resources, made a
36. A Leaflet published and printed by the State Bank of India.
publtc tssue of 4 i  percent twelve-year bonds for Rs. 6  crores. Again tn 1965, 
the Corporation made a private sale of bonds for Rs.2 crores. It Increased Its 
funds during 1974-75 by floating bonds of the value of Rs.19 crores In the mar­
ket. The total amount of outstanding bonds at the end of March 1975, stood 
at Rs. 98.2 crores.
During the financial year 1974-75, the Industrial Finance Corpora­
tion consisted of 41 new projects for an aggregate amount of Rs.20.1 crores. 
Again, of the projects assisted during 1974-75, 29 were In notified backward 
districts, Involving an aggregate amount of Rs.12.6 crores or 40% of the total 
assistance sanctioned during the year. The total financial assistance to 20 
projects promoted by new entrepreneurs and 8  projects In the Co-operative 
sector aggregated to Rs. 4 .9  crores and Rs.4 crores, respectively. The amount 
disbursed against loans during 1974-75 rose by 5 .4  crores and stood at Rs.37.3 
crores. The total financial assistance sanctioned by the Corporation since 
Its Inception In July 1948, up to the end of March 1975, amounted to Rs,
496.4 crores. During the twenty-seven years of Its existence, the Corporation
a
has made^valuable contribution towards accelerating the process of Industrial 
growth. ^ 0
The Food Corporation was constituted In 1964 but started functioning
36a. See Dwett and Varma: Indian Economics.
from 1 January, 1965. The Food Corporation Is the sole agency of the 
Central Government for the State trading (purchase and sale) In food grains. 
It procured about 69 .5  lakh tons of food grain out of the 1972-73 crop.
The storage aapaclty available with It  at the end of 1973 was 7 8 .2  lakh 
tons. The Food Corporation Is regarded as the first organised attempt to 
take up State trading In food on an appreciable scale. It Is Important to 
note that the Government took over the wholesale trade In wheat from 
March, 1973. This produced serious dislocation In normal trade channels. 
As a result, the Government had to abandon the policy of takeover of whole­
sale trade In grain.
The value of sales made by the Corporation recorded Increased from 
Rs.384.62 crores In 1968-69 to Rs. 567.20 crores In 1 9 6 9 -7 0 .^  The gross 
profit after providing for depreciation, was Rs• 15.41 crores, more than 
double the previous year's gross profit of Rs. 6 .82  crores.
The Corporation has undertaken a programme of constructing 24 rice 
mills with the object of modernising rice mills and Increasing the output of 
rice from available paddy.
The O il and Natural Gas Commission was set up to undertake the 
exploration, exploitation and refining of mineral oil In India.
37 . This Is the latest figure we could obtain. See A  Hand Book of 
Information on Public Undertakings, (1970.)
Three oilfields were discovered by the O il and Natural Gas Com­
mission during the Second Plan period (1956-61). During the last 19 years, 
the O il and Natufal Gas Commission has been making efforts to find oil 
wherever there Is a possibility of locating o il.  The OH and Natural Gas 
Commission In A ^rll, 1974, struck oil In the Bombay High area -  at a point 
about 105 miles from the ooast. The deposits may well be around 4 billion  
tons, that Bombay High may yield oil worth Rs. 60,000 crores. This Is ob­
viously good news for India as she was experlecnlng an oil crisis because of 
a price rise by the major oil producing countries In the world. In fact, there 
has been a fourfold Increase In International prices of crude o il. As a result 
of that, India Is passing through a terrible energy crisis.
We also wanted to consider the performance of the Life Insurance Corporation 
and the A ir Corporations, but unfortunately, the recent statistics are not 
available.
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4.2  The Borrowing Power of the Corporation
It has become usual to Tnsert a provtston Tn the respective Acts per­
mitting borrowing from other sources with the previous approval of the Central 
Government, and Tn some cases, the Reserve Bank. Most of the Indian Cor­
porations have been entrusted with the power to borrow money by the parent 
38Statutes. With the approval of the Central Government, the Damodar
39V a lley  Corporation may borrowmoney Tn the open market or otherwise.
The Industrial Finance Corporation Is empowered to borrow money by Issue 
of bonds and debentures, but the amount so raised must not exceed at any 
time more than five times the amount of the paid-up share capital and the
40reserve fund of the Corporation. The bonds and debentures Issued by It
are guaranteed by the Central Government as to the repayment of principal
and the repayment of Interest at such rate as may be fixed by the Government
on a recommendation of the Board of Directors set up by the Industrial Finance 
4]
A c t. The Corporation Is also authorised to borrow foreign currency
3 8 . S .29(3), E .S . I .  A ct, 1948; S .10(3), A ir Corpns. A ct, 1953; S .6(2), 
L . I .C .  A ct, 1956; S .2 ) ,  I .F .C . A c t, 1948; S .20, O  & N .G .C .  A ct, 
i'959; S .27 (l)7 ~ F X .l .  A ct, 1964.
3 9 . S .42 , D .V .C .  A c t, 1948.
40 . S .2 I(1 ), I .F .C .  A c t, 1948.
41 . S .21(2), IbTd,
through the International Bank for reconstruction purposes. The two Air 
Corporations, with the consent of the Central Government, or In accordance 
with the terms of any general authority given to them by the Central Govern­
ment, may borrow money for a ll or any of the purposes of the Corporation and 
secure the payment of any money borrowed by It or any Interest thereon by the 
Issue of bonds, debentures, debenture-stock or any mortgage or charge or other
security on the undertaking of the Corporation or any part of It or on any of Its 
43properties. The Central Warehousing Corporation may, In consultation 
with the Reserve Bank and with the previous approval of the Central Govern­
ment, borrow money, but the borrowings should not at any time exceed ten
times the amount of the paid-up share capital and the reserve fund of the 
44
Corporation. The Life Insurance Acfc 1956, provides In simple terms
that the Corporation may borrow or raise any money In such manner and upon
45
such security as It may think f it .  With the previous approval of the Cen­
tral Government, the O il and Natural Gas Commission may borrow money In 
the open market or otherwise for the purposes of carrying out Its functions
42. S .27, Ibid.
43 . S. 10(3) (a) & (b), A ir Corpns. A ct, 1953.
44 . S .37(1), C .W .C . A ct, 1956.
45 . S .6(2)(f), L I.C . A ct, 1956.
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under thts A ct. The Food Corporation, on the other hand, may borrow 
money only either from any scheduled bank or from any other bank or finan­
cial Institution approved by the Central Government against stocks of food
47grains or other foodstuffs held by I t .  The loans and advances taken by
the Food Corporation are guaranteed by the Central Government as to the
repayment of principal and the repayment of Interest thereon and other 
48
Incidental charges. As the ‘Annual Report* Is not available here, we 
were unable to find out whether the Corporation has borrowed any money In 
the open market recently. Neither matter has been raised In Parliament.
4 6 . S .20, O . & N .G .C .  A ct, 1959.
47 . S .27(1), F .C . l .  A ct, 1964.
4 8 . S .27(2), Ibid.
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4 .3  Disposable Profits
Theoretically, the public corporations exist to provide a public 
service, not to make a profit, and this w ill Involve sometimes providing 
essenlbl but uneconomic services which a private corporation may be reluc­
tant to provide. The general policy of the government, therefore, Is to 
ensure that the public corporations are run economically, efficiently, as 
far as possible, so that they can pay their way.
49
Some statutes creating commercial and Industrial public cor­
porations provide that the corporations shall act as far as may be on*buslness 
principles*. That being so, these corporations are expected to operate at 
a profit.
A specific provision has been Inserted regarding the disposal of 
50profits In many statutes.
The Damodar Valley Corporation Is expected to make profits out
of Its Irrigation, power and flood-. Control projects, and these profits are
51liable to Income-tax like those of private companies. After providing 
for depreciation, reserve and other funds, the net profits of the three kinds
49 . S .6(3), L . I .C .  A ct, 1956; S .6(2), I .F .C . Act, 1948; S .17(2), 
S .B .I. A ct, 1955; S .9 , A ir Corprns. A ct, 1953.
50. S .37, D .V .C . A ct, 1948; S .32, I .F .C . Act; S .40, S .B .I. A ct,
S .33(1), F .C . I .  A ct, 1964; S .47, R .B .I. A ^ t, 1934.
51. S .43 , D .V .C . A c t, 1948.
162.
of projects have to be credtted to the participating governments ( t .e .
Central Government, West Bengal and Bthar) In proportion to thetr respect­
ive shares In the total cost of the projects concerned. Likewise, net de­
ficits have to be made good by the participating governments proportion- 
a te ly .52
The Life Insurance Corporation A ct, 1956, provides that "In the 
discharge of any of Its functions the Corporation shall so far as may be act on
n
business principles, but for the disposal of the surplus there Is a provision to
the effect that "not less than 95 per cent of such surplus shall be allocated
53to or reserved for the policy holders of the Corporation". The Central
Board of the State Bank Is to act on ‘business principles* regard being had to 
54
public Interest. An Identical provision Is found In the Industrial
55
Finance A ct, 1948.
The balance of the profits of the Reserve Bank and the State Bank 
Is to be paid to the Central Government, after making provision for bad and 
doubtful debts, depreciation In assets, contributions to staff and superannua­
tion funds and for a ll other matters for which provision Is to be made or which
52. SS.39 and 40, D .V .C . Act, 1948.
53. S .28, L . I .C .  A c t, 1956.
54. S .17(2), S .B .I. A ct, 1955.
55. S .6(2), I .F .C .  Act, 1948.
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are usually provtded for by bankers. In the case of the State Bank,
the rate of dtvtdend declared by the State Bank ts fixed by the Central 
5 7
Board, but In the case of the Industrtal Finance Corporation, the rate
58of dividend under no circumstances Is to exceed the rate of 5 per cent.
The balance of profits, .In the case of the Food Corporation, Is to
be paid to the Central Government after making provision for bad and doubt- 
59ful debts, etc.
56 . S.47 , R .B .l. A ct, 1934, and SS.38 & 40(3), S .B .I. Act, 1955.
57 . S .38(2), S .B .I. A ct, 1955.
58. S .32, I .F .C . A c t, 1948.
59. S.33(2), F .C . I .  Act, 1964.
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4 .4  Maintenance of Accounts
Some statutes contain provisions regarding maintenance of
accounts. The Air Corporations Act provides that:
the Corporation shall maintain proper 
accounts and other relevant records and 
prepare an annual statement of accounts 
Including the profit and loss account 
and the balance sheet In such form as 
may be prescribed by the Central Govern­
ment In consultation with the Comptroller 
and Auditor-General of India. 60
A similar provision has been Inserted In the Damodar Va lley  Corporation A ct,
/  i  a o  A3
1948. But the Industrial Finance Corporation and the State Bank
are required to furnish a more detailed statement of accounts. Section 40
of the State Bank Act lays down that:
the State Bank shall furnish to the Cen­
tral Government and to the Reserve Bank 
wtthln two months from the date on which 
Its accounts are closed and balanced Its 
balance sheet, together with the profit 
and loss account and the auditors1 report 
on the working of the State Bank during 
the period covered by the accounts.
60. S. 15(1), Air Corpns. A c t, 1953.
61. S .47, D .V .C . Act , 1948.
62. S .35, I .F .C . A ct, 1948.
63. S .40, S .B .I. Act, 1955.
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The balance sheet and the proftt and loss account shall be stgned 
by the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Managing Directors, I f  any, and a major­
ity of the other directors.
The State Bank shall also, within two months from the date on which
Its accounts are closed and balanced, transmit to the Central Government and
the Reserve Bank a statement showing, as far as may be available, the name,
address and occupation of, and the number of shares held by, each shareholder
of the State Bank as on the said date. A  very similar provision Is found In
the Industrial Finance Corporation A ct. It must also furnish to the Central
Government and the Reserve Bank at least once In every year, or as frequently
as the Central 3ovemment or the Reserve Bank may require, a classification
of Its loans and Investments, and of loans guaranteed by It and underwriting
64agreements entered Into by I t .
The Food Corporation A ct, 1964, provides that:
the Corporation shall maintain proper 
accounts and other relevant records and 
prepare an annual statement of accounts 
Including the profit and loss account and 
the balance sheet In such form as may be 
prescribed. 65
64. S .35, I .F .C . Act, 1948.
65. S .34(1), F .C . l .  Act, 1964.
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A  stmtlar provtston Tn Identical terms extsts In the O il and Natural Gas 
CommtssTon Act/ 1959. ^  The statements, I .e .  Trading Account, Profit 
& Loss Account and Balance Sheet are usually prepared by the qualified 
accountants. It Is expected, therefore, that they a ll w ill follow the stan­
dard procedure as set out by the Indian or British Institute of Chartered 
Accountants.
66. S.22(1), Q &  N .G .C .  A ct, 1959.
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4 .5  Provtston of Audit
The real purpose of having accounts examined and audited by an 
auditor Is to check financial Irregularities and to know the true financial 
position of an undertaking. However, the general duties of a commercial 
auditor are to safeguard the Interests of the shareholders and to see that there 
Is no Irregularity In the dealings of the directors with the property of the com­
pany. It Is very difficult to state exactly how far an auditor Is bound to 
carry his Investigations and the posttlon has been summed up by saytng, It 
Is his duty to be a *watch-dog* and not a *blood hound*, meaning that he Is 
bound to be on the alert to detect anything suspicious but not bound to Investi­
gate every transaction until his suspicions are aroused.
In order to safeguard the Interests of the general public, whose 
money, In fact, has been Invested In the various Government undertakings, 
there Is a provision In almost a ll the statutes creating public corporations, 
which provides that ”the accounts of every Corporation shall be audited 
annually” . It should be pointed out that the Indian statutes do not provide 
any uniform system of audit.
The accounts of the Employees* State Insurance Corporation, ^
67. S .34(1,), E .S . I .  A ct, 1948.
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68and the Industrial Finance Corporation are audited by auditors appointed 
by the Central Government. In the case of the Life Insurance Corporation, 
auditors are appointed by the Corporation Itself with the previous approval 
of the Central G overnm ent.^ Whereas In the case of A ir In d ia ,^
71 72
Indian A ir Lines Corporation, and the O il and Natural Gas Commission, 
the accounts of the Corporations are audited annually by the Comptroller 
and Auditor-General of India.
There are provisions In the enactments creating the Industrial
73 74Finance Corporation, the Life Insurance Corporation and the Food Cor-
75poratlon prescribing that auditors appointed to audit the accounts of the 
Corporation must be duly qualified to act as auditors of Companies under 
Section 226 of the Companies A ct, 1956.
68. S .3 4 (l), I .F .C . A ct, 1948.
69 . 5 .25(1 ), L . l .C .  A ct, 1956.
70. S .15(2), AlrCorpns. Act, 1953.
71. S. 15(2), Ibid.
72. S .22(4), Q  & N .G .C .  A ct, 1959.
73. S .34(1), I .F .C .  A c t, 1948.
74. S .25(1), L . l .C .  A c t, 1956.
75. S .34(2), F .C . I .  A c t, 1964.
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In the case of the Damodar Valley Corporation, auditors are 
appointed In such manner as may be prescribed by rules In consultation with 
the Comptroller and A ud ito r-G enera l.^
The affairs of the State Bank are to be audited by two auditors
duly qualified to act as auditors of companies under Section 226 of the Com-
panles A c t, 1956, who w ill be appointed by the Reserve Bank In consultation
with the Central G overnm ent.^ Whereas In the case of the Reserve Bank,
auditors are appointed by the Bank Itself but their remuneration Is fixed by
78the Central Government.
Some statutes contain specific provisions which provide that
auditors have power to examine the annual balance-sheet, profit & loss
79account, vouchers and other books of account. In addition to the above
power, auditors of the Industrial Finance Corporation and the State Bank may,
In relation to such accounts, examine any director or any member of a Local
'80Board or of a Local Committee or any offfcer of the Corporations.
Auditors of the Employees' State Insurance Corporation enjoy a similar power.'
76 . S .47 , D .V .C . A ct, 1948.
77 . S .41 (1), S .B .I.  A ct, 1955.
78 . S.50(1), R .B .I. A ct, 1934.
79 . S.34(2), E .S . I .  Act, 1948; S .34(2), I .F .C . A c t, 1948; S. 15(3) Air
Corpns. A ct, 1953; S .25(2), L . l .C .  Act, 1956; S .34(4), F .C . I .  A ct, 
1964; S .4 l(6 ), S .B .I. A ct, 1355T
80 . S.34(3), I .F .C .  Act, 1948; S.41 <b)(c), S .B .I. A c t, 1955.
81 . S .34(2), E .S . I .  Act, 1948.
Professor V .V . Ramanadham right ly observed that:
audit of accounts of statutory corporations 
carrying on a commercial activity by the 
Comptroller and Auditor-General appears 
to be objectionable. His traditions and 
methods of auditing are different from those 
of commercial auditors, and there Is a 
danger that while auditing the accounts 
of the Corporations, he may apply the 
principles of government audit rather than 
of commercial audit and this may create 
difficulties for the persons managing com­
mercial enterprises who may have to take 
Initiative and use discretion In various 
matters. 82
The present position Is that the Government has decided to set up an Audit 
Board for the audit of public enterprises. It should be under the juris­
diction and control of the Comptroller and Auditor-General. The structure 
and function of this Institution has been discussed In the Chapter on Govern­
ment Companies.
82. V ,V .  Ramanadham: The Structure of Public Enterprises In India, 
(1961), pages 162-163"]
4 .6  What Ts the Legal Status of Employees?
The majority of the statutes establishing public corporations pro­
vide that the corporations may appoint such number of officers and employees 
as It considers necessary for the efficient performance of Its functions. The 
methods of appointment, the functions and the conditions of service will! be
such as may be determined by regulations made by the corporation under the
a * 83 A c t.
The Administrative Reforms Commission, (1967) was of the opinion 
that a ll appointments below the board level should be made by the board I t ­
self, except that the appointments of chief executive of the undertaking and 
Its financial adviser should be made by the board In consultation with the 
government.84
85The Government has now decided that the public enterprises 
w ill be competent both to create posts, and to make appointments thereto, 
Irrespective of pay, for a ll posts below the board level (excluding only
83. S .23(1) & (2 ), L . l .C .  Act, 1956; $.12(1) & (2), Q &  N .G .C .  A ct, 
1959; 5 .8 , A ir Corpns. A ct, 1953; S. 12(2) & (3), F .C . I .  A ct, 1964.
84. Report, supra at page
85. A Hand Book of Information on ‘ Public Undertakings, (1970), pages
150-151.
the General Managers of Constttuent Untts) without any reference. The
appointments of Financial Advisers w ill also be made by the Boards. But
In the appointment to posts carrying scale of Rs.2500-3000 and above, of 
persons above 58 years In age, approval of Government, however, would 
be required.
The public corporations In common law jurisdiction have followed
86the rule that their employees should not have the status of C iv il Servants.
The significance of this, says Professor Robson, Is that there Is no control by 
the Treasury or the C iv il Service Commission, or even Parliament, over
87remuneration, conditions of service and establishment questions generally.
The employees of the public corporations In India as w e ll, do not 
enjoy the status of C iv il Servants because a public corporation has a separate 
legal and Independent existence and Is distinct from the Union or the State 
Government with Its own properjjand Its own fund. The position Is now
firmly established by the various High Courts that an employee of the Life
88 89Insurance Corporation, or of the State Bank, or of the Damodar Va lley
86. W . Friedmann (Ed.): Government Enterprise (1970), page 317.
87. W .A . Robson: Nationalised Industry and Public Ownership (1962), 
page 67.
88. R.B. Rathaur v . P .M . ,  L1C, AIR (1961) A l l .502.
89. S. Mukherjee v . SIB, AIR (1962) C a l. 72 .
90 91Corporation or of the State Transport Corporation, Is not considered a
C iv il Servant and, therefore, Is not entitled to the protection against dis­
missal or reduction In rank guaranteed under Article 311 of the Constitution.
It Is relevant to note that though some statutes confer on their 
employees the status of public servants for certain purposes, for example,
Section 50 of the Damodar Valley Corporation A ct, 1948, provides that the 
employee of the Corporation "shall be deemed, when acting or purporting to 
act, In pursuance of any of the provisions of the Act, to be public servants 
within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code", even the pre-
IsJ (rvi^ L iA rc t> t t£k. S & y i / c i ^ L v  ^
sence of such a clause In a statute/vlthln the meaning of Article 311 of the 
Constitution of India .
According to Section 121 of the Indian Penal Code, the words 
"public servant" mean an officer of the Government whose duty It Is, as such 
officer, to prevent offences, to give Information on offences, to bring offend­
ers to justice, or to protect the public health, safety or convenience. This 
Section also covers every officer, whose duty It Is to take, receive, keep or 
extend any property on behalf of the Government or to execute any revenue 
process or to Investigate or to report on any matter affecting the pecuniary
90. R. Ghosh v . DVC, AIR (I960) C a l. 549.
91. Mafatlal v . D .C . ,  STC, AIR (1966), S .C . 1364.
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Interests of Government or to make, authenticate, or keep any document relat­
ing to the pecuniary Interests of Government, or to prevent the Infraction of 
any law for the protection of the pecuniary Interests of Government and every
officer In the service or pay of Government, or remunerated by fee or commts-
92
slon for the performance of any public duty. It has also been stated In the 
Penal Code that persons falling under any one of the above descriptions are 
"public servants” whether appointed by the Government or not. However, It  
Is submitted that even I f  this wider definition of ” pub lie servant” Is held to In­
clude the servants of the Corporation within Its ambit, the judicial test by the 
Supreme Court for considering the validity of a claim for such privilege ( I .e .  
Civil Servant) w ill discourage any claim on behalf of the Corporation and Its 
employees. It Is hoped that the Courts w ill refuse to uphold such claim when 
made on behalf of the Corporation.
92. S .2 ] ,  Clause (9) of the Indian Penal Code.
4 .7  PublTc Controls over Public Corporations
In the economic fie ld , the Indtan Constttutton requires the State
to bring about a fair and just distribution of ownership and control of the
means of production, prevent concentration of wealth In the hands of a few ,
93and eliminate a ll types of exploitation of workers. In order to achieve 
these objectives the Government's participation In Industry and commerce 
was Inevitable. The principal reasons for vesting the ownership and control 
In autonomous public corporations, Instead of bringing them under the normal 
departmental management, was to encourage a spirit of Initiative and enter­
prise. Socialization Is perhaps the greatest Ideal of a public corporation.
The Corporations are supposed to enjoy a certain degree of auto­
nomy and flexib ility  and are free from Interference In their Internal matters. 
But It has been mentioned earlier that too much Interference by the Govern­
ment would reduce the status of a public corporation to that of a Government 
department, It Is equally true that too little Interference would place It  out­
side the democratic regime. No country which has used this Instrument as 
an organ of Government policy has denied the right of ministerial control 
over I t .  But the degree of control varies from one country to another. It 
Is generally admitted that the control has been necessary to regulate the rate
93. Articles 39 -  51.
pf capital development of these corporations; to make known the wishes of 
the Government, which guarantees most of their capital-; to prevent the 
Board from becoming complacent and unenterprising and to see that the decl 
slons are In harmony with the Government's economic and social policy.
If these enterprises are left completely free, they might become the "head-
94less fourth branch of the Government".
(a) M r. Herbert Morrison, the Chief architect of the modem 
corporation, has expressed the following view regarding the relationship 
which should exist between Ministers and Boards:
Clearly It  Is desirable that the Minister 
should keep himself familiar with the 
general work of the Board or Boards with 
which he Is concerned. It Is wise for 
him with his Parliamentary Secretary and 
principal officers concerned from time to 
time to meet the Chairman and, Indeed, 
the members of the Board, to discuss 
matters of mutual Interest either form­
a lly  or Informally, On such occasions 
both the Board and the Minister w ill be 
conscious of their legal rights: the legal 
right of the Minister to give genera I dir­
ections or to withhold approvals, and 
the legal rights of the Board within the 
field of day-to-day management; but 
It Is also desirable that such discussion 
should be free, frank, forthcoming, and 
co-operative. 95
94. Davies: Administrative Law Treatise (1958), V o l . l ,  page 281.
95. H . Morrison: Government & Parliament, (1954), page 264.
4 .8  MTntstertal Control tn Brtfatn
In post-War nattonaltztng statutes tn Brttatn, tt seems clear that
mtntstertal control over publtc corporattons has shown a tendency towards tn -
creastng. In the case of the pre-1945 corporattons, the Mtntster had no
power to tssue dtrecttons of poltcy; the Chatrman and members of the govern-
tng board were not removable by the Mtntster at w tll, and there was less
mtntstertal control tn matters of ftnance and audtt than tn the case of the
96post-1945 corporattons. Chester ts of the optnton that "the wtde
powers gtven to Mtntsters tn recent nattonaltzatton legtslatton open the way
to comfortable back-seat drtvtng, so reductng the respons 1btitty and dtscret-
97ton and, therefore, ulttmately, the caltbre of the board of management.”
He has suggested that there should be a clearer dtvtston of responstbtltty be­
tween the Mtntster and the board, so that the corporatton can run on sound 
bustness prtnctples. Even today, mtntstertal control over corporattons ts 
conftned to the followtng matters only:-
(a) The Mtntster appotnts the members of the boards of publtc corporattons, 
determtnes thetr salartes and condtttons of servtce, and has power to 
termtnate thetr appotntments;
96. D .N .  Chester: The Nattonaltsed Industries (1952), pages 13-14.
97. Ib td ., pages 42 -43 .
(b) The Mtntster can tssue general poltcy dtrecttons to the Corporattons-#
(c) Captta! tnvestment and borrowtng by the Corporatton requtre mtnt­
stertal approval;
(d) The Mtntster appotnts the audttors of the accounts of the Corporattonsi 
and the form of the Accounts and Annual Reports are subject to hts 
approval;
(e) The Mtntster's approval ts requtred for a Corporatton^ programmes for 
research and development, pension, and tratntng schemes for the staff 
and
(f) The Mtntster has constderable powers tn relatton to the Consumer
98Counctls assoctated wtth some of the Corporattons.
The spectftc powers of the Mtntster are normally provtded tn a 
statute, but tn practtce, a Mtntster goes beyond hts statutory powers and 
often tnformally meets the members of the board and gtves poltcy dtrecttons 
over a lunch-table or behtnd closed doors. Thts practtce has tnvtted crttt- 
ctsm from Professor W . Robson; he satd that:
the Mtntsters should not be permttted to 
rematn tn the twtltght zone tn whtch some 
of them love to dw ell, flttttng happtly 
from one prtvate meettng to another, 
talktng thtngs over wtth the Chatrman 
at lunch, tn the club, tn the House of 
Commons, tn the department, wtthout
98. H . Morrtson: Government & Parltament (1954), pages 260-261.
dtsclostng etther to the publtc or to Parlta- 
ment the real extent of thetr tnterven- 
tton. 99
It needs to be potnted out that the Mtntster has a statutory power to gtve
general dtrecttons/ but tt ts very often not done openly. A  >typtcal pro-
vtston regardtng thts runs as follows: "The Mtntster shall have power to gtve
the board dtrecttons of a general character as to the exerctse of tts functtons
100on matters appeartng to htm to affect the nattonal tnterest." The power
to tssue general dtrecttons has been rarely used, e .g . tt has neverbeen tn use 
tn relatton to any board for whtch the Mtntster of Power ts responstble, nor 
by the Mtntster of Transport under the Transport A ct, 1962 (although tt was 
used twtce durtng the ftfteen years durtng whtch the 1947 Act was on the 
Statute Book). ^
Recently, tt was di£e.losa£tn the House of Commons that the 
Secretary of State for Industry, M r. Varley, dtd tssue dtrecttves to the 
Chatrman of the Brtttsh Steel Corporatton to cover up the ftnanctal loss 
suffered by the Corporatton (1978).
99. W .H . Robson: Nattonaltzed Industry and Publtc Ownershtp ( i960), 
page 162.
100. S .3(1), Coal Industry Nattonaltsatton A ct, 1946; S . l l ,  Post Offtce 
A ct, 1959^
101. C .D . Drake: "Publtc Corporatton as an Organ of Government Poltcy" 
tn the Government Enterprtse, Frtedmann (ed.) ,  page 32.
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4 .9  Mtntstertal Control Tn Indta
There appear to be no dtverse vtews of the necesstty for mtnt­
stertal control over a publtc corporatton, the argument ts over the degree 
of control and the manner of tts exerctse. Mtntstertal control may be con­
ducted through vartous devtces. Let us now examtne the statutory powers 
that are avatlable to the Mtntster concerned and the extent to whtch they are 
used to exert tnfluence on the Chatrman and the members of the governtng 
board of a corporatton.
(t) Appotntment and Removal
The Mtntster can appotnt and remove the Chatrman, dtrectors or 
members of the board, and the managtng dtrectors, a task whtch gtves the 
Mtntster considerable power. As no postttve qualtftcattons for member­
ship are latd down, the Mtntster ts free to find the best persons and appotnt
them. The grounds of removal may Tnclude refusal to work, tncapactty for
102acttng, abuse of posttton, general unsuttabtltty, or J any reason whtch
103may appear to be sufftctent. The State Bank A ct, 1955, provtdes that 
the Central Government has the power to remove, after consultatton wtth the
102. S .51 , D .V .C . A ct, 1948.
103. S .8 , R .F .A . A ct, 1948; S .11(1), R .B .I. A ct, 1934; S .9 (l)  & (2), 
F .C . I .  A ct, 1964.
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Reserve Bank, the Chatrman and the Vtce-Chatrman and any dtrector nomt- 
104
nated by them. These powers are exerctsable only on the ground spe-
ctfted tn the enactments. The vartous statutes confer a regulatton-maktng
power on the corporattons, but the power ts exerctsable subject to the previous
105approval of the Central Government.
As there ts no provision tn the statutes tn respect of the tneltgt- 
btltty of a member for re-appotniment, the Central Government have the 
power to re-appotnt members at the end of thetr terms of office. Such a 
power tn the hands of Ministers, no doubt, encourages members to show 
thetr allegiance to the appointing authority and at the same ttme, the 
re-appotntment whtch depends upon the mtntstertal goodwill may have an 
adverse effect on freedom of actton.
(tt) Dissolution
In certain statutes, the Central Government has been gtven power 
of dissolution and Itqutdatton. The O il and Natural Gas Commtsston A ct, 
1959, em*powers the Central Government to dissolve the Commtsston
104. S .24(1) & (3), S .B .I. A ct, 1955.
105. S .49, L . l .C .  A ct, 1956; S .42, C .W .C . A ct, 1956; S .3 2 (l) , O  & 
N .G .C .  A ct, 1959; S .45 (l) & (2), f . C . l .  A d 7 T ? 6 4 .
106. S .30 (l) & (2), O  & N .G .C .  A ct, 1959.
182.
and also provides that on such declaration, a ll assets, liabilities and obli­
gations vested In the Commission shall vest In the Central Government and 
all members shall vacate their offices as members of the Commission. It Is 
noticeable that enactments creating public corporations like the Life Insur­
ance Corporation, the E m p lo y e e s *  State Insurance Corporation, the A ir  
Corporations, the Reserve Bank, the State Bank and the Food Corporation, 
do not contain any provision In respect of dissolution. We are unable to 
find any special reason for this. The Damodar V a lley  Corporation A ct, 
1948, only confers on the Central Government the power to remove the 
Chairman and the members of the Corporation and appoint a Chairman and 
members In their places.
Several statutes provide a specific provision for liquidation.
A typical provision Is S .38 of the Life Insurance Corporation A ct, which 
provides:
No provision of law relating to the winding 
up of companies or corporations shall apply 
to the Corporation established under this 
A ct, and the Corporation shall not be 
placed In liquidation save by order of the 
Central Government and In such manner 
as that Government may direct. 108
107. S .51(6), D .V .C . A ct, 1946.
108. S .38 , L . l .C .  A c t, 1956; S .37, I .F .C . A ct, 1948; S .57, Reserve 
Bank Act', 1^34; S .45, State Bank A ct, 1955; S .43 , F .C . I .  A ct, 
196?: " "
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(tit) Dtrecttons
Almost a ll the statutes creattng publtc corporattons have con­
ferred on the Central Government the powers to gtve dtrecttons on matters 
of general poltcy. Thts has been provtded tn the statutes perhaps to strtke 
the rtght balance between the governmental power and the autonomy of the 
publtc corporattons.
These dtrecttons are usually of a general character fcufthe Cor­
porattons are bound to follow these tnstructtons and to shape thetr poltctes tn 
accordance wtth them. Thus, the Ltfe Insurance Corporatton A ct, 1956r  
provtdes that:
tn the dtscharge of tts functtons under thts 
A ct, the Corporatton shall be gutded by 
such dtrecttons tn matters of poltcy tnvolv- 
tng publtc tnterest as the Central Govern­
ment may gtve to tt tn wrtttng? and tf any 
questton artses whether a dtrectton relates 
to a matter of poltcy tnvolvtng publtc tn­
terest the dectston of the Central Govern­
ment thereon shall be ftnal. 109
A stmtlar provtston extsts tn the Damodar Valley Corporatton Act, 1 9 4 8 .^ ^  
The dtrecttons latd down tn the Atr Corporattons A ct, 1953^ are more spectftc
109. S .21, L .I  .C . Act, 1956.
110. S .48, D .V .C . A ct, 1948.
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Section 34(1) lays down that ”the Central Government may give to either of 
the Corporations directions as to the exercise and performance by the Corpor­
ation of Its functions and the Corporation shall be bound to give effect to any 
such directions ”, and Section 34(2) provides that :
the Central Government may, If  It Is of 
opinion that It Is expedient In the national 
Interest so to do after consultation with the 
Corporation concerned, direct either of 
the Corporations -
(a) to undertake any a|r transport service 
or other activity which the Corporation 
has power to undertake;
(b) to discontinue or make any change In 
any scheduled air transport service or 
other activity which It Is operating or 
carrying on;
(c) not to undertake any activity which It 
proposes to do •
The Government may also direct the transfer of any air service or property from 
one of the A ir Corporations to the other. ^
In the case of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, the Central
112Government may give such 'general or special* directions as It  thinks f it .
Failure to comply with the Government's directions may ~ ■
6vLp>Z'T£e£S L 0 ^ * * 3  CLf. //J& B o o ^ 'r o i  0 - f  2> c - r ^ ^ ' t o ’TS
111. S .39, Air Corpns. A ct, 1953.
112. S .19, R .F .A . A ct, 1948.
113. S .6(5), I .F .C . A ct, 1948.
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114tn the case of the Industrial Finance Corporation, and removal of the 
Chairman and the members In the case of the Damodar Valley Corporation.
In certain cases, the Central Government may give directions on policy 
matters after consultation with some authority. Thus, the Central Govern­
ment may from time to time, give such directions to the Bank as It  may, after
consultation with the Governor of the Bank, consider necessary In the public 
115Interest. The State Bank A ct, 1955, provides that the Bank shall be
guided by such directions In matters of policy Involving public Interest as 
the Central Government may, In consultation with the Governor of the Re­
serve Bank and the Chairman of the State Bank, give to l t . ^ ^  It also pro­
vides that a ll directions given by the Central Government shall be given
H 7
through the Reserve Bank.
The Central Government Is empowered to supersede the Board of 
Directors of the Reserve Bank, and the Corporation and the Standing Committee 
In the case of the Employees* State Insurance Corporation, If  they fall to carry
114. S .51 (6), P .V .C .  A ct, 1948.
115. S .7(1), R .B .l. A ct, 1934.
116. S .18(1), S .B .I1. A ct, 1955.
117. S .18(2), S .B .I. Act, 1955.
118out the obligations Tmposed on them by these Acts.
The power to tssue genera! dtrecttons has been rarely used.
As the board of management ts appotnted by the Minister, he can achteve hts
objectives through dtscusston and pressure* without giving In writing a forma!
direction. The Minister and the Secretary of the department concerned are
In actual practice, able to exerclse^greater degree of control over the under-
120takings than what Is formally envisaged by the statutes. The Estimates
Committee has also drawn the attention to the authority In this regard. It
121stated In Its report that:
. . .  the relations between these undertak­
ings and the Ministry, the former are 
treated In the same manner as Depart­
ments and Offices of Government con­
trolled and supervised by the Secretariat.
The State undertakings have thus become 
adjuncts to Ministries and are treated 
more or less on the same I Ines as any 
subordinate organisation or office. The
118. S .30, R .B .l. A ct, 1934.
119. S .21, E .S .I.  A ct, 1948. T .R . Sharma: The Working of State Enter- 
prlse In India (1970), page 80. (In 1965-66, only two directives appear 
to have been Issued, one to the Life Insurance Corporation and the other 
to the Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. However, he did not give 
any further details).
120. Administrative Reforms Commission Study Team, Report, at page 65.
121. Estimates Committee -  16th Report ( l .L .S .)  (1954-55), page 4 .
Committee deplore this tendency which has 
had a harmful effect on the productive ac ti­
vity of the undertakings as these have been 
subjected to a ll the usual red-tape and pro­
cedural delays common to a government de­
partment with serious consequential effect 
on production.
A similar observation has been made by the Chagle Commission, 
appointed to Investigate certain matters regarding the Life Insurance Corpor­
ation:
In my opinion, Section 21 (of the Life Insur- 
ance Corporation A ct, 1956) embodies the 
Ideal compromise between the autonomy of a 
Statutory Corporation and the control which 
must be exercised by a welfare state over 
such a corporation, while leaving the Cor­
poration complete Independence to manage 
Its own day-to-day administration, while 
leaving It free to Invest Its funds In the 
Interests of the policy holders, Government 
could only control Its discretion when a 
question of policy Involving public Inter­
est arose . . .  In my opinion, It  Is most 
unfortunate that the wise and sound prin­
ciple laid down In Section 21 has not been 
adhered to In the working of the Life Insur­
ance Corporation. The evidence before 
me . • .  clearly shows that there was a ten­
dency on the part of the Finance Ministry 
to look upon the Corporation as a wing 
or branch of that Ministry and to Issue 
orders to It In the belief that the Corpor- ^ 2  
iitton was bound to carry out those orders.
122. Chagla Commission: Report on the Life Insurance Corporation, 
(1958), page 36.
It may be suggested that the Corporations can function efficiently  
and successfully provided the Minister's directives are confined to the matters 
of policy only and the Informal ministerial control Is kept to the very minimum. 
The Administrative Reforms Commission has rightly remarked that:
It would be a sanguine rule that In order 
to preserve the autonomy of the Under­
takings, Informal controls are minimised 
and Important policy decisions are con­
tained In written directives which are 
published In the annual reports of the 
Undertakings so that responsibility for 
the same may be placed squarely on the 
Ministry. 123
It Is relevant to mention that In Britain the actual practice regard­
ing 'directives' Is that the directions Issued by the Ministers to the Corpora­
tions have to be published In the annual reports unless the Minister advtses 
that It  would be detrimental to the national Interest to do so.
India's position In this regard Is very similar to that of Britain. 
Where the Government considers It necessary to Issue a directive to a public 
enterprise asking It to act In a manner different from that dictated by the eco­
nomic considerations, this should be In writing, and this fact should speclfl-
124cally find a mention In the annual report of the concerned public enterprise.
123. Administrative Reforms Commission, Report on Public Sector Under­
takings, 31 (1967).
124. A  Hand Book of Information on Public Undertakings, page 151.
In answer to a wrttten question enquiring whether a directive has
been Issued to the management of public undertakings on wage revision or 
Improvement of service conditions, the Minister for Finance stated as follows:
The Inflationary pressures which developed 
In 1971 have since been accentuated by 
the drought, floods, e tc .,  Tn various parts 
of the country during 1972. In thts con­
text, Government felt that proposals for 
general wage revisions Tn the Central 
Government Industrial and commercial 
enterprises should be viewed Tn the broad­
er context of the economy as a whole 
taking Into account their wider reper­
cussions. Government have, there­
fore, decided that general revision of 
wages or Increase In fringe benefits Tn 
these enterprises should be done Tn con” j25  
sultatlon wtth the Central Government.
The fact remains, however, that the Government seldom Issue 
policy directives.
(Iv) Financial Control
The financial Independence Is considered to be the life-blood of 
an enterprise. The term ‘autonomy* w ill be meaningless If  the governing
125. Lok Sabha Debates, 2 March, 1973, page 92.
126. Lok Sabha Debates until 1976 failed to provide another question on 
this subject.
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board Ts not permitted to manage Tts own affatrs. The Corporations especi­
ally  the financial, Industrial and commercial, therefore, should be free from 
delays caused by excessive government control, although, obviously, It does 
not mean that they w ill enjoy unrestricted freedom In this respect. In fact, 
the Mtntster exercises a great deal of control over the public corporations In 
this fie ld . This Is true to say that ministerial control becomes very effective 
when It Is applied through financial strings.
(a) Capital
The capital stock of a ll public corporations Is raised In accordance 
with the provisions as set out In the respective statutes.
The Food Corporation Act, 1964, lays down that the original capital 
of the Corporation shall be a sum not exceeding one hundred crores of rupees and 
If  need be, the Central Government may from time to time Increase the capital 
of the Corporation to such extent and In such manner as that Government may 
determine. It Is provided after due appropriation made by Parliament by law 
for the purpose.
For the Rehabilitation Finance Administration, the! financial pro­
vision Is that the Central Government may from time to time, advance money
128to It not exceeding Rs. 14.5 crores, subject to the payment of an Interest
127. S .5(1) to 5(3), F .C . I .  A ct, 1964.
128. S .11, R .F .A . A c t, 1948.
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by the admTnTstratton at 3 per cent. The earntngs of the Corporation con-
stst of the Interest It realises on loans made to displaced persons, (these are
the people who have migrated from East and West Pakistan when India was
partitioned In 1947), at a rate not exceeding 6 per cent. The profits and
gains of the Administration are free from the Income, super, and business 
129profits-tax.
The Damodar Valley Corporation has Its own fund, a ll receipts
130are credit to and a ll payments are made from I t .  The three responsible
Governments, the Governments of India, Bihar and West Bengal, are to pro­
vide the entire capital needed by the Corporation for the completion of the
projects undertaken by It ,  In proportions specified for the various kinds of pro- 
131jects In the A c t. Each Government should pay Its share of capital re­
quired, on a date or dates specified by the Corporation, and should It fa ll
to do so, the Corporation may raise a loan to make up the deficit at the cost
132of the Government concerned.
The authorised capital of the Industrial Finance Corporation
133was fixed at 10 crores of rupees divided Into 20 thousand fully paid-up
129. S .20, R .F .A . A ct, 1948.
130. S S .2 9 & 30, P .V .A .  Act, 1948.
131. Ib id ., SS.34, 35 and 36.
132. Ib id ., S .31.
133. S .4 , I .F .C . A ct, 1948.
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shares of Rs.5000 each. O f these 10,000 shares were Tssued Tn the ftrst
Instance , out of whtch 2,500 were subscribed by the Central Government, 
and 2,500 by the Reserve Bank. Insurance companies and other financial 
Institutions could subscribe 2 ,500 shares In a ll,  and the co-operative banks 
1,000 shares. The repayment of shares Is guaranteed by the Central Govern- 
m ent.134
The authorised capital of the State Bank was fixed at Rs.20 crores
135
divided Into 20.00.000 fully paid-up shares of Rs.100 each. The Issued
capital of the Bank was maintained at Rs. 5 .6 2 .5 0 .0 0 0  divided Into 5 .62 ,500
shares of Rs.100 each allotted to the Reserve Bank In lieu of the shares of the
Imperial Bank of India transferred to I t .  The Central Board may from time to
time Increase the Issued capital, but no Increase Tn the Issued capital shall be
made Tn such a manner that the Reserve Bank holds at any time less than 55 per
cent of the Issued capital. The Tssued capital cannot be Increased beyond
twelve crores and fifty  lakhs of rupees without the previous approval of the
136Central Government. The holding of shares by Individuals Is permitted 
under the Industrial Finance Act and the State Bank A c t. The State Bank Act
134. S .36, l .F .C . A ct, 1948.
135. S .4 , S .B .I. A ct, 1955.
136. Ib id ., S .5(2) and (3).
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provtdes thar no person shall be regtstered as a shareholder tn respect of any 
shares held by htm, whether Tn hts own name or jotntly wtth any other per­
son, tn excess of 200 shares , but thts restrtctton does not apply to the Reserve 
Bank, a Corporatton, an tnsured as deftned by the Insurance A c t, 1938, a
I ocal authortty, a co-operattve soctety and a trustee of a publtc or prtvate
137reltgtous or charttable trust. Stmtlar restrtcttons on the tndtvtdual
138holdtng of shares extst tn the Industrtal Ftnance Corporatton A ct. 1948.
There ts no provtston regardtng guatanteetng the shares of the Bank found tn 
the Act creattng the Corporatton.
In the case of the two Atr Corporattons, the tntttal expendtture
tncurred was provtded by the Central Government, whtch may also provtde
any further capttal that may be requtred by etther of the Corporattons for the
carrytng on of the bustness of the Corporatton or for any purpose connected
therewtth, on such terms and condtttons as the Central Government may deter- 
139mtne. An tdenttcal provtston ts found tn the O tI and Natural Gas Corn-
140mtsston A c t, 1959. (no amount was menttoned).
The Ltfe Insurance A ct, 1956, provtdes that the ortgtnal capttal
137. Ib td ., S .11(1).
138. S .4 (3), l .F .C . A ct, 1948.
139. S. 10(1) & (2), Atr Corpns. A c t, 1953.
140. S. 16(1) & (2), O  & N .G .C .  A ct, 1959.
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of the Corporatton shall be ftve crores of rupees provided by the Central 
Government after due appropriation made by Parliament by law for the 
purpose and the Central Government Is authorised, on the recommenda­
tion of the Corporation, to reduce the capital of the Corporation to such
]4 ]
extent and In such manner as the Central Government may determine.
The fund of the Employees* State Insurance Corporation consists
of contributions made by the employers and employees at prescribed rates
142and all other monies received on behalf of the Corporation. Loan- 
143capital was also provided by the Central Government, but which was
144
adjustable against the annual grants which the Central Government was 
under an obligation to make to the Corporation for the first five years after 
the establishment of the Corporation.
The Corporation Is authorised to accept grants, donations and
gifts from the Central and State Governments, local authorities and Ind lv l-
145duals or bodies or a ll or any of the purposes of the A ct.
141. S .5(1) & (2), L . l .C .  A ct, 1956.
142. S .26(1), E .S .l.  A c t, 1948.
143. S .31, Ibid.
144. S .31, Ibid.
145. S .26(2), Ibid.
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In some cases, a Corporatton has to submtt to the Central Govern­
ment tts programme and budget for the next year. Thus, the Food Corporatton 
A ct, 1964, provtdes that "the Food Corporatton shall, before the commencement 
of each year, prepare a statement of programme of tts acttvtttes durtng the forth- 
comtng year as well as a ftnanctal esttmate tn respect thereof, at least three 
months before the commencement of each year."
A stmtlar provtston extsts tn the O tl and Natural Gas Commtsston 
A ct, 1959. 147
(b) Borrowtng
The Mtntster's approval ts also requtred tn the matter of borrowtng
by Corporattons. They are authortsed to borrow money wtth the prevtous
sanctton or consent of the Central Government, or tn accordance wtth the terms
148of any general authority given to them by the Cdntral Government. They
are also permttted to ftnance themselves by tssutng and selltng of bonds and
debentures whtch are guaranteed by the Central Government as to the repay-
149ment of prtnctpal and the payment of tnterest thereon. Bestdes control­
ling the rate of the dtvtdend which Is declared by the Corporattons out of their
146. S .26 .
147. S .21 .
148. S .42 , D .V .C . A c t, 1948; S . 10(3), AlrCorpns. A ct, 1953.
149. S .21(2), l .F .C . A ct, 1948; S. 10, AtrCorpns. A c t, 1953.
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net proftts, Government may also share tn whole or tn part, the proftts
150made by the Corporatton.
The accounts of the Corporattons have to be prepared and kept 
tn a form settled tn consultatton wtth the Central Government or the Comp­
troller and Audttor-General, and the accounts are normally audited and 
examined by audttors appotnted by the Mtntster or by the Audttor-General 
htmself. (Thts questton has already been discussed tn some detatl tn coonect- 
ton wtth the audtt control.)
The Mtntsters are also entitled to recetve a ll the necessary Inform­
ation from the Corporattons whtch are under a statutory obltgatton to submtt
to the Mtntsters accounts, returns, pertodtc statements, annual ftnanctal estt-
151mates, programmes and the annual report on the acttvtttes and working.
In 1965, the Central Government created the offtce of the Bureau 
of Public Enterprises, wtthtn the framework of the Mtntstry of Finance, wtth a 
vtew to matntatntng co-ordtnatton between the policy of the Government and 
tts Implementation through the Instrumentaltttes of these publtc corporattons.
In thetr 52nd Report (III Lok Sabha, page 57, 1963-64), on Personnel Poltctes 
of Publtc Undertakings, the Esttmates Commtttee fe lt the need for an agency 
tn the Government of India whtch could gather together, classtfy and
150. S .32, l .F .C . A ct, 1948; S .37, D .V .C . A ct, 1948.
151. S .45 , D .V .C . A ct, 1948; S .18, R .F .A . A c t, 1948; S .37 , AlrCorpns.
A ct, 1953; S .35 , l .F .C . A ct, 1948; S .32 , E .S . I .A c t ,  1948; S .27, 
L .I.C .T C c t, 1956; 5 .3 5 , H .C . I . A ct, 1964;~5T^3, 0~5"N .G ~.C . A ct, 1959.
communicate such of the recommendations of the Committee as were of general 
application to a ll public enterprises though the recommendation was contained 
In a report which was of Immediate and direct Interest only to one Ministry.
The then Secretary of the Ministry of Industry, speaking as a wttness on be­
half of the Government, promised to get the matter examined and see I f  such 
an agency could be useful In other matters of common concern to public enter­
prises and I f  so, to set this up. And the Bureau was set up In A pril, 1965, 
to perform the followtng functions:-
(1) To provide a central point of reference and consultation and to deal 
with matters of general Interest, such as organisational patterns, methods 
of management, personnel policies, collaboration arrangements, training 
programmes, project planning, economic, financial anil social policies.
(2) To explore a ll avenues of economy In the capital costs of the projects.
(3) To devise steps for Improving productivity and profitability of public 
enterprises.
(4) To undertake appraisal and evaluation of selected areas tn the perform­
ance of public enterprises from time to time.
(5) To prepare annual reports for presentation to Parliament, and also other
reports that might be called by Committees of Parliament or other
. 152
Government agencies.
152. Organisation, Set-up and Functions of the Ministries/Departments of the
Government of India, 253, (3rd e d .), published by the Ministry of Finance.
In 1974, a back-bench M .P . wanted to know whether the Bureau 
of Publtc Enterprises had made any study of the basic problems In functioning 
of public undertakings and the measures proposed to be taken to meet these 
problems. The Minister for Finance had this to say:
The Bureau of Public Enterprises has found 
out that some of the basic problems of pub­
ltc enterprises relate to the long gestation 
periods, the time taken to develop sktlls In 
some sophisticated Industries, shortage of 
raw materials, components, power and un­
satisfactory Industrial relations, and In 
some cases, Inadequacy of demand.
Some of the Important measures taken to 
Improve the operations of public enter­
prises relate to:
(t) Improvements In organisational struct­
ure and manning at the corporate as 
well as plant level;
(tt) Improvements In technology, operating 
method and maintenance system;
(ill) diversification and export to Improve 
capacity u tlllza tlo  n;
(Iv) provision of additional facilities to 
remove bottlenecks and Imbalances;
(v) Improvement of the quality and avail­
ability of Indigenous materials;
(vl) Import of critical components and raw 
materials;
(vU) Improvement In Industrial relations, 
communication system, personnel 
management, training and develop­
ment;
(vlll) Institution of Improved Incentive/ 
reward scheme at a ll levels.
153. Lok Sabha Debates, 15 March, 1974, V o l. 36, pages 114-115.
The Bureau, therefore, Ts aiuseful TnstTtutton to brtng about an 
all-round Improvement Tn the publtc enterprises through better management, 
higher production and higher return on Investment.
We have mentioned above the capital structures of some corpora­
tions as set out In the respective statutes,as a result of which the boards have 
the advantage of operating under those well-defined terms. But there are 
some areas whose decisional Initiative may vest Tn the boards themselves, 
but which sufficiently Involve broader consideration that call for govern­
mental attention and sanction. Examples may be cited of the pricing struct­
ures, Investment policy and dividend policy. It Is noticeable that there has 
been a greater Ministerial control In these areas.
One broad provision relating to pricing Is that the public enter­
prise shall conduct Its operations on business principles*. The question Is: 
are the boards free to fix prices on their own productions In accordance with 
market conditions? It w ill be seen that the Importance of pricing In the 
public sector Is being considered In relation to the general economy of the 
country and not In Isolation In respect of a particular Industry. For example, 
a railway*s pricing structure may lead to losses under social pressures or a 
public-owned colliery may sustain high costs by being overmanned.
The pricing policy of certain basic products of national Import­
ance like coal, o il, steel, e tc . Is kept under constant observation and review.
The boards are bound to follow thetr pricing structure Tn accordance wtth the 
Tnstructton Tssued by the Mtntster. The basts of ftxtng the prices of public 
sector products Is stated by the Minister of Finance In Parliament as follows:
(a) In framing the price of the products like 
coal, o il, esteel, e tc . usually the follow­
ing factors are taken tnto consideration:
(I) Cost of production at reasonably achiev­
able capacity.
(II) The ability of consumers to bear the 
prices;
(til) Reasonable margin to be allowed to 
the producers; and
(Tv) Landed cost of Imported products.
(b) In case of a public sector unit which enjoys 
monopoly or near monopoly position with re­
spect to certain products, usually landed 
cost of comparable Imported product Is 
taken as the celling price, below which
a suitable price ts fixed.
(c) In case of certain products like photography 
films, bricks, certain medicines, electronic 
equipments, heavy chemicals, e tc . the 
prices are fixed by normal market forces
of demand and supply. 154
The Government from ttme to time prescribes guide-lines In con­
nection with the appropriation of profits and declaration of dividends for the 
consideration of the Board of Directors of the public undertakings. It Is the 
responsibility of the boards to follow the gulde-Ilnes. The Government
154. Lok Sabha Debates, 30 April, 1976, pages 121-122.
representatives ( I .e .  Secretary) In the board are required to ensure that the
Interests of the Government and the shareholders are kept In view by the
Board of Directors at the time of considering the appropriation of profits
155towards tnternal resources and declaration of dividends.
With regard to capital expenditure and Investment, the Board of
Directors were delegated powers to sanction capital expenditure In cases
where detailed project reports have been prepared with the estimates of
different component parts and where such project reports were approved
by the Government. But an Increase over 20% of the level of Investment
based on the approximate estimates of cost In itia lly  Indicated w ill require
156the approval of the Cabinet.
We could discuss and analyse to what extent these Instructions 
are followed by the Board of Directors In practice, I f  the annual reports of 
some public undertakings werea/allable here.
It Is unfortunate that although the annual reports of the Life
Insurance Corporation, 1974-75, the A ir India Corporation, 1974-75, Coffee
157 bee*
Boards, 1974-75, e tc . havejald on the table  ^ no discussion took place 
on these reports.
155. A  Hand Book of Information on Public Undertakings, page 159.
156. Ib id ., page 157.
157. Lok Sabha Debates, 23 January, 1976, V o l. 56 , pages 125-128.
Therefore, we conclude wtth the remark that some time should be 
spectally earmarked every year for the dtscusston of the annual reports on the 
floor of both Houses of Parliament for better accountability of these under­
takings to the public through Parliament.
4.10 Parliamentary Control
One problem common to all countries Ts that of ensuring that the 
public corporations shall be adequately accountable to Parliament. It ts 
Parliament which creates the public corporations and therefore, Tt ts Tts re­
sponsibility to ensure that they carry out the activities entrusted to them, and 
do not exceed their statutory powers. As Parliament Ts also responsible for 
broad financial policy of the public corporations, tt Is through Tts financial 
powers that It chiefly exerctses control over them. It Is the function of 
Parliament to be the watchdog of the tax-payer and It Is natural that It  should 
be more formal Tn Its relationship and more critical tn Tts approach.
Under a parliamentary form of government, such as the Indian, 
members of Parliament are, therefore, entitled to ask any question about a 
corporation. Parliament^ authority to watch the working or to exert Influ­
ence over the conduct of the corporation Is undisputed In any democrattc 
country. It ts true that In Britain questions about the affairs of a public
corporation must be restricted to those matters for which a Minister Is made
158responsible by statute. But In India, the speaker Is allotted (under Rule 
55) half-an-hour for raising discussion on a matter of a recent question, here
158. "Public Corporation In the U .K ." ,  J .F . Garner In the "Public Enter­
prise", Friedmann (ed.)
an M .P . has a chance to ask a question on matters of policy but not on day-
to-day administration.
Public corporations are accountable to Parliament through M in i­
sters on matters for which Ministers have responsibility, but Ministers are not 
responsible for their day-to-day administration. This point has been ex­
plained clearly by M r. Herbert Morrison. In his words:
It Is, of course, a firm Parliamentary 
rule and tradition that a Minister Is 
accountable to Parllamentfor anything 
he or his Department does or for any­
thing he has powers to do, whether he 
does It  or not. That Is to say, I f  the 
action or possible action Is within the 
field of ministerial power or competence 
the Minister Is answerable to Parliament.
On the other hand, In regard to a ll 
matters declared to be within the dis­
cretion of the authority, tfie Minister 
would be entitled and, Indeed, bound 
to disclaim responsibility. 159
as
So far/4he Indian Parliament Is concerned, the Minister Is answer- 
able to I t ,  but the Indian Rirllament has not prescribed any detailed prin­
ciples governing parliamentary control over the public corporations. This 
problem has been further complicated due to the fact that the Acts creating 
public corporations do not contain any specific provision for Parliamentary 
control except In provision for laying of annual reports, estimates and accounts
159. H . Morllson: Government & Parliament, (1959), pages 256-257.
before Parliament.
The prtnctpal methods whtch Parltament usually appltes for the 
exerctse of dtrect control tnclude questtons by the Members of Parltament, 
debates and examtnatton by Parliamentary Commtttees •
Let us ftrst constder the statutory provtstons whtch are latd down 
tn the vartous statutes.
The Ltfe Insurance Corporation A c t, 1956, provides that the Cen­
tral Government shall place the report of the auditors, the report of the actu­
aries and the report gtvtng an account of the acttvtttes of the Corporatton 
during the year before both Houses of P a r l t a m e n t . T h e  Atr Corporattons 
A ct, 1953, makes further provtston for the submission of the programme of 
the Corporation and of the acttvtttes whtch are Itkely to be undertaken by the 
C o rp o ra tio n .^  The reports thus latd before Parltament are open to dis­
cussion. But the State Bank Act and the Reserve Bank Act make no provt­
ston for submtsston of annual reports to Parltament. However, the reports
of the Reserve Bank are required to be published tn the Offtcal G azette .
162On the recommendation of the Estimates Committee, the Government
160. S .29, L . I .C .  Act* S .35(2), F .C . I .  A c t, 1964; S .23 , O & N .G .C .  
Act, iw :------  -------------------  -------------
161. S .37(1), AtrCorpns. Act, 1953; S .2 6 ( l) , F .C . I .  A ct, 1964.
162. 9th Report (III L .S .) ,  page 5 .
agreed to place the reports of the State Bank and the Reserve Bank on the 
table of both the Houses; but no statutory change has been made for thts 
purposes•
(t) Questions
The best-known weapon for the purpose of ensuring public 
accountability of a public corporation Is the parliamentary question.
But since questions may not be asked on details of day-to-day amtntstratton, 
they have to be confined to those matters where the Minister has specified 
duties under the A c t. Under Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure of the Lok 
Sabha, unless the Speaker otherwise directs, the first hour of every sitting 
shall be available for the asking and answering of questions. The rules of 
admitting questions with regard to public corporations are as follows:-
( I)  Where a question (a) relates to a matter of policy of (b) refers to an 
act or omission of an act on the part of a Minister, or (c) raises a 
matter of public Interest although It may pertain to a mdter of day- 
to-day administration, or In an Individual case, It Is usually admitted 
for oral answer.
(II) A  question to obtain Information from the Corporation concerned Is 
normally admitted as unstarred.
(III) Questions which clearly relate to day-to-day administration and tend 
to throw work on the Ministers and the Corporation Incommensurate
163wtth the result to be obtatned therefrom are generally dtmllowed.
The Mtntster may often refuse to answer on the grounds that he ts 
not responstble. He can do so etther because there ts no clear dtsttnctton be­
tween general poltcy and day-to-day admtntstratton, or because he has chosen 
to tnfluence the Board*s dectston tnformally by prtor consultatton tnstead of 
through clear-cut dtrecttves.
A  Mtntster ts bound to answer a questton whtch falls wtthtn the 
domatn of hts statutory responstbtltty -  for example, a questton relattng to 
appotntment, dtsmtssal, approval or a spectftc dtrectton whtch he ts requtred 
or empowered by statute to gtve.
(tt) Debates
Debate tn Parltament w tll take place on btlls espectally btlls 
tncreastng a Corporatton*s borrowtng powers or on a btll tntroduced to amend 
the ortgtnal statute or on a prtvate memberks motton relattng to a matter of 
urgent publtc tnterest or tmportance or on the day set astde for dtscusstng 
the Boards annual report tn the House. The Governments present and 
future poltctes can be properly and correctly drawn up, tf due wetght ts 
gtven to these debates and dtscusstons.
163. Speakers Dtrecttve dated 17 March, 1958, Parltamentary Bullettn, 
Part I I,  18 November, pages 1431-2.
Under Rule 55 of the Rules of Procedure of the Lok Sabha, the 
Speaker (or the Chatrman) ts allotted half-a-hour for ratstng dtscusston on a 
matter of a recent questton and tfie answer needs eluctdatton on a matter of 
fact. A  prtvate member may also move a motton for an adjournment of the 
bustness of the House for dtscusstng a deftntte matter of urgent publtc Tm- 
po rtance.
Dtscusston on matters relattng 
occur through the medtum of resoluttons. 
ure of the Lok Sabha provtdes that:
a resolutton may be tn the form of a decla- 
ratton of optnton, or a recommendatton or 
may be tn the form so as to record etther 
approval or dtsapproval by the House of 
an act or poltcy of Government or convey 
a message, or command, urge or request 
an actton or call attentton to a matter 
or sttuatton b for constderatton by Govern­
ment, or tn whtch such other form as the 
Speaker may constder appropriate.
Rules 136 and 137 of the Rajya Sabha Rules stmtlarly provide for resolutton.
Mottons have proved much more useful tn thts fte ld . Thts ts 
only natural, for the Rules of Procedure declare that save tnsofar as ts 
otherwise provtded tn the Constttutton, or tn these rules, no dtscusston of 
a matter of general publtc tnterest shall take place except on a motton made 
wtth the consent of the Speaker.
to publtc corporattons may also 
Rule 171 of the Rules of Proced-
(TTt) Parliamentary Commtttees
UnttI 1964, Parltament used to exerctse tts control over the publtc 
undertakings through the Esttmates Commtttee and the Publtc Accounts Com- 
mtttee, whtch were authorised by Parltament to look tnto the affatrs of the 
publtc undertakings. In accordance wtth a motton passed by Parltament tn 
1963, the Commtttee on Publtc Undertakings was established for the first ttme 
wtth effect from 1 M ay, 1964, to examtne the working of publtc undertakings. 
To replace the ftrst two Commtttees by the Commtttee on Publtc Undertakings 
was ortgtnally recommended by the Krishna Menon Commtttee on the Parlia­
mentary supervtston over State undertakings, appotnted tn 1959. A  stmtlar 
tnstttutton, known as the Select Commtttee on Nationalised Industries, was 
constituted by the Brtttsh House of Commons tn 1957. It was emApowered 
to examtne the reports and the accounts of the nationalised tndustrtes and to 
report to the House.
Though the Esttmates Commtttee and the Publtc Accounts Com­
mtttee made valuable contributions and recommendattons relattng to organt- 
satton, procedures, e tc ., the Krishna Menon Commtttee found that the extst- 
tng methods of Parliamentary control over the publtc undertakings were not 
adequate so as to bear on them enough Parliamentary crtttctsm.
The examination of the affairs of the public enterprises by the
Estimates Committee used to be quite detailed and at times, It even went
164
Into the day-to-day working of these enterprises. The Committee sub­
mitted nearly 131 reports on public enterprises. Out of these, 75 deal with 
particular enterprises and 51 are "action taken reports" which examine the 
action taken or proposed to be taken by the Government on Its recommend-
I 65atlons.
The Committee on Public Undertakings carries the functions of 
both the Estimates Committee and the Public Accounts Committee with regard 
to public undertakings. The members are 15 In number •  10 from the Lok 
Sabha and 5 from the Rajya Sab ha; a Minister cannot be a member of the 
Committee. The members are elected every year by each House on the 
principle of proportional representation by means of a single transferable vote.
The functions of the Committee shall be:-
(d) to examine the reports and the Accounts of the public undertakings;
(b) to examine the reports, I f  any, of the Comptroller and Auditor-Genera I 
on the public undertakings;
(c) to examine^ In the context of the autonomy and efficiency of the 
public undertakings, whether the affairs of the public undertakings
164. J .P . Sharma: Estimates Committee on Public Enterprises, II I .J .P .A .  
(1965), pages 113-114.
165. J .P . Sharma: Ib id ., page 83.
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are being managed tn accordance with sound bustness principles and 
prudent commerctal practtces;
(d) Such other functions vested tn the Public Accounts Committee and the 
E stlmates Committee In relation to public undertakings specified under 
the Rules of Procedure and conduct of business of this House as are not 
covered by clauses (a), (b) and (c) above, and as may be allotted to 
the Committee by the Speaker from time to time • Provided that the 
Committee shall not examine and Investigate any of the following 
matters, namely:-
(!) Matters of major Government policy as distinct from business 
or commercial functions of the Public Undertakings;
(II) matters of day-to-day administration;
(III) matters for the consideration of which machinery Is esta­
blished by any special statute under which a particular Public 
Undertaking Is established.
The Committee shall be concerned with the following types of 
Public Undertakings :
(1) Public Undertakings established by Central Acts such as (a) the Damodar 
Valley  Corporation; (b) the Industrial Finance Corporation; , (c) The 
Life Insurance Corporation, etc.
166. These fa ll within the definition of Public Undertakings.
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(2) Publtc Undertakings whtch are Government Companies formed under the 
Companies A c t, I .e .  every Government Company whose annual report
Is placed before the Houses of Parliament under sub-section (1) of Section 
619 of the Companies A ct, 1956.
(3) Specific enterprises like Hlndusthan Aircraft L td ., Bharat Electronics, 
Garden Research Workshop L td ., e tc .^ ^
The status of this Committee Is advisory and Its recommendations 
are not obligatory on the part of the Government to comply w ith . It has no 
other organ to see that the accepted recommendations are carried out by the 
Government. If they are not Implemented, the Committee may ask the 
Government to supply the reasons for not doing so.
It Is pleasing to note that although the status of this Committee Is 
advisory, the Government considers seriously ihe recommendations It  makes.
The Committee recommended that the steps should be taken to bring the Food 
Corporation within the audit control of the Comptroller and Auditor-General
0l $
as early^practlcable. ( I  t Is relevant to mention that no specific reason was
given by the Committee for this recommendation.) The Government has
accepted the recommendation and brought the Food Corporation under the
168audit control of the Comptroller and Auditor-General Immediately.
167. Resolution on the Committee on Public Undertakings as passed by the 
Lok Sabha on 20 November, 1963.
168 . 42nd Report of the Committee on Public Undertakings on the F .C . I .  
(1973-74), page 14.
In Its sixty-stxth report during the 4th Lok Sabha on the Ptpelines 
Division of the Indian O il Corporation, the Committee commented adversely 
on the manner In which the firm of Betchels were given the contract of de­
signing enlnges and supervision for construction of Gauhatl-Slllgurl and 
Haldla-Barounl-Kanpur pipelines and the part played by them In the entire 
deal. It was due to this report of the Committee on Public Undertakings 
that a fully-fledged enquiry Into the whole affair was carried out by Justice
Takru, a retired judge, who agreed with the findings and report of the
169Parliamentary Committee, as submitted In his report, In 1976.
The Committee, therefore, has a great value In Improving the 
performance and the profitability of these enterprises.
169. B.P. Mathur: Public Enterprise In Perspective, (1977), page 216.
4.1] Lega I Status of Corporations
In the UnTted Kingdom, the Corporation Is regarded as a legal 
entity, distinct from Its members and subject to legal duties and entitled to 
legal rights. It has legal personality and Is described as an artific ial per­
son. It Is created by an Act of Parliament and can perform such func­
tions as It  Is empowered to do under the Act creating I t .
A ll statutes creating public corporations usually mention these 
following features, namely, It  Is a body corporate with common seal; It  Is 
entirely different from Its shareholders; Its assets are separate and distinct 
from those of Its members; It  can sue and be sued for Its own purpose and It  
can own and dispose of property.
Professof Friedmann has advanced three reasons In order to esta­
blish that a public corporation Is a legal entity distinct and separate from 
the State. His reasons are that there Is a specific legislative purpose be­
hind them, that they are specifically Incorporated and that they are based 
on the principle of equality before law In the mixed economy of public and 
private enterprise. ^  His contention may be supported on the ground that
170. L .C . Gower: The Principles of Modern Company Law, page 68.
171. W . Friedmann: Law & Contemporary Problems (1951), pages 586-588.
although the prtvate and public corporations differ In their Intentions behind 
their activities -  private corporations serve private Interests whereas public 
corporations serve public Interest^ but Tn the eye of law, both enjoy the same 
legal status.
In India, all statutes provide that "each corporation shall be a
body corporate". Therefore, the rights, duties and obligations are en-
172trusted to the Corporation In stmllar way as they are to natural persons.
The best statement on the legal status of a public corporation Is 
found In the observations of Denning, L . J. (as he then was), In Tamlln v .
173
Hannaford, with reference to the British Transport Commission set up 
under the Transport Act, 1947. He observed:
The Transport Act, 1947, brings Into being 
British Transport Commission, which Is a 
statutory corporation of a kind compara­
tively new to English law. It has many 
of the qualities which belong to corpora­
tions of other kinds to which we have been 
accustomed. It has for Instance, defined 
powers which It cannot exceed; and It  Is 
directed by a group of men whose duty It 
Is to see that those powers are properly 
used. It may own propeity, carry on
business^ borrow and lend money, just as 
any other corporations may do, so long
172. S .3(2) of the D .V .C .  Act, S .B .I. A c I,R .B .l. A ct, E .S . I .  A ct, l .F .C  
Act, F . C . I .  Act!
173. []95o7 1 KB.18 C .A .  at pages 23-24 .
as It keeps within the bounds whtch Parlia­
ment has set. But the significant difference 
In this corporation Is that there are no share­
holders to subscribe the capital to have any 
voice In Its affairs. . The money which the 
Corporation needs Is not raised by the Issue 
of shares but by borrowing; and Its borrow­
ing Is not secured by debentures but Is guaran­
teed by the Treasury. If It cannot repay, 
the loss falls on the Consolidated Fund . . . ,  
that Is to say on the tax-payer. There are 
no shareholders to elect the directors or to 
fix their remuneration. If It  should make 
losses and be unable to pay Its debts, Its 
property Is liable to execution, but It Is 
not liable to be wound up at the suit of 
any creditors. The tax-payer would no 
doubt, be expected to come to Its rescue 
before the creditors stepped Tn. Indeed, 
the tax-payer Is the universal guarantor 
of the Corporation. But for hlip It could 
not have acquired Its business at a l l ,  nor 
could It  now continue It for a single day.
It Is his guarantee that has rendered shares, 
debentures, and such like a ll unnecessary.
He Is clearly entitled to have his Interest 
protected against extravagances or mis­
management.
But there are other persons who have also 
a vital Interest In Its affairs. A ll those 
whose use the services which It  provides -  
and who does not? -  and all whose sup­
plies depend on I t ,  In short, everyone Tn 
the land, Is concerned Tn seeing that It  
Is properly run. The protection of the 
Interests of a ll these-tax-payers, user and 
beneficiary -  Is entrusted by Parliament 
to the Minister of Transport. He Is given 
powers over this Corporation which are as 
great as those possessed by a man who 
holds a ll the shares In a private company. 
Subject, however, as such a man Is not, 
to a duty to account to Parliament for
hts stewardship. It Is the Minister who ap­
points the directors -  the members of the 
Commission -  and fixed their remuneration.
They must give him any Information he 
wants; and lest they should not prove 
amenable to his suggestions as to the 
policy they should adopt, he Is given 
power to give them directions of a general 
nature, In matters which appear to him to 
affect the national Interest, as to which he 
Is the sole judge, and they are then bound 
to obey. These are great powers but still 
we cannot regard the Corporation as being 
his agent, any more than a Company Is the 
agent of the shareholders, or even of a 
sole shareholder. In the eye of law, the 
Corporation Is Its own master and Is answer- 
able as fully as any other person or corpor­
ation . It Is not the Crown and has none 
of the Immunities or privileges of the 
Crown. Its servants are not C iv il Ser­
v a n t ,  and Its property ts not Crown pro­
perty. It Is as much bound by Acts of 
Parliament as any other subject of the 
King. It Is, of course, a public autho­
rity , and Its purposes, no doubt, are 
public purposes, but It Ts not a govern­
ment department nor do Its powers fa ll 
within the province of government.
This decision has settled, beyond doubt, that the commercial 
corporations w ill not participate In any remaining Crown privileges. It 
has also settled that although the controls exercised by a Minister are enor­
mous, for example, appointment, direction, removal, e tc .,  even these con­
trols are not adequate enough to qualify these Corporations as Crown servants 
or agents. It has also decided that I f  a corporation Is a public authority and
Its purposes are public purposes, It  Ts not entitled to claim Crown exemption.
But there are public authorities and thetr purposes are publtc purposes and
174can clatm certatn privileges. For example, hospital boards set up
under the National Health Service A ct, 1946. We respectfully submit that 
this decision does not solve this anomaly. We feel that I f  we have to solve 
this problem ( i .e .  whether a corporation can be regarded as a Crown servant/ 
agent), we have to rely on the creating statute and the nature of corporation 
Parliament Intended to create and not on Its purpose.
Professor W . Robson Is undoubtedly correct In stating that one of 
the good features of the legislation creating public corporations Is that a 
public corporation Is liable under the ordinary law of the land In almost 
the same way as a commercial company or a private person, except Insofar
175as special Immunity Is conferred upon It by the legtilatton which creates t t .
176The Corporation Is also subject to Income-tax and other revenue legislation 
to the same extent as other subjects, only the Crown, Central Government 
departments, and corporations acting solely as agents of the Crown or a 
Central department (e .g . the hospital boards) are exempt.
The observations made by Lord Justice Denning (as^then was) are
174. See G .F .  Gamer: ’’Public Corporations In the U .K ."  In the Govern- 
ment Enterprise, Friedmann (ed .), (1970), page 5 .
175. W . Robson: Nationalised Industry and Public Ownership, page 70.
176. B .B .C . v .  Johns |j965^C h.32 .
tn substance true with respect to the publtc corporations tn Indian law, except 
In one respect which Is that some of the public corporations are authorised to 
raise capital by Issuing shares, though the shareholders are Governments and 
financial Institutions such as banks, Investment trust, Insurance companies 
and co-operative societies. Every Act creating a public corporation opens 
with the provisions that "the said Corporation shall be a body corporate, 
having a perpetual succession and a common seal, and shall by the said 
name sue and be sued." Therefore, a public corporation must be capable
of suing and being sued. It can conclude contracts, hold and dispose of
property, Is liable to pay taxes like ordinary companies, e tc . In fact,
It possesses allthe Ingredients of a natural person and, therefore, has legal 
personality. It Is true that some public corporations have shareholders, 
but for that matter, they do neither enjoy nor suffer any dtsadavantages.
Like other corporations, they equally enjoy separate legal status and are 
liable for their own acts. A ll are equal before the law.
A ll the public corporations In India have been created by statute 
except the fourteen statutory corporations established to take over the affairs 
of the fourteen commercial banks, which are created by a Government 
O r d i n a n c e . T h i s  was the first time the Government had taken the
177. Under Article 123 of the Constitution of India, power vests In the 
President of India to create a public corporation by an Ordinance.
220.
advantage of Article 123. In July 1969, the VTce-Prestdent acting as
the President of India, promulgated the Banking Companies (Acquisition and 
Transfer of Undertakings) Ordinance, vesting the undertakings of fourteen 
banks In corresponding new banks set up under the Ordinance. Petitions 
challenging the competence of the President to promulgate the Ordinance 
were Immediately lodged In the Supreme Court. But In August 1969, be­
fore these petitions could be heard, Banking Companies (Acquisition and 
Transfer of Undertakings) Act was passed. The Act was then challenged 
and the Supreme Court by a majority judgment declared that this Act of 1969 
was void. The Court struck down the Act on the ground that It violated
Articles 14, 19 and 31(2) of the Constitution, which guaranteed equality h ,
re.c^c,&t- fcy
before and certain Ft. right. The Government quick ^ promulgated a
fresh Ordinance on 14 February, 1970, re-nationalising the banks. Subse­
quently, the Ordinance was replaced by the Banking Companies (Acquisition 
and Transfer of Undertakings) A c t, 1970, which received the Presidents 
assent on 31 March, 1970.
Section 3(2) of each of the Damodar V a lley  Corporation A ct,
1948, the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, the State Bank A ct, 1955, 
the Industrial Finance Corporation A ct, 1948, the Reserve Bank A ct, 1934, 
the Food Corporation A ct, 1964, to name a few, declares that each of M e  
Corporations shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a
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common seal with power, subject to the provtstons of (thts) A c t, to acquire, 
hold and dispose of property, and may by Its name sue and be sued.”
It Is strictly from the legal point of view that a ll the Corpora-
178
tlons may be said to be Corporations aggregate c £ a £ /> ' C cxyp w t x  C\:£m 
Cck/yk S use err kesStAQct • tn '^do* OUTh. . ,
Section 3 of the Reserve Bank A c t, 1934, lays down that:
(1) a Bank to be called the Reserve Bank 
of India shall be constituted for the 
purposes of taking over the manage­
ment of the currency from the Cen­
tral Government and of carrying on 
the business of banking In accordance 
with the provisions of this A ct.
(2) The Bank shall be a body corporate by 
the name of the Reserve Bank of India, 
having perpetual succession and a 
common seal ,and shall by the said 
name sue and be sued.
The public corporation Is treated In the same way as a company
for taxation purposes. Statutes creating corporations which are likely to
make profits contain specific provisions for payment of taxes on Income, and
for this purpose the corporation shall be deemed to be a company within the
179meaning of the Income-Tax A ct, 1961. Only the Rehabilitation Finance
178. Corporation sole: An artific ial legal person conslstlngof only one Ind l- 
vldual. Corporation aggregate: Corooratlons which do not consist of 
one person only. 5581 r r f «' ' • 1 - ' —y- M '
179. S .40 , I .F .C .  A ct, 1948; S .43(1), D .V .C .  A ct, 1948; S .42 , F .C . I .  
A ct, 1964; S .29, 0 &  N .G .C .  Act,' V959 .
Administration and the Reserve Bank are exempted from the payment of taxes
t 180 on income.
Several statufes contatn a provtston relattng to wtndtng-up stmtlar 
to the one stated below:
No provTston of law relattng to the wtndtng- 
up of compantes or corporattons shall apply 
to the corporatton established under (thts)
Act, and the corporatton shall not be placed 
tn Itqutdatton save by order of the Central 
Government and tn such manner as that 
Government may dtrect. 181
It ts an Interesting potnt to note that though the corporatton ts regarded as a 
company for taxation matters but for wtndtng-up purposes, the same law w tll 
not apply to the corporatton •
Somettmes a statute creattng a publtc corporatton contatns a 
provtston to the effect that the spectftc powers gtven to tt by the Act shall
not be construed as permttttng tt to disobey any law for the ttme betng tn
,  182 force.
Some corporattons have been empowered to modtfy certain agree­
ments entered tnto wtthtn a short pertod of the date when the bustness has
180. S .20, R .F .A . A ct, 1948; S .48(1), B .B .l. A ct, 1934.
181. S .37 ,”1 .F .C . A ct, 1948; S .38, L . I .C .  A ct, 1956; S .45, S .B .l. A ct, 
1955;-ST577 R .B .1 . A ct, 1934; S .43, F .C . l .  Act, 1964.
182. S .7(3), Atr Corpns. A c t. ,  1953.
been transferred and vested tn the corporatton, tf they tmpose unreasonable
Itabtltttes on the corporatton and seek relief tn the case of those transactions
183whtch have resulted tn dtsstpatton of assets.
The Industrial Ftnance Corporatton and the Rehabtlttatton Finance
Admtntstratton have been granted certatn prtvtleges whtch are not avatlable
to a person under the law. They can demand repayment of a debt before
the due date by an application before the Dtstrtct Judge. The remedy
avatlable ts transfer of the management to the corporatton, tnjunctton re -
stratntng the tndustrtal concern from removtng a machtnery and the equipment
184and sale of the property pledged or mortgaged.
The credttors of a publtc corporatton cannot obtatn sattsfactton
from the assets of Its members, and the credttors or the members have no
185rtght to the assets of the corporatton.
183. SS.14 and 15, L . I .C .  A ct, 1956; SS.23 and 24, AtrCorpns. Act, 1953.
184. SS.29 and 30, l .F .C . A ct, 1948; SS.14 and 15, R .F .A . A ct, 1948.
185. Tata Engtneertng & Locomotive Co. v . State of Bthar, A . I .R .  1965 
S .C . 40 at 4 6 .
4.12 Judtctal Control
As corporate bodies, a ll public corporations are subject to the 
186
ultra-vtres doctrine. Therefore, the Courts can ensure that the corpor
a tlon restricts Its acttvtttes which Tt Ts authorised to exercise under the Act 
creating t t .  The Courts have legal power to tntervene tf tt exceeds tts 
power.
In the Untted Ktngdom:
Commercial publtc corporattops are 
treated both as publtc authortrTes 
and as commerctal concerns. As 
publtc authorities, they are subject 
to the normal controls of constttu- 
ttonal and adm tntstrattve law; to 
supervtston by the Mtntster, who tn 
turn, ts answerable to Parltament, 
and by the Courts through the con­
trol whtch they exerctse over admtnt- 
strattve authorities. 187
It has been potnted out by Professor J . Gam er that the statutory powers con­
ferred on the publtc corporattons are frequently so wtdely drawn as to make 
the ultra vtres doctrtne nugatory as a means of exerctstng judtctal control
186. Ultra vtres: Thts ts a Lattn expresston meantng, "Beyond the lawful 
power". An act of a company or a corporatton ts to be ultra vtres 
when tt ts "beyond the powers" of the person who has done t t . If he 
does, the Courts can declare tt ultra-vtres or votd.
187. L . Gower: The Prtnctples of Modern Company Law, page 238.
188
over the acttvtttes of the corporation, for example, the AtomTc Energy
Authority Is emApowered to produce, use and dispose of atomic energy,
and "to do such things as may seem to them necessary and expedient for
189the exercise of the foregoing powers". This clause Is so broad and 
wide that tt could be Interpreted by the Corporation In such a manner that 
It  w ill be d ifficu lt, I f  not Impossible, for the Courts to apply the doctrine 
of Ultra-vires.
It has been decided In many cases In India that a publtc corpor­
atton Is a distinct and separate legal entity from the State. It Is subject to
190the doctrine of Ultra-vires and the ordinary laws of the land, except 
where It Is expressly latd down by the creating statute that the corporation 
should enjoy certain special privileges and Immunities. The Corporation^ 
separate existence and non-departmental character are recognised both by
191statute and In practice •
The Supreme Court held In Barium Chemicals Ltd. v . Company
188. J . Qmer: Government Enterprise, Friedmann (ed.) page 12.
189. S .2(1), Atomic Energy A ct, 1946; S .7(2), The Post Office Act,
S .(1)(2)7 Coal N .  Act,
190. Hlndusthan Atlbtottcs Ltd. v . The Workmen, A .I .R .  (1967), S .C .948 .
191. Subodh Ranjan v . Slndrl Fertilizers and Chemicals L td .,  A . I .R .
1957 Patna 10.
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Law Board that a corporate body Ts an arttftctal legal person. The same 
vtew had been expressed Tn Tata EngTneerTng & LocomotTve C o. v. State of 
BthoJ93
194
In Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport CorporatTon v . 1 .1 ,0 . ,  
the Corporation claimed exemption from Union taxation on Its Income under 
Article 289(1) of the Constitution, which exempts the Income of a State from 
centrally-levied Income tax. It was held by the Supreme Court that the In ­
come of the A .P . Road Transport Corporation set up under the Road Transport 
Corporation A ct, 1950, Is not the Income of the State of Andhra Pradesh 
within the meaning of Article 289(1), because the Corporation has a separate 
legal entity of Its own, distinct from the State, and Ts not exempt from Union 
taxation •
The judicial Intervention Is needed to limit the activities of a 
corPftatlon within the bounds as provided by the Act creating It and also 
find out any legal remedies which are available to a person against the public 
corporation In case there Is a violation of powers on the part of the Corpora­
tion .
192. A .I .R . 1967 S .C .2 9 5 .
193. A .I .R . 1965 S .C .4 0 .
194. A .I .R .  1964 S .C . 1486.
(T) L iability Tn Tort and Contracts
As mentioned earlier, . , a corporation Ts distinct and separate
from the State and It  can sue and be sued Tn Its own name. Therefore, Tt 
cannot claim any protection under Article 299 of the Constitution ( I .e .  the 
text of this Artic le has been mentioned In Chapter I I) .
Some statutes creating public corporations contain specific pro­
visions to the effect that the corporations can make contracts and can sue
195and be sued for breach of contract. And where a corporation has
c/Lo
done a ll that It  was bound toAunder a single contract, It  may In like manner
196
sue the other party for non-performance on his part.
Since the Acts say that the corporation can sue and be sued, It
may be taken that the public corporation w ill be liable for the torts of Its
servants to the same extent as a private employer of fu ll age and capacity 
197would have been. However unjustified, a large number of statutes
creating public corporations contain a specific provision which exempt them 
and their employees from liab ility . A  typical provision like the one below
195. S .9(1), L . I .C .  A ct, 1956? S.7(1)(h), AlrCorpns. A ct, 1953.
196. Awon: Principles of the English Law of Contract,  page 50.
197. R.S. Arora: "State Liability and Public Corporation In India", 
Public Law, (1966), page 246.
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Itmtts the Itabtltty of the corporatton for the torts of tts servants: 11 No sutt
or other legal proceedtng shall Ite agatnst the Corporatton for any loss or
damage caused or Itkely to be caused by anythtng whtch ts tn good fatth
198done or tntended to be done under thts A c t .”
Under common law, servants of the publtc corporatton would
normally be Itable for thetr torts personally. But some Indtan statutes confer
tmmuntty on the servants of the corporatton. For example: Sectton 47 of the
Ltfe Insurance Corporatton A ct, 1956, provtdes: "No sutt, prosecutton or
other legal proceedtng shall lte agatnst any member or employee of the
Corporatton for anythtng whtch ts tn good fatth done or tntended to be done 
199
under thts A c t .” In the Pamodar Valley Corporatton Act, 1948, em­
ployees of the Corporatton are protected from ”sutt, prosecutton or legal pro­
ceedtng” but the Corporatton ts protected agatnst only ctvtl Itabtltty for 
damage As the Corporatton ts a dtsttnct person tn law, tt cannot
clatm protectton under Arttcle 300 of the Constttutton wtth regard to sutts 
for torts commttted by tts servants.
198. S .40, F .C . l .  A ct, 1964; S .47 , S .B .I.  A ct, 1955.
199. S .28 , O . & N .G .C .  A ct, 1959.
200. S .57, D .V .C . A ct, 1948.
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(Tt) Mandamus;
201It Ts now well-establTshed that the wrtt of mandamus w tll Ite
202
agatnst a publtc corporatton. In Prag Tools Corporatton v . Immanuel/ 
the Supreme Court held that mandamus may be tssued even to a company tf 
tt has been placed under a statutory duty. It ts not necessary that the person 
or the authortty on whom the statutory duty ts tmposed need to be a publtc 
offtctal or an offtctal body. A  mandamus can be tssued, for tnstance, to 
an offtctal of a soctety to compel htm to carry out the terms of the statute 
under or by whtch the soctety ts constttuted or governed and also to compantes 
or corporattons to carry out duttes placed on them by the statutes authortstng 
thetr undertaktngs
We have menttoned ear Iter that a Mtntster has power to tssue 
dtrecttons to a corporatton. The questton ts now; can mandamus be tssued 
to enforce them? Professor S .A . de Smtth, a leadtng authortty on thfcsub- 
ject, has suggested that tf  a board were to refuse to comply the Mtntster 
could presumably compel performance of the duty by obtatntng an order of 
mandamus, or alternattvely be awarded a judtctal declaratton that the board
201. The wrtt of mandamus ts a wrtt dtrected by a Judge of the Htgh Court 
to any tnfertor Court or to any Tndtvtdual, person or other body,order 
such persdni. to perform any publtc duty he may be Itable to perform.
202. A .I .R .  1969 S .C . 1306.
203. Ib td ., 1309-10.
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was Tn breach of duty; but matters have yet to be brought to thts pass/ and
204Tn such a sTtuatTon a MTnTster mTght prefer to exercTse hTs powers of dTsmTssal.
(Tit) AvaTlabTlTty of Fundamental Rtghts
Now the questTon remaTns whether (a) fundamental rights can
be claTmed by the publTc corporatTons and (b) whether a person can clatm
fundamental rights agaTnst the publTc corporatTons. In the case of State
205TradTng Corporatton of IndTa v . CommercTal Tax O fficer, the Supreme 
Court held that a publtc corporatton Ts not a ctttzen wtthtn the meantng of 
the Ctttzenshtp Act and hence cannot clatm any of the fundamental rights 
guaranteed under Arttcle 19 of the Constttutton. As regards the questTon.
of enforcement of fundamental rights agatnst the publtc corporattons, tt has
m
been judtctally Tnterpreted that the expresston ’’other authorities’^  Art Tele 12
of the Constttutton tncludes publtc corporattons. The Supreme Court tn
206Rajasthan State Electrictty Board v . Mohan Lai, held that a statutory 
body or the board comes wtthtn the category of "other authortttes" under 
Arttcle 12, and the fundamental rights can , therefore, be enforced agatnst 
tt by a person affected. The Court does not look tnto the questton whether 
the body concerned ts carrytng on commerctal acttvtttes or not.
204. S .A . de Smtth: Constttuttonal & Admtntstrattve Law, (1971), page 225.
205. A .I .R .  1963 S .C . 1811.
206. A . I .R .  1967 S .C . 1857.
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5.1 Introduction
Tanzania's determination to stamp out capitalism and to establish 
socialism has brought the pressure to bear upon the Government to take 
nationalisation measures and control over the means of production and ex­
change. Nyerere has spelt out In clear terms why he Is against capitalism 
In Tanzania:
But the decisions (under Capitalism) as 
to what goods shall be produced, and 
how they shall be produced, are made 
by a small number of people who have 
control over land and capital. And 
the determining factor In a ll their deci­
sion-making Is whether the activity w ill 
yield a monetary profit, or power, or 
prestige, to them as owners of the land 
and capital. The needs of mankind are 
secondary, If  they are considered at a l l .
The result Is a few men living In great 
luxury. At the same time masses of 
men, women and children are reduced 
to beggary, squalor, and to the humili­
ation of that disease and sou I-destroy­
ing Insecurity which arises out of their 
enforced poverty. 1
Hence, there was creeping nationalisation by purchase of shares 
In Tanzania before the Arusha Declaration In 1967. The Government's 
Intention of controlling the means of production and exchange can be seen
1. J .K . Nyerere: "Speech to the Mary Knoll Congress In New York"^ 
(Dares Salaam, Government Printer, 1970), page 13.
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Tn the establtshment of the National Development Corporation In 1964. 
Before the Arusha Meeting
there are 21 extstlng firms of various kinds 
which are already fully Government owned 
and run under the supervision of the ND C, 
and 17 In which NDC hold 50 per cent of 
the shares or more. In addition, Industries, 
for example, Lands, Forests, Mineral Re­
sources, Water, Electricity, Posts, Tele­
communications, Radio, Railways, and so* 
on, are In Government hands or Government 
control. 2
One of the basic principles of the Interim Constitution of 
Tanzania, 1965 (which Is set out In Article I I ,  para.4 of the TANU Con­
stitution) Is that "In order to ensure economic justice the State must have
3
effective control over the principal means of production" . The Consti­
tution also believes
that It  Is the responsibility of the State to 
Intervene actively In the economic life 
of the nation so as to ensure the w ell­
being of all citizens, and so as to pre­
vent the exploitation of one person by 
another or one group by another, and 
so as to prevent the accumulation of 
wealth to an extent which Is Inconsis­
tent with the existence of a classless 
society. 4
2 . J .K . Nyerere: "Public Ownership In Tanzania" In Freedom & Socialism , 
page 254.
3 .  Ib id ., para, (h), page 232.
4 .  Ib id ., para (1).
In vtew of the above (and the SoctalTst Ideology of men and 
the Party referred to tn Chapter 1), the Arusha Declaration of February, 
1967, was not a bolt from the blue. The Declaration was a commitment 
to a poltcy of nationalisation In order to control the principal means of 
production and exchange. It contains. Inter a lia , a statement on public 
ownershtp, which runs as follows:
To build and maintain Soctallsm It  Is 
essential that all the major means of 
production and exchange In the nation 
are controlled and owned by the 
peasants through the machinery of 
their Government and thetr co-opera- 
tlves. Further, It  Is essential that 
the ruling party should be a party of 
peasants and workers. The major 
means of production and exchange 
are such things as: land; forests; 
minerals; water; oil and electri­
city; news media; communications; 
banks; Insurance; Import* and ex­
port trade; wholesale trade; Iron 
and steel, machine-tool, arms, 
motor car, cement, fertilizer, and 
textile Industries; and any big 
factory on whtch a large section of 
the people depend for their living, 
or whtch provides essential compon­
ents of other Industries; large plan­
tations, and especially those which 
produce raw materials essential to 
Important Industries. 5
President Nyerere has stressed that”the nationalisation and the taking of 
a controlling Interest In many firms were a necessary part of our deter-
5 . J .K , Nyerere: "The Arusha Declaration", Freedom & Socialism, 
pages 233-234.
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mlnatlon to organTse our society In such a way that our efforts benefit a ll
°  6our people and that there Is no explltatlon of one man by other.*' He
further added that:
We are Socialists as well as nationalists.
We are committed to the creation of a 
classless society In which every ab le- 
bodied person Is contributing to the 
economy through work, and we believe 
this can only be obtained when the 
major means of production are publicly 
owned and controlled. But the fact 
remains that our recent soctaltst meas­
ures were not taken out of a blind ad­
herence to dogma. They are tntended 
to serve our soctety. 7
Furthermore,
We decided to secure majority owner­
ship In Industries because they are key 
points In our economy, and because 
wp believe that they should therefore 
be under the control of Tanzania.
Our purpose was thus primarily a 
nationalist purpose; It  was an ex­
tension of the political control which g 
the Tanzanian people secured In 1961.
It ensures that the people of the country are able to decide development
9
policies as well as obtain a large portion of the profits.
6 . J .K . Nyerere: "Socialism Is not Racialism", Freedom & Socialism, 
page 257.
7 . Ib id ., page 265.
8 . Ibid. ,  page 262.
9 . Ib id ., page 311.
But tt cannot be dented, however, that the mottves for nation­
alisation extend beyond the economic and Into the central theme of social­
ist philosophy that the means of production should be owned by the people. 
Socialists believe that public ownership enables the people to exercise full 
control over the means whereby they earn their living and provides an effect­
ive means of redistributing Income from property owners to the workers. It 
Is true to say that effective Socialist planning presupposes public control 
over the resources of the country and thus Implies publtc ownership. With 
regard to the nationalisation measures In Tanzania, Leone 1 CItffe has this 
to say: "The motives for the nationalisations are found In the orthodox 
Socialist case, expressed In the Tanzanian context by the Arusha Declara- 
tto n ".10
Another motive for nationalisation measures was the lack of 
Indigenous private capital and foreign Investment. Nyerere admitted 
that It was a mistake to rely on foreign Investment for development for two 
reasons: "Firstly, there was not enough money available; secondly, even 
If there were enough, Tanzania would be sacrificing Its Independence." ^
He believes that:
10. L . C llffe: "Arusha Declaration: Challenge to Tanzanians", In the 
East Africa Journal, March, 1967.
11. J .K . Nyerere: U|aama: Essays on Socialism, pages 22-25 .
the poltcy of tnvtttng a chatn of Capital­
ists to come and establish Industries In our 
country might succeed In giving us all the 
Industries we need, but It would also suc­
ceed In preventing the establishment of 
Socialism unless we believe that without 
first building Capitalism we cannot build 
Socialism, 12
In respect of foreign aid, Nyerere says that:
even I f  a ll the prosperous nations were 
willing to help the needy countries, the 
assistance would still not suffice. But 
In any case, the prosperous nations have 
not accepted a responsibility to fight 
world poverty. If Tanzania could re­
ceive ample foreign aid , the foreign 
domination accompanying the aid would 
more than offset the economic advan­
tages . 13
14Therefore, "the only people we can rely upon are ourselves” .
Another motive for nationalisation was advanced by Shlvjl; he 
claimed that the public enterprise has been used In Tanzania to break the
15economic strength of the Aslan and foreign groups, Nyerere appears 
to mean the same thing In his statement:
12. J .K , Nyerere: Ujaama: Essays on Socialism, page 26.
13. Ib id ., pages 23-25 .
14. J .K . Nyerere: Freedom & Socialism, page 167.
15. Quoted from Gha1‘s "Control o& Management of the Economy: Research 
Perspective on Public Enterprise” In the VRU, February, 1976, page 165. 
(This article gives a good account of the role of public enterprise In the 
management of the economy, and discusses the question of Its efficiency 
and control over I t ) .
Tanzania wants to control Its own economy.
It does not necessarily exclude foreign par­
ticipation In economic life , but It  does In­
sist as soon as It can that the major means 
of production, distribution and exchange 
are In the hands of Its own nationals. It 
would be absurd to expect Africa to accept 
that the well-being of Its people should be 
Indefinitely controlled from outside. What­
ever economic system the peoples of differ­
ent African countries eventually adopt, It  
Is quite certain that sooner or later they 
w ill demand that the key positions of their 
economy are In the bands of their own 
citizens. 16
Although public enterprise has been chosen as an Instrument to 
achieve the Socialist goals, Nyerere did not rule out the potential of pri­
vate enterprise to help build the national economy. He said that: "We 
have rejected the domination of private enterprise; but we shall continue 
to welcome private Investment In a ll those areas not reserved for Government 
In the Arusha Declaration” . ^  One can conclude, therefore, that Tanzania 
has accepted the philosophy of a mixed economy In which public and private 
can co-exlst. In reality , there Is hardly any Important field left where the 
Government's presence Is not fe lt.
In order to Implement the obligations of the Arusha Declaration,
16. J .K . Nyerere: "Economic Nationalism" In Freedom & Socialism, 
pages 261-263.
17. J .K . Nyerere:"P ubllc Enterprise In Tanzania” In Freedom & Socialism, 
page 254.
the Tanzanian Government has adopted four different methods to bring 
certain Industries under public ownership and control. Firstly, by 
statutory corporations set up by an act of Parliament to take over entirely 
existing business or (later) by orders under the Public Corporation A c t, 1969, 
(N o . 17). Secondly, by acquiring company shares by agreements and vest­
ing In a public agency, e .g . the State Trading Corporation, Act N o . 2- of 
1967. Thirdly, by acquisition of 60 per cent shareholdings, e .g . the 
Tanzanian Sisal Corporation, A ct. N o .39 of 1967, and fina lly , by compul­
sorily acquiring and vesting a ll shares In an agency on a monopoly basis,
18e .g . the National Insurance Corporation, Act N o . 4 of 1967. After
19the Arusha Declaration of February 1967, altogether five acts Imple­
menting extensive nationalisations (consisting of only 91 sections) were 
passed by Parliament within a period of two days and with little debate. 
Consequently, further provisions became essential for the proper functioning
18. For a full discussion see A .W . Bradley: "Legal Aspects of National 
Isatlons In Tanzania", In EALJ, 1967, page 149, and J .S . Read: 
"Tanzania" In the Annual Survey of African Law, 1967, page 169.
19. The five Acts are: (1) National Bank of Commerce (Establishment 
and Vesting of Assets and Liabilities) A ct, 1967, A c t. N o .l ;
(11) State Trading Corporation (Establishment and Vesting of Inter­
ests) A c t, 1967, A ct. N o .2; (ITT) National Agricultural Products 
Board (Vesting of Interests) A ct, 1967, A c t. N o .3; (iv) National 
Insurance Corporation (Vesting of Interests and Regulations) Act7~~ 
1967, Act N o .4; (v) Industrial Shares (Acquisition) Act, 1967~ 
A ct. N o .5 . In 1974, the State Trading Corporation was dis­
solved and 25 companies were formed to carry out the operations.
240.
20of these Acts •
In Tanzania, State participation In public utilities, commerce 
and Industry Is conducted through the following public Institutions, namely,
(I) Government Departments; (t!) Parastatals Organisations which Include 
Statutory Corporations established by or under any written law or by an Act 
of Parliament, Public Corporations established by orders under the Public 
Corporations A ct, 1969, and Companies Incorporated and registered under 
the Companies Ordinance, 1931 (Cap.212), where the Government holds at 
least fifty per cent of the total Issued shares.
We w ill now discuss the powers and functions of each Institution 
In turn, as well as the control exercised by Ministers and Parliament over 
these Institutions.
20. Act N o .2 l of 1967; Act N o . 14 of 1967; Act N o .4  of 1967.
5 .2  Government Department
Departmental enterprises are directly subordinate to a Ministry. 
They are run by C ivil Servants working under the direction of the relevant 
Minister who Is fully answerable In Parliament for their performance. They 
have no separate legal existence. In Tanzania, a government department 
can only be sued through the Attorney-Genera I (Cap.69). The character­
istics of the departmental enterprises may briefly be recapitulated as follows:
(I) They are financed by annual appropriations from the Treasury 
and a ll,  or a major share, of their revenues are paid In to the 
Treasury.
(II) They are subject to Budget, accounting and audit controls 
applicable to government activities.
(III) Their permanent staff consists of civil servants.
(Iv) They can be sued only by the prescribed procedure for suits 
against government.
The assumption In the case of the departmentally organised enter­
prises Is that full governmental control over their activities exists and that 
there Is full parliamentary control over them and Parliament may ask questions 
on any matter, major or minor.
5.3 Parastatal Organisation -  Definition and Scope
As mentioned earlier, a Parastatal organisation may be one within 
the following categotles of public enterprise:
(a) a Statutory Corporation established by or under any written law;
(b) a Public Corporation established by an order under the Public 
Corporations A ct, 1969; and
(c) a Company Incorporated and registered under the Companies 
Ordinance (Cap. 212), where at least fifty per cent of the 
Issued share capital Is held by the Government.
This definition obviously does not Include an enterprise where less 
than fifty  per cent of the Issued capital Is owned by the Government and where 
the Government exercises effective Influence In the management. But the 
Governments official definition (G N  1976 of 1967) Includes all the above 
three categories as well as an enterprise where the Government has minor 
share holdings. The General Notice N o . 1976 of 1967 defines It thus:
A Parastatal organisation Is not an Inte­
gral part of Government but an Institu­
tion, organisation or agency which Is 
wholly or mainly financed or owned and 
controlled by the Government. The 
criterion of such public enterprises 
would be ownership by Government of 
fifty per cent or more of the capital 
shares or other forms of Government 
participation and effective Influence 
In a ll the main aspects of the manage­
ment of the enterprise.
The definition was given by the Government for the guidance 
of the Standing Committee on Parastatal Organisations, which was appoint­
ed by the President by General Notice N o . 1976 of 1967, to examine the 
salary structure and conditions of service of the employees of the parastatal 
organisations, Including their fringe benefits,and also to protect any misuse 
of public funds. The functions of the Institution w ill be discussed at some 
length later In a separate section. However, It  Is surprising and difficult 
to appreciate that even the legal draftsmen could not provide a precise, 
accurate and uniform definition for this expression. In order to justify the 
above comment, let us now consider the statutory definition of this express­
ion appearing in the various statutes and orders.
Section 2 of the Tanzania . Investment Bank A ct, 1970' ,
(N o .20), defines the term as follows:
Parastatal organization* means any body 
established by or under any written law 
other than a Company registered under 
the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 212), 
save where the whole of the Issued share 
capital of such company Is owned by the 
Government.
It Is needless to say that this definition Is far from satisfactory, 
because It  Is a narrow one and It does not Include a company (I) which Is 
wholly owned by parastatal organisations, (H) where the majority share­
holding Is owned either by the Government or by any other parastatal
organIsatlons , and (TTt) where the Government exercises an effective Influ­
ence In the management.
A  slightly wider definition than the above one Is provided by 
Section 2 of the Parastatal Organizations (Financial Supervision and Control) 
A ct, 1975y which states:
Parastatal organisation means any body 
corporate established by or under any 
written law other than
(a) a company Incorporated or registered 
under Companies Ordinance;
(b) the Community, the Corporations 
within the Community and bodies 
corporate established by or under 
any Act of the Community,
but Includes any Company, the whole of 
the share capital of which Is owned by 
the Government or any parastatal organi­
sation (Including any such company).
Happily, however, the definition Includes companies where the 
whole of the Issued share capital Is held either by the State or any parastatal 
organisation. This definition again leaves out the companies In which the 
State or any parastatal organisation has either majority shareholdings or other 
forms of Governmental participation and effective Influence In a ll aspects of 
management.
Section 2 of the Parastatal Employees (Recovery of Debts) A c t,
1974, Includes companies where the majority shareholding Is owned either
by the State or many other parastatal organisations as well as trade and 
political unions, but still excludes companies where the Government exer- 
clste Influence In the management. Section 2 defines It thus:
‘Parastatal organization” means:-
(a) a local authority;
(b) a body corporate established by 
or under any Act or Ordinance 
other than the Companies Ordi­
nance (Cap. 212);
(c) the Tanganyika African National 
Union, any organ of the Tangan­
yika African National Union and 
every body of persons, whether 
corporate or unlncorporate, which 
Is affiliated to the Tanganyika 
African National Union;
(d) a trade union registered under the 
Trade Union Ordinance (Cap.318);
(e) any Company registered under the 
Companies Ordinance not less than 
fifty per centum of the Issued dliare 
capital of which Is owned by the 
Government or a parastatal organi­
sation or, where the company Is 
limited by guarantee, a company 
In respect of which the amount that 
the Government or the parastatal 
organisation which Is a member of 
such company has undertaken to 
contribute In the event of the com­
pany being wound up Is not less 
than fifty per centum of the aggre­
gate amount which all the members 
have undertakento contribute, and 
references In this paragraph to a 
parastatal organisation Include 
references to any such company.
The Governments ofFtctal statement (G N  N o . 1976 of 1967) 
regardtng the parastatal organisation Is perhaps reflected In the definition 
provided by paragraph 2 of the Tanzanian Legal Corporation (Establishment) 
Order, 197^ (G N , ■ , N o .32), which states that:
‘parastatal organization* means -
(a) a body corporate established by or 
under any written law other than >■
(I) a company Incorporated under 
the Companies Ordinance;
(II) a body corporate established 
by or under any Act of the 
Community;
(HI) a local authority.
(b) any company registered under the 
Companies Ordinance, not less 
than fifty  per centum of the Issued 
share capital of which Is owned by 
the Government, a Local Authority 
or any parastata I organization or, 
where the company Is limited by 
guarantee, a company In respect
of which the amount that the Govern­
ment, a Local Authority or a para­
statal organisation which Is a mem­
ber of such company has undertaken 
to contribute In the event of the 
company being wound up Is not less 
than fifty percentum of the aggre­
gate amount which a ll members have 
undertaken to contribute; and refer­
ences In this paragraph to a parastatal 
organisation Include reference to any 
such company.
(c) any body of persons, whether corpor­
ate or unlncorporate, which Is desig­
nated by the Minister by Notice In 
the Gazette to be a parastatal organi­
zation for the purpose of this order.
It Ts clause (c) above whtch has given wide powers to the Minister to bring In 
any Institution within the ambit of the parastatal organisations. However, 
our study has been unable to find a case where the Minister has exercised this 
power. The diversity of the definition may not have caused any particular 
problem In Tanzania, but surely a standard and uniform definition w ill be 
helpful for two reasons: Firstly, foreign Investors and businessmen may wish 
to deal with parastatals only for a variety of reasons, for example, security 
of Investment. Secondly, foreign Governments may prefer to guarantee- 
foreign Investments of their citizens If  such Investments are made In para­
statals.
5.4 Distinction between Statutory Corporation, Public Corporation and
Company
‘Parastatal organisations* can be classified Into three categories, 
namely: (a) Statutory Corporations, (b) Public Corporations and (c) Companies.
In most countries, Including the U .K . and India, the phrases
*publlc corporation* and ‘statutory corporation* are synonymous. But In
Tanzania, especially since 1969, one can be distinguished from the other.
under
The former Is established by an order /th e  Public Corporation A ct, 1969.
clLZi
The latter Is set up by or under any written law or byflA^Act..
Section 2 of the Public Corporation Act, 1969, defines the two 
corporations thus:
‘Public Corporation* means any public 
corporation established by an order under 
the Act, and *Statutory Corporation* 
means anybody corporate established 
by or under any written law other than 
an Act of the Community, but does not 
Include a company Incorporated under 
the Companies Ordinance save where 
the whole of the share capital of such 
company Is owned by a Statutory Cor­
poration or two or more Statutory Cor­
porations, and references In this para­
graph to a Statutory Corporation In­
clude references to any other company 
the whole of the share capital of which 
Is so owned.
The general characteristics of a statutory corporatlonjhave been 
mentioned In great detail In the previous Chapter. A  statutory corporation, 
In Tanzania, enjoys the same status and privileges as that of an Indian corpor­
ation, I . e .  (1) It  Is wholly owned by the State; (11) It  Is created by special 
law defining Its objects, demarcating the powers, privileges of government, 
the management and the relations that w ill subsist between them; (111) It  Is 
a body corporate and has separate legal existence and hence, can sue and 
be sued, enter Into contracts and acquire property In Its own name; (Iv) It 
Is not subject to governmental budget, e tc . Some of these corporations 
have share capital. The notable corporations In this group are: (1) the 
Bank of Tanzania; (11) the National Bank of Commerce; (111) Tanzania 
Investment Bank; (Iv) Treasury Registrar, and (v) Tanzania Rural Develop­
ment Bank.
The President Is empowered to establish public corporations 
under SectTon 3 of the Public Corporation A ct, 1969, which provides:
(1) The President may, by order pub­
lished In the G azette , establish a 
public corporation for such functions 
as may be specified In such order.
(2) Every public corporation established 
by an order made under this section 
shall (a) have perpetual succession 
and a common seal; (b) In Its cor­
porate name be capable of suing 
and being sued; and (c) subject to 
the provisions of this Act and of
any order made tn that behalf by 
the President, be capable of pur­
chasing and otherwise acquiring, 
and alienating any property, 
movable or Immovable.
Corporations of this type do not possess share capital. Their activities 
are regulated by the principal Acts. The other Important points of differ­
ence between the two categories w ill be mentioned as we proceed. The 
principal "public corporations” are the National Development Corporation, 
the Tanzanian Tourist Corporation, the National Agricultural & Food Corpor­
ation, and the Tanzanian Legal Corporation.
The enactment of the Public Corporation A c t, 1969, has un­
doubtedly simplified the procedure for the creation of a corporation. Prior 
to this, a special Act was necessary to set up a corporation, but now a cor­
poration Is born by an order of the President. The President Is also empowered 
to reorganise and even to terminate the existence of any existing corporation 
(whether public or statutory ) under Section 8(1) of the Act,
which provides:
Where the President has established or 
establishes a public corporation,or any 
statutory corporation has been establish­
ed, for the performance of any functions 
and the President Is satisfied that there 
exists any other public corporation or 
statutory corporation (hereinafter refer­
red to as ‘the existing corporation*)
for the performance of a ll or any of the 
functions for which such public corpor­
ation or statutory corporation Is or has 
been established, the President may -
(a) by order In the Gazette provide 
that the existing corporation shall 
cease to exist or shall cease to 
perform all or any of the functions 
which are conferred upon the pub­
lic corporation or the statutory 
corporation, as the case may be;
(b) by order transfer any asset or lia ­
b ility  of the existing corporation 
to the public corporation or the 
statutory corporation as the case 
may be;
(c) by order transfer an y person who 
Is an employee of the existing 
corporation to the service of the 
public corporation or the statutory 
corporation, as the case may be.
In effect, the President can repeal a statute (Setting up a Statutory Corpor­
ation) by order. However, on this A c t, Read comments aptly that:
It  may well appear In practice to be 
the source of the law which has 
changed In essentials, rather than 
Its contents, but the new system un­
doubtedly gives greater flex ib ility , 
for example, for shifting spheres of 
activity between parastataIs. 21
21. J .S . Read: "Tanzania” , Annual Survey of African Law, 1969, page 134.
In accordance wtth the provisions of the Public Corporations
22A ct, 1969, the President Issued a circular which divided the National 
Development Corporation, set up by the National Development Corporation 
A ct, 1964, Into three parastatals: the new National Development Corpora­
tion, the Tanzanian Tourist Corporation and the National Agricultural and 
Food Corporation. The Tourist and Agricultural functions of the old 
National Development Corporation were transferred to the Tanzanian 
Tourist Corporation, and the National Agricultural and Food Corporation, 
respectively. And the new National Development Corporation was en­
trusted with the following functions:
(a) to promote the development of manu­
facturing, processing and mining In­
dustries;
(b) to conduct or engage In the businesses 
of manufacturers, processors, produc­
ers, packers, craftsmen, engineers, 
assemblers, tanners, brewers, millers, 
miners, and such other businesses re­
lating to Industrial activities or the 
use of mineral resources ta the Board 
may from time to time decide;
(c) to establish branches and carry on 
business either within the United 
Republic or elsewhere;
(d) to acquire by agreement and hold 
Interests In any undertaking, enter­
prise or project associated with In­
dustrial development;
22. The Presidential Circular N o .2 of 1969.
(e) to manage the affairs of any corpor­
ation, company, firm or other body 
the Interests of which are trans­
ferred to or acquired by the corpor­
ation under the provisions of the 
Act or this order;
(f) to do all such acts and things as 
may be necessary to uphold and 
support the credtt of the Corpor­
ation and to obtain and justify 
public confidence and to avert 
or minimize any loss to the Cor­
poration;
(g) to do anything or enter Into any 
transaction which, In the opinion 
of the Board ,1s calculated to fac i­
litate the proper and efficient 
carrying on of Its activities and 
the proper performance of Its 
functions. (23)
The failure of the old National Development Corporation (NDC)
was due to the fact that It was responsible alone "to facilitate and promote
the economic development and the participation of other persons and bodies
24
In the economic development of the entire country” . As a result &  
of the wide extent of these powers, the old NDC had:
23. Paragraph 4 of the National Development Corporation (Establishment) 
Order, 1969, G N  N o .90 on 11 A pril, 1969.
24. Section 4 of the Tanganyika Development Corporations A ct, 1962, as 
amended by Section 6 of Tanganyika Development Corporations Act 
of 1964, N o . 69 .
over seventy subsidiary and associate com­
panies and their functions were equally 
numerous ranging from Mdlamc!sM to "milk.
It thereby became very large and was go­
ing beyond the scope of effective control 
and planning while the country*s needs 
demanded more and more public enter­
prises along Socialist Itnes. 25
In order to rectify the above mistake It  became essential to set up new 
Institutions with defined areas of operation. And the new NDC*s 
function Is now confined mainly to promote the development of manu­
facturing, processing and mining Industries.
26The Presidential Circular also admitted that :
the present number and structure of 
parastatal organisation In Tanzania 
Is not the result of any well-thought 
out comprehensive plan. It Is the 
result of a series of decisions taken 
since Independence, and In particu­
lar the Implementation of the Arusha 
Declaration In February 1967. The 
result Is that we now have one (cor­
poration I .e .  N .D .C .)  whose respon­
sibilities are so large and diverse that 
almost every economic Ministry of 
Government Is Involved In Its acti­
vities .
It Is suggested that the activities of the National Development Corporation 
are divided In such a manner that Government control and administration
25 . P. Oluyede: Administrative Law In East Africa (1973), page 149.
26. The Presidential Circular N o . 2 of 1969.
would be simplified and made more effective. The Circular wenlon to
add that"thls new organisation structure was to be based on the following 
27
principles” .
1. broad policy Is a matter for the 
elected TANU Government of 
Tanzania, and the parastatal 
organisations are Instruments of 
execution.
2 . the parastatal organisations can­
not be run In ways similar to a 
Government department, so that 
flexib ility  of organisation and 
day-to-day administration Is 
essential I f  real service Is to be 
given to the people by the pub­
lic sector of the economy.
3 . the parastatal organisations are 
not spending organisations; they 
provide goods and services In re­
turn for payment, and In our c ir­
cumstances they must not only 
pay their own way but also take 
part In capital creation.
4 .  each parastatal organisation 
should be responsible to one 
sectoral ministry;
5. the overall structure must be such 
that Increasing public enterprise 
and public economic Initiative  
can continue to be effectively 
controlled and co-ordinated by 
Government as the economy ex­
pands* This demands a three- 
level structure: the parastatal 
organisation, the sectoral mini­
stry and the President through 
the Central Coordinating M in i­
stries.
In one respect, we think that this structural pattern Is open to 
criticism. As the broad policy w ill be dictated and determined by the 
TANU Government officials, It Is highly unlikely that ^flexibility of 
organisation and day-to-day administration * w ill be left entirely In the 
hands of the board of management. In theory, the Corporation Is to be 
run by the board of directors subject to directives Issued by the President 
or his delegates ( I .e .  ministers). But "no agreement can now be con­
cluded by a parastatal unless and until It  Is approved by the Committee on
28parastatal organisations and the Economic Committee of the Cabinet."
The total effect Is that the Government, In fact, Involves Itself In the 
running of the Corporation. Furthermore, as the members of the board 
are apjDolnted either by the President or by the Ministers, It  Is expected 
that the board Is to confirm Its directives from the appolnter. It Is appro­
priate to mention that most of the delegates ( I .e .  ministers) are also the 
members of the Economic Committee of the Cabinet. Therefore, one can 
conclude that the real power of control, In effect, lies with the Govern­
ment. The functions of the Standing Committee on Parastatal organisations 
w ill be discussed later.
However, a Government company, on the other hand, comes Into 
existence either by fulfilling the requirements as laid down In the Comjxinles
28. R .W . James and S .L . Gunya: "Organizational Relationship and 
the Control of Parastatals In Tanzania1, EALR (1972), page 60.
Ordinance (Cap 212) or by acquiring compulsorily or by agreements, the 
majority shareholdings of an existing company.
With these preliminary remarks we w ill now examine the boards 
of management, their composition, functions and powers, and where the 
main responsibility lies for the successful and efficient planning and opera­
tion of the parastatals.
5 .5 .  Boards of Management: (1) Appointment and Removal
The composition of the board Is undoubtedly a matter of great 
Importance. If ,  therefore, an enterprise Is to achieve Its objectives, 
the membership of the board should be on the basis of ab ility , competence, 
Initiative and experience.
In the case of most statutory and public corporations, the respon­
sibility for the proper running Is vested In the board of directors. The mem­
bers of the board are usually appointed by the Minister, except the Chairman 
who Is appointed In each case by the President. This basic power of appoint 
ment makes the Minister very powerful. He can choose anyone he likes 
Irrespective of his ab ility , experience and competence. "Practice Indi­
cates that Ministers In a ll three countries (Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda)
are prepared to use, and use frequently, their powers, especially In the
29Interests of polttlcs." It Is surprising that this view has not been sub­
stantiated by any proof. However, In a one-party State this claim would 
have very little relevance and significance.
But provisions are also to be found In the constitutions of certain 
boards for the Inclusions of persons who have had experience of, and shown 
capacity In Industrial, commercial or financial matters, administration or
29 . A .W . Bradley and J .P .W . McAusIan: "Public Corporations In East 
Africa" In Government Enterprise, Friedmann and Garner (Ed.), page 
page 273.
the organisation of workers, experience In economic and financial
31matters or In banking, fn rural development, agriculture, small scale
32
Industries, Ujamaa villages and co-operatives. This provision In the 
Statutes I f  strictly observed, would Impose some kind of restriction on the 
Ministers to appoint kJtve*he pleases as a member of the board. But It 
could also be argued that It Is difficult for the Minister concerned to be 
so selective In a nation where there Is an acute shortage of qualified and 
skilled personnel.
In most public corporations created by Presidential Orders,
the structure of the Boards Is uniform. In each case, the management
Is vested In a Board of Directors which consists of aChatrman appointed by
the President and such other members being not less than five nor more
than nine as the Minister may appoint and a General Manager who Is
33appointed by the President. But In case of the |f  anzanla Legal Cor­
poration, the Board w ill consist of aChalrman nominated by the President 
and such other members, being not less than three nor more than five , as 
the Minister for Legal Affairs may appoint after consultation with the
30 . S .5(3), NBC A ct, 1967.
31 . 5 .20(7), TIB A c t, 1970.
32 . S.20(4), TRDB A ct, 1971.
33 . Paragraph 5(1) to 5(3), NAFC (Establishment) Order, 1969;
" " " NDC (Establishment) Order, 1969;
11 " 11 11 TTC (Establishment) Order, 1969.
34Attorney-General. All the Orders creating public corporations
provide for the office of Vice-Chairman, who Is appointed by the Minister 
concerned. It Is Interesting to note that no specific functions are a llo ­
cated to the office of Vice-Chairman • In addition to the above officials, 
the Minister, In the case of the Tanzania Legal Corporation, Is em powered
to appoint a Chief Corporation Counsel who Is the Chief Executive Officer 
35of the Corporation.
In most statutory corporations, the management Is vested In a
Board of Directors. The Constitution of the Bank of Tanzania established
In 1967 Is simple. It consists of a Governor who Is a Chairman, a Director-
General who Is a Deputy Chairman appointed by the President, the Principal
Secretary to the Treasury and five directors appointed by the Minister Tor 
36Finance. In the case of the National Bank of Commerce, the Board
of Directors consists of a Chairman appointed by the President, a General
Manager and such other members being not less than five nor more than
37
nine as the Minister for Finance may appoint. Section 5(1) of the 
State Trading Corporation also provides for the creation of a board of 
directors which consists of a Chairman appointed by thePresIdent, a General
34. Paragraph 5(1) to 5(2), T .L .C . (Establishment) Order, 1970.
35 . Paragraph 5(4).
36 . S .7(1) to 7(3), Bank of Tanzania Act, 1967.
37 . S .5(2), National Bank of Commerce A ct, 1967.
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/Manager and such other members betng not less than ftve nor more than
38ntne as the Minister for Commerce may appoint. The composition of
the board of directors of the Tanzania Investment Bank established In 1970,
Is somewhat different. It consists of a Chairman who Is the Managing
Director appointed by the President and six other directors, of which
three are appointed by the Minister for Ftnance, two are appointed by
the National Bank of Commerce, and one Is appointed by the National
Insurance Corporation Limited. The shareholders ( I .e .  N .B .C . and
N . I .C . )  are eligible to appoint directors by notice In writing addressed
to the Bank and they can cancel jsuch appointment at any time by such 
39notice. The Tanzania Rural Development Bank consists of a Chairman
appointed by the President and eight other directors appointed by the M lnl- 
40ster for Finance.
It Is evident from the above that the Minister has considerable
power In the matter of appointment of the members of the governing board.
Although some statutes empower the board of directors to appoint the Chief 
41Executive, I . e .  the General Manager of a Corporation subject to the 
approval of the Minister, or the Minister Is empowered to appoint such a
38 . This Institution was dissolved In 1974 and 25 companies were formed 
to continue Its functions.
39 . S .20(3) to 20(6), Tanzania Investment Bank A ct, 1970.
40 . S .20(3), T .R .D . Act, 1971.
41 . S .5(4), N .B .C . A ct, 1967.
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42person after consultatton wtth the board of directors. But In effect, 
the decision of the Minister Is likely to prevail as he has the power to 
appoint the members of the board, and the provision becomes a nullity .
With regard to removal, the Ministers are given unfettered
power. The Bank of Tanzania Act, 1967, empowers the President to
remove a director only for Inability to discharge the functions of his
office or for misbehaviour (whether In connection with his office or other- 
43wise). Under the Tanzania Investment Bank A ct, 1970, the Minister
for Finance has the power to remove, after consultation with the Board of 
44
Directors. A  similar provision Is found In the Tanzania Kura I Develop-
45ment A ct, 1971. Most public corporations established In accordance 
with the provision of the Public Corporation A ct, 1969, have a provision
as follows: "The Minister may make regulations with respect to the appolnt-
of 46
men^and the tenure and vacation of office". An exactly similar pro-
47
vision exists In the National Bank of Commerce Act, 1967. The members
42 . S .22(1), T .I.B . Act, 1970, and 22 (1 ), T .R .D .C . A c t, 1971.
43. S .8(3), B .O .T . A ct, 1967.
44 . S .22(3), T . I .B . Act, 1970.
45 . S .22(3), T .R .D .B . A ct, 1971.
46 . Paragraph 5(b)(a), N .A .F .C .  Order, 1969, N .D .C .  Order, 1969, 
T .T .C . Order, 1969, 5(7), T L .C . O rd e r7 19701
47 . S. 5(b) (a).
of the board are usually appointed for two or three or five year-terms, 
which are renewable. But there seems to be no provision In the
statutes or orders regarding the Ineligibility of a member of any corpora­
tion for appointment for a further term. It obviously means that the 
relevant Minister has the power to reappoint members at the end of their 
terms of o ffice. Such a power has a tendency to encourage subservience 
to the appointing authority.
It Is noticeable that statutes or orders creating corporations 
contain no clause disqualifying a person from the membership of the Cor­
poration, but only In the case of the Bank of Tanzania, the creating sta­
tute contains express provisions relating to disqualification from member­
ship. Section 8(1) of the above Act provides that :
no person shall be qualified to be appoint­
ed a member of the Board, or an alternate 
for a member, I f  he Is -
(a) a member of the National Assembly.
(b) a person holding office In the service 
of the United Republic;
(c) a director, officer, employee or 
shareholder of a bank In respect of 
which the Bank may exercise a regu­
latory power under Part IV .
Section 8(2) further provides that:
a member of the Board or alternate shall 
vacate his office I f  -
(a) he acquires any attribute which, were 
he not a member, would disqualify him 
for appointment under sub-section (1);
(b) he becomes bankrupt or suspends pay­
ment or compounds with his creditors-#
(c) he Is adjudged or otherwise declared 
to be of unsound mind; or
(d) he Is absent, without the leave of the 
Board, from the meetings of the Board 
for a consecutive period of three 
months.
We are unable to understand why this provision has not been Inserted In
48other statutes or orders creating corporations. We say this because 
our study has not found that by subsequent regulations this provision has 
been Included In the statutes or orders.
48 . For a full discussion, see Bradley & McAuslan, "Public Corpora­
tions In East Africa”, Government Enterprise, Friedmann & Garner 
(Ed.) ,  pages 290-291
5.6 Use of the General Direction
The Influence which a Minister can exert Is a combination of 
the various formal powers provided by the respective statutes, and the In­
fluence arising from the Informal contacts between the Minister and his 
department and the corporation and Its staff. It Is not Impossible, how­
ever, for a Minister to secure a conslderab le direction of the affairs of a 
corporation by using his formal powers and Informal Influence. There Is 
a popular tendency to regard the general power of direction as a means 
whereby a Minister can have the final say In any dispute between himself 
and the board. But the use of direction would be justified I f  It Is used 
to share and define their respective responsibilities for policies based on 
social and economic grounds on the one side, and on commercial consider­
ations on the other. If the direction Is used In this spirit, then a Minister 
by using the general direction would be able to tell a corporation the social 
and economic objectives within which he expected the Industry to operate 
and the board would be left free to pursue Its undertaking In a commercial 
manner within the limits laid down -  thus to minimise the conflict between 
the two.
A scrutiny of the various Acts and Orders establishing statutory 
and public corporations disclosed that provisions empowering the Minister 
to give directions are present In every statute with the exception of the
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Bank of Tanzania and the Tanzania Audit Corporation, which Is subject to 
directions from the Controller and Auditor-General.
These directions are usually of a general character, but In the 
case of the public corporations, the President has the power to Issue direct­
ions In regard to specific matters as w e ll. Section 6 of the Public Corpor- 
atTon A ct, 1969, provides that:
the President may give to the Board of 
Directors of any public corporation, or 
to any other person entrusted with the 
management of the corporation, direct­
ions of a genera I or specific character 
as to the exercise and performance by 
such Board or such person of their or 
his functions, and such Board or per­
son shall give effect to any such direct­
ions.
49
But In the case of statutory corporations, the Minister may give such 
directions after consultation with the Governor of the Bank of Tanzania 
as to the exercise and performance by the Board of their functions In rela­
tion to matters appearing to the Minister to affect the national Interest, 
and the Board shall give effect to any such directions.
It Is Interesting to point out that In the case of statutory corpor­
ations, the directions are Issued to the board and only In matters affecting
49 . S .6(1), N .B .C . Act, 1967; S.20(2), T . I .B .  A ct, 1970; 
S .20(2), T .R .D .B . A ct, 1971.
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national Interest, but In the case of the public corporations, the directions 
are Issued not only to the board but also to any person entrusted with the 
management. However, In both cases these directions are obligatory 
on the part of the corporations to shape their activities In accordance with 
them.
It Is true to say, therefore, that as regards the constitution of
the board of directors and the form of general directions of policy, the
50Tanzanian Corporations have followed the British pattern.
The form of direction created for the 
nationalised enterprises Is not parti­
cularly novel but resembles the general 
pattern of nationalised Industries In the 
United Kingdom, In the structure of the 
Board and their relationships with the 
respective Ministers. 51
However, besides directives Issued by the Minister, the Standing 
Committee on Parastatal Organisations are also empowered to Issue direct­
ives to boards of parastatals.
52
The SCOPO has Issued a directive restricting transfer of 
party branch chairmen and secretaries In national Institutions. It has
50. For a full discussion of British model, see J .F . Garner: PUbllc 
Corporations In the United Kingdom”, In Government Enterprise, 
Friedmann & Garner (Ed.), pages 3 to 25 .
51. J .S . Read: ’Tanzania” -  Annual Survey of African Law, 1967, 
page 172.
52 . The Dally News, 10 March, 1976.
also banned all TANU meetings during office hours. The directive said 
that transfer w ill only be made under the following conditions:
(a) when such a worker has been promoted and hts services are 
needed elsewhere;
(b) when a party leader can no longer be usefully employed at 
his place of work;
(c) transfer on health grounds; and
(d) when a worker Is Involved In acts of discipline.
The directive, however, does not cover TANU Secretaries 
appointed by the Party*s Central Comintttee to work In national Institut­
ions. A  meeting can be held during office hours In an unavoidable c ir­
cumstance,^ which case a decision should be reached between party leaders 
and management.
The directive also stated that ’’transfer of party leaders because
of personal conflict w ill create a sense of fear among TANU leaders towards
management and this does not conform to the aim of forming TANU branches 
53at place of work” .
The directive, In effect, has curtailed the power of the board 
of management to transfer a party official from one place to another.
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5.7 Statutory Powers and Functions
It ts a matter of real Importance that the board of directors ought 
to be aware of the powers and functions of a corporation so that they restrict 
their activities within the framework laid down by the respective statutes or 
orders.
54The Bank of Tanzania Act, 1967, and the National Bank of 
55Commerce A ct, 1967, followed the same patten? of a general powers 
clause followed by a specific enumeration of powers without prejudice to 
the scope of the general power.
Section 5(1) of the Bank of Tanzania A ct, 1967, provides that 
”the principal functions of the Bank shall be to exercise the functions of a 
central bank” . The principal functions are summarised below:
(a) It Is the governments bank. It handles the Income and expendi­
ture of the government departments.^
(b) It has the responsibility for carrying out the governments monetary
57and fiscal policies.
54. S .5(1).
55. S .4 ( l) .
56. S .37(1) to (2 ).
57. S .38 .
270.
58(c) It makes advances to the Government.
(d) It manages the NatTona! Debt. Thts ts a large responsibility and
Involves making repayments on governments securities when they
mature, floating new Issues of long-term securities, making regular
59payments of Interest to existing holders of securities.
(e) It Is the bankers bank. Other banks maintain accourts with l t . ^
(f) It rediscounts bills of exchange and promlipry notes
The Bank Is also empowered to Issue currency, to regulate banking and credit, 
to manage the gold and foretgn exchange reserves of Tanzania, and to perform 
any function conferred upon It  by or under any International agreement to 
which Tanzania Is a party.
Section 5(2) of the Act authorises the bank to direct Its activities 
to the promotion of credit and exchange conditions conducive to the rapid 
growth of the national economy of Tanzania, due regard being had to the 
desirability of fostering monetary stability. The bank Is bound to give 
advice to government on any matters relating to Its functions, powers and 
duties under this or any other law and the Government may require the bank
58. S .39 .
59. S .40
60. S .43(l) & (2).
61. S .44 .
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to give advice on matter relating to the functions,  powers and duties of the
62bank and the bank shall give Its advice accordingly.
The kinds of business the Bank of Tanzania cannot transact are 
enumerated In detail In Section 62(1) of the A c t. It lays down that:
the bank shall not
(a) engage In trade or own or acquire any 
direct Interest In any commercial or 
similar undertakings unless otherwise 
expressly authorised by this Act;
(b) purchase, acquire or lease Immovable 
property for the use of the membe rs 
of the board or the staff, except for 
Its own use as premises for the bank;
(c) draw or accept bills payable other­
wise than for demand; or
(d) save for the purposes of giving effect 
to sub-section (2) of 12, ^3 guaran­
tee any loan, advance or investment.
64The main objects of the National Bank of Commerce are:-
(a) to provide In accordance with the conditions appropriate In the normal 
and proper conduct of banking business, adequate and properfybanklng 
services and facilities throughout the United Republic;
62. S .61(1) & (2).
63. The powers of the Board to make provisions for the staff of the bank 
shall Include power to provide for benefits for or In respect of those 
of Its staff who die or retire, and their surviving dependants, and such 
other benefits and facilities as are usually accorded to employees In
Tanzania.
64. S .4 ( l) ,  N .B .C . A ct, 1967.
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(b) to conduct tts bustness without discrimination except on such grounds 
as are appropriate In the normal and proper conduct of banking busi­
ness;
(c) not to divulge any Information to, or to the affairs of, a customer of 
the National Bank, except In circumstances In which It Is In accord­
ance with any written law or the practices and usages customary among 
bankers, necessary or proper for the National Bank to divulge that 
Information.
With regard to the discrimination clause, A .W . Bradley has this to say:
This clause, although Its meaning may be 
arguable, seems particularly apposite to 
banking In Tzananla where It has been 
alleged that racial factors made It  easier 
for some persons to borrow from the banks 
than others. 65
The Insertion of this clause In the Act would be very much appreciated by 
the disadvantageous groups, but It remains to be seen whether just a provi­
sion like this would be able to overcome the racial problems.
Regarding clause (c) above, A .W . Bradley Is of the opinion that: 
"this might seem to conflict with the duty of the Bank to provide the Minister 
with Information regarding Its property and activities". ^  But as we see It
65. A .W . Bradley/1 Legal Aspects of Nationalisation Laws In Tanzania," 
EALJ, 1967, page 156.
66. Ibid. S .6(2), N .B .C . A ct, 1967.
the question of conflict of duty does not arise because the second part of 
clause (c) specifically provides that the bank Is w ell within Its right to 
divulge Information, I f  the activities of a customer fa ll outside the normal 
banking practices and, therefore, the Minister w ill be justified In asking for 
any Information In respect of a customer whose activities are considered to 
be prejudicial to the national Interest, I . e .  violation of foreign exchange 
regulations and payments received from and paid to a person not properly 
accounted for, etc.
Section 4(2) of the National Bank of Commerce A c t, 1967,
   1 V " ■ ■ ‘
empowers the bank also to:
(a) carry on the business of banking In a ll Its branches and departments, 
Including borrowing, raising or taking up money, lending or dealing 
In bills of exchange, promlsory notes, coupons, drafts, bills of lading, 
warrants, debentures, certificates, scrip and other Instruments and 
securities, whether transferable or negotiable, or not; granting and 
Issuing letters of credit and circular notes; buying, selling and deal­
ing In bullion and species, acquiring, holding, and Issuing on com­
mission, underwriting and dealing with stocks, funds, shares, deben;- 
tures, debenture stock, bonds, obligations, securities and Investment 
of a ll kinds, the negotiating of loans and advances; receiving money 
and valuables on deposit; or for safe custody, or otherwise; collecting
and transmitting money and securities; managing property, and 
transacting all kinds of agency business commonly transacted by 
bankers;
(b) undertake and execute any trusts the undertaking whereof may seem 
desirable, and also to undertake the office of executor, administra­
tor, receiver, treasurer, registrar or auditor, and to keep for any 
company, Government authority, or body, any register relating
to any stocks, funds, shares or securities, or to undertake any 
duties In relation to the registration of transfers and the Issue of 
certificates;
(c) take or concur In taking a ll such steps and proceedings as may 
seem best calculated to uphold and support the credit of the 
National Bank, and to obtain and justify public confidence and 
avert or minimise financial disturbances which might affect the 
National Bank.
According tothe Annual Report of 1974-75, the N .B .C . has satisfactorily 
carried out Its banking functions. It has realised a surplus of shs.14] .9 m /-  
durlng this period. The Report says that lending Increased by shs.656m/- 
or 32 .9  per cent to shs. 2 .4 4 6 m /-, while total Investment rose from the 
previous year's level of shs.515 .3 m /- to shs. 1081 rry^ —, an Increase of 
109.76 per cent, thereby affecting the Bank's jllquldlty. This, according 
to the Report, was a result of financing the Importation of food grains
following the previous year's drought.^
The Bank's surplus has further Improved 
from shs, 141,9 m /- as at 30th June 1975 
to a net surplus of shs, ]97,8m/ -  as at 
30th June 1977, The return on equity 
capital employed averaged 118% Indi­
cating a satisfactory return on capital 
employed • The lending activities of 
the bank has also Increased substantially.
The lending has Increased from shs.
2 .446m /- In 1975 to shs. 3 , l9 6 .6 n r /-  
In 1977. O f the total lending of shs.
3 , 196.6m /-  approximately shs.
2811,3nr/- or 88 per cent waschannel- 
led to the public sector. 68
In the Tanzania Investment Bank A ct, 1970, the Tanzania Rural 
Development Bank A ct, 1971, the National Agricultural and Food Corpora­
tion (Establishment) Order, 1969, the National Development Corporation 
(Establishment) Order, 1969, the Tanzania Tourist Corporation (Establtsh- 
ment) Order, 1969, the Tanzania Legal Corporation (Establishment) Order, 
1970, however, there Is no general powers clause and the powers of the Cor 
porattons are defined by way of enumeration only.
The Tanzania Investment Bank provides medium and long-term 
finance for economic development and technical assistance and advice for
67. The Dally News, 3 February, 1976.
68. The Economist (London), 11 March, 1978.
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69the purpose of promoting Industrial development. The functions of the 
bank also Include administering such special funds as may from time to time 
be placed at the disposal of the bank, and to undertake such other activities 
as may be necessary or advantageous for the purpose of furthering the fore­
going o b jec ts .^  The business transacted by It Includes the guaranteeing 
of loans by a borrower for a specific project and granting loans repayable 
within a specified period .^  In granting or guaranteeing a loan, the 
bank must be satisfied that the borrower and Its guarantor w ill be able to 
meeting their obligations under the loan contract. The bank Is entitled 
to charge Interest, fee and commission for Its risks. It Is also the respon­
sibility of the bank to ensure that the proceeds of any loan made or guaran­
teed by the bank are used only for the purposes for which the loan was 
granted, and the bank may ask the borrower to provide Information and 
allow Inspection of Its books and records during such time as any part of 
the loan remains outstanding.
In addition to the above, Section 16 of the Act has emTpowered
the bank -
(a) to borrow funds In Tanzania or elsewhere, and In this connection, 
to furnish such collateral or other security therefor as the Bank
69. S.4(a) &(b), T . I .B .  A ct, 1970.
70. S.4(c) & (d ).
71. S .12.
shall determine;
(b) to buy and sell securities which the Bank has Issued or guaranteed 
or In which It  has Invested;
(c) to guarantee securities In which It has Invested In order to fac ili­
tate their sale;
(d) to Invest funds not Immediately needed In Its operation In such 
securities as It  may determine and Invest funds held by the Bank 
for pensions or similar purposes In trustee securities;
(e) to provide technical advice and assistance which may serve Its 
purposes and fa ll within Its objects and where appropriate, the 
Bank charge for such services; and
(f) to study and promote Investment opportunities.
The Tanzania Investment Bank Issued loans totalling shs. 128,33m/-
to 22 firms In the country during 1974-75. Since Its Inception In 1970, the
Bank has given totally 299.2l7rry^- to finance, 73 projects. According to
the T . I .B .  Chairman and Managing Director, Ndugu G .F .  M ltowe, the year
under review (1975-76) has been the most active period of the Bank since It
was established. The Report notes that the Bank faced problems In apprats-
72Ing projects which contained very little Information.
72. The Dally News, 5 December, 1975.
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Identical provisions, as above, appear In the Tanzanian Rural 
73Development Bank Actf  1971, with the exception that the loan so made
or guaranteed by the bank must be utilised for rural development only.
The Tanzania Rural Development Bank has Issued loans amounting to shs.
59]m/~  for development projects In the country since Its formation In 1971.
The projects Include transportation, animal husbandry, small-scale Industries,
74fishing and agricultural activities.
It Is of Interest to note that although the different public corpor­
ations are set up for different objectives, similar powers are given to each
corporation. These powers are very wide, for examples, clauses (f) and 
75
(g) of paragraph 4 of each Corporation, provide that a Corporation Is em­
powered to do a ll such acts and things as may be necessary to uphold and sup­
port the credit of the Corporation and to obtain and justify public confidence, 
and to avert or minimise any loss to the Corporation and to do any thing or 
enter Into any transaction which, In the opinion of the Board, Is calculated 
to facilitate the proper and efficient carrying on of Its activities and the 
proper performance of Its functions. Each board has the power to regulate 
Its own procedure subject to the provisions of any regulation made by the
73. SS.4, 12 and 16.
74. The Dally News, 23 June, 1976.
75. The N .A .F .C .  (Establishment) Order, 1969, the N .D .C .  (Est.) Order, 
1969, the T .T .C . (Est.) Order, 1969, 4 ( l ) (c ) , T .L .C . (Est.) Order, 1970.
relevant Ministers.
We may now note the functions of the above Public Corporations. 
The National Agricultural and Food Corporation has been given power to 
promote agricultural development and the production of food, to conduct 
or engage In the businesses of growers,planters, dealers, processors, Import­
ers, exporters of such agricultural products, Including livestock, to establish 
branches and carry on business either within the United Republic or elsewhere, 
to acquire by agreement and hold Interests In any undertaking, enterprise or 
project associated with agricultural development or the production of food, 
and to manage the affairs of any Corporation, Company, Firm or other body , 
the Interests of which are transferred to or acquired by the Corporation under 
the provisions of the Act or this O rd e r .^
The Tanzania Tourist Corporation Is empowered to promote the 
tourist Industry In a ll Its aspects, to conduct or engage In the businesses of 
tour operators, travel agents, hotel developers, hotel managers, publicity 
agents, advertising agents, printers, publishers, film distributors, film ex­
hibitors, and such other businesses pertaining to the tourist Industry, to 
establish branches and carry on business anywhere, to acquire by agree­
ment and hold Interests In any undertaking, enterprise or project associated
76. Ib id ., paragraph 5(7).
77. Paragraph 4(a) to 4(e).
with the development of the tourist Industry and to manage the affairs of any
forms of enterprise, the Interests of which are transferred to or acqutred by
78the Corporation under the provisions of the Act or this Order.
The Tanzania Legal Corporation Is created to provide legal services
to parastatal organisations on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon
between them and the Corporations, and such legal services to the Government
79
as the Attorney-Genera I may direct. Paragraph 4(2) provides that the 
Corporation ought to perform Its functions In accordance with the best pro­
fessional standards.
We now face a vital question of real Importance and significance -  
where lies the real power of authority In a one-party State? Is It  with the 
Government or Is It  with the Party, or Is tt with the board of management?
Nyerere has spelt out In unequivocal terms the relationships that 
should exist between the three organs. "A Government", he said,
Is an Institution which always uses force: 
that Is why the Constitution had to be 
amended so that the Government would 
always be enjoined to remember that when 
It makes decisions It  does so on behalf of 
the people. The Government had a l­
ways to be remtnded that It  was the party's 
Instrument of law enforcement. 80
78. Paragraph 4(a) to 4 (e ).
79. Paragraph 4(l)(a ) to 4 (])(b ).
80 . "Tanzania" In the African Contemporary Record, 1975-76, Colin 
Legum (Ed.), page B17.
Thts means that the people of Tanzanta have accepted the party supremacy 
over the Government. In other words, the Government ts subordinate to 
the Party. In January, 1975, TANU Central Committee directed the 
Government to set In motion machinery to amend the Constitution so as to
3]make the Party supreme. This would simply be giving .political re­
inforcement to what was actually happening In fact. It means , In effect, 
that TANU Is the real centre of power and decisions, not the Government.
The question now remains what should be the relationship between 
the Party and the board of management. Here Is a conflict between real 
power and the legal power. The board of management has been empowered 
by statutes or orders to run the Corporations smoothly and efficiently without 
any Interference but subject to directives Issued by the President or his dele­
gates. Are they then free to take decisions? It w ill be recalled that In 
all the Corporations the President appoints the Chairmen and the other mem­
bers of the board may be appointed by the Minister where the President thinks 
It fit to delegate his powers to the Minister. Therefore, the real power re­
sides with the President or the Minister. Even though the board of manage­
ment Is endowed with legal powers, In effect, they are subordinate to the 
Government and, tn turn, the Government Is subordinate to the Party. 
Therefore, the Party Is supreme and Its decision Is fina l. Hence, the
81. "TAN ZAN IA : TANU Supremacy", Africa (April, 1975), page 86.
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board of management w ill have to shape thetr policy decisions In line with 
the Party's policy decisions.
However, the Party's Influence and presence can also be fe lt In 
the National Institutions. The Party activists are much alive and take an 
active role In activities of these Institutions.
The Party's call to establish TANU branches In Industries and
other places of work has been Implemented by the National Bank of
Commerce. There are now 19 branches. These branches are playing
an active role In a ll activities of the bank, Including organising political
education for a ll cadres of staff, cultural activities, coordinating between
82the management and the workers, etc.
In June 1975, Ndugu M havtlle, the Party Nattonal Executive 
Secretary, called on 25 TANU Secretaries who were appointed by the 
Party's Central Committee to various Corporations and Industries to co­
operate with the management In executing their duties. "We expect you
to co-operate and work for the common good -  to put the Interests of the
83and the Natlona before anything", he said. He expects both the 
management and functionaries to consult with each other In order to ensure
82. The Dally News (Tanzania), 7 February, 1976.
83. Ib id ., 1 July, 1975.
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84the smooth running of thetr establishment.
This statement seems to suggest that there exists some tension 
at least between the management and the Party leaders.
84. Ibid.
5.8 Financial Structure
The method of providing finance to corporations varies from one 
country to another and also between different corporations within the same 
country. The usual practice Is to provide the required capital to the cor­
porations either In the form of loans or by guaranteeing the loans floated by 
them, or by acquiring the shares In the corporations. The financial string 
Is considered to be a powerful weapon available to the Minister to exercise 
his control over a corporation.
The financial structure of the public corporations established under 
the Public Corporations Act, 1969, Is simple and uniform. The original 
fund of the corporation Is provided by the Government. Section 9(4) of the 
Public Corporations A ct, 1969, also empowers the Government to raise money 
with the approval of the National Assembly, either within or outside the United 
Republic, for the purposes of the corporation and a ll morifes so raised Is to be 
charged and Issued out of the Consolidated Fund, and when paid to the Cor­
poration w ill form part of Its fund. It Is necessary to point out that the 
borrowing power of a public corporation Is unlimited. Paragraph 9 of each 
of the Public Corporations provides that "the Corporation may from time to 
time borrow such sums of money as It may require to meet any of Its obliga­
tions or for the purposes of Its business." If the management Is allowed to 
exercise this function freely, then the ministerial control over a public
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corporation wtll be Ineffective.
The Acts establishing the Bank of Tanzania, the National Bank of 
Commerce, the Tanzania Investment Bank and the Tanzania Rural Develop­
ment Bank prescribe the authorised capital with which the Corporations have 
85
to function. The Bank of Tanzania Act provides that the authorised capi­
tal Is to be 200 million shillings and the Issued capital Is to be subscribed and 
held only by the United Republic.
In the case of the National Bank of Commerce, the In itia l legis­
lation made no provision for capital but It was put right after four months by
86amending the original legislation. The Act now provides that the author­
ised capital Is to be 100 million shillings divided Into 1,000 shares of 100.000 
shillings each, a ll Is to be subscribed and held by the United Republic. The 
shares are divided Into paid-in shares and callable shares In the ratio of 1:3. 
The amounts subscribed to the callable shares are charged on the Consolidation 
Fund but payable only when required by the Bank to meet obligations which It
cannot otherwise meet even by the use of the General Reserve or facilities
87obtained from the Bank of Tanzania.
85. S . l4 ( l ) & ( 2 ) ,  Bank of Tanzania A ct, 1967; S .2, N .B .C . (Amend­
ment) A ct, 1967; S .5(1) & (2), T . I .B .  A ct, 1970; S .5(1) & (2),
T .R .D .B . A ci~T971.
86. See J .S . Read: "Tanzania11, Annual Survey of African Law, 1967, page 170.
87. Ibid.
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The authorised capital stock of the Tanzania Investment Bank Is
to be 100 million shillings divided Into 100 shares, eachlng have a par value
of 1 million shillings. The shares are equally divided Into paid-in shares
and callable shares. The shares of the Bank are to be subscribed by the
Government of the United Republic, the National Bank of Commerce and
88the National Insurance Corporation of Tanzania In the ratio of 6:3:1.
The authorised capital of the Bank Is amenable to Increase by a resolution
of the board of directors, but no Increase Is possible without the approval 
89
of the Minister.
The Tanzania Rural Developmen^Act provides that the authorised
capital of the Bank Is to be 100 million shillings, divided Into 100 shares of
901 million shillings each. A prescribed rumber of shares of the Bank are
to be Issued In the first Instance divided equally Into paid-in shares and
callable shares, and the remaining shares w ill be Issued from time to time In
91the proportion specified by a resolution of the board of directors. The
authorised capital of the Bank may also be Increased by the board of directors
92but It  w ill not take effect without the approval of the Minister. The
88. S .6(1) & (2), T . I .B .  A ct, 1970.
89. Ib id ., S .5(3).
90. S .5(1).
91. S .5(2).
92. S .5(3) & (4).
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Issued capital Is to be subscribed and held only by the Government of the 
93
United Republic,
The Bank of Tanzania, the Tanzania Investment Bank and the
Tanzania Rural Development Bank are required by law to create a reserve 
94fund. The Bank of Tanzania, after consultation with the Minister, Is
to transfer to the general reserve fund -  (I) I f  the amount of monies In that 
fund Is less than the authorised capital of the Bank, not less than one-quarter 
of Its net profits; or (II) If  the amount of monies In that fund equals or ex­
ceeds the authorised capital of the Bank but Is less than three times the 
amount of that capital, not less than one-eighth of Its net profits; and
(III)  the remainder of the net profits of the Bank Is to be paid Into the Con- 
96solldated Fund. The Act also provides that In the event of any net loss
In excess of the monies standing to the credit of the general reserve fund of
97the Bank, Is to be charged upon, and paid out of, the Consolidated Fund,
With respect to the Tanzania Investment Bank, It  Is provided that 
the Board of Directors should decide annually what part of the net Income Is 
to be transferred to the general reserve fund and tfhat part Is to be distri­
buted to the shareholders. The question of distribution does not arise so
93. S .6(1).
94 . S .15(1), B .O .T . A ct, 1967; S .17(1), T . I .B .  A ct, 1970; S .17(1), 
T .R .D .B . A ct, 1971.
96. S. 15(2).
97. S .16(1).
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long as the reserve fund ts less than fifty percentum of the authorised 
98
capital. An Identical provision exists In the Tanzania Rural Develop-
99
ment Bank A ct, 1971. The Rural Development Bank Is empowered to
use the general reserve fund In making good any loss or deficiency which
100may arise on the ordinary operations of the Bank.
The Bank of Tanzania, the Tanzania Investment Bank and the
Tanzania Rural Development Bank are also required to make provisions for
bad and doubtful debts, depreciation of assets, contributions to staff and
superannuation fu n d s .^  In addition to the general reserve fund, the
T anzanla Investment Bank and the Tanzania Rural Development Bank are
102authorised to create special funds. The relevant section provides
that the Bank may accept for administration from such sources as It may 
consider appropriate special funds which are Intended to promote the ob­
jects of the Bank and such funds are to be used on terms and conditions 
consistent with the objects of the Bank. Tanzania still has a long way 
to go before It  can attain economic Independence. It Is appropriate 
to mention that parastata! surpluses grew from shs. 626m /- In 1973 to
98. S .17(2).
99. S .17(2).
100. S .17(3).
101. S .15(2), Bank of Tanzania A ct, 1967.
102. S .8 ( l) ,  T . I .B . A ct, 1970; S .8(1), T .R .D .B . A ct, 1971.
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shs. 6 9 3 .3 m /- tn 1974, and shs. 800^3m/- tn 1975 -  rose agatn tn 1976,
and the foreign capital received by parastatals Increased from shs. 5 8 .4 m /-
104
In 1969 to shs. 106 .2m /- In 1976. Hopefully, these could be used
for economic development.
In almost a ll statutes there are provisions regarding maintenance
of accounts. In the case of the public corporations established under the
Public Corporations Act^ 1969, these are to provide statements of account
In such form as the President may direct to be prepared In respect of each
financial year of the public corporation In such manner and In such form
105as the President may direct.
In the case of the Bank of Tanzania, the relevant provision runs
as follows:
The Bank shall cause true and full 
accounts and records to be kept of 
a ll Its transactions, and the books 
of account and records shall be kept 
at Its head office and shall be open 
at a ll times to the Inspection of the 
members of the Board. 106
103. "Tanzania” In the Africa Contemporary Record (1976-77), page B339.
104. Economic & Operations Report (Bank of Tanzania),  June, 1976.
105. S .7(1).
106. S .17(2), B .O .T . A ct, 1967.
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The Bank Is also required to submit to the Minister within three months 
after the close of each financial year, a statement of the Bank's opera­
tions throughout that year, together with the balance sheet and profit 
and loss account for that year, certified by the auditor.
Under Section 7(1) of the National Bank of Commerce A ct, 1967, 
the board Is to ensure that proper accounts and other records In relation 
thereto are kept by the National Bank and prepared In respect of each finan­
cial year of the Bank, a statement of accounts In such form as the Minister 
may direct, being a form which should conform with the best commercial 
standards.
The Tanzania Investment Bank A ct, 1970, requires the board of
directors to ensure that proper accounts and proper records are kept In re la -
108tlon to the operations of the Bank. The Bank Is to prepare and submit
to the Minister for Finance, and to the shareholders, and to publish an
109
annual report,together with an audited statement of Its accounts. It 
must also furnish a quarterly statement to Its shareholders In respect of Its
financial position and a profit and loss account showing the results of Its
<* 110 operation.
107. S . 18(1 )(a ) .
108. S .23(1).
109. S .23(2).
110. S .23(3).
Identical provisions exist In the Tanzania Rural Development Act,
With regard to the existing staff of a Corporation, a provision slml
112
lar to the one below does appear In various statutes creating corporations 
to protect the Interests of the staff. We may note that Section 8(5) of the 
Public Corporations A ct, 1969, which provides :
the President may transfer any employee 
of a Corporation to the service of an­
other corporation -
(a) such employee shall, as from the 
date of such transfer, be deemed 
to be an employee of the Corpora­
tion to which he Is transferred;
(b) the terms and conditions of service 
applicable to such employee after 
such transfer shall not be less 
favourable than those which were 
applicable to him Immediately 
before the transfer, and for the 
purposes of determining any right 
to gratuity or any other superannu­
ation benefit the service of such 
employee with the Corporation to 
which he Is transferred shall be re­
garded as continuous with his ser­
vice Immediately preceding such 
transfer; and
(c) the employment of such employee 
Immediately prior to his transfer, 
and his employment by the Cor­
poration to which he Is transfer­
red, shal I be deemed to be con-
111. S .23(1), to 23(3).
112. See Bradley, supra,
tTnuous employment by one employer 
wtthTn the meaning of section 8A of 
the Severance Allowance A ct, 1962, 
and that Act shall apply to the parties 
In the same manner as It applies to the 
cases set out In subsection (1) of the 
said section 8A .
5.9 Audit
A question of great Importance Is the audit of the accounts of 
the public and statutory corporations. The accounts of the public corpor­
ations In the United Kingdom are audited by professional auditors appointed 
by the responsible Minister and not by the Comptroller and Auditor- 
General, who Is responsible for the auditing of the accounts of Government 
departments. In Tanzania, there Is a special body for carrying out the 
audit of public corporations, known as the Tanzania Audit Corporation, 
which was set up by a separate Act of Parliament (T .A .C . A ct, 1968, N o .l)
to provide auditing, accounting and advisory services for the said Institutions
113and for certain national companies In which the Government owns shares.
The Public Corporations Act, 1969, In section 7(2) provides that subject to 
any written law, the accounts of every public corporation Is to be audited 
by the Tanzania Audit Corporation or by such other person as the President 
may direct. The Audit Corporation Is to perform Its functions In accord­
ance with the best professional standards and the board of directors Is to give 
effect to any direction as to the exercise of the functions of the Corporation 
given, after consultation with It ,  only by the Comptroller and Auditor- 
General. The Tanzania Audit Corporation Act, 1968, also provides that 
I f  the President falls to lay the annual report and accounts of the Audit
113. See J .S . Read: "Tanzania” , Annual Survey of African Law, 1968, 
page 136.
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Corporation before the National Assembly within the prescribed time, the 
Auditor-General must submit them himself to the Speaker who, tn turn,
114must lay them before the Assembly. It Is of Interest to note that the
accounts of the Corporation w ill be audited by the Comptroller and Auditor- 
115
G eneral. This provision has enhanced the power of control of the 
Auditor-General over the Audit Corporation.
But the accounts of the Bank of Tanzania and the National
Bank of Commerce  ^^  are to be audited annually by auditors appointed by
the Minister. The Bank of Tanzania Act, 1967, also lays down that the
Minister may, at any time, require the Comptroller and Auditor-General
or such other auditor as he may appoint, to make an examination of, and to
118report on, the accounts of the Bank.
The Tanzania Investment Bank A ct, 1970, provides that the 
accounts of the Bank In respect of each financial year are to be audited
119by the Tanzania Audit Corporation. An Identical provtslon exists
114. S .9(4).
115. For a discussion, see Bfadley & McAuslan: "Public Corporations In 
East Africa", Government Enterprise, Friedmann & Garner (Ed.) 
page 294.
116. S .17(3), B .O .T . A ct, 1967.
117. S .7(2), N .B .C . Act, 1967.
118. S .17(4).
119. S .23(1).
120Tn the Tanzania Rural Development Bank Act, 1971.
In addttton to the power entrusted to the Audit Corporation to 
audit the accounts of the public and statutory corporations, the Corpora­
tion can also now be directed by the President to conduct a special audit 
Inspection of any specialised authority, or with regard to any person em­
ployed by a specialised authority or reasonably suspected of having had any
121
dealing with a specified authority. This provision, undoubtedly, has
Increased the Importance and the scope of activities of the Audit Corpora­
tion.
120. S .23(1).
121. The Tanzania Audit Corporation (Amendment) A c t, 1970.
5.10 Parliamentary Control
Parliament exercises direct and Indirect control over public and 
statutory corporations. Direct control Includes powers which are exercised 
by Parliament Itself. Indirect control Is exercised through a Minister respon­
sible to Parliament. We have already considered the question of Ministerial 
control under the several heads, namely, composition, appointment and re­
moval of members of the board, directions, financial and audit control.
We must now consider the accountability of the Corporations to Parliament. 
This must depend on the availability of published Information supplemented 
by parliamentary questions addressed to the Minister concerned. The 
methods, usually applied for the exercise of direct parliamentary control 
over corporations Include questions, debates, discussion of reports and 
accounts, etc.
(a) Parliamentary questions
O f all parliamentary techniques, the most widely known and the 
most commonly used Is the parliamentary question. Any member of parlia­
ment Is entitled to ask any questions regarding the affairs of any corporation. 
This source of Information, however, yields little since questions relating to 
the Internal organisations and the day-to-day administration cannot be asked. 
Therefore, parliamentary questioning has been regarded as an unsuitable de­
vice for the purpose of ensuring public accountability, but It can have a
desirable moral Influence on the managers of public and statutory corpora­
tions. Since any major aspect of their conduct Is liable to form the sub­
ject matter of a question, they develop a high sense of responsibility In the 
taking of decisions.
(b) Debates
Members of Parliament get many opportunities for debating 
matters affecting corporations In the course of the parliamentary programme. 
For example, when a Bill Is presented before the House to amend existing 
legislation, or when the President or the Minister makes an order under the 
Public Corporations A ct, 1969, to establish a corporation, and a copy of 
such order Is laid before the National Assembly, or a specific Bill Is laid 
before Parliament to set up a statutory corporation, the Members of Parlia­
ment can discuss the pros and cons of the provisions of the Bills and put for-
122ward their arguments for and against those provisions.
Another occasion for Members of Parliament to deAbate Is when 
the annual statement, otherwise known as the Budget, which Is a statement 
of the estimates of Income and expenditure for the coming year, Is presented 
before the House. From the time It Is presented until the time the Appro­
priations and Finance Bills are passed, Members get opportunities to discuss 
the financial policies pursued by the Government, and the relative merit of
122. For a full discussion, see Bradley & McAuslan: supra, page 284, and 
V . N .  Carvallo: "Control of Managing Agents", EALR, V o l.5 , 1972, 
pages 104-105.
298.
allocation of funds to dtfferent MtnTstrtes.
The effectiveness of this device Is very doubtful, because the 
Government may not be willing to accept the views expressed by Members 
of Parliament.
(c) Discussion of reports and accounts
Another opportunity for the exercise of direct control by Parlia­
ment Is provided by the Presidential Orders or Statutes establishing public 
or statutory corporations. They are usually required to submit annual re­
ports to the National Assembly, together with their accounts duly audited 
by auditors. The Public Corporations A ct, 1969, provides thah
As soon as the accounts of a public 
corporation shall be audited, the 
Board of Directors or any person en­
trusted with the management of the 
Corporation shall send a copy of 
the statement of account together 
with a copy of any report made by 
the Auditors to the Minister desig­
nated by the President and such 
Minister w ill lay a copy of such 
statement of account and report 
before the National Assembly.
122aSimilar provisions appear In the Bank of Tanzania Act, 1967, and the
123
National Bank of Commerce Act, 1967.
122 a .S .l8 (l)(b ) & (2).
123. S .7(3) & (4).
The Tanzania Investment A ct, 1970, and the Tanzania Rural 
Development A ct, 1971, do not contain a provision for laying a copy of 
the statement of accounts and auditorks report before the National Assembly. 
It Is difficult to appreciate this.
However, these reports do not completely meet the needs of 
Parliament, partly due to their sheer volume and complexity, and partly 
because Information Is not necessarily available on matters on which It Is 
required or when It Is required. For example, the Annual Report of the 
National Development Corporation (1971-72), which has been scarcely 
Impressive. It Is actually a bare statement of profit and loss. It would 
be useful If  the Boards are asked to produce comprehensive reports to ac­
quaint the public and the M .P .s with as much Impartial Information and 
account of their doings as possible.
We have mentioned above the techniques which are available 
to the Members of Parliament to exercise control over the public enter­
prises. It depends entirely on the Individual judgment and willingness 
of the Members of Parliament to make use of them. However, our study 
Is unable to provide any example of parliamentary discussion because de­
bates In the National Assembly are conducted tn the Swahili language.
We had to rely on the secondary sources, I . e .  newspapers, periodicals, 
etc. , and even then the examples are very rare. One such case was
reported tn the *0011/ News* , 23 June, 1976. In answering a question 
asked by the M .P . for Musnna Rural, Ndugu H .K .D . Klrglnl, the Minister 
for Finance and Industry, said that the Tanzania Rural Development Bank 
has Issued loans amounting to shs. 591 m/ -  for development projects since 
Its Inception In 1971. The Minister also told the House that there was 
need for the Bank to recruit more personnel to effectively spread Its ac ti­
vities throughout the country.
The question now remains how effective parliamentary discussion 
Is In a one-party State. Usually, but not always, the Members of the 
Opposition Party or Parties raise questions In Parliament relating to the pro­
per functioning of the public enterprises. One would assume that In a one- 
party State, the Party, the Government and the Government machinery mean 
the same thing. Therefore, the Members of Parliaments functions would 
be effectively performed by Government machineries. In the case of Tan­
zania, this Is done by the three Institutions, namely, the Audit Corporation 
(discussed earlier), the Standing Committee on Parastatal organisation, and 
the Inspectorate set up by the Parastatal Organisation (Finance Supervision 
and Control) A c t, 1975.
The Standing Committee on Parastatal Organisations exercises a 
considerable control over the public enterprises. It Is In itia lly  entrusted 
with the job of seeing that the public funds are properly used and uniform
pattern tn respect of wage structure and fringe benefits Is followed for all
parastatal employees. Its powers and scope have been widened• The
124
SCOPO has been reorganised to ensure efficiency. Under the new 
set-up, Ndugu S .J . Galtnoma, has been appointed Permanent Chairman 
and Ndugu L .L . M ltalo , Executive Secretary (who was an Inspector In the 
Ministry of Finance). According to a circular Issued by the Chairman to 
all parastatal heads, the SCOPO Is now empowered to approve the organi­
sational structure of a ll parastatals to ensure that the structure conforms with 
the needs and obligations of the respective parastatals. The SCOPO w ill 
ensure that the number of workers In a parastatal conform with Its manpower 
requirements and that there Is no overlapping between parastatals and com­
panies • The SCOPO w ill continue to work out parastatal salary saales 
and fringe benefits to ensure that they do not exceed those given tnthe 
C ivil Service. It w ill continue to supervise the transfer of C iv il Servants 
to parastatals and ensure that they are mobilised accordingly.
However, the N .D .C .  complain that the job descriptions and 
salary grades, as determined by the SC O P Q j were too rigid to encourage 
Individual responsibility and productivity. The Chairman, Ndugu N .  
Gallnoma replied that:
124. The Dally News (Tanzania), 1 September, 1976.
on job descriptions, these were done 
on Individual basis, taking Into con­
sideration the performance and Import­
ance of the companies. He thinks 
that there Is need to see the NDC  
officials and study their case after 
which the SCOPO w ill Issue a full 
statement with regard to these Issues •
It Is too early to expect a statement.
A new body ( I .e .  the Inspectorate) has been formed In accord­
ance with the Parastatal Cfganlsatlons (Finance, Supervision and Control),
126A ct, 1975. The Functions of the Inspectorate w ill be:-
(I) To examine the expenditure of parastatal funds by the various para- 
stata) organisations and their employees.
(II) to Investigate the conduct and performance of officers who control 
or have access to the funds.
(III) To review the financial regulations and propose amendments to them.
(Iv) To make recommendations and submit proposals to the Minister for
ways and means of minimising unproductive expenditure of the funds.
(v) To undertake such other enquiry and perform such other functions as 
the Minister may direct.
125. The Dally News (Tanzania), 7 December, 1977.
126. Ib id ., 11 November, 1975.
The Inspector w tll be given access to a ll accounts, records of 
ftnanctal transactions and other documents appertaining to such funds or 
property.
We have not come across any report as ye t. However, we be­
lieve I f  these Institutions work effectively, they can exercise a good deal 
of control over the parastajjorganlsatlons on behalf of the Members of Parlia­
ment, the Government and the people.
It Is of Interest to tnote that Section 67(4) of the Interim Con­
stitution of 1965 has also empowered the Commission of Enquiry to deal 
with the cases of misconduct and misuse of powers , whether It  be a person 
or corporate bodies established by statute and public authorities or boards.
But It  Is relevant to mention that no statute has made a specific provision 
regarding this.
However,
the Tanzanian Presidential Commission 
of Inquiry on the Co-operatives and 
Marketing Boards noted that mini­
sterial pressure on the Development 
and Credit Banks had resulted In 
those bodies making some loans of 
doubtful soundness; It  recommended 
that the Government should revert 
to Its original and statutory role In 
relation to the banks of vetoing pro­
posals only. 127
127. Bradley & McAusIan: "Public Corporations In East Africa", In 
Government Enterprise, Friedmann & Garner (Ed.), page 280.
It ts appropriate to mention that the Commission of Enquiry
have Investigated ”2,814 complaints up to June 1970. Out of 2,814
cases, 1,005 cases have been completed, and so far 372 were successful 
128
and 633 were not” . These figures speak for themselves that the
people are taking advantage of this Institution and that the Commission 
Itself Is very active and doing a real service to the nation as a whole.
128. M . Klmlcha: "The Ombudsman and the Permanent Commission 
Enquiry” , In the Journal of Administration Overseas, January, 
1973, page 48 .
5.11 Position of Members of Parliament and Government Officials
As regards the participation of Members of Parliament In the board 
of corporations, almost all statutes and orders are silent on this matter, with 
the exception of the Bank of Tanzania A ct, 1967, which provides that M .P .s  
are disqualified from appointment to the board of the Bank. It can be argued 
that the appointment of an M .P . to the board w ill lead to overlapping of his 
functions, I .e .  as the representative of the people, It Is expected that he 
should raise questions and seek Information on the affairs of the Corporation 
In the public Interest, and as a member of the board he Is supposed to support 
and defend the policy of the Corporation. One may find these tasks d iffi­
cult to reconcile. But Bradley and McAuslan are of the opinion that sofar 
as Corporations retain some autonomy and until the East African Parliament 
develop new techniques of calling corporations to account, the position of
the M .P ./board member Is potentially valuable as a link between Parliament,
129the Corporation and the Public.
However, there Is no restriction Imposed on the Ministers or de­
partmental secretaries to servfe on the boards of parastatals.
129. Bradley & McAuslan: "Public Corporations In East A frica", o p .c lt ., 
page 291.
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130It can be seen from the table below that the boards of 
Tanzanian parastatals are dominated by the Government officials.
Ministry Parastatal Posts held on 22 A prilt 1972
Directorships or 
Representatives
Chairmanship Total
1. Central Establishment
(M r. D .A . Mwakosya) 13 3 16
2 . Commerce
(M r. O .M .  Katlkaza) 17 10 27
3 . T reasury
(M r. C .D . Msuya) 24 - 24
4 . Natural Resources
(M r. G .J .  Klleo) 6 2 8
5 . Rural Development 
(M r. A . Mushl) 6 - 6
6 . Lands
(M r. E .P . Mwaluko) 8 - 8
7 . Devplan
(M r. E .A . Mulokozl) 8 10 18
8 . Education
(M r. J .D . Maganga) 1 1 2
9. Comworks
(M r. I .A .  Kaduma) 6 — 6
89 26 115
130. ShlvjT: Class Struggles In Tanzania (1976).
Thus, 9 principal Secretaries shared among themselves 89 directorships and
26 Chairmanships, In a ll 115 top posts In the parastatals. On average,
therefore, each one of them had 13 leadership posts In the parastatals.
Shlvjl states: ’’These links considerably minimize the Internal contradictions
131between those running the State and those running the economy” . This 
statement Is true but the success of the domination as a whole surely depends 
on the confidence the above officials create In the departments and on the 
efficiency with which they combine administrative ability and business acu­
men. Such Government appointments to the boards of parastatals can only 
be supportedon the ground that there Is an acute shortage of qualified, skill­
ed and educated people In Tanzania . It cannot be denied, however, that 
there w ill be an overlap of secretarial and directorial functions, which w ill 
also deter ‘new blood* from getting Into these Institutions with their new Ideas, 
In itia tive, drive and enterprise.
131. Shlvjl, I: Class Struggles In Tanzania, page 90.
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5.12 Legal Status
In Tanzania, statutes and the Presidential orders bring Into exist­
ence the statutory and public corporations respectively. They provide for 
Its constitution, functions and powers. It Is a body corporate with a common 
seal. As to Its legal personality, every statute-creating corporation provides 
that the corporation shall:—
(a) have perpetual succession and a common seal;
(b) In Its corporate name be capable of suing and being sued;
(c) subject to this Act, be capable of purchasing and otherwise acquiring,
132and of alienating any movable or Immovable property.
The public corporations established under the authority of the Public
133Corporation Act, 1969, are also endowed with the above powers.
The Corporation, therefore, Is a separate legal entity different 
from the Individuals who compose I t .  It Is like a company or a natural per­
son and Is eligible to carry on such activities which lie within Its powers, 
and Is subject to the ordinary law of the land. The Corporation can exer­
cise Its rights and powers given to It by the statute creating I t .  A detailed 
discussion of the legal position of the Corporation can only be attempted
132. S .3 , B .O .T . A ct, 1967; S .4 , N .B .C . A ct, 1967; S .4 , T .I .B . A ct, 
1970; $ .4 , T .R .D .B T ^ c t, 1971.
133. S .2 .
when the Courts of Law have considered the scope of the powers, privileges 
and Immunities granted to It In a few cases.
Corporations are legal entitles and they are subject to the ordinary 
law of the land. Now the question remains whether the corporations are 
subj ect to the ultra-vires doctrine.
The application of this doctrine and Its Implications In the case of 
the public enterprises In Tanzania has been fully explained by Professor R.W .
134James and S. Llgunya. The argument against the application of this
doctrine Is that It does not serve any useful purpose. On the contrary, It  
does dampen down the drive and Initiative of the management. The problem 
usually arises when the activities of different corporations are very closely 
connected with each other, I .e .  the functions of N .D .C . ,  S .T .C . and 
N .A .F .C .  sometimes overlap, and managerial decision Is called for. In 
this situation, It Is the responsibility of the Individual corporation to confine 
Its activities strictly within Its bounds. If It exceeds Its lim it, then the 
action can only be supported on the ground that It has done so In the public 
Interest. But the danger Is that similar actions could also be taken by 
other corporations In the national Interest and this would lead to duplication. 
In these circumstances, I f  the doctrine of ultra-vires Is Invoked In order to
134. "Organizational Relationships and Control", In East African Law 
Review, V o l.5 , 1972, pages 39-64 .
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find out the offender, then the action which was taken by the defendant 
corporation In the public Interest could In principle, be declared null and 
void.
The supporters of the doctrine claim that such a problem of dupli­
cation can be solved by the use of Ministerial directions. But the fact of 
the matter Is that the use of direction Is usually applied In respect of the 
general policy matters. It Is expected that the Minister w ill refrain from 
Interfering In the day-to-day administration. A  conflict, however, might 
arise between corporations with regard to the day-to-day administration and 
the relevant Ministers may be asked to suggest a remedy. At this point, 
the Ministers, obviously, w ill consult the object-clause of the corporations 
concerned and try to look for the ultra-vires action In order to find out the 
corporation at fault. Therefore, the usefulness of this doctrine cannot be 
overemphasised.
Professor James and S. Llgunya also maintained that the ultra- 
vires principle as an element of control enhances a priori controls over a 
posteriori ones.
The former are statutes and regula­
tions defining the powers of the 
Corporations, the method of appoint­
ing the members of the board, and 
the machinery for prior approval 
for certain well-defined transactions 
etc . The latter Include the manner 
and degree of supervision exercised 
by the Ministry, the President and 
Parliament. 135
135. Ib id ., page 63.
They are of the optnton that the shortcomings of the control mechanism In
136Tanzania Is the prominence of the expqjt controls over a priori ones.
The next relevant legal question to be answered Is whether a 
corporation can claim sovereign Immunity, on the ground that It Is owned 
by the Government and run by the people appointed by the Government, 
and hence, It Is an Integral part of the Government, In a legal suit. The 
law Is not very clear In this respect In Tanzania, as no definite legal prin­
ciple has been established by the Courts. However, the decision In the
137case of Trendtex Trading Corporation v . Central Bank of N igeria, w ill 
be Instructive because a similar situation might arise there In the near future. 
The facts of the case are as follows:
In July, 1975, there were 300 to 400 ships waiting on demur­
rage outside the port of Lagos -  Apapa -  for berths that were a ll occupied. 
More ships were arriving dally. Most of them were carrying cement. The 
Government departments had ordered far too much cement. The ports were 
utterly unable to cope with I t .  In the same month, a new military admini­
stration took over the government machinery. It suspended the Import of 
cement Into N igeria . It set up a Committee to negotiate firesh terms with 
the suppliers so as to reduce the quantities on order and to spread the deli­
veries over a longer time. The steps taken had proved successful. The
136. O p .c lt . ,  Ib id.
137. Reported In The Times, 18 January, 1977.
congestion of shtps had been cleared.
The Central Bank of NTgerta originally Issued a letter of credit 
for more than $l4m and It had expressly stated that no confirmation of the 
credit was necessary, that they were ’’Irrevocably committed to honour” 
their engagements under the credit. The credit had been transferred to 
Trendtex Trading Corporation who made shipments of cement to Lagos for 
some of which they had not been paid. In Novem ber, 1975, Trendtex 
Issued a writ In the High Court against the Bank claiming demurrage on six 
ships, the price of cement shipped on two, and damages for non-acceptance.
M r. Justice Mocatta had ordered the Bank to retain $l4m In London 
to meet the claim. M r. Justice Donaldson had set aside the writ and state­
ment of claim against the defendants, the Central Bank of N igeria, on the 
ground that the Bank was a department of State and, therefore, was Immune
t t f  138from suit.
The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the plaintiffs, Trend­
tex Trading Corporation of Zurich, against M r. Justice Donaldson's order*
It was held on appeal, reversing the judgment of M r. Justice Donaldson, 
that the Central Bank of Nigeria Is not to be regarded as a department of 
the Government of Nigeria In the guise of a bank so as to be Immune from
138. jj9 7 6 j 1W LR 868.
suit under the doctrine of sovereign Immunity.
Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls, said that:
a century ago no sovereign state 
engaged In commercial activities.
It kept to the traditional function 
of a sovereign: to maintain law 
and order, to conduct foreign 
affairs and to see to the defence 
of the country. So England, like 
most other countries, adopted the 
rule of absolute Immunity. Now 
nearly every State engaged In com­
mercial activities. It had Its de­
partment of State or It  created new 
legal entitles which went Into the 
world's market places . . .  If a 
Government went Into the market 
places of the world to buy cement 
as a commercial transaction It 
should be subject to the laws of 
the market place.
His Lordship preferred to rest his decision on the ground that there was no 
Immunity In respect of a commercial transaction even for a Government 
department. The two other Judges, Lord Justice Stephenson and Lord 
Justice Shaw, also agreed.
The above case was entertained and decided by a foreign Court. 
But our purpose Is to establish the legal status of corporations In their country 
of origin. In Tanzania, all corporations have corporate personality and, 
therefore, can sue and be sued In the Courts In their respective names •
However, It ts expected that tn a legal proceeding which may be brought 
by the Corporations or against the Corporations, they would not enjoy any 
special privileges, for example, sovereign Immunity, exemption from tax 
liab ility , e tc .,  Tn the absence of any established legal principle In this 
regard.
5.13 Dissolution
An Interesting feature of the Tanzanian Corporations Is the power 
of the President Tn the matter of dissolution and merger of the Corporation. 
Section 8(1) of the Public Corporations A ct, 1969, provides for a merger or 
dissolution Tn the following terms:
(1) Where the President has esta­
blished or establishes a public cor­
poration, or any statutory corpora­
tion has been established, for the 
performance of any functions and 
the President Is satisfied that there 
exists any other public corporation 
or statutory corporation (hereinafter 
referred to as 'the existing corpor­
ation') for the performance of a ll 
or any of the functions for which 
such public corporation or statu­
tory corporation Is or has been 
established, the President may -
(a) by order Tn the Gazette  
provide that the existing corpora­
tion shall cease to exist or shall 
cease to perform a ll or any of the 
functions which are conferred 
upon the public corporation or 
the statutory corporation as the 
case may be;
(b) by order transfer any 
asset or liability of the existing 
corporation to the public corpor­
ation or statutory corporation,
as the case may be;
(c) by order transfer any person 
who Ts an employee of the exTsttng 
corporation to the service of the pub­
lic corporation or the statutory corpor­
ation, as the case may be.
Our study reveals that the President has exercised the power to
dissolve certain corporations tn 1971, for example, the National Develop'
139
ment Credit Agency (Windlng-up) Order, 1971, and The College of
140
Agriculture (Dissolution) Order, 1971 ^
139. G N  N o . 112, published on 3 0 .4 .1 9 7 1 .
140. G N  N o . 120, published on 2 1 .5 .1 9 7 1 .
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6.1 Government Companies
The third type of public enterprise Is the Government Companies. 
Like private companies, they are governed by the provisions of the Companies
Act and have the common basic structure of companies with their memo-
1 2 rand urn of association, articles of association , annual general meetings,
boards of directors, and share capital. They come Into existence either 
by fulfilling certain statutory requirements as laid down Tn the Companies 
Act or by acquisition of shares, compulsorily or by agreements, Tn an exist­
ing company.
The Government company Is one Tn which the Government has a 
controlling Interest through Its ownership of a ll or some of the shares. It 
may be wholly owned by the Government or a mixed enterprise, I . e .  partly 
owned by the Government and partly by the private Individuals.
1. The Memorandum of Association^ as Is well-known, Is by far the 
most Important document relating to the Company because In It  are 
set out things which the Company Is to have power to do. It Is 
signed by the persons forming the Company.
2 . The Articles of Association contro! the Internal management of the 
Company and deal with such matters as voting rights, powers of the 
directors, appointment of auditors, etc.
" The term Vntxed enterprise*, says Professor T . DaTnttth,
may be used to describe an enter­
prise, a substantial part of whose 
capital ts privately subscribed, 
which Is constituted as a company 
subject to the Companies Acts or 
Is otherwise endowed with corporate 
status, In which the Government I t ­
self, a public corporation, o ra  
local authority has a substantial 
financial Interest of a permanent 
character, coupled with the ab i­
lity to exerctse a measure of In ­
ternal control either by way of 
voting power conferred by the 
ownership of shares or by the 
possession of a right to nominate 
directors or both.
In the United Kingdom, public corporation has been accepted as 
a vital Instrument of Government policy, but even then the participation of 
the Government through commercial companies Is not unknown. Between 
1964-70, the two Labour Governments Implemented a variety of economic 
and Industrial policies which were directed at the private sector of Industry. 
The Industrial Reorganisation Corporation was established under the Industrial 
Reorganisation A ct, 1966, with a view "to promoting Industrial efficiency and 
profitability", and to assist the economy of the United Kingdom, the Industrial 
Reorganisation Corporation was to promote or assist the reorganisation or
3 . T .N .  Dalntlth: Government Enterprise, W . Friedmann (Ed .), 
"Mixed Enterprise In the United Kingdom", page 56.
development of any Industry. Its powers were backed up by the 1968 
Industrial Expansion A ct, whtch extended Government powers to the pro­
duction and marketing activities of firms by the Investment of funds through 
the purchase of shares. By 1970, the Government had purchased millions 
of pounds1 worth of shares of different commercial companies and made 
their presence fe lt. But In 1971, the Conservative Government had termi­
nated the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation. The Labour Government^ 
desire to take acttve participation In the Industrial management did not, 
however, die down. In 1975, the Industry Act was passed. Part I of the 
Act Is concerned with the establishment and constitution of the National 
Enterprise Board. This Is modelled broadly on the same line as the Industrial
Reorganisation Corporation. In general terms, the functions of the Board 
5
are as follows:
(1) To foster a htgher level of Investment In British manufacturing 
Industry. The conventional wisdom at the present time holds 
that Industrial troubles stem from a failure on the part of private 
enterprise to Invest sufficiently. The National Enterprise 
Board Is endowed wtth public funds amounting to £700m.
4 .  S .21(1), I .R .C . Act, 1966.
5 . N .  Branton: ’The Industry A c t, 1975”, Accountants Review, (AprJI), 
page 17.
(2) To obtain for the State a stake Tn the more profitable sections of 
Industry •
(3) To assist firms or Industries which may be In difficulties but which 
are thought to have good prospects of a prosperous existence In 
the future.
(4) At the Instigation of the Government, to come to the aid of 
"lame ducks” which It Is considered essentia! to save ”ln the 
national Interest".
One of the criticisms levelled against the National Enterprise Board Is that It  
Is an Instrument for "backdoor nationalization".
However, several examples Involving Government Interest In pri­
vate enterprise firms had resulted In the late 1960s from the activities of the 
Industrial Reorganisation Corporation, for example, B .P . O il Company, the 
British Sugar Corporation, Internationa! Computers Limited, e tc . The 
Nationalised Industries also were Involved In mixed enterprise, as In the 
case of B .O .A .C . (now B .A .) .  Minority Interests In several airlines 
which served as feeders for Its main routes, the case of the Gas Council, 
which held a 50% share In British M ethane,, and the British Steel Corpor­
ation, which had holdings exceeding 10% In fifty-four subsidiary companies .*
6 . W .A . Robson: Mixed Enterprise, N .W .B . & R ., August (1972), 
page 7 .
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During the ftrst year the N .E .B . has made equity Investment In 
five companies In the fields which range from the paper Industry (Reed and 
Smith) to the machine tool Industry (Agemaspark). The percentage of vot­
ing shares and the Investment In these companies are as follows:
„ °/o Voting Shares Total Investment
(1) Data Recording Instrument 54 .0  £ 2 ,40m
(2) Agemaspark 30 .0  £0.4 lm
(3) Twin lock 33.3  £ 1.00m
(4) Reed & Smith 29.8  £0.80m
(5) Sinclair Radionics 4 2 .9  £0.65m "
In addition, the N .E .B . also became Involved In lending cash 
to machine tool companies on a commercial basis at rates slightly In excess 
of the 13 per cent. In 1976, It made a pre-tax profit of £51m on a group 
turnover of £2.75 b illion , giving the N .E .B . a before-tax rate of return of
g
11.8 per cent on the average capital employed during the year.
It remains to be seen whether the N .E .B .ks Involvement In In­
dustry Is likely to secure the present Government economic objectives.
Apart from numerous cases In which the Government Is a share­
holder In public limited companies, there are cases In which such companies 
are owned and controlled by the Government, as with Remploy L td ., Cable
7 . J .E . Abbott: "The Nationalization of Enterprise", In the Accountants 
Record, February, 1978, pages 16-19.
8 . Ibid.
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and Wtreless L td ., Beagle Atrcraft L td ., and the National Seed Development 
9
Organization Ltd.
It Is the mixed enterprise that provides the most obvious justifica­
tion for the use of the company rather than the public corporation.^ The 
recent trend , however, Indicates that the present Labour Government Is ex­
tremely keen to participate In the economic and Industrial development 
directly through this Institution. The ”mlxed company”, says Professor 
W . Friedmann, has thus become a respectable and deliberate Instrument of 
Stde economic Involvement In B rita in .^
At the Rangoon Seminar on:
some problems In the Organisation 
and Administration of Public Enter­
prises In the Industrial fie ld , organ­
ised by the United Nations, It  appear­
ed to be the unanimous opinion of the 
consultant that where an enterprise 
Is wholly Government-owned It  
should be set up In the form of pub­
lic corporation, or In some admini­
stered as a department of Govern­
ment. 12
9 . Turvey (Ed.): Public Enterprise (1962), Chapter 21 .
10. A .H . Hanson: Public Enterprise & Economic Development, (1959), 
page 351.
11. W . Friedmann (Ed.): Government Enterprise (1970), page 312.
12. Ib id ., page 13.
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The Rangoon SemTnar recognised the difference between a mixed enterprise 
and a wholly-owned State company, but consldere the latter to be frauds.
In support of Its view, It remarked:
Among the main disadvantages of 
this device In the case of entirely 
State-owned enterprises are the 
following:
(I) The Company device evades 
the constitutional responsibilities 
which a State-con trolled enter­
prise has, Tn a democratic society, 
to the Government and to Parlia­
ment.
(U) The use of the Company form 
and of the law relating commercial 
companies usually becomes a mere 
fiction because all or most of the 
functions normally vested Tn the 
shareholders and Tn the management 
are reserved to the Government by 
the statute setting up the company.
There Is usually no meeting of 
shareholders because It  would be 
meaningless, and the profits as 
well as appointments to the Board 
are naturally reserved to the 
Government. 13
Professor W .A . Robson has also expressed his view Tn very strong words 
against this form of Government participation. He said that: J,tts cor­
porate nature Is often fictitious, since the ownership Is usually vested In
13. Ib id ., pages 13-14.
the Crown or Tn the Government. It ts no way an Instrument of democratic
socialism, but Ts rather a device for avoiding public accountability and 
14controls11. Nevertheless, the Company form has come to be recognised
as an Important Instrument of the public sector Tn India, and the creation of
a company at present Is the rule rather than an exception. There are a lto - 
15gether 604 Government Companies Tn India. This figure speaks for I t ­
self, as to Its recognition and popularity.
14. W .A . Robson: Nationalized Industry and Public Ownership (1962), 
page 28 .
15. Reported In the Amrlta Bazar PatrTka, 18 April, J976.
6 .2  Government Companies Tn IndTa
The Indian Companies A ct, 1956/ contains a set of provisions 
designed to apply specially to Government Companies.^ A  Govern­
ment Company has been defined by section 617 of the Companies A ct, 1956, 
as one
In which not less than fifty-one 
percent of the paid-up share capi­
tal Ts held by the Central Govern­
ment, or by any State Government 
or Governments or partly by the 
Central Government and partly by 
one or more State Governments and 
Includes a Company which Is a sub­
sidiary of a Government Company 
as thus defined.
It Is appropriate to mention that the definition excludes the participation 
by the Public Corporations.
It must be noted, however, that *Government Company* Is not a 
separate class by Itself. A  public company as well as a private company 
may be a Government Company. Most of the Government Companies In 
IndTa have taken the form of private companies,^ where only two share-
16. SS. 617, 618, 619, 619A, 620 ,620A .
17. Other distinguishing features are (I) the number of shareholders can­
not exceed fifty , (II) the general public cannot be asked to subscribe, 
and (III) shares are not freely transferrable.
holders are required to sign the Memorandum and Articles of Association.
To comply with this formality, the Instruments are signed by the President 
of India and the Secretary of the Ministry or Department concerned as 
shareholders.
18Despite the Industrial Policy resolution of 1948, which declared
that the management of State enterprises would, as a ruler  be through the
medium of public corporations, the company form has been preferred for exe-
19cutlve convenience. The following reasons have Influenced the Govern 
ment to adopt the company form In preference to a statutory body. Firstly,
It  Ts easy to establish and the Government does not have to go to Parliament 
each time It  wants new machinery for one of Its new ventures. Secondly, It  
provides a great deal of flexib ility  and freedom of action Tn management. 
Since they are governed by the Companies Act as the private companies and 
constitutionally they are not part of the Government administration or of the 
Government finances, Parliament has no power to exercise any rights over 
this form of organisation. Thirdly, the articles of association can be alter­
ed by the Government without reference to Parliament. This means that 
the Government could reserve sufficient powers tn Its hands by making neces­
sary provisions In the articles. Fourthly, this form of organisation Ts parti­
cularly suitable when foreign participation Ts essential because of the dearth
18. See supra.
19. S .S . Khera: Government In Business, pages 115-119.
of capital and technical knowhow.
Finally, the company-type organisation enjoys greater freedom 
to adjust salaries and conditions to market trends. This helps to employ 
people whose experience Is a valuable asset to Government Tn business. 
Another purpose Tn establishing Government concerns In the company form 
may be to secure for them a certain amount of flex ib ility  Tn administration. 
Thus, the normal rules and regulations In Government relating to, for 
example, recruitment policy, method of purchasing raw materials, e tc .,  
may not apply to the company form of organisation.
One threat might be that the Government Tn an opportune moment
can change Its mind and sell a ll or majority of shareholdings either to
the general public or to a favoured class. If this happens, the whole
exercise of State participation Tn the economy w ill be frustrated. When a
question was raised In Parliament to that effect, the Government emphatl-
20cally stated that It had no Intention of doing so In any of the companies.
The Administrative Reforms Commission In Its report on Public 
Sector Undertakings (1967) discussed the question of a suitable organisational 
pattern for public enterprises. Its recommendations were as follows:
20. Lok Sabha Debates, dated 9 March, 1973, V o l. X X IV , page 136.
(1) The form of a statutory corporatton 
should tn general be adopted for 
public sector projects tn Industrial 
and manufacturing fie ld .
(2) For projects In which there Is an 
element of private participation 
the Government Company form 
may be adopted.
(3) Promotional and developmental 
agencies should, as far as pos­
sible, be run as statutory corpor­
ations or departmental concerns.
(I) Undertakings which are predomi­
nantly trading concerns or which 
are set up to Improve and stabi­
lise particular areas of buslness2 j 
may have the company form.
22In answer to a starred question enquiring which of the Com­
mission^ recommendations the Government has accepted, It  state^as follows:
For certain enterprises providing 
public utilities which are primarily 
Intended to develop the basic Infra 
structure facilities the statutory 
form of management may be pre­
ferable. For other enterprises 
Including those operating In the 
monopolistic fie ld , but where the 
commercial aspect Is predominant, 
the present form of a company may 
allow more flex ib ility . Govern­
ment therefore do not consider the
21 . Report of the Administrative Reforms Commission on Public Sector 
Undertakings, (1967), page 14.
22 . Starred Question N o .97, d t. 21 February, 1969.
form of statutory corporation should 
In general be adopted for public 
enterprise.
The A .R .C . study team has rightly observed that:
the Government have kept the whole 
questton open while going Invariably 
for the company form. We feel that 
Government have not yet laid down 
a rattonal basts or a well defined 
set of criteria for determining which 
form waald be suitable In different 
areas of enterprise. 23
The observation made by Professor W .A . Robson Tn respect of Government 
Compantes seems to be true tn the Indian context.
6.3 Nature and Composition of Govemtng Boards
The usual pattern of managing the affairs of a Government Com­
pany Is to have a board of directors for the purpose. The board consists of 
both full-tim e and part-time members. A ll the members of the board are 
appointed by the Government, with the exception of companies which have 
outside participation; In these cases, outside participants have a right to 
nominate some directors tn proportion to thetr capttal contribution tn the 
enterprise concerned. One of the members of the board Is nominated by 
the Government as Its Chatrman. As no qualifications are laid down In 
the articles of association for appointment to the board of directors, the 
Government feels free to appotnt any one It pleases. It Is noticeable 
that there Is Invariably one representative each from the parent and
Finance Ministries. In some cases, there may be more than these two 
24
officials.
The A .R .C . In Its report In 1967 on public undertakings rightly 
stated that the presence of senior officials of the Ministry/Department on 
the board tends to take away Its character as an autonomous body and Im­
ports Into It  the climate and character of a Government Committee. In th|jr» 
regard, the A .R .C . recommended that:
24 . Appointment of M .P.s as directors has been discussed earlier.
( I)  If sufficiently experienced men 
are not available for holding
the board membership, then suit­
able persons may be selected 
from among Government officers, 
leading Industrialists, profession­
al managers and specialists In the 
public sector. In such cases, 
persons selected should sever their 
connection with their previous 
organisations. In particular,
Government officers selected 
for these posts should be asked 
to resign;
(II) Certain general quallflfcutlons 
should also be prescribed for 
the members of the board; and
(III) While appointing part-time offi­
cial nominees to the board, the 
Government should see that per­
sons nominated do nt>t have to 
serve on more than two or three 
boards and are not so burdened 
with their substantive work that 
they find It difficult to play a ^  
useful part In board meetings.
With regard to the recommendation (tl) above, the Government had this to 
say:
Any qualification that may be pre­
scribed for appointment to the Boards 
of Directors w ill have to be In gen­
eral terms, and It  may not be pos­
sible to lay down such qualifica­
tions In precise terms. The Chalr-
25 . A .R .C . Report on Public Sector Undertakings, (1967), page 3 9 .
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man of the Board wtll be appointed 
by Government and the members of 
the Board appointed by Government 2 ^ 
In consultation with the Chairman.
The rejection of this recommendation Is Invariably Influenced by the fact 
that I f  It  Is accepted, this would restrict the scope of patronage generally 
exercised by the Government In appointing members to the boards.
The other decisions on the A .R .C . recommendations are as
follows:
( I)  As a normal rule, there should be 
full-tim e Chalrman-cum-Manag- 
Ing Director. However, there 
might be exceptions where the 
Chairman might be only a part- 
time one. In such cases, there 
should be a full-tim e Managing 
Director. Even where the Chair­
man Is part-time, he should take 
on the full responsibilities and 
should be Invested with the full 
authority. There should, how­
ever, be no diffusion of authority 
as between the Chairman and the 
Managing Director.
(II) As a rule# no officer of a Ministry 
should be made Chairman of a 
public undertaking, nor should 
the Secretary of a Ministry be 
Included In Its Board of Manage­
ment. 27
26, A  Hand Book of Information on Public Enterprises, (1970), Delhi, 
(Ministry of Finance), page 139.
27. Ib id ., page 139.
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The Government has also agreed that tn the larger units, full-ttme func­
tional directors may be appointed, who w ill be executive heads of their 
departments, and recognised that there should be suitable decentralisation
of powers, not only between Government and the board of directors but
28within the undertaking Itself.
The Government has further agreed that In the boards of 
directors, not more than two Government representatives ( l.e  who have 
ordinary secretariat duties) should ordinarily be appointed; but In ex­
ceptional cases, and for good reasons, the number may be exceeded.
It has also been decided that Government representatives should be on
the board by virtue of their office. No Government official should
29
normally serve as part-time director on more than two Boards.
With regard to the representation of outside members on the 
boards of management, the government decided that there should be 
two or three part-time members on the Board from outside the Govern­
ment. As regards their qualifications, the Government stated that It
would be difficult to lay down any precise qualifications tn the relevant
30Statutes or Articles of Association.
28. Ib id.
29. Ib id ., page 140, ARCRec. 4 ( l)(c ), 12(3) to 46(6).
30 . Ib id ., ARC Rec. 4 .
31It ts relevant to mention that the KrTshna Menon Commttte
32tn 1961, made similar recommendations and the Government then agreed 
that an officer having ordinary secretariat duties would not be appointed 
a director In more than three or four undertakings; one representative each 
from the controlling and the Finance Ministries would be appointed as a 
director; no Secretary of a Ministry would be appointed as a director? 
no Member of Parliament would be appointed as a director; persons having 
business connections may be appointed as part-time, but not as fu ll-tim e, 
directors provided there Is no clash of Interest.
But unfortunately, the decision had not been carried out In prac­
tice . In 1963-64, the Estimates Committee In Its report has brought to light 
that many public undertakings had appointed Secretaries and additional 
Secretaries as dlrec tors on a part-time basis, and that certain officers con­
tinued to be on the boards of as many as eight undertakings and that the
33boards were generally dominated by the official element. Again In 1967, 
the Study Team of the Administrative Reforms Commission had discovered that, 
on the whole, seventy per cent of the directorships of the Government
31 . Discussed earlier.
32 . Government decisions on the Committeeks recommendations, Lok 
Sabha Debates, 20 November, 1961, A p p .l,  A nne.3, 4 -6 .
33 . Estimates Committee, 52nd Report (HI L .S .) 6 .1 1 .8 7  (1963-64).
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Companies were held by C iv il Servants on a part-time basis.
A  recent study of the Department 
of Economic Affairs revealed that 
In the 53 companies, where the 
strength of the board varted from 
5 to 15, out of the 367 directors,
263 were Government officials 
(but not Secretaries and additional 
Secretaries), thus constituting on 
the average, nearly two-thirds of 
the membership of the board ^
The rest were non-offlclals.
Some of the big companies with predominant official majority
are . ! m ’ - ^ ;7 the Hlndusthan
Cables Ltd. (10 out of 11), the Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd. (8 out
35
of 9), and the Indian Rare Earths (6 out of 7 ).
However, since the acceptance of the recommendations of the 
Administrative Reforms Commission, there Is no evidence to suggest that 
the decisions have been bypassed.
The purpose of this study w ill be far from complete I f  we do not 
discuss by way of example the objects, constitution, board of directors, 
functions, e tc . of a typical Government company. To fu lfil this, we take 
the case of the State Trading Corporation.
34 . B .P. Mathur: Public Enterprises In Perspective (1977), Delh i, 
page 220. (The author did not mention when the report was pub­
lished) .
35 . Ibid.
The State Tradtng Corporation Is a company Incorporated under 
the Companies A ct, and was set up In M ay, 1956, with an authorised capi­
tal of Rs.l crore divided Into 100,000 equity shares of R s .l00 each. The 
paid-up capital was In itia lly Rs.5 lakhs, but It  was raised to Rs.10 lakhs In 
October, 1956, and toRs. 1 crore In 1957. The paid-up capital has been
Increased a number of times since then, and In 1973-74, It  stood at Rs.10 
36crores. It Is, however, appropriate to mention the purpose and need 
to create such an Institution.
Since Independence, the Government has given a great deal of 
thought to the question of State trading In commodities. The subject of 
State trading was examined by two Committees appointed by the Govern­
ment. The first Committee, with D r. P.S. Deshmukh as Chairman was 
appointed In 1949. The Committee suggested that the Government might 
entrust Its trading functions In foodgralns and fertilizers to a statutory organ­
isation which should be called the State Trading Corporation. The Desh­
mukh Committee also recommended the State Trading Corporation might 
take over a ll the Import and export operations of a commercial nature which was 
then handled by different departments of the Government/ I . e .  the Ministry 
of Commerce and the Ministry of Agriculture). In addition, the Committee 
also recommended that the State Trading Corporation might take up the Im­
port of East African cotton and export of short-staple cotton and the pro­
ducts of cottage Industries. The Committee was of the opinion that when
36. The 18th Annual Report on the Working and Administration of the 
Companies Act, 1956, page 129.
the commodtty tn question was suitable for state trading, then only the 
possibility of raising revenue for the State should be considered as an 
additional ground for resorting to State trading. The Committee, how­
ever, pointed out that In the case of luxury articles, the prices of which 
generally remain high, State trading could be resorted to for the purpose 
of raising additional revenue. The report was shelved because the Govern 
ment did not want to upset the prevailing market system.
However, the second Committee, with M r. S .V . Krlshnamurthy 
Rao as Chairman, was appointed In 1952 to examine the question of State 
trading In commodities. The Committee came to the conclusions that In 
view of the altered conditions In the world market, It was necessary for 
a State Trading Corporation to take over Import of foodgralns, cotton and 
fertilizers. The Committee, however, recommended the setting up of a 
State Trading Corporation for the export of handloom cloth and the products 
of small-scale and cottage Industries. Thus, both the Committees were In 
favour of setting up a State Trading Corporation. Finally In M ay, 1956, 
the State Trading Corporation, an entirely State-owned organisation, was 
established.
The objectives of the Corporation, as set out In the Memorandum 
of Association are to "organise and effect exports and Imports Into India of 
such goods and commodities as the Company from time to time determine,
and to do a ll such other thtngs as are Tnctdental or conductve to the attain­
ment of the above object." In practice, the management of the Corpora­
tion has :
having regard to the business alreac^ 
being transacted by other companies 
or organisations, endeavoured to seek 
out opportunities to make Its contri­
bution to the building up of the 
countryks commerce with new markets 
and new sources of supply; to pro­
viding facilities to augment exports; 
to securing, wherever possible, Im­
provements In terms of trade and 
economies In Imports; and to arrang­
ing to the extent practicable for Im­
port and distribution of certain essen^  
tla l raw materials at stable prices.
The share capital was wholly subscribed by the Government of India. The 
shares were held In the names of the President of India and the joint Secre­
tary of the Commerce Department. The President has been provided with 
special powers In the Articles of Association. These powers range from 
giving directives to the board of directors, to the appointment and dismissal 
of the members of the board at the absolute discretion of the President.
According to the First Annual Report, a ll eight Directors were 
Government officials. The Additional Secretary to the Ministry of Com­
merce was appointed as the Chairman. In August, 1959, an outsider was
37 . The S .T .C . ,  First Annual Report, November 16, 1957 (pages not 
numbered).
appointed as a full-tim e Chairman. But the Board was dominated by the 
Government officials, namely, the Financial Adviser representing the 
Ministry of Finance, another Joint Secretary In the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry, a full-tim e employed officer of Government, who had re­
tired as Finance Secretary and was continued In employment or reemployed 
for the speclftc purpose of serving on a number of boards of management 
of Government concerns, a Joint Secretary from the Ministry of Steel,
Mines and Fuel, the Director of the Indian Bureau of Mines, the Dlrector-
38General of Supplies and Disposals, and a Director of the Railway Board.
The situation Is somewhat different at present. There are two Government 
officials, one representing the controlling Ministry (Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry) and the other representing the Ministry of Finance, are on 
the Board of Directors •
Although the State Trading Corporation functions under the super­
vision of the Government and Its Directors appointed by the Government, It 
Is not concerned with the performance of Governmental functions. So far as 
Its functions are concerned, It  cannot be considered as a deportment or an 
organ of the Government.
38 . S .S . Khera: Government In Business, page 131.
The fact that the Minister appotnts 
the members of the Corporation and 
Is entitled to call for Information 
and supervise the conduct of the 
business does not make the Corpor­
ation an agent of the Government, 
where, however, the Corporation 
Is performing In substance govern­
mental and not commercial func­
tions an Inference of agency Is 
readily to be made. 39
It Is relevant to mention the performance of the State Trading 
Corporation In the recent years. In 1968-69, the total sales of the 
Corporation stood at Rs. 167.2 crores, an Increase of 18% over the pre­
vious year's level of Rs. 141.2 crores. O f this, 48 .5  crores were accounted 
for by exports, Rs. 114.1 crores by Imports, and the rest by Internal trade.
For the first time, salt was exported to East African countries, Urea formalde­
hyde powder to U .A .R ., bleaching powder to Kenya, and Iraq, and mangan­
ese dioxide sludge to Austria. Consignments of roses, Indian mangoes and 
vegetables have been sent to the European countries and the United Kingdom.
The gross profit for the year after deducting depreciation was Rs. 12.06
40crores as against Rs. 5 .84  crores In the previous year.
39 . S .T .C . v . C .T .O . , 1963 , SC 1811.
40 . A  Hand Book of Information on Pdpltc Enterprises, page 229.
In 1969-70, the State Trading Corporation^ gross profit stood 
Rs. 12.74 crores, but In 1970-71, the gross profit fell back to Rs.6.43 
crores and It "was partly due to our large export losses this year and the
41constant demands for reducing prices and margins on our Imports".
4 1 . Annual Report, 1970-71, page 9 .
6.4 Public Accountability
There are four major types of public control: (1) Ministerial 
control, (11) audit control, (ill) Parliamentary control, and (iv) judi­
cial control.
(1) Ministerial and Presidential Control
The Indian Companies A ct, 1956, does not make any specific 
provisions relating to Ministerial control of Government companies. In 
practice, this type of control Is more effective and real because It Is the 
responsibility of the Minister to set out the policy as well as to appoint the 
members of the board of directors Including other top officials.
The following provisions are ordinarily to be found In the Articles
of Association of Government Companies where the Government Is the sole 
42shareholder. A ll the directors are appointed and removable by the 
Government. The Chairman of the Board of Directors and the Managing 
Director are also appointed by I t .  The management of the company, sub­
ject to the control and supervision of the Board, lies In the hands of the 
Managing Director. The Managing Director may request the Chatrman 
of the Board to reserve for the consideration of the Government certain
42 . S .S . Khera: Government In Business, pages 283-383.
43matters relating to the working of the Company, for Instance
(a) Calling up unpaid capital or Increasing the authorised capital of the 
Company or Issuing of any unissued shares;
(b) Any proposal to borrow beyond a certain limit or at a rate higher 
than the Bank rate;
(c) Any proposal for the reduction of the capital;
(d) Issue of debentures;
(e) Acquisition, construction or sale of vessels;
(f) Winding up of the Company;
(g) Any Important matter relating to the Companyks establishment;
(h) Any other matter which, In his op! nlon, Involves an Important tssue 
of general policy.
In the case of Government public companies, I . e .  where the 
majority of shares Is held by the Government, the Government exercises 
Its power In such a manner that only those directors who are acceptable to 
It have a chance of election. The Chairman of the Board of Directors Is 
appointed on the recommendation of the Government. The Government 
has also the power to nominate a special director. He holds office during 
the pleasure of the Government. He enjoys certain special powers. A  
special director Is entitled, as set out In Article 140 of the Asoka Hotels
43 . O .M .  Prakash: The Theory and Working of State Corporations, 
page 202.
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Ltd. :
to cause a reference to be made to the 
President Tn wrttTng by the Board wtth 
a view to secure the previous approval 
of the President In writing In regard to 
any Important matter Involving policy 
affecting the financial position of the 
Company/ provided however that no 
action shall bd taken by the Company 
In respect of any matter referred for 
the decision of the Prestdent as afore­
said until approval of the President to 
the same has been obtained In writing, 
provided further that t f  the President 
does not convey to the Board his deci­
sion on any such question as aforesaid 
within one month from the receipt of 
the reference to him or within such 
reasonably lesser time than such one 
month -  as the exigencies of the case 
may require (such time being In no 
case less than two weeks from such 
receipt unless any director nominated 
by the President on the Board agrees 
otherwise In writing), the Board shall 
be at liberty to take Its decision 
thereon. Provided lastly that the 
question as to what matters are not 
matters Involving policy affecting 
the financial position of the Com­
pany for which a reference may be 
caused to be made as provided here­
in shall be decided between the 
President and the Company by mutual 
agreement and by exchange of letters 
In this behalf.
Further, he Is not liable for retirement by rotation as per Artic le 119(3).
The Board of Directors shall take action on the matters when the views of
the Government are known. This power of reference of a director caused
unnecessary delay Tn the working of a company, hence In 1961, the
Government decided that the Chairman alone should have the power to
reserve a proposal of the board of directors for Government approval and,
4
accordingly, amended the articles of association of various undertakings.
The Government further decided that the following powers relat
Ing to financial matters may be exercised by the public enterprises:
(a) the Board of Directors are authorised 
to sanction capital expenditure with­
out prior reference to Government 
within specified limits (It varies from 
enterprise to enterprise and bears no 
relation to their operations) bn works 
and schemes which comes within the 
approved objectives of the enter­
prises. The Boards are also fully  
authorised to sanction a ll capttal 
expenditure In cases where the 
Detailed Project Reports have been 
approved by Government and also 
permit variations In the estimates
of not more than 10 per cent for 
any particular component part.
(b) It Is not necessary for public enter­
prises to submit their revenue budgets 
for prior approval except In cases 
where Government Is expected to 
make up the deflctt, If  any, In the 
budget. The revenue budgets, as 
approved by the Board of Directors 
have to be sent to Government only
44 . Paranjape: "Note on Recent Developments In Public Enterprises", 
10 I .C .J .P .A .  (1964), page 535.
for Information of production targets , 
probability, etc.
(c) The public enterprises may approach 
financial Institutions such as the 
I .F .C . ,  the I.D .B . and the Unit 
Trust for financial assistance for ex­
pansion programme. 45
Mr.. G .P . Yadav, a Member of Parliament, raised a question In 
Parliament covering a ll the matters mentioned above, with special reference 
to the Indian Tourism Development Corporation. The Minister of State In 
the Ministry of Finance stated that:
(a) In the case of public enterprises, 
the annual capital budgets of the enter­
prises have to be approved by the Finance 
Ministry and the funds required from 
Government voted by Parliament. The 
administrative Ministries can, thereafter, 
release funds on the basis of these ap­
proved budget provisions, except that,
In the last quarter of the year, the re­
lease has to be with the approval of the 
Ministry of Ftnanc e . In the case of 
public enterprises, that have Incurred 
cash losses, which have to be re-lm - 
bursed, by Government, the revenue 
budgets have also to be approved by 
Government.
(b) A ll financial powers of the Corpor­
ation vest with the board of directors.
The board of directors has complete 
poWers / except the power to take 
major Investment decisions, which Is 
reserved by Government. In the
45 . A  Hand Book of Information on Public Enterprises (Ministry of 
Finance), 1970, page 150.
exercise of these powers, the board 
Is advised by the Company^ Chief 
Executive and Its Financial Adviser. 
The board of directors, In turn, can 
delegate financial powers to appro­
priate subordinate authorities within 
the Company. The delegation Is 
done by -
(1) reserving matters which require 
the concurrence of the Finan­
cial Adviser;
(U) matters where consultation with 
Financial Adviser Is necessary; 
and
(ill) those on which he need not be 
consulted.
Control Is also exercised through the 
Internal audit, statutory audit and 
the audit by the Comptroller and 
Auditor-General.
The India Tourism Development Cor­
poration follows the general pattern 
of delegation of financial powers 
and financial control. The Corpor­
ation has a fully;fledged Finance 
Division whose chief assists the board 
of directors In the exercise of the 
Corporation^ financial power.
(c) As stated above, a ll powers, In ­
cluding financial and administrative 
powers, vests with the board of direct 
ors and not with any single person. 
The board of directors may devise 
suitable delegation of powers for the 
proper functioning of Its activities.
As such, the question of vesting 
financial or administrative powers 
with any single Individual or divorc­
ing It from administrative control 
does not arise. 46
4 6 . Lok Sabha Debates, 10 M ay, 1974, pages 64-66 .
It Ts clear from the above statement that the project reports and 
revenue budgets are not presented to Parliament for discussion, but the 
Minister concerned Is answerable to Parliament I f  a question relevant to 
them Is raised. But It Is significant that even If  a ll companies are re­
quired to submit the projects reports and revenue budgets In Parliament, 
the Members of Parliament w ill hardly find any time to discuss them as 
there are 604 companies at present. However, Parliament must ensure 
that effective control Is exercised by sectoral Ministers by Its M .P .s  
raising questions from time to time.
Having delegated these financial matters to the board of directors, 
the Government has also asked the Reserve Bank of India to study the finan­
ces of the Government companies for the year ending March, 1971, In order
to ensure that finances are properly raised and utilised.
In answer to a written question relating to the findings of the
Study, the Government stated that:
(I) O f the Companies studied, 93 were 
companies having a paid-up capital 
of less than Rs.20 crores each.
These companies performed better as 
compared to the remaining 12 com­
panies (each having a paid-up capi­
tal of Rs. 20 crores and above);
(II) Mining and quarrying companies, 
generally fared badly In compari­
son with engineering and chemical 
companies;
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(Ttt) Although the Companies (having a 
paid-up capital of Rs. cro20 crores 
and above) have lagged behind the 
Companies (having a paid-up capi­
tal of less than Rs. 20 crores) In Im­
proving their sales performance,  In 
the overall operating results, the 
former type were able to reduce 
their overall net loss from Rs.26 
crores In 1969-70 to Rs.24 crores 
In 1970-71, while the overall net 
loss of the latter type of companies 
Increased from Rs. 11 crores to Rs.l3 
crores during the same period; and
(Iv) Internal sources contributed a minor 
portion to the financing of assets 
formation,both of the former and 
the latter companies. 47
The Government further added that It  wishes to "keep a con­
stant watch over the performance of the Central Government Industrial
48and commercial undertakings In order to take ttmely remedial action".
It has taken various measures to Improve the working of these enterprises, 
which Include steps:
(I) to Improve maintenance organi­
sation and practices for reducing 
equipment downtime;
(II) better production, planning and 
control; and
(III)  incentive schemes and training 
for better motivation and higher 
productivity, etc . 49
47 . Lok Sabha Debates, 23 February, 1973, V o l.X X Il l ,  pages 141-142.
4 8 . Ibid.
4 9 . Ibid.
The philosophy behtnd this Ts to encourage the Government com­
panies to stand on their own feet and to generate greater internal resources 
to finance their own growth.
Another technique which Is available to the Minister In order to 
strike a balance between the Government control and the autonomy of the 
undertakings Is the power to Issue directives to Government companies on 
matters of "policy". A ll the articles of association contain a provision 
which provides that :
the President may from time to time 
Issue such directives as he may con­
sider necessary In regard to the con­
duct of the business of the company 
or Directors thereof, and In like 
manner may vary and annul any 
such directive. The Directors 
shall give Immediate effect to 
directives so Issued. 50
The Administrative Reforms Commission has Indicated In Its report
that this power of directives has been rarely Issued because of the fact that
the management Is appointed by the Minister, therefore, he can Influence
the decisions of a public undertaking through discussion, negotiation and
51
pressure, without Issuing a formal directive. It went on to say that
50. S .S . Khera: Government In Business, page 383.
51. A .R .C . Report, page 65.
'’the MTnTster and the Secretary of the department concerned are Tn actual
practice able to exercise greater degree of control over the undertakings 
than what Is formally envisaged by the statutes or even articles of assocla
Hence, the Study Team suggested that:
It  would be a sanguine rule that 
In order to preserve the autonomy 
of the undertakings, Informal con­
trols are minimised and Important 
policy decisions are contained In 
written directives which are pub­
lished In the annual reports of the 
undertakings so that responsibility 
for the same may be placed squarely 
on the Ministry. 53
In response to this recommendation, the Government decided that:
where It  considers It necessary to 
Issue a directive to a public enter­
prise asking It to act In a manner 
different from that dldated by the 
economic considerations, this 
should be In writing, and this fact 
should specifically find a mention 
In the annual report of the concerned 
public enterprise. 54
For example, the Indian O il Corporation, In Its Annual Reports 1972-73,
52. Ibid.
53 . Ib id ., page 31.
54. A  Hand Book of Information on Public Enterprises, (Bureau of Public 
Enterprises) (1970), page 151.
gtves a heading "Directives received from the President of India under 
Article 144 of the Articles of Association of the Corporation”, and men­
tions the number and date of the letter received from the Government.
It Is Interesting to find two of these directives asked the Corporation to 
conduct departmental enquiries against Officers of the Baraunl Refinery.
As long as the arbitrary power of appointment and dismissal re­
sides with the Minister, the management becomes most vulnerable and 
the distinction between the Governmert department and the Company form 
becomes meaningless.
The Study Team also suggested that:
by reducing the spread of govern­
ment control, which appears to be 
much larger than It  need be, govern­
ment w ill be able to focus attention 
on vital and strategic points, and 
thereby ensure a more effective 
compliance wtth their policies and 
directives. This can be
brought about only I f  there Is a 
change In the attitude of the M in i­
ster and the senior officials. In 
fact, It w ill require a scrupulous 
and punctilious self-restraint on 
the part of the Minister. As the 
attitude of the Minister depends 
largely on that of members of 
Parliament towards autonomy of 
the enterprise and towards the 
role of the Minister, It appears
55. Mathur: Public Enterprises In Perspective, page 110
equally necessary for the Members 
to Impose scrupulous restraint on 
themselves. We feel that this Is 
essential I f  the public undertakings 
are to acquire the requisite measure 
of autonomy and the ability to stand 
firmly on their own feet, 56
We entirely agree with these conclusions and would also like to 
suggest that the part-time members, I f  appointed, should be drawn from 
public affairs, social services, non-offlclal agencies, voluntary organisa­
tions, and the most successful men from private Industry, In order to pro­
mote the public Interest. This would, hopefully, Increase the public 
acceptability of such undertakings. Full-time members, on the other 
hand, should be experts and specialists entrusted with the responsibility 
of the implementation of programmes. And the management should be 
given a free hand to run their own affairs on business principles.
(11) Audit control
The provision for audit control Is contained In section 619 of the 
Indian Companies A c t, 1956, which Is In the following words:
(1) In the case of a government com­
pany, the following provisions 
shall apply, notwithstanding any­
thing contained In sections 224 to 
223. 57
56. A .R .C . Report, o p .c lt., page 30.
57 . These sections relate to appointment, remuneration, qualifications, 
disqualifications, powers, etc. of auditors.
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(2) The auditor of a government com­
pany shall be appoTnted or reap- 
potnted by the Central Government 
on the advice of the Comptroller 
and Auditor-General of India.
"Provided that the limits speclftedg 
In sub-sections (1~B) and (1-C ) 
of section 224 shall apply In re la- 
tlon to the appointment or reappoint­
ment of an auditor under this sub­
section . 59
(3) The Comptroller and Auditor-General 
of India shall have power -
(a) To direct the manner In which the 
Companyks accounts shall be aud­
ited by the auditor appoTnted In 
pursuance of sub-section (2) and 
to give such auditor Instructions
to any matter relating to the per­
formance of his functions as such;
(b) to conduct a supplementary or test 
audit of the Company^ accounts 
by such person or persons as he 
may authorise In this behalf; and 
for the purposes of such audit, to 
require Information or additional 
Information to be furnished to any 
person or persons so authorised, 
on such matters, by such person 
or persons, and In such form, as 
the Comptroller and Auditor- 
General may, by general or spe­
cial order, direct.
58 . Sub-sections (1-B) and (1-C ) restrict the number of clients an auditor 
Is legally eligible to audit.
59 . The proviso was added by the Companies (Amendment) Act (XLI of 
1974).
(4) The auditor aforesaid shall submit a 
copy of his audit report to the Comp­
troller and Auditor-General of India 
who shall have the right to comment 
upon, or supplement, the audit report 
In such manner as he may think f it ;
(5) Any such comments upon or supplement 
to, the audit report shall be placed be- 
for the annual general meeting of the 
company at the same time and In the 
same manner as the audit report.
The accounts of Government companies, of course, must be audited 
by Independent auditors• Opinion, however, Is divided on the question 
whether private auditors or the Comptroller and Auditor-General should audit 
these companies. But the fact remains that the auditors are appointed and 
re-appolnted by the Central Government on the advice of the Comptroller 
and Auditor-General, who also has the right to comment upon the report or 
supplement I t .  This prevents the board of directors themselves appoint­
ing auditors. The power to conduct a supplementary or test audit of com­
pany^ accounts Is a valuable one which would keep the auditor alert and 
on the right course.
M r. Asoke Chanda, lndla*s Comptroller and Auditor-General, 
has suggested that "the provision for an Independent audit by the Comp­
troller and Auditor-General would, obviously, be Invoked only where the 
normal audit reveals gross mismanagement" However, M r. Chanda
60. A . Chanda: Indian Administration (1958), page 202.
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has justified the provtsTons of the Companies Act, 1956, on the following
grounds:
An audit conducted merely for the 
certification of the balance sheets 
and profit and loss accounts might 
not, In these circumstances, safe­
guard the Interests of the tax-payers.
It would only afford a permanent 
meausre of Immunity to officials for 
mismanagement and Inefficiency.
Further, when such units are oper­
ated side by side with private units 
within an Industry, an assessment of 
comparative efficiency Is of the ut­
most Importance. The determina­
tion of the unit-cost of production 
for this purpose therefore becomes 
necessary. In the case of the 
monopolistic state concerns, It  Is 
equally necessary to find and apply 
a suitable yardstick to assess the 
degree of efficiency and economy 
with which these are being operated.
An examination of these and other 
aspects of management, where 
necessary^, can be covered by the 
Issue of directives. An exten­
sion of the scope of audit Is also 
necessary to make the reports 
more Informative to meet the re - ^  
qulrements of public accountability.
Although the type of efficiency audit which M r. Chanda has In 
mind has not fully developed yet,
61. Ib id ., pages 201-202.
since 1964-65 the Annual Reports 
of some of the public enterprises 
carry a "Review of Accounts by 
Indian Audit & Accounts Depart­
ment". The review Is prepared 
by the Comptroller and Auditor- 
General In accordance with sec­
tion 619(4) of the Companies A ct, 
which authorises him to ‘comment 
upon or supplement the audit re­
port In such manner as he may 
think f it* . The review-contains 
comparative statistics for the last 
three years about the financial 
position, capital structure, re­
serves and surpluses, liquidity or 
solvency, working capital, work­
ing results, lost trends, product­
ion performance, Inventory and 
production, sundry debtors and 
turnover. Out of 53 companies 
whose annual Reports were pre­
sented to the Comptroller and 
Auditor-General In 1970-71, 
such reviews appear for 31 com­
panies . 62
The question of audit was also considered by the Administra­
tive Reforms Commission. The Commission said In Its report that 
management believed that detailed and continuous audit wasted time 
and effort and da mpened In itiative, forcing everyone to caution and 
leading to centralisation of powers. They maintained that In commercial 
undertakings, not a ll decisions or judgements can be correct and unless a 
serious loss was Incurred, management should not be blamed as negligent
62 . For a detailed discussion, L . Nalraln: Efficiency Audit of Public 
Enterprises In India (1972), pages 123-35.
or Inefficient and efficiency, they said, was a concern of the management
which It was hardly equipped to judge. As a solution, the Administrative
Reforms Commission has recommended that there should be four or five
Audit Boards, each dealing with sector corporations. These boards were
to be under the overall control of the Comptroller and Auditor-General.
The staff were to be recruited by the Public Service Commission. The
boards were to be composed of five members, three to be permanent and
common to a ll boards and drawn from senior officers belonging to the Indian
Audit and Accounts Service. The other two were to be part-time members
appointed by the Government and In consultation with the Comptroller and
Auditor-General, the members being drawn from non-officials with special
knowledge of the area of enterprise the board Is required to deal w ith.
These boards should attempt to  cover all undertakings once In five years.
The annual regularity audit by professional auditors, however, would be
the
continued. The Commission also Indicated certain lines tha/efflc lency  
audit should take. The success achieved In reducing the cost of pro­
duction, the efficiency of the services provided, the quality of goods pro­
duced, they said, are some of the tests of a competent management and
63should be considered.
The Government has accepted the recommendation In Its entirety.
63 . A .R .C . Report, page 92.
64. A Hand Book of Information on Public Enterprises (1970) (Delhi), 
page 162.
It has dectded to set upaudTt boards whTch would constst of three perma­
nent members, a ll nomTnated by the Comptroller and AudTtor-General and 
wTth a Chatrman of the rank of an Additional Deputy Comptroller and 
Auditor-General. For each particular sector of the Industry, e .g .  Steel, 
fertilizers, e tc .,  the concerned Ministry would nominate two additional 
members In consultation and with the concurrence of the Comptroller and 
Auditor-General. The present system of audit by professional auditors 
would continue and the auditors would work under the direction of the 
Audit Boards. The professional auditors should do their normal regular 
audit plus any other Items under the directives given to them by the Comp­
troller a nd Auditor-Genera I . The Audit Boards would also do with their 
own staff an efflclency-cum-propriety audit which, at present, Is being 
done by the Director of Commercial Audit. The arrangements under the 
new system would not detract from the right of the Comptroller and Auditor- 
General to undertake any special or supplementary audit If  he considers It 
necessary. The comments of the Audit Boards on the audit of public enter­
prises would be Incorporated In the Audit Report plased'before Parliam ent.^
This new arrangement has undoubtedly enhanced the controlling 
powers of the Comptroller and Auditor-General.
In addition * from time to time the public sector undertakings have
65. A Hand Book of Information on Public Enterprises, (Bueau of Public 
Enterprises), page 162.
been advised to Introduce an effective system of Interna! audit by the Com­
mittee on Public Undertakings. In Its 58th Report on Hlndusthan Machine 
Tools Ltd. In 1974-75, the Committee recommended that Internal audit system 
should be Introduced as Internal audit being one of the essential tools of 
management control, the Company should actlvlse the Internal audit cells 
In the various units and make use of the reports of Internal audit to set right 
the deficiencies and plug loopholes, If any, In the working of the u n its .^
The Government replied that action was being taken to strengthen 
the Internal audit functions In the various units of the com pany.^
69( III)  Parliamentary Control
Parliamentary control over companies begins with the frery Incep­
tion of the Government company. When a Government company Is being 
formed, Parliament provides the money required for the Stated proportion 
of the share capital. Later should a company find Itself In difficulties
66. 58th Report on the Hlndusthan Machine Tools Ltd. by the C .P .U .,  
(1974-75), page 43~
67. Ibid.
68 . This section w ill only deal with the method of Parliamentary super­
vision by discussions on annual accounts and reports, because the 
main Instruments, e .g . questions, Debates and Committees, to con­
trol the public enterprises have already been discussed In Chapter 3 .
It ts Parliament which decides to help It  with a subsidy. It Is on such an 
occasion that Parliament Ts likely to show the full extents of Its Interest In 
the operations of the company. In addition to this, the Companies A ct,
1956, contains a provision relating to Parliamentary control of Govern­
ment companies (section 619A(1)) which provides that :
where the Central Government Is a 
member of a Government Company, 
the Central Government shall cause 
an annual report on the working and 
affairs of that Company to be
(a) prepared within three months of 
Its annual general meeting before 
which the audit report Ts placed 
under sub-section (5) of section 
619; and
(b) as soon as may be after such pre­
paration, a laid before both Houses 
of Parliament together with a copy 
of the audit report and any comments 
upon, or supplement to the audit 
report made by the Comptroller
and Auditor-Genera! of India.
A well-drafted Annual Report serves as an Important channel of 
communication between the enterprise and Parliament, and through Tt, to 
the public.
The main purposes of the annual report of a public enterprise 
would be the foI lowing :-
(1) to fu lfil the statutory requirements;
(H) to pralrTde a record of the year's activities;
( Ill)  to provide as complete an account of the policies and plans 
of the enterprise as possible;
(Iv) to Indicate clearly the efficiency with which an enterprise Is 
operating.
The Board of Directors of every Government company Ts obliged to
lay before the shareholders at Its Annual General Meeting a Balance sheet as
at the end of the financial year and a Profit & Loss Account for that p e rio d .^
The Balance sheet shall give a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the
company and shall be In the form prescribed or In such other form as approved
by the Governm ent.^ The Items for the Profit & Loss Account are to be
arranged under the most convenient heads, so as to provide a true and fair
72view of the profit or loss of the company for the financial year. In the
case of companies not carrying on business for profit, an Income and Expend!-
73ture Account Ts required to be prepared.
The usual procedure for the exercise of parliamentary control Ts to 
present the annual report before Parliament and have a discussion through
70. S .210(1), ComppnTes A ct, 1956.
71. S .2 l1 ,1 b ld .
72. S .211(2), Ib id .
73 . S .2 ]0 (2 ), Ib id.
debates or questions, which are related to matters of general policy and not 
directed to day-to-day management. Unfortunately, the Government's 
annual report to Parliament Is nominal and contains nothing more than what Is 
contained In the annual report of the company. Perhaps the purpose of 
allowing three months' time after the annual general meeting to cause an 
annual report to be prepared on the working and affairs of the company Is 
to provide a comprehensive picture of the affairs of the company to Members 
of Parliament, which the board of directors may not be able to provide In Its 
formal report to shareholders. In this respenst'the Estimates Committee has 
expressed Its view In the following words:
Parliament Is not Interested merely In 
the rate of dividend declared by the 
public undertakings but It  Is also con­
cerned with various aspects of their 
working such as their physical and 
financial programme, achievements 
In relation to the programme, price 
structure, employment trends, labour 
relations, organisational changes etc.
The Committee suggests that a ll the 
undertakings may be advised to des­
cribe In their reports their programmes 
and achievements In greater details; 
the Industrial undertakings may Indi­
cate In their reports. Inter a lia , 
their unit cost of production, the rate 
of output per man or per unit of capi­
tal employed and other undertakings 
also may be encouraged to Indicate 
where possible similar co-efficients 
i f  efficiency appropriate to their 
business. 74
74. The Estimates Committee, 73rd Report, Second Lok Sabha, page 12.
The Government accepted this recommendation, and Instruct­
ions were given so that the reports are amplified on the lines Indicated by 
the Committee,
Since Its Inception In 1964, the Committee on Public Under­
takings ^  has been pressing the Government to make the annual reports more 
detailed and Informative, The Committee has suggested that annual reports
of public enterprises should contain a review of their performance with refer-
77ence to the objectives laid down for them. The Committee has also re­
commended that If  an activity cannot be justified on strictly economic con­
siderations, Its effects on the overall working of the enterprise should be
78published In the annual reports. To judge the progress of public enter­
prises In the use of Indigenous raw materials and components from year to
year, the Committee felt that this Information should olso be published
79In the annual report.
75 . Ib id ., 9th Report, Third Lok Sabha, page 10.
76 . This Committee has now taken Dver the functions of both the
Estimates and the Public Accounts Committee so far as public enter­
prises are concerned,
77 . C .P .U . ,  1st Report, NILS, page 3 .
78. Ib id ., 3rd Report, page 9 .
79. Ib id ., 13th Report, page 52.
If these recommendattons are fully Implemented, this w tll en­
able Members of Parliament and the public to get a clear picture of the 
role played by the public undertakings In the development of the country's 
economy.
However, In September 1969, the Bureau of Public Enterprises 
Issued a circular suggesting that the following matters be covered In the 
annual reports of public enterprises:
Each public sector undertaking Is required to attach a report to Its 
Annual Audited Accounts so as to render the financial accounts of the under­
taking Intelligible and meaningful. The Administrative Reforms Commission 
has also gone Into this question and has recommended that standard opera­
tional Indices should also be Included In the Annual Report of the Public 
Undertakings for a better appreciation of the performance.
Section 217 of the Companies Act requires the Board # f Directors
of a Company to Indicate In the Annual Report, the state of the Company's
80affairs, proposed dividends, allocation to reserves and a general analysis 
of the Important events, while these are the points on which Information Is 
required to be Included under the provision of the Act, It Is necessary that 
ihe Annual Report should be made more Informative. It Is not the Intention 
to prescribe a rigid form of Annual Report, but It would be necessary that
80. The dividend policy and the pricing policy have been discussed In 
Chapter 4 .
Information on the following points Is, by and large, Included In the Annual
Report.
(1) A  summary of financial results Indicating the annual turnover, profit 
after depreciation and Interest but before tax, provision for taxation, 
net profit appropriation to reserves, proposed dividends, etc.
(2) Information about Increase In paid-up capital, long-term loans, etc.
(3) Important changes In the pricing policy.
(4) Changes In accounting methid as changes In depreciation, valuation 
of Inventories, etc.
(5) Main events which have Influenced the production and profitability 
of the company under report, and outlook for forthcoming year/s.
(6) General order book position and production performance vls-a-vls  
capacities and targets.
(7) Export achievements and foretgn exchange earnings together with 
future outlook.
(8) Any significant achievements In Import substitution or developments 
of new products, etc.
(9) Employee-employer relations -  strikes, lock-outs, Incentive schemes, 
training, etc.
(10) Staff welfare activities -  township, education, health facilities.
(11) New projects or expansions contemplated to Increase or diversify the 
production and progress made so far.
81(12) Changes tn the Board of Dtrectors and General Managers.
It Ts generally admitted that the more Ts known, the better Tt Ts 
for a ll concerned. A  weII-Informed Parliament w ill Interfere less Tn the
operations of the companies, because Inappropriate and Irrelevant questions 
which may be damaging at times, result from Ignorance and suspicion. It 
Ts also admitted that Parliament ought to Interfere more If  a company Is not 
efficiently run.
(Iv) Judicial control
Judicial control of a Government company does not cause a great
problem. A registered company Ts a legal person distinct from Its share- 
82holders. The Indian Courts hcve reiterated that view. They have
said that a Government company Ts owned by the Government, Its board of
directors Ts appointed and removed by the President, and Tt Ts bound to give
effect to directives Issued by the Government. In spite of that, Tn the eyes
of law, the company Ts treated as having a separate legal personality and
83existence from that of the Government. A  Government company, public
81. We have mentioned earlier that some annual reports have been laid on 
the table, but no discussion or debates took place. Therefore, we are 
unable to give the reactions of M .P .s towards these reports.
82 . Soloman v . Soloman & C o ., j[l897 j , A .C .2 2 .
83. Subodh Ranjan v . Slndrl Fertilisers & Chemicals L td ., A . I .R .  1957 
Pat. 10; State Trading Corporation v . Commercial Tax O fficer, A . I .R .
1963 , 5 .C . 1811; S .L . Agarwal v . Hlndusthan Steel L td ., A IR ., 
1970 , S .C . 1150; H .E .M . Union v . State of Bihar, A . I .R .  1970 
S .C . 82; State of Bihar v . Union of India, 1970 1 S .C .C . 67.
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or private, therefore, Ts dtstTnct from the Government or any of tts depart­
ments. The ordinary C ivil Courts have full jurisdiction over Tt just as over 
any other registered company. The Companies Act has not made any pro­
vision for any special tribunal to exercise jurisdiction over the Government 
company.
The mere fact that the company Ts wholly Government-owned does 
not alter Tts character. A  company which Ts limited by guarantee and In­
corporated under the Companies Act, 1956, and over which the Central 
Government exercises some degree of control under the articles of association
of the company, Ts not a public body or authority and Is not a local or other
84authority within the meaning.of Article 12 of the Constitution. A  
Government-owned company cannot exercise any authority as a public body
and, therefore, Tt does not become and cannot be regarded as a public autho-
85 86rlty . In Lakshml v . Neyvell Lignite Corpratlonks case, It was held
that where an employee was placed under suspension on the basis of a depart­
mental enquiry conducted by the employers of the defendant corporation, It 
was not possible for such an employee to apply for a writ of Certiorari against
84. In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, ’’the State” Includes 
the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the 
Legislature of each of the States and a ll local or other authorities within 
the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.
85. Lakshml v . Neyvell Lignite Corporation L td ., 1966 , 36C om .C as., 197.
8 6 . Ibid.
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the Corporation, Insofar as such a corporation Is not a public authority, and
the proceedings were thus only of a domestic tribunal of a private body and
87thus, as such, could not be challenged under article 226 of the Consti­
tution .
legal
On another Important/principle, the Supreme Court of India was 
asked to pronounce Its judgment on whether a Government company can be 
regarded as an agent or an extension of the Government. The matter was 
dealt with In the case of the State Trading Corporation v* Commercial Tax 
O ff ic e r .^
The facts of the case are that on 18 M ay, 1956, the State Trading 
Corporation of India Ltd. was Incorporated as a Private Limited Company 
under the Indian Companies A c t, 1956, with an authorised capital of Rs.5 
crores divided Into five hundred thousand shares of Rs.100 each. N inety- 
eight percent of the subscribed capital which was contributed out of the 
funds of the Government of India stoodreglstered In the name of the Presi­
dent of India, and the remaining two percent In the names of two Joint 
Secretaries In the Ministry of Commerce and Industries. On 12 February, 
1961, the Commercial Tax Officer assessed the Company In the sum of
87. Article 226 relates to the power of High Courts to Issue certain writs.
88 . A . I .R .  1963 , S .C . 1811.
r* ,
4
Rs.5.79198 = 17 up to sales tax Tn respect of certain transactions, and
Issued a notice demanding payment of the amount. The Company and
M r. K .B . La 11, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Commercle and Industries,
then petitioned this Court for a writ quashing the order of the Commercial
Tax O fficer, and the notice of demand on the plea that the assessment
order and the notice of demand Infringed the fundamental rights of the pe-
89 90tltloners under A rt. 19(1)(f) and (g). At the hearing of the petition, 
Counselfor the Commercial Tax Officer and the State of Andhra Pradesh, 
submitted that the petition was not maintainable because the Company was 
not a citizen within the meaning of A rt. 19 of the Constitution, and Tn any 
event, the Company being an "organ, department or Instrumentality” of 
the Government was Incompetent to enforce any fundamental right against 
the State of Andhra Pradesh. The Court thereupon referred the following 
question to a larger Bench:
(1) Whether the State Trading Corporation Is notwithstanding 
the formality of Incorporation under the Indian Companies A c t, 1956, Tn 
substance a department and organ of the Government of India with the 
entirety of Its capital contributed by Government. The Court decided
89. Article 19(1)(f) -  to acquire, hold and dispose of property.
90. Article I9 (l)(g ) -  to practise any profession, or to carry on any occu­
pation, trade or business.
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that the answer should be tn the negattve.
The State Trading Corporation has 
been constituted not by any special 
statute or charter but under the 
Indian Companies Act as a private 
Limited Company. Ft may be wound 
up by order of a competent Court 
Though Tts functions under the super­
vision of the Government of India 
and Its Directors, Tt Is not concern­
ed with performance of any govern­
mental functions. Its functions 
being commercial, It  cannot be re­
garded as either a department or 
an organ of the Government Itself.
It Is a circumstance of accident 
that on the date of Its Incorpora­
tion and thereafter Its entire 
shareholding was held by the Pre­
sident and the two Secretaries to 
the Government of India. 91
As has been observed by Denning, L. J. In Tamlln v . Hannaford, 
(1950) 1 K.B. 18 , that ’’In the eye of law, the Corporation Is Its own
master and Is answerable as fully as any other person or Corporation. It Ts 
not the Crown and has none of the Immunities and privileges of the Crown” . 
This dictum of the learned Judge has been rightly approved and adopted by 
the Indian Courts mainly on the ground that the company registered under 
the Companies Act has an Independent legal extstence and consequently,
91 . S .T .C . v . C . T . O . , A . I .R . (1963), S .C .,  page 1848.
Tt could not be said to be a department of the Government or Tts delegate
or agent.
The Government company Ts subject to the doctrine of ultra-vtres 
but the Government may by a mere notification Tn the Gazette take away 
the power of the Court to sanction or not to sanction an a Iteration.of the 
memorandum of association and may, thereby, Increase or alter the powers 
Tn whatever manner It  likes, completely without any judicial control.
Thts power of modifications and adaptations Ts contained In section 620 
of the Companies A ct, 1956, which runs as follows:
(1) The Central Government may by noti­
fication Tn the official G azette , direct 
that any of the provisions of this Act 
(other i+ian sections 618, 619 & 619A) 
specified Tn the notification:-
(a) shall not apply to any government 
company; or
(b) shall apply to any government com­
pany, only with such exceptions, 
modifications and adaptations, as 
may be specified In the notification.
(2) A  copy of every notification proposed to 
be Issued under sub-section (1) shall be 
laid Tn draft before both Houses of Parlia­
ment for a period of not less than thirty 
days while they are In the session and
If  within that period, either House dls-
92. Section 618 relates to Government companies not to have managing agents. 
Section (619 relates to audit control.
Sectron 619A , deals with the annual reports on Government companies.
approves of the Tssue of the notifi­
cation or approves of such Issue only 
with modifications, the notification 
shall not be Issued or, as the case 
may require, shall be Issued only 
with such modifications as may be 
agreed on by both the Houses.
We must now examine why this potentially far-reaching pro­
vision has been Introduced Tn the Companies A ct, 1956.
It may be noted that the Indian Companies Bill Introduced In the 
Lok Sabha Tn 1953 , contained no provisions relating to Government com­
panies. In the course of the debate, the Finance Minister gave an assur­
ance that the Government would Incorporate suitable provisions In the Act 
for the regulation of such companies. In pursuance of the assurance, the 
Government proposed the Insertion of a new Part X I I -A  when the Bill came 
before the Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament for consideration.
An examination of the proposals disclosed many difficulties, and Tn parti­
cular, that the exemptions and modifications could not be made on a uniform 
pattern, as the amount of Government Interest Tn, and the nature of the acti­
vities carried on by the various Government companies differed very w idely. 
A t the same time, It was felt that:
It would be Inappropriate to apply 
to Government companies the 
clauses of the Bill Imposing penal­
ties In respect of failure to do cer­
tain things by directors, managers, 
e tc ., but those prescribing routine
things like supplying Information to 
shareholders, filling returns, Issuing 
prospectus , e tc .,  should be made 
applicable to them like any other 
company. 93
The Joint Committee, therefore, recommended that subject to the above 
principle, the Government should consider each case or class of cases 
on merits and decide about the applicability of the various provisions of 
Act with or without modification.
It Is relevant to mention that section 617, which defines a 
Government company, can now be altered by the notification under 
section 620 of the Government with the approval of Parliament I f  so de­
sired. This w ill enable the Government to Include within that term com­
panies Tn which Government Interest Is less than fifty-one percent. It 
could be done by Issuing fresh capital to the public, thereby the Interest 
of Government falls below fifty-one per cent. In such cases, the 
Government may notify that In spite of the fall In the percentage of the 
Government Interest, the Company would continue to be a Government 
company.
However, our study revealed that during 1973-74, one Govern­
ment company, Punjab Tractors Limited of the Union Territory of Chandigarh
93. Joint Committee Report, page 51, para. 155.
became a non-Government company wtth effect from 2 M ay, 1973, owtng
to a reduction Tn the percentage shareholding of the Government Tn this 
94Company.
The power of modification has been exercised by the Govern­
ment Tn November, 1965, with respect to section 23(1). After sub­
section (1), the following sub-section shall be Inserted, namely:-
(1-A) where the change Tn the name 
of a Government Company consists 
only In the deletion of the word 
’’Private” therefrom that Govern­
ment Company shall, not later 
than three months from the date 
thereof, Inform the Registrar of 
the aforesaid change and there­
upon the Registrar shall delete the 
word ’’Private” before the word 
•Limited* Tn the name of the Com­
pany upon the register and shall 
also make the necessary altera­
tions Tn the Certificate of Tncor- ^  
poratlon Issued to the Company.
Although the power to modify the provisions of the Act In rela­
tion to Government companies 1 . h^as been conferred on to the Central
Government alone, sub-section (2) of section 620 does provfata a
94. The Eighteenth Annual Report on the Working & Administration of 
the Companies A ct, 1956, page 17.
95. The above modification of applications of section 23 was made by 
Notification G .S.R. N o .1649, dated 13 November, 1965.
necessary protection. A draft of the proposed notification for modTfytng 
the provTsTons of the Act Tn relatTon to any Government company has to be 
latd before both Houses of Parliament for not less than thirty days. The Idea 
Ts to give more effective control to Parliament regarding the terms of the noti­
fication. This Ts also clear from the fact that the draft notification has to 
be laid before both Houses while they are In session so that they may not be 
Ignored by any device.
It Is also evident that the Central Government cannot exclude or
make any alteration In section 619 and sedlon 619A. These provisions are
96regarded to be fundamental and apply to a ll Government companies.
Section 618 provides: "No Government Company formed after the commence­
ment of this Act shall appoint a managing agent” . The following argument 
was put forward In favour of Inserting this section:
The main advantages of the manag­
ing agency system were that the 
managing agents provided capital 
where private Investor was shy to 
Invest, helped the newly formed 
Companies to tide over financial 
difficulties by loans on cheap terms 
and provided managerial and admini­
strative expertise at low cost. Now 
the managing agents came to domi­
nate the Companies for their self- 
interest. They had the power to
96, Joint Committee Report, page 173.
nominate Directors and by recourse to 
well-known practices packed the 
Board with a larger number of their 
own men. They assured for them­
selves long terms and heavy remuner­
ation In various forms. The Inter­
ests of the Company were gradually 
subordinated to their own Interest.
However, Tn the case of Govern­
ment companies, the Government 
can supply a ll the advantages con­
ferred by the managing agents on 
other companies. Hence, there 
Is no necessity for them. The 
retention of managing agents In 
some cases (which had already 
managing agents) had to be made 
for various reasons, for example, 
the Government was reluctant to 
upset the existing organisational 
pattern of such companies Tmmedl -  
ate ly .
It has been held by the Indian Courts that employees of Govern­
ment companies are not C iv il Servants and so not entitled to the protection
97
offered by Article 311 of the Constitution.
97. Sunil Kumar Deb Nath v . Mining & Allied Machinery Corporation, 
1968 , 1 Com. L .J . 214; M alik Ram v . Hlndusthan Cables L td ., 
1968 , Com. Cases 500; A .B . Biswas v . H .C .L . ,  1968 , Com.
Cases 528; R .K . Chatter}ee v . Union of India, 1969 , Com. Cases 
329: N . Rao v . Indian OH Corporation^ 1969 , Com. Cases 896; 
Verma & Others v . Bokaro Steel L td ., 1971 , Com. Cases 826.
In Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v . State of Bihar, 1969 Com. 
Cases 905, tfe Supreme Court while holding that Government company 
w ill ordlnarly be presumed not to be a Servant or agent of the State, 
has also observed that Interference may be drawn that such Company Is 
an agent of the Government I f ,  Tn substance, Tt also performs govern­
mental functions.
However,
no writ under article 2226 of the 
IndTan ConstTtutTon wtll be agatnst 
a Government Company Tf there ts 
no publtc or statutory duty Tnvolved.
Though Article 226 of the ConstTtutTon Ts very general, Tt Ts well under­
stood that :
a mandamus Ites only to secure the 
performance of a public or statu­
tory duty Tn the performance of 
which the one who applies has a 
sufficient legal Interest. No 
doubt the person against whom It  
Ts Issued need not be a public o ffi­
cer. It may Issue against private 
officials of a society e tc .,  also, 
but the subject must relate to pub­
lic responsibilities. It cannot 
Issue on matters or relationship 
between a company and Tts work­
men . 99
It Ts significant to mention that now Tt Ts well settled that the 
writ of mandamus will lie against those statutory bodies, Including those
100discharging commercial functions. In Prag Tools Corporation v . Immanuel, 
the Supreme Court observed that mandamus may be Issued even to a company 
Tf Tt has been placed under a statutory duty.
98. C .R . Datta: The Company Law (1976), page 960.
99. Praga Tools Corporation v . C .V .  Imanuel, 1969 Com. Cases 891 
(S .C .) .
100. A . I .R .  (1969) S .C . 1306.
6.5 Legal Status
A Government company has a name and separate corporate 
personality. It Is capable of suing or being sued Tn Tts own name -  an 
Independent entity from the Government. It has none of the privileges 
or Immunities of the Executives. It Ts bound by Acts of Parliament or of 
State Legislatures just as any other person. The Income and property of 
a Government company Ts as much subject to taxation as that of any other 
company.
No notice under section 80 of the C ivil Procedure Code Is neces­
sary before filing a suit against a Government company.
The doctrine of ultra-vires can be Invoked I f  the acts of a Govern 
ment company are not provided by the objects contained In the Memorandum 
of Association. Revenue, taxes and rates due and payable by the company 
to the Government or any local authority within 12 months of the commence­
ment of the wlndlng-up are entitled to preferential payment under section 
530 ^  of the Indian Companies A ct, 1956. The Government Is eligible 
to rank as creditor for any sums advanced to the company as a loan.
The assets of the company alone are liable to pay Tts debts and 
liabilities to the extent of Tts commitments ( i .e .  limited liab ility ). The
101. The Section relates to Preferential Payments.
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legal liability of a Government for breach of contract Ts subject to the 
jurisdiction of the C ivil Courts.
A Government company Ts subject to winding-up proceedings 
like other companies. The Arttcles of Association usually provide that 
the question of winding-up shall be reserved for the consideration of the 
Government at the request of the Special Director or Managing Director, 
as the case may be. This only refers to the passing of the special resolu­
tion by the Company. Once the resolution Ts passed , the winding-up 
would follow the procedure laid down In the Indian Companies .A c t. In 
cases vhere the resolution or other action by the company Ts not necessary, 
e .g . Tn a petition by a creditor on the ground that the company Ts unable 
to pay Tts debts, no reference to the Government was required.
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6 .6 . Government Companies Tn TanzanTa
In Tanzania, a company comes Into existence by satisfying the
102
requirements of the Companies Ordinance. The Ordinance, however,
does not provide any separate precise definition for a Government company. 
As the Government of TanzanTa has used the company form widely, so the 
Companies Ordinance has had to be modified and amended to suit Tts require 
ments. Professor Y .P . Ghal has observed thus:
At first the forms and rules of the 
private sector company Influenced 
the Government Company, and only 
minor amendments such as those dis­
pensing with more than one share­
holder, general meetings, e tc ., were 
made. As more and more substan­
tive amendments were made, e .g .  
powers to modify articles and memo­
randum, transfer assets, special pro­
cedure for winding up, e tc ., two 
streams of company law emerged, 
one dealing with private and the 
other with Government Companies.
As the Government companies 
tended to become more Important, 
they began Increasingly to consti­
tute the norm by analogy with 
which private companies were 
regulated. Thus, governmental 
powers over dividend policy, com­
pulsory Investment Tn specific se­
curities, registration and winding 
up, over public sector companies
102. Cap.212, SS.14-17.
were extended to private companies.
The two streams are beginning to 
merge again, but the pattern Ts that 
of government company. 103
However, our study entirely agrees with the observation of Pro­
fessor G hal. In India, the Indian Companies Act has made special provi­
sions to deal with Government companies, while In Tanzania, the Companies 
Ordinance has had to be amended to accommodate the Government companies 
as this form has been used extensively for economic management of the
country. The National Development Corporation, for example, controls 
104over 100 companies.
But It Ts appropriate to mention that so far as Government com­
panies are concerned, It  w ill be Inappropriate to apply those sections of the 
Ordinance which Impose a penalty Tn respect of failure to do various things 
by directors, managers, e tc ., but those prescribing routine things like sup­
plying Information to shareholders, the submission of returns, Issuing pro­
spectus, e tc ., should be made applicable to them like any other company.
We suggest, therefore, that consideration might be given to the 
creation of two forms of company law: (1) Private Company Law, and (2)
State Company Law. This would give State companies a separate status
103. Y .P . GhaT: "Control and Management of the Economy: Research 
Perspective on Public Enterprise”, In th e V .R .U .,  1976, page 182.
104. The Eighth Annual Report of the National Development Corporation , 
(1972), page 1.
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than that of prTvate companies. But the distinction between corporations 
and companies would remain,as the former are created by an Act of Parlia­
ment or Orders, whereas the latter are created and governed by the provi­
sions of the Companies A ct. The Companies Acts, therefore, should be 
reviewed to develop more definite forms of public accountability, and a 
code of conduct should be set out to promote desirable social practices Tn 
Industry. The right of the Government to Inspect the accounts and opera­
tions would also be established. It would then be possible to distinguish 
the two types of company, and to ensure that Government companies were 
fully accountable to the Government.
However, there are two types of Government companies Tn Tan-
•owntit
zanla. The first one Ts companies which are wholly^lTmlted companies; 
such companies may be owned by one public corporation or several. A  
single statutory corporation can own the entire shares of a limited company 
under the 1969 amendment to the Companies Ordinance. These are better 
jcpo'wn as subsidiary companies. Section 127(1) (Cap.2]2) of the Com­
panies Ordinance defines a subsidiary company as follows:
127(1) Where the assets of a com­
pany consists Tn whole or Tn part of 
shares Tn another company, whether 
held directly or through a nominee 
and wheth er that other company Ts 
a company within the meaning of 
this Ordinance or not and -
tf
(a) the amount of the shares so held 
Ts at the ttme when the accounts 
of the holdTng company are made 
up more than fifty  per cent of the 
Issued share capital of that other 
company or such as to entitle the 
company to make more than fifty  
percent of the voting power In 
that other company; or
(b) the Company has power (not being 
power vested In It by virtue only 
of the provisions of a debenture 
trust deed or by virtue of shares 
Issued to It for the purpose In pur­
suance of these provisions) direct­
ly or Indirectly to appoint the 
majority of the directors of that 
other company, that other com­
pany shall be deemed to a sub­
sidiary company within the mean­
ing of this Ordinance, and the 
expression "subsidiary company"
In this Ordinance means a com­
pany In case of which the condl- 
tlons of this section are satisfied.
The second type Is companies where the Government holds at 
least fifty  per cent of the total shares. In most cases, the shares 
are vested In the National Development Corporation, which Is a wholly 
owned Government parastatal. The National Development Corporation 
took over, for example, 75 per cent shares of the Tanzania Tanneries Ltd. 
and the remaining 25 per cent Is owned by the Ehrnberg and Sons of Sweden,
105. Subsidiary Companies: B .A .T ., National Printing Company L td ., 
Friendship Textile Mills L td ., Tanzania Breweries, etc.
51 per cent shares of the Tanzania Breweries Ltd. and 49 per cent shares 
by East African Breweries Ltd.;, 60 per cent shares of the Tanzania Shoe 
Companies and the remaining 40 per cent shares by Bata Shoe Co. Ltd. 
(U .K .)  tn 1967.106
The control over these companies Is exerclwed In various ways 
through the appointment of the board of directors. As companies they are 
obliged to follow their rules and regulations, as set out In their memoranda 
and articles of association. In most cases, they have two shareholders, 
I . e .  the National Development Corporation and other shareholders In the 
company concerned. As a majority shareholder, the National Develop­
ment Corporation has a controlling Interest and has the power to appoint 
more members, and usually It  also appoints the Chairman of the board of 
directors.
(1) The Management of the National 
Development Corporation Is vest­
ed In a Board of Directors.
(2) The Board shall consist of -
(a) a Chatrman who shall be ap­
pointed by the President;
106. This Information has been received from Shlvjl‘s:
(1) The Silent Class Struggle (1974); (2) Class Strugges In Tanzania 
(1976)T *
107. For a detailed discussion, see James and Llngunya's "Organisational 
relationship and the Control of the Parastatals In Tanzania” , In EALR, 
V o l.5 , (1972), pages 54-57 .
(b) Such other members being not 
less than five not more than 
nine as the Minister for Com­
merce may appoint, one of 
whom he shall nominate as Its 
Vice-Chairm an.
(3) There shall be a general manager 
who shall be appointed by the Pre­
sident. 108
The General Manager Is the Chief Executive and has under him 
seven departments. Through these departments, the National Develop­
ment Corporation exercises control over the subsidiary and associated corn- 
109panles. Therefore, the National Development Co rporatlon has be­
come the Important Instrument of government policy to formulate and Imple­
ment the developmental programmes. It would be helpful to mention 
the seven departments of the National Development Corporation:
108. S .5(1) to 5(3), the N .D .C .  (Establishment) Order, G N  N o .90 of 1969.
109. Associated Companies (50 per cent shareholding): Tanzania Portland 
Cement Co. L td ., Hallmark Hotels L td ., Tanganyika Extract Co. L td ., 
Tanzania Distillers L td ., etc . See James & Llngunya. Hallmark 
Hotels (T) Ltd. Is an associate company of the N .D .C . ,  which holds 
30% of Its shares. It specialises In hotel management, providing mana­
gerial and consultancy services to most of the N .D .C .  hotels, Including 
the new projects like the New Africa Hotel, Baharl Hotel, Lake Manyara 
Hotel, etc.
The remaining 70% of the Hallmarks shares are held by the Hallway 
Hotel Overseas L td ., a hotel management firm, linked with the Trust 
Houses Group of the U .K . and the United Transport Overseas Ltd.
Shlvjl, I: The Silent Class Struggle , page 26, published Tanzania 
Publishing Hse, (Dar es Salaam) (1974).
(1) General Manager*s Department: The General Manager Ts In­
formed about the affatrs of the corporation by his personal assistant. It 
has also a legal section which attends to legal matters relating to both the 
National Development Corporation and Its group companies.
(2) The Accounting Department Is responsible for a ll accounting 
activities of the corporation and gives necessary guidance to a ll group 
companies of the National Development Corporation In this respect.
(3) The Administrative Department provides leads In administrative 
functions of the National Development Corporation. The Corporationks 
Secretary, the Insurance Manager and the Public Relations Manager are 
housed In this department.
(4) The Executive Department Is responsible for advising the National 
Development Corporation on policies and programmes for developing the 
necessary managerial skills.
(5) The Planning and Finance Department Is concerned with strategies, 
policies and plans for the future. It ensures the best use of the National 
Development Corporation^ resources for the achievement of Its purposes.
(6) The Development and Research Department carries out Investiga­
tion and assessment opportunities for Investment, and makes Its recommenda­
tions to the Board. The National Development Corporation management 
cannot undertake any new project without the sanction of this department.
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(7) Operations Department. Further control ts exercised by the 
National Development Corporation through this department. Each com­
pany Is required to send a monthly report of Its operations to the National 
Development Corporation. The Operations Officer makes a thorough In­
vestigation and then reports his findings to the National Development Cor­
poration's Management. But In practice, as It  Is pointed out by I .  Hdgg: 
"the Operations Officer sometimes askes for some additional Information or 
clarifications but nothing very Important. These contacts are mostly by 
telephone” . He goes on to say that:
there does not seem to be any 
noticeable Inconsistencies be­
tween the goals of the NDC and 
the Companies. The NDC takes 
a more active Interest only when 
problems are encountered In a 
company. Otherwise the Com­
panies are allowed much discret­
ion -  this may also be the conse­
quence of the high turnover of 
operations officers In the N D C .
They have not had time to really 
get to know the company. I l l
He further adds that:
the Company managements seem 
to have great freedom In their 
ordinary short-term planning
110. I # Hd'gg: Some State Controlled Industrial Companies In Tanzania, 
page 13.
111. Ib id ., page 13.
activities, but unfortunately this vtew 
Ts not totally supported by James and 
LTgunya. According to them/*thTs 
discretion or freedom Is not Interfered 
with as long as a company management 
follows the NDC's policy, otherwise 
In many cases, the decision of the 
NDC board of directors, even against 
the wishes of the other party, Is a 
foregone conclusion V  112
It Is recognised that the National Development Corporation Is an Import­
ant Instrument to formulate and execute government policy, therefore,
Its dominance over Its subsidiaries cannot be denied.
However, our examination of the Annual Report of the National
Development Corporation has not been able to contribute much In this re - 
113gard. The Report begins with a brief statement from the Minister for
Finance. He states that:
the NDC Ts Tanzania's principal 
Instrument of economic expansion 
and progress In the fields of pro­
ductive Investment and the NDC's 
main source of finances are: In­
come from Investment; Interest 
from loans and repayment of loans 
made by the Corporation to Indivi­
dual companies In the group;
112. James & LTgunya: EALR ,V o l.5  (1972), page 55.
113. Eighth Annual Report and Accounts of the NDC, (1972).
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borrowing from International Insti­
tutions ; Tanzania T reasury gran ts; j ^  
and Tnter-governmenta! credits.
The report Issued by the National Development Corporation has been 
scarcely Impressive. It leaves out many Important matters, for example, 
Information about Increase In paid-up capital, long-term loans, e tc .,  
Important changes In pricing policy, employer-employee relations, new 
projects or expansion contemplated to Increase or diversify the production 
and progress made so far, changes In the Board of directors and General 
Manager, etc. The Report Is actually a bare statement of profit and 
loss. It Ts very d ifficult, I f  not Impossible, for someone to know what 
Is the actual financial position of a particular company. We suggest, 
therefore, that the report should be more Informative and simple so that 
the people can easily understand the financial situation of a company -  
who, In fact, owns I t .
The above Companies would be parastatals In practice and, 
according to the Government statement, for the purpose of providing 
legal services by the Legal Corporation.
The Government stated that:
A parastatal organization Is not 
an Integral part of the Govern­
ment, but an Institution, organi­
zation or agency which Is wholly
114. Ib id ., page 1.
or matnly ftnanced or owned and con- 
iTolled by the Government. The cri­
terion of such public enterprises would 
be ownership by the Government of 
fifty per cent or more of the capital 
shares or other form of governmental 
participation and effective Influence 
In a ll the main aspects of the manage­
ment of the enterprise. 115
The methods of control, e .g . control by the Minister, control by 
Parliament, audit control, e tc ., which are employed to control the activ i­
ties of parastatals, therefore, w ill be applicable to these companies as w e ll. 
These techniques have been discussed earlier. In addition to these, two new 
Acts  ^^  have granted to the Minister for Finance wide powers to control 
prices, dividends and Investment of companies. These Acts were originally 
designed to control the private sector companies, but the scope of them has 
been extended to Government companies as w e ll.  ^^
The Tanzania Government has been continuously equpped with
118legal powers for price control since 1920. 1950 saw an unprecedented
115. G . N ,  N o . 1976 of 1967.
116. ( | )  The locally manufactured products (Price Stability) A ct, 1972,
No .24 of 1972.
(II) The Companies (Regulation of Dividends and Surpluses) A ct, 1972, 
N o .22 of 1972.
117. Act N o . 16 of 1974.
118. H . Kimble: The Price Control In Tanzania, page 33.
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rtse Tn prtces, and tn that year a Committee was appointed to Investigate
the whole question of rising costs, and In 1951 a new Price Control O rd l- 
119nanae was passed. This Ordinance empowered the Government
to appoint a Price Controller to be responsible For the administration of the 
120Ordinance. The Price Controller could from time to time by Order
published In the Gazette
(a) fix maximum prices for the sale of any goods -
(I) by any person to any person; or
(II) by their manufacturer to or through the agency of a
trader In such goods; or
(III) by a trader In such opods to another trader In such 
goods; or
(Iv) by a trader In such goods to a person who Is not a
trader In such goods; or
(v) by a person who Is not a trader In any particular
goods to a trader In such goods; or
(b) to (f) fix maximum service charge or hire charge or commission that may
be made In respect of any sale or prescribe the type of packing,
121
weight, size, quality, etc.
119. Cap.309.
120. S .3 (l)
121. S .5(1)
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The maximum penalty for breach of the Act was a fine of ten
thousand shillings or Imprisonment for 2 years or both and, In the case of
a second or subsequent offence, a fine of twenty thousand shillings or Im -
122prlsonment for 5 years or both.
But unhappily, the period 1965-67 saw the most marked rise In
123
the general price level. The Government was determined to take
more positive steps to combat this problem. In 1967, a National Price
124
Control Advisory Board was established, which Included representa­
tives of consumers, trade unions, retailers, wholesalers, as w ell as offi­
cials and economic advisers. A  network of Regional Boards was also set
up to advise or restrain Regional Commissioners In their new role as Asslst-
125ant Price Controllers.
Between January and March, 1968, a number of price orders were 
Issued by the Price Controllers In respect of meat, bread and other essentials. 
Although the Boardwas not very successful, "one of the main achievements 
of the Board", says H . Kimble, "was to Institute detailed enquiries Into the
122. S .20(1)
123. For a detailed discussion, see H . Kimble: The Price Control In 
Tanzania, pages 35-41 ,
124. G . N .  N o .79, 1967.
125. S .3 (2).
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markets for several commodtttes where Itttle TnformatTon had previously
126
been avatlable on channels of trade and prtce TnformatTon” .
The Tanzania Government has been seen to be actively con­
cerned over the price problem since then. In 1972, the Locally Manu- 
factured Products (Price Stability) Act was passed to combat price rises In 
certain goods manufactured Tn Tanzania. The Act prohibits any manu­
facturer, wholesale or retailer to sell or offer for sale a specified product 
at a price higher than he normally sold such product at Immediately before 
thd* effective date” (which Ts 15 June, 1972) for those products specified Tn 
the original schedule: tyres, tubes, pangas, jembes, ploughs and similar 
agricultural Implements.
Section 5(b) authorises the Price Controller to fix a price where a 
product Ts first manufactured after the effective date.
r '
The Price ontroller can authorise price Increases by the manu­
facturer and It Is a defence for a seller to satisfy the Court that he was 
merely passing on to his customer the additional cost he had paid for the 
product.
126. Ib id ., o p .c lt .,  page 33.
127. S .41, also see J .S . Read: "Tanzania” In the Annual Survey of 
African Law, (]972), page 135.
128. S .6(1).
Section 11 lays down the penalty clause. In the event of the 
provisions of the Act being violated, the maximum penalties are a fine of 
twenty thousand shillings or Imprisonment for 5 years or both. A  prin­
cipal or employer w ill be held liable unless they prove their Innocence.
Owing to Inflationary pressures, unpredictable world markets 
and prices for Its goods as well as Its steady rise In population growth and 
basic poverty, the Price Control Ordinance, 1951 (Cal.309) and the 
Locally Manufactured Products (Price Stability) A ct, 1972, failed to t ' 
check the rise In prices.
However, It  Is appropriate to quote the observations of H . Kimble:
Price control can only help to 
even out the short term fluctua­
tions Tn prices and to reduce 
price variations between con­
sumers, Tn spite of the risks and 
difficulties Involved. They can 
also reduce some prices, although 
not a l l .  The maximum Impact 
w ill be achieved when the con­
trolled prices are c lear-cut, 
realistically calculated, well -  
publicised and applied top  
limited range of essential com­
modities. 129
129. H . Kimble: The Price Control In Tanzania, page 51.
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We are quite aware of the fact that the prices of goods do not 
entirely depend on the condition of the domestic economy alone; they 
are greatly Influenced by the International market forces, for example, 
the prices of many products went up owing to the five-fold rise In the 
price of petrol since 1974.
As has been mentioned earlier, a statutory system of price con­
trols was adopted since 1920 In Tanzania. The Price Control Ordinance,
1951 (Cap.309) continued until 1973. The Acts ( I .e .  (1) the Price Con- 
trol Ordinance, 1951; (2) The Locally Manufactured Products (Price Sta- 
blllty) A ct, 1972) were always Intended to narrow the gap between the 
"have” and ”have nots", which was always the main objective of the pre­
sent leadership. However, Tn order to achieve this goal, a new machinery
. .  . QTQ 1 30was set up Tn 1973.
131The Regulation of Prices A ct, 1973, established a new machinery 
for the control of prices.
The National Price Commission has now taken over the functions 
of the former Price Controller, with AsJTstants and Advisory Boards. The 
Price Commission consists of a Chairman, who Ts appointed by the President,
130. J .S . Read: ’’Tanzania” In the Annual Survey of A frica, 1973, pages 
155-156. (See, for a detailed discussion. The fcegulatlon of Prices 
A ct, 1973).
131. N o . 19 of 1973.
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and ChTef Executive O fficer, and five to seven members appointed by the 
132
Minister. Regional and District Development Directors are Asslst-
133ant Price Commissioners at their respective levels.
Section 6 of the Act empowers the Commission:
(a) to determine reasonable price 
structures on a national basis 
and to provide for their orderly 
variation when necessary;
(b) to ensure that prices of goods 
and services In Tanganyika are 
compatible with and conform 
to the principles of socialism 
and the political, economic 
and social aspirations of the 
people of the United Republic;
(c) to perform such other functions 
as are conferred on It  by this 
Act or as the President may, 
from time to time, by order 
published In the G azette , 
confer upon I t .
It Is an Indication that Tanzania Is now trying to use regulatory 
mechanism to control the activities of the public sect'Orv for example, In 
this case, the prices of products manufactured by parastatals and other com­
panies .
Section 12(1) of the same Act has mentioned certain specific 
factors that are to be taken Into consideration by the Price Commission
132. S .3 (l) to 3 (c ).
133. S .7(1) to 7(5).
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Tn ftxtng prtce structures. It says that :
the Prtce CommTssTon shall, Tn deter-
mTnTng the prTce structure of any goods
or servTces or class of goods or servTces,
have regard to -
(a) the commodTtTes and servTces essen- 
tTal to the communTty;
(b) the need to avoTd unduly rapTd or 
frequent varTatTons Tn prTces;
(c) the need to preserve and promote 
the competTtTve posTtTon of local 
products Tn the domestTc market 
as well as Tn foreTgn markets;
(d) the need to prevent the Tncome 
of peasants and workers Tn the 
UnTted Repub iTc from beTng 
affected adversely by unneces­
sary and unjustTfTed prTce Tn- 
creases;
(e) the need to maTntaTn faTr re la - 
tTonshTps among the Tncomes
of dTfferent sectors of the com­
munTty;
(f) the need to ensure the contTnued 
abTlTty of the Government to 
fTnance development programmes 
and recurrent expendTture;
(g) the need to provTde cTrcumstances 
under whTch local manufacturing, 
processTng and servTce TndustrTes 
are able to maTntaTn effTcTency 
and expand theTr busTness;
(h) the need to provTde cTrcumstances 
conducTve to a healthy and orderly 
development of trade and commerce 
Tn rural areas as well as urban areas;
(!) such guTdeltnes as to margins or 
otherwtse as the MtnTster may 
from time to tTme Issue.
Read aptly comments that:
thTs sub-sectton not only Illustrates 
the complexity of the challenging 
responsibilities laid upon the ^om -  
mission but also makes a remarkable 
exposition of the fundamentals of 
the Tanzanian policies towards 
trade and commerce. 134
Section 8(l)(a) to 8(1)(g) has given various other powers to deter­
mine price structures, namely:
(a) power to fix maximum prices for the sale of any goods, Including 
used goods, by any person (Including manufacturer, Importer, 
wholesale or retailer);
(b) power to fix maximum hire and service charges;
(c) power to determine maximum commission charges and maximum 
hire-purchase charges;
(d) power to prescribe types of packing, weight, size, quality, pro­
cessing and Ingredients of any goods manufactured In Tanganyika.
134. J .S . Read: "Tanzania” Tn the Annual Survey of African Law, (1973), 
page 155.
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An Assistant CommtssToner may determine price structures for
the region, but his decision may be reviewed and changed by the CommTs-
135slon, subject to the Ministerial discretion. A  similar power has also
136been given to the Assistant Price Commissioner at district levels.
Section 10(6) empowers the Minister to establish Advisory Committees, at 
regional and district levels, In order to advise the Assistant Price Com­
missioner. A trader w ill commit an offence, I f  he charges a price above 
the maximum fixed by the Commission. In such a case, a maximum 
fine of Shs.50,000/- anchor Imprisonment for five years may be Imposed on 
the offender. Sections 27 and 28 empower the Price Commissioner, the 
Assistant Commissioners, Senior Police Officers, other authorised persons 
and Price Inspectors to Inspect, Investigate and report upon any breach of 
the A ct.
A  striking newpoweKgtven to the 
Price Commissioner or any Assist­
ant Price Commissioner Ts the 
authority to certify a large num­
ber of matters such as not merely 
the maximum prices but what con­
stitutes a wholesale or retail sale 
and the total amount of overcharge
135. Ib id ., S. 10(1) and 10(2).
136. Ib id ., S. 10(5).
137. Ib id ., S .17(1).
Involved In any transaction; such 
a certificate Ts admissible In evJr 
dence In any proceedings and the 
Court must presume that It Is valid 
and correct unless the contrary Is 
proved. 138
The question now remains whether these measures have been able 
to combat domestic Inflation as well as Improve the balance of payments 
situation.
In 1977 a combination of good 
financial housekeeping and 
high world prices for tea and 
coffee helped the balance of 
payments so much that there 
was at least some relaxation 
of the restrictions on the Im­
portation of spare parts and 
other essentials. At the same 
time, the rate of Inflation has 
slowed sharply (although no 
figure was given) having been 
(officially) up to 26 per cent 
Tn 1975. 139
It Ts significant to mention that It  Is d ifficult to control prices by 
legislation alone ,  as Nyerere himself has admitted that ” Our nation Is 
still economically dependent upon the vagaries of weather and upon econo­
mic and political decisions taken bj  other peoples without our participation
138. J .S . Read: ’'Tanzania” In ASAL (1973), page 156. S .29(l)(a) 
to 29(l)(g) and S .29(2). For a full discussion of the above Act, 
see the above artic le .
139. The Economist, 17 March, 1978^ page 12.
or consent."
The other Act, T.e. the Compantes (Regulatton of Dividends 
141and Surplus) A ct, 1972, has authortsed the MTntster for Ftnance to
Tmpose ItmTtattons on the amount of dividends whTch could be given to
shareholders and direct a company to Invest Its funds In specified Govern
142ment securities or other Investments.
Section 7(1) lays down that:
No company whether or not speci­
fied shall In respect of any finan­
cial year, declare dividends the 
aggregate sum of money payable In 
respect of which,
(a) exceeds the sum of money which 
when deducted from the com­
pany^ net worth In respect of 
such financial year w ill have 
the effect of reducing such net 
worth of the company to a sum 
which Ts less than 120% of the 
par value of the company^ paid 
up share capital at the close of 
the financial; or
140. The Guardian, 21 April, 1977.
141. The main purpose of the Bill Ts to give power to regulate levels of 
dividends and uses of cash flow of companies and corporations so that 
they serve the national Interest. Bill Supplement N o . 4 (G ovt. 
Printer, Dar-es-Salaam, June, 1972).
142. A  good account of this Act can be found In J .S . Read: "Tanzania” 
Tn the Annual Survey of African Law, (1972)^! pages 133-134.
(b) Exceeds the largest of the
following sum of money namely:-
(I) the average of the annua I 
profits of such company dur­
ing the financial year Imme­
diately proceeding such finan­
cial year; p r
(H) 80% of the profits In the finan­
cial year Immediately proceed­
ing such financial year;
( III)  where the company first com­
menced Its business Immedi­
ately before or during such 
financial year, 80% of Its 
profits In such financial year.
The Minister Is also empowered to sanction larger dividends with
143prior approval by resolution of the National Assembly. In the case of
144
certain specified companies, the Minister can order any one of these com 
panles to limit Its dividends further, to an aggregate not exceeding a pre­
scribed percentage of the companies approved net worth, or he can order the 
company to declare and pay dividends and may then prescribe a minimum
143. S .7(2).
144. ‘ Specified companies‘means a company specified In Part I of the
Schedule to the Act and Includes a corporation specified In Part 
II of the said Schedule (Section 2 ).
A sample -  The list of specified Companies and Corporations:
(1) African Trading Co. Ltd. (2) Banco Products (Tanzania) Ltd.
(3) Burns and Blane (Tanzania) Ltd. (4) Car & General (Tanzania) 
Ltd. (5) Hallmark Hotels (T) L td ., e tc .
(1) Tanzania Sugar Board -  Corporation.
There are 59 companies In Schedule I and 1 Corporation In Schedule I I .
405.
145aggregate for such dTvtdends as a percentage of approved net worth.
The MTntster can order spectfTc companTes to submit, at least
thirty days before each financial year, cash flow budgets showing clearly
146estimated receipts within a specified period.
The Minister can pass an order under section 11(2), before the 
year starts or within three months of receiving the budget, to the company 
to Invest a certain amount of Its estimated receipts, within a prescribed 
period, In specified Government securities or other Investments.
The Act names fifty-nine companies, but the Minister for 
Finance has added more than seventy companies to the list whtcbr section
14713(1) authorises him to do. One cannot agree with Read more when
he said: "The Act thus attempt* a cure for the weakness of Investment
148policy shown by parastatal organisations, amongst others, In the past.”
145. S .9, Net worth Is the difference between the value of a ll assets 
minus all liabilities at the end of the financial year; ‘approved 
net worth1 Is equalled to the net worth shown by the latest audited 
balance sheet plus the portion of profits which the Minister Is 
satisfied has been spent subsequently In specified ways.
146. S .11(1).
147. J .S . Read: "Tanzania" , ASAL (1972), page 134.
148. Ib id ., o p .c lt .,  page 134.
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The Act also confers powers on the MtnTster for Finance to Tntroduce
149specTal controls to deal wtth foreign companies.
Now we would like to come back to sectTon 7(1) of the Act 
Tn order to assess tts effect on the Specified Compantes. The main effect 
of thts wtde sectTon Ts to narrow down and ItmTt the amount of money paTd 
as dTvTdends to shareholders, to make the compa^iyjas Itttle as possTble and 
to facTlTtate Tnternal accumulatTon of capTtal wTthTn the company Ttself. 
The purpose Ts to make avaTlable money to help Tn the development of the 
natTon and to enable the company to expand Tts actTvTtTes. The Inten­
tion, no doubt, Ts good but the questTon remaTns whether both the long- 
termaidi the short-terms Tnvestors sacrTfTce theTr Tnterest equally. It 
seems to us that the sectTon operates to the detrTment of the short-term 
Tnvestors. The long-term Tnvestors are not Tnterested Tn ready cash but 
Tn the domestTc accumulatTon of capTtal wTthTn the company whTch wTlI 
gtve them more return Tn the future and also would help them to borrow 
less from banks and fTnancTal TnstTtutTons, whTch Ts no doubt a costly 
affatr. Therefore, they try to declare very iTttle dTvTdends. Some- 
tTmes, the shareholders are gTven each a few more shares Tn whTch case, 
share capTtal Tncreases and the money retaTned for Tnvestment wTthTn the 
company Tncreases. ThTs can now be done legally under the above-
149. S .8(1)
menttoned provisions.
Under sectTon 6(a), no Court can make an order for the winding 
up of a specified company. This again would work out to the advantage 
of the long-term Tnvestors and to the detriment of the small short-term 
shareholders. Therefore, under the A ct, a resolution for the winding-up 
of a company which has been specified under the A ct, by the members can­
not, under any cTrcumstances, succeed. This benefits the long-term 
shareholders.
Another Intention of the Act Ts to restrict the expatriation and 
expropriation of capTtal generated by foreign companies to maintain a 
healthy financial base at home. For that reason, the Act has chosen 
special ‘specified companies1 and restricted them to declare more d iv i­
dends than the amount allowed by the Act Itself. However, It Ts also 
appropriate to add that Tn order to encourage foreign Investors, the Govern­
ment has attempted to allow some of these companies to declare dividends 
which are higher than those allowed by the A ct.
It Is difficult to predict at the present time what w ill be the 
total effect of the Act In the long run.
CHAPTER 7
WORKERS* PARTICIPATION IN  MANAGEMENT
7.1 Britain
7 .2  India
7 .3  Tanzania
7.1 Britain
The question of workers* participation In the management of 
public enterprises In the United Kingdom must be considered In the con 
text of recent discussions concerning workers* participation In Industry 
generally. M r. Peter Shore, then Secretary of State for Trade, 
announced to the House of Commons on 5 August, 1975, that he was 
setting up an Independent Committee of Inquiry to consider ways of ex­
tending Industrial democracy In British Industry. The Committee, 
chaired by Lord Bullock, was given the following terms of reference:
Accepting the need for a radical 
extension of Industrial democracy 
In the control of compantes by 
means of representation on boards 
of directors and accepting the 
essential role of tracf^ union 
organisations In this process, to 
consider how such an extension 
can best be achieved, taking Into 
account In particular the proposals 
of the Trades Union Congress Re­
port on Industrial democracy, as 
well as experience In Britain, the 
E .E .C . and other countries. 
Hafcrlng regard to the Interests of 
the national economy, employees, 
Investors and consumers, to ana­
lyse the Implications of such
410.
representation for the efficient 
management of companies and 
for company law. 1
In Its Report, published In 1977, this Committee expressed In 
unequivocal terms the purpose of, and need for, Increased participation 
by workers In the management of both public and privately-owned under1 
takings.
With changes In the structure of 
the economy and the nature of 
the society since World War I I ,  
the question of workers* partici­
pation has come to focus In­
creasingly on the need to In­
volve employees to a greater 
extent In company decision­
making. 2
The Committee went on to say that:
the power and complexity of 
the Industrial enterprise and 
the remoteness of decision­
making have led to demands 
for large companies to be more 
responsive to the needs of so­
ciety In general and of their 
employees In particular. In­
dustry has come under pressure 
to consider the wider effects 
of the decisions It takes In pur­
suit of profitability, and com­
panies now explicitly or Im­
p lic itly  accept that they have
1. Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy, H .M .S .O .  
( l 9 / / ) ,  page 5 .
2 . Ib id ., page 20 .
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res pons Tb Tittles not just to share 
holders, but also to employees, 
customers, creditors, suppliers, 
the local community and to 
society at large. 3
More recently, a recognition, 
shared by Government, manage­
ment and trade unions, of the 
urgent need for British Industry 
to be more responsive to change 
If  there Is to be any hope of re­
versing the relative decline of 
this country's Industrial perform­
ance, has led to the development 
of tripartite Industrial strategy. 
This Is founded on the assumption 
that Britain's Industrial problems 
can only be successfully remedied 
by concerted action to Improve 
the performance of Industry.
Trade union Involvement Is seen 
as fundamental to the strategy, 
not simply because such Involve­
ment Is necessary to forestall 
negative resistance to change, 
but also because employees 
through their trade unions have 
a positive role to play In com­
bating Industrial stagnation and 
In stimulating much needed 
changes In Industrial structure 
and performance.
Furthermore, new concepts of 
the role of employees In decT- 
slon-maklng at company level 
are not just reactions to econo­
mic trends. They also derive 
from social changes which have 
taken place since the W ar, 
especially rising standards of 
education and higher standards
3 . Ib id ., page 22.
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of ltvtng. The effect of these 
socTal changes has been an In­
creasing desire among employees 
to control their working environ­
ment and to have a say In deci­
sions which affect their working 
lives. They have become less 
prepared to accept unquestion­
ing ly unilateral decisions by 
management, and have shown a 
readiness to challenge a decision 
If  It seems to have Ignored their 
point of view or to affect them 
adversely. Traditional manage­
ment prerogatives have therefore 
come under attack, and the modern 
manager has had to develop a style 
of participative management, 
which has recognised the necessity 
and the benefits of Involving em­
ployees In decision-making, rather 
than Imposing decisions upon them 
without consultation. 4
The special Issues raised by the question of workers* partlcl*- 
patlon In the management of public enterprises were considered by the 
Trades Union Congress In 1944 with the publication of the "Interim Report 
on Post-War Reconstruction”, which rejected the Idea of direct workers* 
representatives on the board of the new corporations, which was antici­
pated would be set up, on the following grounds:
It w ill be essential not only for 
the maintenance and Improvement 
of standards and conditions of the 
work place, but because of the
4 . Ib id ., pages 22-23 .
power of Independent criticism that 
they may exert, that the trade unions 
shall maintain their complete Inde­
pendence. They can hardly do so 
I f  they are compromised In regard to 
Board decisions which are not con­
sidered to be In their members* In­
terests by the fact of their represent­
atives* participation In them.
Moreover, unless a workers* repre­
sentative participates In responsi­
b ility  for, and thereby authority 
over, the direction of the Industry, 
his status Is likely to be In fact 
advisory or consultative. The 
tendency w ill be, however, for 
effective authority In administra­
tion to lie In the hands of those 
appointed as full-tim e directors 
of the Industry. Members of the 
governing body cannot at the same 
time answer to the workers of 
the Industry as their representatives 
and bear responsibility to the M in i­
ster for Tts administration. To 
attempt to lay such a double duty 
on them may well result In making 
the Governing body In a sense a 
negotiating committee, In which 
the workers* representatives ^ 
w ill be In an ambiguous position.
The T .U .C . ,  however, strongly suggested that some of the mem­
bers of the board should be chosen from a list which It would put forward to 
the Minister after consultation with the Unions Involved, so that the Inter­
ests of the workers of the Industry and their points of view could be more
5 . T .U .C . ,  Interim Report on Post-War Reconstruction, (1944), page 21.
effectively taken Into consideration In the management of the Corpora­
tions, but the T .U .C . thought It proper that the nominees should sever 
any trade union connections whilst taking office.
The recommendations of this Report were substantially Imple­
mented In the Constitutions of the new public corporations established 
by the post-war Labour Government, following the nationalisation of some 
major Industries. On the one hand, efficiency and the development of 
production were stated to be the major duties of the new corporations, 
and on the other, whilst no direct representation of the workers was pro­
vided for on the boards of these corporations, amongst the qualifying 
criteria outlined In the statutes for the Minister to take Into considera­
tion In the selection of the members was for nominees to be qualified "as 
having had wide experience and shown capacity In the organisation of 
workers".^ These Acts, however, are silent as to any obligation of the 
Minister to nominate any director with a trade union background or from 
a list of names put forward by the trade unions.
It Is Interesting to mention that the Ministers In charge of 
various Industries "appointed some directors from senior trade unionists,
6 . S .2(3), The Coal Industry Nationalisation Act, 1946; S .3(2), 
The Electricity A ct, 1947; S .5(4), The Gas A ct, 1948; S. 1(2), 
The Iron & Steel Industry A ct, 1949.
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but these Individuals holding office had to abandon all their trade union 
affiliations".^ The Study also revealed that nine of the forty-seven 
full-tim e members and seven of the forty-eight part-time members of the
g
Boards of Nationalised Industries had some trade union background.
It Is difficult to assess the significance of the appointment of a handful 
of directors with trade union background to the Boards of the nationalised 
Industries. This composition could hardly be described as the Involve­
ment of workers* representatives In the declslon-maklng process. The 
Impact of these directors on the Boards, therefore, was almost Ineffective. 
However, the functions of negotiation and joint consultation through the 
trade union machinery, which were given basic statutory framework, were 
expected to fulfil this need. This conception of the public corporation 
was kept unchanged for over two decades by the leadership of the T .U .C .  
and the majority of the Labour movement.
The late Lord Melchett, when he was Chairman of the British 
Steel Corporation, Introduced "worker directors" to that undertaking In 
the middle of the l960*s. This experiment had no legal basis, for the 
Iron and Steel A ct, 1967, which re-nationalised the steel Industry merely
7 # A study by the Action Society Trust: The Men on the Boards: a 
study of the composition of the Boards of Nationalised Industries 
(1951), pages 6 -9 .
8 . Ibid.
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provided for the obltgatTon to negotiate and consult with trade unions
9
following the pattern of the post-war nationalisation acts. The scheme 
was devised by mutual agreement between the British Steel Corporation 
and th e T .U .C . Steel Committee. In itia lly , 12 worker-dlrectors 
were nominated on the four regional groups1 divisional boards, but the 
number was Increased to 16 when, In 1970, the steel Industry was re­
structured on a product basis. In the same year, the Minister appointed 
a worker as a member of the Board of the Corporation. The Chairman of 
the B .S .C . had selected the worker-dlrectors from a short list of candi­
dates prepared by the T .U .C . Steel Committee. The worker-dlrectors 
were expected to spend fifty  per cent of their working week on their 
ordinary job. They were holding this part-time office In their Indivi­
dual capacity and It was stressed that they did not do so as representa­
tives of the work force. In consequence, they were required to relin­
quish the holding of any union office.
It Is Important to note that these worker-dlrectors sit on the 
divisional boards which are not executive or policy-making bodies.
They advise the divisional managing directors who themselves hold exe­
cutive power under the authority of the National Board of the Corporation. 
In practical terms, the appointment of worker-dlrectors on the boards was
9 . S. 1(3).
not designed to create a seat for the opposition at the centres of decision­
making, the reason was perhaps to bring Into the boardroom the point of 
view and expertise of any men from the shopfloor and possibly, In return, 
to help the diffusion of the point of view of the management.
The employee director^ role Is 
to ensure that divisional boards 
are aware of the Ideas and be­
liefs held by work-people and 
that the decisions taken follow­
ing board discussions are Informed 
by a knowledge and understanding 
of these Ideas.
At the same time, he w ill learn 
from the professional manager 
of the commercial, operational 
and other factors which Influ­
ence decisions -  and can thus 
contribute these points of view 
to the shopfloor. 10
This role of the worker-dlrectors was, however, very unclear, 
but In 1969, a job description was worked out with the help of the B .S .C . 
Senior executives:
This made It clear that employee 
directors could participate In 
advisory committees, working 
parties, and study groups; that 
they could attend formal and 
tiformal meetings of functional 
directors and local management
10. R. Smith: The Future of Employee Directors (1972), page 5 .
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at the tnvttatton of the D iv i­
sional Managing Directors; 
that they could go to their 
own and other trade union 
meetings and could attend 
consultative meetings as ob­
servers . 11
The Alexander Committee, an Informal study group, came to 
the conclusion that "seen from either an overall management perspect­
ive or an overall union perspective, It  had not achieved any significant 
degree of success” . ^
A very appropriate comment on the role of the worker-dlrectors 
was made by M r. B. Cassidy:
Not only did they feel that 
they fulfilled little useful pur­
pose In their advisory capacity 
but their very functions and the 
question of their accountability 
were unclear, and above all 
they tended to be ostracized 
from all quarters. In addition 
to this, the majority of mana­
gers were always very hesitant 
In acknowledging the contri­
bution that these worker directors 
could make to the exercise of 
their functions and In some cases
11. Quoted from a report presented to the B .S .C . and the T .U .C .  
Steel Committee, by an Independent study group under the Chair 
manshlp of Professor K . Alexander of Strathclyde University, In 
1971, page 15.
12. Ib id ., page 14.
there was hostility over the pro­
motion of subordinates to such a 
high office. 13
However, following the Alexander Committee report, the 
worker-director scheme, which had been so far tried only on an experi­
mental basis, was adopted as a permanent feature of the B .S.C .  Sub­
stantial modifications were, however, agreed upon. The most Important 
modification was that the restriction on worker-dlrectors*s holding union 
office was withdrawn, and a new selection procedure, allowing greater 
Involvement of the trade union members and organisation, was adopted.
For their part, the Unions resolved to keep closer contacts than before 
with the worker-dlrectors. Finally, the worker-dlrectors were permitted 
to take an active part In the joint consultative meetings, and, whilst re­
taining an Interest In a ll matters within their product division, they were 
expected to concentrate on the works within a designated area, thus keep­
ing a closer working relationship with their fellow employees In that partl- 
cu lar area.
It remains to be seen whether these alterations w ill give a new 
dimension to the role of worker-dlrectors and whether the more representative
13. B. Cassidy: Workers on the Board: a Study In Employee Participation 
(1973), page 38 .
nature of theTr revTsed role wtll affect theTr relationship with other
directors, who see them more as channels of communication.
The T .U .C . now officially supports the representation of work­
ers on the Boards of Nationalised Industries appointed through Union and 
the T .U .C . machinery. It has thus proposed the following changes:
( I)  Legislation for nationalised 
Industries should be altered 
to provide for one-half of 
the board to be trade union­
ists, having some regard to 
the wider public Interest;
(II) The procedure for appointment 
should be altered to provide 
that Ministers should formally 
seek nominations from the 
T .U .C . for trade union 
appointments to a ll national­
ised boards of statutory status.
(ill) The T .U .C . would normally 
seek nominations from Unions 
wltfffn the Industry covered 
by the board • 14
This was the situation In the nationalised Industries with regard
to workers* participation In management before the Bullock Committee was 
appointed by the Government to examine the whole question of Industrial
14, Quoted from B. Cassidy: Workers on the Board: a Study In
Employee Participation (1973), pages 39 -40 . (A document con­
cerning workers* participation was prepared by the General Council 
of the T .U .C . and was presented to the T .U .C .  In 1968).
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democracy Tn British Industry.
Now we come back to the Bullock Committee's findings. The 
recommendations of the Committee have again brought the matter of workers' 
participation In management Into the open. The Committee, which had 
three trade union representatives, three members from the Confederation of 
British Industry and two academics, began work In December, 1975. The
Committee began their work by examining the T .U .C . main proposals con­
tained In the 1974 Report on Industrial Democracy and the C .B . I .  proposals 
for an extension of Industrial democracy In British Industry, which are dis­
cussed later.
The main T .U .C . proposals are as
follows:
(a) Workers * representation on the 
board to be a legal right which 
a recognised and Independent 
trade union may demand;
(b) Selection of representatives to
be through trade union machinery;
(c) Half the seats on the board to be 
occupied by worker representa­
tives;
(d) the provisions to apply (at least 
Initially) to all companies and 
groups employing 2,000 or more 
people;
(e) the responsibilities of worker 
representatives to be analogous 
rather than Identical to those 
of shareholder directors, and 
their accountability and report­
ing back to their constituents
to be safeguarded. 15
15. Bullock Report, page 26.
On the other hand, the C .B .1. laid strong emphasts on the 
value of voluntary participation ischemes.
A fundamental principle, there­
fore, on which proposals for great­
er employee Involvement In com­
pany affairs must be based, Is that 
participative arrangements must 
be designed to fit a company 
structure, and not vice versa.
Moreover, such participative 
arrangements must be sufficiently 
flexible to accommodate the 
various forms of participation 
already In operation success­
fu lly , and to the satisfaction 
of all parties, In a number of 
companies. 16
After 28 meetings of the Bullock Committee between December 
1975 and December 1976, Its Report, with Its recommendations, was pub­
lished on 26 January, 1977. The Committee*s three members from the 
Confederation of British Industry refused to put their signatures to that 
Report. They argued that participation should Involve a ll employees, 
not just trade unionists, at every stage. It should not be Introduced In 
a company until an employees* council has been In successful operation 
for at least three yea rs .^
The main recommendations of the Bullock Committee are as
follow s:^
16. Ib id ., page 30.
17. The Times, dated 12 January, 1977.
18. Bullock Report, pages 92-108.
The major new right of the workers would be the right (which the 
workers In each company that employs 2,000 or more people can 
choose to take up or not) to elect through $Tade union machinery 
a number of worker representatives, equal to the number of share­
holder representatives, who sit on the board of the company that 
employs them. This right should apply to companies that are 
subsidiaries of foreign -owned multlnatlons as well as to Brlttsh- 
owned companies.
In addition to the equal numbers of worker and shareholder repre­
sentatives, the board would also have a third, smaller group, of
Independent members jointly agreed by the other two groups. The
19
Report calls this the ”2x +  y" formula. The Committee
suggest that the size of each x 
In the fall-back solution should 
be as follows:
for a company or group with
2 .000-9 ,999  employees = 4 
for a company or group with
10.000-24,999 employees = 5 
for a company or group with
25,000 or more employees = 7
We propose that the size of the 
co-opted group of directors, the 
y element, should be related to 
the number of employee and 
shareholder representatives, who 
sit on the new board, as follows:
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Where the number of employee 
and shareholder representatives 
together Ts less than 14 ( i .e .  
x = 6 or less) : 3 
Where the number of employee 
and shareholder representatives ^ 
together Is 14 or more : 5 .
(3) The shareholders‘ meeting w ill have only limited jurisdiction, 
with Its power of veto restricted to Issues like the acquisition 
and disposal of assets. But the following Important matters of 
comjxiny policy w ill be handled by the new unitary boards of 
worker and shareholder-appointed directors, together with a 
smaller number of Independents
(a) Wlndlng-up of the company;
(b) Changes In the memorandum and articles of association 
(these cover the capital structure of the company, the 
duties and responsibilities of directors so far as these are 
not covered by law, procedures to be followed by the board 
and so on);
(c) recommendations to the shareholders on the payment of 
dividends;
(d) changes In the capital structure of a company (e .g . by an 
Increase or decrease In authorised share capital, or by a merger);
19. Ib id ., page 103.
(e) disposal of a substantial part of the undertaking;
(4) The law should clearly specify certain key areas where the respon­
sibility to take final decisions would rest with the board. The two 
key areas suggested are: (l)
(l) the allocation or disposition of resources (this effectively means 
all planning, Investment, research, development and budgeting 
decisions).
(it) the appointment, removal, control and remuneration of manage­
ment.
The Bullock Committee also recommends that the nationalised
Industries w ill be Included In such legislation, and the workers In these
Industries w ill have parallel representational rights. An Interdepartmental
Committee, chaired by M r. Alan Lord, Second Permanent Secretary In charge
of the Treasury's domestic economic sector, has been set up to coordinate
20Industrial democracy for the nationalised Industries. It Is probable,
In this fie ld , that the Government would make a general statement of In­
tent and leave Individual Industries to make their own arrangements within 
an agreed framework.
The Bullock Committee Report has received the seal of approval 
from all Cabinet Ministers and most Trade Unton leaders. For M r. Booth,
20. The Times, 11 January, 1977.
Secretary of State for Employment, Tt Ts not sTmply a matter of equity or
efficiency: ^We are too highly developed a nation not to capitalize on
the sophistication of our most valuable asset -  people” . He continues
that: ”1 am convinced from examples I have seen In action that If
Interest and Initiative are encouraged, an unsuspected seam of expertise
2 ]
knowledge, talent and energy can be opened u p .” M r. Jack Jones,
former General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union,
believes that ”If there Is to be any hope of convincing the workers of
the virtues of private enterprise, the way to do Tt Ts to Include them In
22decision-making at the top."
"It Ts high time” , M r. Len Murray, General Secretary of the 
T .U .C . ,  told Industrialists recently, "that Capital and Labour were recog­
nised as equal partners” . He argues that " If  decisions are taken jointly,
this would provide a new legitimacy for management, and force the Unions
23
to move away from the negative veto role of resistance” .
Lord Bullock Ts of the opinion th a t:
21. The Times, 10 January, 1977.
22. The Economist, 12 February, 1977, page 110.
23. The Economist, 22 January, 1977, page 95.
Worker representation on the 
board emphasises an Important 
change In the attitude of the 
trade union movement. Pre­
viously the emphasis has been 
on the need for nationalisation: 
now the trade unions are seek­
ing a new relationship with 
Industry on the basis of which 
the private sector can continue 
and be strengthened. 24
However, the attitude of employers and the C .B . I .  towards this Report
Ts not sympathetic. They reckon the Bullock Report Is dead. The
powerful Engineering Employers1 Federation has already made Tt clear
25that Bullock w ill be Implemented over Its dead body.
Sir Geoffrey Howe, the Shadow Tory Chancellor, claims that
worker directors, Bullock style, would only enhance the Unions* power
26to obstruct Industrial choice.
But M r. Prior, Conservative spokesman on employment, wants
participation enshrined through codes of practice rather than statute, with
27possible minority worker representation on the beard.
24. The Economist, 12 February, 1977, page 110.
25. The Economist, 22 January, 1977, page 95.
26. Ib id ., page 95.
27. The Times, 10 January, 1977.
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The C .B . I .  policy document proposals on Involvement and 
participation, of 1973, opposes any form of participation or consultation 
Imposed by legislation. The document states that MTt has never be­
lieved that any director ought to be Imposed on a company by the trade
28union or anyone else.” It goes on to say that "It Ts possible that
employee representation on company boards may In time be a logical
development but Tt must not be Imposed; Tt must come about voluntarily,
29when both management and employees are ready for I t . ”
Lord Caldecot, Chairman of Delta Metals, welcomes workers1 
participation on employers* terms. He says that:
We fully accept the wish of most 
employees to have a bigger say 
In the development of the com­
pany In which they work, and 
the best way of doing this seems 
to be develop participation from 
the bottom upwards. My own 
view Ts that virtually everyone 
wantsto be consulted and to know 
that his views are properly con­
sidered, but then he expects a 
manager to take a firm decision 
quickly In the light of all the 
circumstances and consultation, 
and to be responsible for Its 
outcome. 30
28. The Times, 16 November, |9 7 7 .
29. Ibid.
30 . Ibid.
The views of the T .U .C . and the C .B . I .  on the subject are
diametrically opposite. The T .U .C . wished to see the legislation on 
the statute book by 1978, whereas the C .B . I .  wished to adopt this 
scheme on a voluntary basis.
Arguments and debates, for and against, over the subject of 
workers* participation In management w ill perhaps continue for some 
time to come before this Ts finally accepted as a permanent feature of 
the economic management. One hopeful sign Ts that the Post O ffice  
Board and the Unions have agreed that an experiment In Industrial demo­
cracy within the Post O ffice should run for two years without commitment 
to either party. The proposals on which the experiment would be based 
were worked out by the Board and the Unions.
During this experiment, the Post 
Office Board at national level 
w ill be reconstituted to consist 
of a Chairman together with 16 
members. The Chairman of 
the Board w ill be appointed by 
the Secretary of State for Industry.
O f the 16 members of the Board,
6 w ill be appointed from manage­
ment by the Secretary of State,
In consultation with the Chair­
man . 6 members of the Board
w ill be appointed from Post 
Office Trade Unions. In the 
first Instance, these w ill be
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elected through theTr appropriate 
Trade Union constitutional mach­
inery. Their names w ill then be 
submitted to the Secretary of State 
who w ill retain the statutory autho­
rity to appoint them to the Board.
They w ill be full members of the 
Board with the same responsibilities 
as other members.
4 members of the Board w ill be 
part-time members who w ill be 
genuinely Independent. The 
Secretary of State w ill consult 
both management and the Trade 
Unions before appointing the out­
side members and w ill not make 
appointments against the reason­
able objections of either. 31
The Trade Union members w ill be accountable and, therefore, 
would report back regularly to Executive Councils and to Annual Con­
ferences .
A Trade Union member of the Board would not be expected
publicly to defend a decision of the Board which was at variance with
Union policy, but would be expected to refrain In public from attacking
such decisions. Like a ll other Board members, they would be expected
to explain the Board*s reasons for decisions, Including any with which 
32
they disagreed.
31 . Union of Post O ffice Workers, Annual Report, 1977, page 198.
32 . Ibid.
On 4 January, 1978, M r. ErTc Varley, Secretary of State for 
Industry, announced the names of the Unionists and Independent members 
who w ill serve on the Post Office Board and also Increased the number of 
membership from a maximum of 16 to a maximum of 19 (no specific reason 
was given for this enlargement). The Board w tll now consist of seven 
members, each from the Trade Unions and management, and five Independ­
ent members.
Trade Union members Include two from the Union of Post Office
Workers, two from the Post Office Engineering Union, and one each from
the Post Office Management Staffs Association, the Society of Post O ffice
33Executives, and the C iv il and Public Services Association.
This Is the first full-scale experiment In Industrial democracy In 
a major nationalised Industry. Its working w ill be closely watched by 
many Interested groups, for example, the Government,managers of the 
private sector Industry, Unions and so on. Its success w ill encourage 
others to Introduce this scheme, but Its failure w ill encourage the Govern­
ment to shelve the Idea of workers* participation In management, at least 
for the time being. An editorial In The Times has given a guarded welcome 
to this scheme Introduced In the Post Office:
33. The Times, 5 January, 1978.
A judgment on the effectiveness 
of the new system w ill have to 
await the passing of the full two- 
year period, although Initia l Indi­
cations give little cause for hope 
that the experiment w ill succeed.
But I f  the Trade Union members 
forget their sectional Interests, 
and behave as true directors 
should, they may yet prove the 
pessimism to be unfounded. If 
this happens, they w ill have done 
a real service both to the cause 
of Industrial democracy and to 
the nation as a whole. 34
The statement seems to suggest that the success of this experi­
ment falls squarely on the shoulders of the Trade Union members alone. 
But, we believe that the responsibility lies with all the members of the 
Board equally to make this experiment a success.
Having said that, Tt Ts appropriate to mention the concluding
observations of both the majority and minority reports of the Bullock
Committee. The majority report concludes:
During our Inquiry we found a 
widespread conviction, which 
we share, that the problem of 
Britain as an Industrialised 
nation Is not a lack of native 
capacity In Its working popu­
lation so much as a failure to 
draw out their energies and
34. The Times, 5 January, 1978.
skill to anything like their full 
potentla I . It Ts our belief that 
the way to release those energies, 
to provide greater satisfaction In 
the work-place and to assist In 
raising the level of productivity 
In British Industry, Ts not by re­
crimination or exhortation but 
by putting the relationship be­
tween Capital and Labour on a 
new basis.
The minority report rejects the Committee*s terms of reference
as being
far from satisfactory or even wise.
We believe that Industry Is not 
ready for such radical changes, 
that management evidence be­
fore the Committee was disre­
garded and that the majority 
see proposals as a way of chang­
ing the structure of society by 
bringing the boards of the pri­
vate sector under trade union 
control. We do not want the 
system to be based on trade 
unions. 35
We have restricted the discussion within our bounds, I .e .  the 
public sector. The scheme has got off the ground under the auspices of 
the Labour Government. It Is likely to be followed by experiments In 
other public corporations. However, Tt Ts difficult to predict what form 
and shape this w ill take If and when the Conservative Party comes Into
35. Bullock Report, Chapters 7-12.
power, for Tt has not stated any defTnTte or concrete proposals relating to 
the Tdea of workers* participation In management. We suspect that the 
Party w ill perhaps follow the C .B .I.*s  line of reasoning. This means 
that If  the proposed Industrial Relations Bill becomes an A ct, It w ill have 
to die a premature death.
Nevertheless, we maintain that ”those who w ill be substantially
affected by decisions made by social and political Institutions must be Tn-
36volved In the making of those decisions” .
We have discussed the present situation In Britain In the hope 
and expectation that India and Tanzania, each of which has committed 
Itself to Introduce the scheme of workers* participation In management 
In Tts respective Industries, w ill gain some experience and shape their 
policies In the light of such experience.
36 . Bullock Report, page 25.
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7 .2 . India
The present situation In India with regard to workers* partici­
pation In management has been summed up by the Minister for Industry, 
George Fernandes, at a press conference In New Delhi In 1977. He 
said that:
like the previous Government, we 
also accept the Idea of workers* 
participation In management In 
principle. Until recently It was 
on a voluntary basis, but It did 
not achieve the desired result.
We Intend to pass legislation to 
make It compulsory. 37
Our study of various Acts of nationalised undertakings reveals 
that the principle of direct representation of trade union members on the 
boards of public corporations has been completely Ignored. No legal 
validity has been given to this principle In any of the Acts.
However, the concept of workers* participation was first stated 
at the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956, which provides that:
It Is necessary that proper ameni­
ties and Incentives should be pro­
vided for a ll those engaged In In­
dustry. The living and working 
conditions of workers should be 
Improved and their standard of
37. The Times of IndTa, 5 September, 1977.
effTcTency raised. The mainten­
ance of Industrial peace Is one of 
the prime requisites of Industrial 
progress. In a Socialist democracy 
labour is a partner In the common 
task of development and should 
participate In It with enthusiasm •
There should be joint consultation 
and workers and technicians should, 
wherever possible, be associated 
progressively In  management.
Enterprises In the public sector 
have to set an example In this 
respect. 38
Later, the second Five-year plan declared In clear terms that, 
for the successful Implementation of the Plan,Increased association of 
labour with management Is necessary. Such a measure would help In:
(a) promoting productivity for 
the general benefit of the 
enterprise, the employees 
and the community;
(b) giving erployees a better 
understanding of their role 
In the working of Industry 
and of the process of pro­
duction; and
(c) satisfying the workers* urge 
for self-ex press Ton, thus 
leading to Industrial peace, 
better relations and In­
creased production. 39
38. Government of IndTa Resolution on Industrial Policy, dated 30 A pril, 
1956, para. 17, page 8 .
39 . The Second Rve-Year Plan (Planning Commission, Government of 
IndTa )), page 577, para. 18.
Following the policy declaration In 1956, a study group was
sent under the Union Labour Minister to visit a number of countries to 
study the Ideas and practices In this fie ld . They were particularly Tm 
pressed with the scheme which was In operation In Yugoslavia.
In every enterprise there are three 
organs of management -  the workers*
Council, the Managing Board and 
the Director of the enterprise. The 
Workers* Council Is elected by a ll 
the workers and office employees 
on the basis of adult franchise 
through direct and secret voting.
Workers from the basic activity  
of the enterprise must account for 
at least two-thirds of the members 
of the Workers* Council. |ts term 
of office Is two years and Its strength 
of membership varies from fifteen to 
sixty. The Workers* Council Is the 
top organ of the enterprise. It then 
elects the Managing Board (consist­
ing of three to fifteen members) 
which, In Its turn, controls the work 
of the Director. However, the 
Director has the right and obliga­
tion to prevent enforcement of any 
resolutions of the Workers* Council 
and the Managing Board which are 
against the law of the land. The 
Workers* Council conducts the eco­
nomic and personnel policy of the 
enterprise and Issues all the funda­
mental acts of the enterprise -  Its 
statute, pay scales, rules on labour 
relations, safety precautions, etc .
It allocates the net receipts, Issues 
the economic plans, prepares the 
balance sheets and statements of 
accounts. 40
Although the concept and method of workers* participation In 
Yugoslavia Is very effective, It Is not particularly suited for India, as the 
nature of society and the political system Is different.
It Is true to say that the Yugo­
slav experiment has been 
reasonably successful, but this 
has been mainly due to the fact 
that, under President Tlto*s 
leadership, workers have shown 
a sense of discipline and public 
Interest. The Yugoslav experi­
ment Is unique and should not be 
cited as a model. 41
However, the study group submitted Its report In April, 1957, 
and the subject was Included on the agenda of the 15th session of the 
Indian Labour Conference under the auspices of the Ministry of Labour.
The I .L .C .  discussed the Item and, accepting the Idea of workers* parti­
cipation In principle, Indicated the broad guidelines for Its Implementation. 
The guidelines recommended by the 15th session of the Indian Labour Con­
ference were:
40 . N .  Balog: Some Experience In the Management of Yugoslav In­
dustrial Enterprises (1969), page 20.
41 . N . Das: Experiments In Industrial Democracy, page 145.
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(?) The Joint Management Councils
should be set up and theTr main 
functions should Include commu­
nications, working and living 
conditions of workers, producti­
vity , suggestion schemes, admini­
stration of labour laws, etc.
(IT) The Councils should have consult­
ative status In matters like changes 
In standing orders, retrenchment 
and closures, procedures for en­
gagement and punishment of workers, 
etc.
(Ill) The Councils should have the right
to seek and recetve Information 
about the undertaking^ economies 
technology, e tc ., and the connect­
ed documents and elucidations.
(Tv) Issues like wages, bonus and Indivi­
dual grievances should be excluded 
from the Councils functions which 
should otherwise be flexib le.
(v) To reduce the danger of apathy,
the Councils should be entrusted 
with some administrative functions 
In fields such as welfare, safety, 
training, starting hours of shifts, 
rewards for suggestions, and so on.
(vl) W illing and active co-operation
of middle and junior managers, 
supervisors, e tc .,  should be en­
listed In the operation of the 
scheme.
(vIT) Tripartite machinery should be
built up at the Centre and In the 
^ates to guide and direct the work 
In this field with Government pro­
viding leadership, but not making 
It a departmental a ffa ir. 42
42 . S .S . Khera: Government In Business, pages 179-181.
Following this, a seminar on Labour-Management Co-Opera-
tlon took place on 31 January and 1 February, 1958, at the Initiative
of the Labour Ministry. They decided to experiment with the joint
43Councils of Management In 24 undertakings.
In reply to a back-bencher *s question on workers* participation 
In public undertakings, M r. Shah, the Minister of Industry, replied In the 
Lok Sabha:
Government have Introduced 
the Scheme of participation 
la bour In two undertakings.
The experience gained In these 
two undertakings would have to 
be assessed and then a further 
decision can be taken In regard 
to extending this to other under­
takings • 44
In addition, joint Management Councils were also set up In 24 
undertakings. Out of these 24 undertakings, 10 were In the public sector.
In most cases, the functions of the joint Management Council 
were four-fold:
43 . Ibid.
44 . Lok Sabha Debates, 1 September, 1959, 1041. The two under­
takings are: (1) Hlndusthan Antlblottcs Ltd. (2) Hlndusthan 
Insecticides Ltd.
4 5 . S .S . Khera: Government In Business,
( I)  In the first category, the Coun­
cil shall have the responsibility 
to discuss employees* suggest­
ions, labour laws, sense of par­
ticipation and channels of com­
munication.
(II) the Council shall be consulted 
regarding the administration of 
standing orders. Introduction of 
new methods and reduction.
(ill) the Council have the right to 
receive Information and dlsaoss 
the general economic position 
(including accounts, reorgani­
sation schemes, e tc .)
(Iv) the Council shall be entrusted 
with the administration of wel­
fare measures, supervision of 
safety measures, training 
schemes, working hours, rewards 
for suggestions and any other 
matter agredd upon • 46
However, these experiments did not make much headway, for
example, In the case of Hlndusthan Machine Tool L td ., the scheme had
to be abandoned due to some disputes regarding the representative charac-
47ter of two rival unions.
Between 1959 and 1962, the progress of the pilot project was 
reviewed In a succession of meetings of the Standing Labour Committee,
46 . V .V .  Ramanadham: Public Enterprise In India (1959), page 83.
47 . S.S. Khera: Government In Business, page 182.
the Indian Labour Confernece, a second seminar and by a conference of 
Central Ministers where the possibility of Implementing the scheme In the 
public sector was examined. The Labour Mlntstry appointed an OffTcer- 
on-Spectal duty tn the Chief Labour Commissioner ks organisation to keep 
track of the working of the scheme In the units which had volunteered for 
the pilot project. A  special tripartite Committee was also set up by the 
Mlntstry to advise and assist Tn the Implementation of the scheme. In 
spite of so much enthu±ism for t t , the pilot project made little  or no 
progress.
A  former Director-General of the Employeeks Federation of India, 
writing Tn 1964, observed that:
many employers have reported un­
satisfactory working of the joint 
machinery. The most
Important factor responsible for 
this state of affairs Is the absence 
of healthy, constructive and good 
Industrial relations Tn the under­
takings, e .g .,S a x b y &  Farmers 
L td ., Indian Bobbin Co. Ltd.
In fact, he blamed trade union leaderships and trade union rivalries for poor 
Industrial relations.
The National Commission on Labour also observed:
48. N .  Das: Experiments Tn Industrial Democracy, page 150.
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"Even where Councils exist, they are reported to be Ineffective and their 
functioning unsatisfactory In many cases", and further opined that:
In undertakings In which Indust­
rial relations are not cordial and 
even arrangements like works 
committees, grievance procedure 
and union recognition are absent, 
joint management councils can­
not be expected to function 
satisfactorily. 49
Among other causes mentioned by the Commission for the failure of work-
50er*s participation In management, are: lack of adequate Interest
and enthusiasm among employers and unions; multiplicity of bljxirtlte 
bodies; a prejudice among employers against the Idea of workers1 parti­
cipation In management, presumably out of a fear of encroachment on 
their prerogatives; a tendency among workers to transgress the limits of 
[olnt consultation by seeking to break Into areas of management rights 
or of collective bargaining; Inadequacy of training facilities for both 
labour and management; and Inter-union rivalry.
We are of the opinion that to remedy this state of affairs, 
there must be a strong trade union organisation ready and w illing to 
take a responsible view of the matter, and It should have a full comple­
ment of exfjerts who can fully underhand the techniques and finances
49. Report of National Commission on Labour, 1969, para . 24*13.
50. Ibid.
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of the Industry for which a joint Council of Management has been set up.
it Is appropriate to mention that even In 1971-72, the situation 
has not Improved very much.
Virtually  no Information Is pro­
vided of efforts to bring about 
workers* participation Tn manage­
ment, except a brief reference to 
the existence and functioning of 
the Works Committees, or joint 
management Councils Tn some 
annual reports. TheElectronTcs 
Corporation, for example, states 
that apart from representation on 
committees like the Works Com­
mittee and Grievances Committee, 
workmen also participate In cer­
tain areas by their representatives 
being given a place on committees 
like Canteen Management Com­
mittee, Welfare Fund Committee, 
etc . Apparently, there Is not 
much to report on workers* parti­
cipation In management by the 
public enterprises. 51
The author went on to say that the success of Industrial demo­
cracy In a large measure depends on an educated labour force, but virtu-
52a lly  no reference has been made to workers* education Tn the Report.
However, the Committee on Public Undertakings In Its 58th Report
51. L . Naram: Public Enterprises Tn IndTa, page 93.
52. Ib id ., page 93.
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on Hlndusthan Machine Tools L td ., recommended that the Company
should spare no efforts to give workers In the Undertaking a sense of
participation and Involvement In the challenging task of greater pro-
53ductlon for the good of the community.
The Government replied that these observations have been
54brought to the knowledge of the management for compliance.
Although the Government took the In itiative to popularise 
workers* participation In management since Independence, It  has not 
yet achieved Its desired goal.
Now again the Idea of workers* participation In management 
has been revived and has even been given a place In the much-publi­
cised new 20-polnt economic programme of the then Prime Minister, 
published In 1975.
The Government have laid down broad guidelines for this 
scheme. They have kept the scheme sufficiently flexible so that It 
can be adjusted to the requirements of any particular Industry. Both 
employers and employees have reacted enthusiastically. The main ob­
jectives of workers* participation have been described as follows:
53 . C .P .U .,  58th Report, (1974-75), page 47 .
54. Ibid.
(a) Maximization of production 
and productivity;
(b) Development of skills among 
workmen and the creation of 
adequate facilities for train­
ing;
(c) Optimal use of raw materials 
and adequate control on the 
quality of finished products;
(d) Evolution of suitable measures 
for the welfare and safety of 
workers; and
(e) Maintenance of discipline at 
the shop-floor and the plant 
level. 55
It Is admitted that a happy and content work-force Is an essen­
tial feature of a nation's economy. Therefore, a scheme for workers* 
participation In management Is definitely a good move In the right direction. 
But the question remains whether this scheme w ill succeed this time. The 
chances are far from good. Because of the fact that this scheme, like the 
previous one, Is for voluntary adoption with help and encouragement from 
the Government. One of Its main objectives, as mentioned above, Is 
to maximise production and productivity. Without undermining the Import­
ance of this objective, It could be said that It  Is of Indirect Interest to 
labour and trade unions. The areas which matter most to workers like
55. The Statesman, 29 January, 1976.
wages, job security, bonus,or working hours are to be settled by collect­
ive bargaining and, hence, do not fa ll within the jurisdiction of joint 
consultation. But other areas, for example^
conditions of work, safety, work 
planning and assignment at the 
shop-floor and so on, do belong 
to that arena. These areas alone 
w ill be unable to create enthusi­
asm amongst workers for this 
scheme. Incridltlon, the success 
of this scheme w ill depend upon 
the attitude between employers 
and trade unions towards each 
other and the relationship be­
tween rival unions at the plant 
level.
In reply to a question relating to 
workers* participation In manage­
ment, the Minister for Steel,
Mines and Fuel replied that the 
Scheme of Workers* participation 
has been Introduced In 21 under­
takings, for example, Bharat 
Aluminium Co. L td ., Bharat 
Gold Mines L td ., Hlndusthan 
Copper L td ., Hlndusthan Zinc 
Co. L td ., etc. 56
M r. Ravlndra Varma, Labour Minister of the present new Govern­
ment, has reassured the House again that wthe Government would formulate 
clear and constructive scheme that would enable full and effective partici­
pation of workers In management. This was one of the Party*s election 
promises to which the Government was fully committed.” Referring to the
56. Lok Sabha Debates, 24 March, 1976, page 39.
efforts made during the last three decades, the Minister said:
the means and methods that were 
adopted In the past were not ade­
quate to ensure effective partici­
pation by workers In management.
We had been groping, we had been 
experimenting to find an effective 
means for workers* participation 
In management. It could be 
claimed that the attempt which 
was being made now was some­
thing more than the commitment 
made In the past since It was 
based on the evaluation of the 
past experiments. 57
The present Government Is only one year old. They have pro­
mised to provide provisions for workers* participation Tn management at 
various levels, for Incorporation Tn the Comprehensive Industrial Relations 
B ill. The Bill has not been Introduced yet, therefore, It Is too early to 
make any meaningful or constructive comment on their success or failure.
However, we believe that an Improvement In the quality of 
trade union leadership and the change Tn management attitude would 
pave the way for workers* participation Tn management Tn India.
57. The Statesman, 28 January, 1978.
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7 .3 . TanzanTa
The ftrsty duty of a Tanzantan Ts to work. ”There Ts no such
58thing as soctaltsm without work” . Nyerere stated that:
a truly Socialist State Is one In 
which a ll people are workers and 
In which neither capitalism nor 
feudalism exists. It does not 
have two classes of people, a 
lower class composed of people 
who work for their living, and 
an upper class composed of 
people who live on the work 
of others. In a really Social­
ist country no person exploits 
another. 59
Therefore,
we aim at building a classless 
society for one reason. In no 
state Is there enough wealth to 
satisfy the desire of a single 
Individual for power and prest­
ige. Consequently, the mom­
ent wealth Is divorced from Its 
purpose, which Is the banish­
ment of poverty, there develops 
a ruthless competition between 
the Individual; each person 
tries to get more wealth, simply 
so that he w ill have more power, 
and more prestige, than his
58. J . K . Nyerere: Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism, page 6 .
59. Ib id ., page 15.
fellows. Wealth becomes an In­
strument of domination, a mean^Q 
of humiliating other people.
But Nyerere wants to build a nation where ”all the members of society
must equally be sovereign; they must be free to change peacefully the
laws that rule them and the personnel In the positions of leadership” . ^
He recognises that ”such a society depend on a willingness to cooperate
and an understanding of the different kind of life which can be obtained
62
by the participants If they work together” . In other words, the people 
should be given proper opportunity, training, education, e tc ., to develop 
themselves. He said that education should be designed
to prepare people for their respon­
sibilities as free workers and c iti­
zens In a free and democratic so­
ciety. They have to be able to 
think for themselves, to make 
judgements on all Issues affect­
ing them; they have to be able 
to Interpret the decisions made 
through the democratic Institu­
tions for our society, and to Imple­
ment them In the light of the pecu­
liar local circumstances where they 
happen to live . 63
60. J .K . Nyere: Freedom and Unity, page 207.
61. J .K . Nyerere: Freedom and Socialism, page 5 .
62. J .K . Nyerere: Freedom and Development, page 190.
63. Svendsen andTelsen (Ed): Self-Reliant Tanzania, page 225.
Nyerere sees workers* participation Tn management as one of
the essential Ingredients of a Socialist society. He believes that volun­
tary co-operation by Individuals Is necessary to their progress as developed 
human beings.
The people*s freedom to deter­
mine their own priorities, to 
organize themselves, and their 
own advance Tn welfare, Ts an 
Important part of our objective.
It cannot be postponed to some 
future time. The people's ac­
tive and continued voluntary 
participation Tn the struggle 
(for development) Ts an Import­
ant part of our objective because 
only through this participation 
w ill the people develop. And 
to us, the development of the 
nation means the development 
of people. The people are 
more self-confident; not only 
Is the future to determine, but 
they know It Ts theirs to deter­
mine . 64
The starting point Tn the case of Tanzania Is the Presidential 
Circular on Parastatals, N o .l  of 1970, entitled ”The Establishment of 
Workers* Councils, Executive Committee and Boards of Directors” . In 
the President's words:
64. J .K . Nyerere: Freedom and Development, pages 330-333.
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Given a proper work environment 
and proper co-operation and sup­
port from their leaders and fellows, 
the majority of Tanzanian workers 
are capable of accepting more re­
sponsibility, and would like to do 
so; they can become more creative 
and can accomplish more. Easy 
communication of Ideas and Inform­
ation between workers and all 
levels of management, can have 
the effect of Improving the quan­
tity and quality of goods produced, 
provided that an atmosphere of 
common endeavour and common 
responsibility Is created. In parti­
cular, the top management have 
an attitude which regards the 
workers and the lover levels of 
management as partners Tn a com­
mon enterprise, and not just as 
tools like the machine they work 
with.
Furthermore:
true Industrial discipline does 
not exclude the workers Tn an 
Industry from participation Tn 
the enterprise, or from a respon­
sibility for tts Improvement.
Indeed, true discipline Tn a work 
place should be easier when the 
workers understand what they are 
doing, what their objective Is, 
and when they know that they 
have contributed to the final 
result as fully respected partners.
Hence,
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there must be provision for the work­
ers to be represented on bodTes whtch 
consider matters of production, sales, 
and the general organisation of the 
enterprise. It has therefore been de­
cided that all parastatal organisations 
shall, as soon as possible, and In any 
case not later than the end of 1970, 
establish Workers1 Councils, and 
shall establish or re-establish their 
executive committees and Board of 
Directors so as to give practical 
effect to workers* representation 
and participation In planning, pro­
ductivity, quality and marketing 
matters.
The Circular goes on to say that:
every Corporation or firm employing 
more than ten workers shall establish 
a Workers* Council which shall be 
constituted as follows:
(a) A  TANU Chairman of the Branch 
established at the business.
(b) The Manager or the General 
Manager.
(c) A ll Heads of Department or 
Sections.
(d) A ll members of the Workers* 
Committee.
(e) Workers* representatives elected 
In proportion to the number of 
workers In different departments 
or sections, provided that the 
number of the workers* represent­
atives does not exceed three- 
quarters of the total membership 
of the permanent members ( I .e .  
permanent members mean (a),
(b), (c) and (d) above). In
other words, Tf for example,the 
number of members of the Work­
ers* Council under (a), (b),(c) 
and (d) together total 24 mem­
bers, of whom the number under
(d) Is 12, then the Workers* 
representatives shoold not hotal 
more than 6 .
(f) Co-opted members from outside 
the business as and when re­
quired. The presence of such 
members shall be determined by 
agreement between the National 
Union of Tanganyika Workers 
(N .U .T .A .)  and the Manage­
ment. The N .U .T .A .  shall 
be entitled to send a represent­
ative to the Workers* Council 
meeting. 65
The functions of the Workers* Council In , and In relation to, 
the business for which It Is established shall be:
(a) to advise on the requirements 
of the existing wages and In­
comes policy as announced by 
Government from time to time;
(b) to advise on the marketing 
aspects of the commodity pro­
duced;
(c) to advise on matters relating 
to the quality and quantity of 
the commodity produced;
(d) to advise on matters of plan­
ning;
65. Presidential Circular N o . 1, Ref. S H C /C . 180 /1 /102.
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(e) to advtse on others aspects of 
productivity, such as works 
and enterprise organization, 
technical knowledge, workers* 
education, etc.
(f) to receive and discuss the 
Balance Sheet. 66
In addition, there w ill be the Executive Committee, which w ill 
perform the following functions:
(a) to scrutinize financial and pro­
duction estimates prepared by 
management;
(b) to scrutinize labour programmes,
Including programmes for raising 
workers* productivity and educa­
tion which are prepared by manage­
ment and the N .U .T .A .;
(c) to scrutinize finance, production, 
quality, export and marketing 
programmes, In consultation with 
the body or bodies concerned;
(d) to advise on the execution of the 
general policy as proposed by the 
Workers* Council and approved by 
the Board of Directors; and
(e) generally advise on the efficient 
running of the day-to-day work 
of the Industry. 67
The Board of Directors shall have at least one of Its members
66. Ibid.
67 . Ibid.
68nominated by the NatTonal Unton of Tanganyika Workers.
The concept of workers1 participation In management has Influ­
enced Nyerere because of the fact that :
a Soctallst Society Is not built up 
solely on monetary Incentives, but 
on Ideas of service to society and 
the willingness on the part of the 
latter to recognise such service.
It Is necessary In this context that 
the worker should be made to feel 
that, In his own way, he Is helping 
to build a progressive state. The 
creation of Industrial democracy, 
therefore, ts a prerequisite to the ^  
establishment of a Socialist society.
However, Professor G hal argues that:
Worker participation Issues have 
to be seen In the context of shar­
ing power and enhancing enter­
prise accountability rather than 
In terms merely of good Industrial 
relations. How far worker parti­
cipation does perform thlf function 
depends on the political conscious­
ness of the worker. 70
68 . Ibid.
69 . Workers* Participation In Management: Bombay Management Asso­
ciation (1962), page l9 .
70. Y .P . Ghal: ’’Control & Management of the Economy: Research 
Perspective on Public Enterprise” , In VRU (1976), page 169.
No doubt, Tt Ts true that there Ts some element of truth Tn hts
observatton, but Tt could also be argued that an assoctatton of labour 
wTth management would be useful Tn sattsfytng the workers* urge for self- 
expressTon, thus leadtng to Industrial peace, better relations and Increased 
co-operation.
Although "there are Tn most parastatals Workers* Councils
which are represented In the Boards and are Involved Tn every stage of 
71management” , Shlvjl has observed that:
Tn respect of workers* participation 
and control of the Industrial sector, 
the bureaucrats show reservation to 
talk about workers* participation 
and control of the Industrial sector.
Their method of organisation, set up, 
e tc .,  are not only typically bureau­
cratic but also bourgeois. There Is 
much more paraphernalia surrounding 
the sumptuous headquarters of the 
parastatals than the factories -  the 
productive units. The advertisement 
campaigns mounted by various para­
statals are no different whatsoever 
from what one gets from private com­
panies. They are more an effort at 
‘sales promotion* and stimulation of 
consumers demands than an attempt 
to educate the public and provide 
for their needs. However, despite 
definite signs that a powerful econo­
mic bureaucracy Ts Tn the making Tn
71. An occasional paper on "Tanzania Law and Economy”, submitted 
by M r. L .S . Ballonzl, an L L .M . Student of S .O .A .S . ,  1975-76.
Tanzania, Tt Ts clear that they do not 
have an upper hand as yet. The 
TANU leadership does manage to 
raise the alarm when the bureau­
cracy appears to adopt non-Soclallst 
measures. Thus recently, following 
the Presidents directives, the para­
statals are going to have Workers*
Councils to participate In manage­
ment and running Tn Industries.
The Fact that the bureaucracy does 
not have Its way completely does 
not mean that Tt Is weak either.
A t any particular time, therefore, 
what measures are taken would 
very much depend on which side 
has the upper hand. Many Social­
ist measures -  for example, a drastic 
cut In conspicuous consumption, 
genuine workers* participation Tn 
management, e tc . -  cannot be 
easily carried out because of the 
resistance from the bureaucratic 
machinery. 72
The Statement Indicates that there Ts a certain amount of tension 
existing between the Workers and Management.
The reason for lack of total accept­
ance of the Circular has always 
been supported with reasons that 
the workers are not educated and 
competent enough to assume the 
managerial role. Though there 
Ts some validity In this argument, 
this Ts not the main reason. The
72. I .G .  Shlvjl: The Silent Class Struggle (1974), pages 35-36
matn reason ts that the manage­
ment Ts not wtlltng to fully inte­
grate the workers Tn decision­
making. They only want to g lv e ^  
piecemeal rights of participation.
It cannot be denied, however, that education generates con­
fidence and confidence creates Interest and enthusiasm. Therefore, the 
education Ts an Important element which makes people core clous about 
their role and responsibility. In order to educate the workers so that 
they can assume responsibility and behave as a director should, the Govern­
ment of Tanzania should set up a Workers* Management Training College. 
This Institution should be designed mainly to train workers to enable them 
to play their part Tn schemes of workers* participation Tn the management. 
The Tanzanian Universities and Trade Unions w ill have to play a major 
role In this regard and see Tt as their long-term objectives to provide teach­
ing and research programmes designed to produce workeiswlth managerial 
talent and skill needed to run the board efficiently. These, we believe, 
would help promote the Intelligent participation by workers Tn management.
Loxley and Soul aptly suggested that:
the education which Ts necessary 
must be of a certain type, a type 
which the elite  themselves are 
generally least able to provide -
73. Quoted from Loxley & Soul: "Political Economy of Parastatals", 
Tn the E .A .L .R ., V o l.5 , (1972), page 33.
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as much political education, de­
signed to raise consciousness, as 
technical education, designed to 
provide Information about the 
enterprise Itself. 74
They also observed that:
armed with Mwongozo, the work­
ers appear to have gone beyond 
the economlsm of wage demands 
(especially since the Incomes policy 
makes them redundant) and have 
been paradoxically ‘side-tracked1 
Into the more difficult but signifi­
cant pursuit of workers* control.
Their strikes have been about 
and against unsympathetic manage­
ment, lack of consultation, command- 
Ism at the work place, the maltreat­
ment of trade union leaders (or con­
versely, the Ineffectiveness of the 
same leaders). 75
This conflict w ill not only hinder the progress of workers* parti 
clpatlon In management, but also affect the production and the producti­
vity of workers. It has been reported recently by M r. Cleopa Msuya, 
Minister for Industries, In the National Assembly that:
a survey of 10 enterprises In Dar 
es Salaam showed that 820,000  
man-hours had been lost In 1976 
through processions and public 
meetings, workers* education,
74. Ib id. ,  page 33.
75. Ib id ., page 33.
cultural activities and military 
parades. This was the equiva­
lent of closing the Tanga Steel- 
rolllng mill for three years. 76
Despite this shortcoming,
there was a renewed emphasis In 
1975-76 on worker participation 
and management re-education.
Worker and TANU directors (at 
least one a shop floor worker) 
were added to most parastatal 
boards In 1975 and a goal of 
forty per cent worker directors 
set for 1976. TA NU seminars 
for managers stressed the need 
for genuine worker Involvement 
and Initiative In respect of 
management to become general 
and not limited to a few firms, 
for example, N .B .C . ,  Ubongo,
Farm Implements, e tc . 77
However, Shlvjl Is not very pessimistic; he has specifically 
concluded that:
for a strategy like this to succeed 
the working class must be surely 
and firmly In political power.
The State power must be In the 
hands of the workers and peasants 
led by the present revolutionary 
party and not the bureaucracy.
76. The Economist (London), 4 March, 1978, page 16.
77. Africa Contemporary Record, Colin Legum (Ed.), (1975-76), 
page B326.
A  class -  Tn thTs case, workers 
and peasants -  cannot but Id a 
soctety Tn tts Tnterests wtthout 
wteldtng poltttcal power. Bulld- 
Tng Soctaltsm Ts the workers* and 
not the bureaucrats* business. 78
It ts encouragtng to note that the Chairman of the Nattonal
Development Corporation has stated that "Workers* Councils have now
been formed In the majority of group companies, and others are follow- 
79Tng suit."
It could be concluded from the above observations that the 
workers are now aware of their rights, ’ responsibility and place Tn the 
society. However, It  Ts Important to bear In mind that a programme or 
scheme which Ts put forward for Its adoptton, Ts greatly Influenced by the 
political philosophy which the country practices. Therefore, It Ts an Im­
perative necessity to put Into practice the Idea of workers* participation 
Tn management Tn transforming the country Into a Socialist society, which 
Ts the declared objective of Tanzania. "Tanzanian workers", says Loxley
and S3ulc!, "properly plugged Into the national development effort, thus
80remain a potentially building block for Socialist Core truetlon. ”
78. I .G .  Shlvjl: The Silent Class Struggb, page 36 .
79. 7th Annual Report, (1971)^...page 19.
80. Loxley & S^uI: "Political Economy of ParastaIs11 In E .A .L .R .,  
V o l.5 , (1972), page 34.
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The present Investigation assumes that the public enterprise Ts 
a key Instrument by means of which to operate certain economic functions 
of the State. A characteristic feature of this century, especially since 
the Second World W ar, has been an Increasing Involvement of govern­
ments Tn the economic fie ld . The Influence of governments on the 
social, political and economic life of their respective communities has 
been far-reaching. The nineteenth century gospel of "lalssez-falre", 
I . e .  the doctrine of State non-interference, has given place to the In ­
creasing acceptance of Socialism. With the spread of Socialist Ideo­
logies Tn countries like Britain, India, Tanzania, e tc .,  governments began 
to experiment Tn a somewhat tentative way with Industrial and commercial 
activity under their own direct Initiative and management.
There Ts hardly any country to-day Tn which government Ts not 
engaged actively and directly In establishing and managing commercial 
and Industrial enterprises. These range from basic transport systems -  
Railways, road, air and shipping enterprises -  to energy systems -  the 
generation of power and Its distribution -  to the mining and processing 
of coal, Iron and other minerals , and Indeed to Industrial enterprises of 
all kinds, such as machine tools, fertilizers and chemicals, the manu­
facture of aircraft, locomotives and transport equipment; financial
services such as banking and Insurance; Indeed every conceivable sort of 
Industrial and commercial activity, productive of goods and services.
In varying degrees, governments everywhere are Involved Tn Industrial 
and economic management.
Public enterprises, especially Tn India and Tanzania, embrace 
the entire national life and are the foundation of economic planning and 
Socialism.
The reason why India and Tanzania were chosen for a compara­
tive study of public enterprise Ts that despite their dlversltlesln religion, 
tradition, culture, language and political system, one thing which both 
countries share Is a particular social philosophy.
The present Chapter, therefore, w ill attempt a brief compara­
tive survey of the position of public enterprise, as It obtains Tn India and 
Tanzania, under the following heads.
8.1 The Role of PublTc Enterprise
Both countries have constitutionally committed themselves to 
establish Socialist societies. It could be argued, therefore, that to 
achieve social, political and economic goals Tn a SocTalTst economy, the 
State*s direct Involvement Tn the fields of commerce and Industry Ts neces­
sary. Hence, both India and Tanzania have decided to use public 
enterprise as an Instrument for economic development and social justice.
In 1975, the then Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, 
told the public sector enterprise management:
The public sector cannot be judged 
on the basis of Investment but on the 
basis of actual services which It 
Jakes available to the country and 
iiie surplus that It generates for 
further Investment. We advocate 
a public sector for .three reasons: 
to gain control of the commanding 
heights of the economy; to promote 
critical development Tn terms of 
social gains or strategic values 
rather than primarily on considera­
tions of profit; and to provide com­
mercial surpluses with which to 
finance further economic develop­
ment. The final test lies Tn profit­
ab ility , service and growth.
She further observed that:
there can be no stereo type of the 
public sector. It must grow, 
evolve and change with the times.
In another twenty years, the pub­
lic sector might well be larger 
than the government Tn terms of 
personnel and budgets.
She summed up her observations about the public sector as follows:
There Ts no question whatsoever 
of playing down the Importance 
of the public sector or of allow­
ing It to be diluted or pushed 
around. I think that, certainly 
In their pronouncements, Its 
business circles now are not so 
derisive or critical of the pub­
lic sector as they used to be, 
because our public sector now 
Ts gaining ground and Ts Im­
proving In production, Tn cut­
ting down the lossess and so on.
We are convinced that It  must 
continue to occupy the command­
ing heights of our economy.
But I must continue to stress 
that Its production and perform­
ance have to be further Improved 
by the adoption of more efficient 
methods of management and also 
by drawing upon the enthusiasm 
of workers to a much larger 
extent. 1
I . Quoted from R .K . Nlgam: Social Justice Through Public Sector, 
(1976), Delhi, page 53.
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It Ts significant to mention that the profits of the public enter­
prises Tn India have Improved Tn a very spectacular manner Tn the last 
three years even while the politico-economic situation has progressively 
deteriorated. The gross profits before tax went up from Rs. 1,720 million
Tn 1971-72 to Rs. 4 ,650  million Tn 1974-75. The gross profits for 1975-76
2
were estimated to be around Rs. 8,500 m illion.
These figures, of course, do not prove that the public enter­
prises are more efficient and properly run than the private sector enter­
prises. In order to make a comparison of performance, we need to know 
the net return on the Investment, which obviously calls for details of the 
Investment made, Interest, taxes and depreciation that are to be deducted 
from the gross profits.
It Ts encouraging, however, that some public enterprises In 
India are at least making some profits and others are paying their own way. 
This Ts not to say that profit should be considered as the main criterion to 
judge whether a public enterprise Is efficient or not. A  public enterprise 
may be efficient, but may record losses or low profits because of public 
policies that overtly or covertly require operations at low prices. For 
example, a rallway*s pricing structure may lead to losses under social
2 . Ibid. ,  page 58.
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pressures. On the other hand, a public enterprise with the monopoli­
stic power can make a high profit not necessarily through efficiency 
but through market conditions.
A  Colloquium on Public Corporations and the Legal Systems of 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Sri Lanka was held Tn Colombo Tn 1974, 
which has suggested that:
one aim of the public sector Ts 
to produce a financial surplus.
A  continuing deficit cannot be 
explained away Tn terms of com­
peting social alms. Moreover, 
for an enterprise to operate at a 
continuous loss may be demoral­
izing, erode financial discipline, 
and lead to adverse pub lie c riti­
cism of the public sector. 3
The Colloquium has also pointed out that:
the criteria to be applied Tn a 
particular case w ill depend upon 
the type of pub lie enterprise.
Profit-making may not always 
be an appropriate test of e ffi­
ciency: I f  the enterprise Ts a 
monopoly, profit maximization 
could be due to exploitation, 
or high profits might be the re­
sult of high prices. 4
3 . International Legal Center: Law and Public Enterprise Tn Asia, 
(1976), page 17.
4 . Ibid.
It Ts appropriate to mention that the White Paper on the 
Nationalised Industries, which was published by the Government of the 
United Kingdom Tn March 1978, has said that:
It Is essential that the mistakes 
of the early 1970s should not 
be repeated. The Govern­
ment Intends that the national­
ised Industries w ill not be 
forced Into deficits by re­
straints on their prices. When 
help has to be given to poorer 
members of the community, It 
w ill be given primarily through 
the Social Security and taxa­
tion systems and not by subsi­
dising nationalised Industry 
prices. 5
Nyerere has also admitted that "profit Ts necessary whether an 
enterprise Ts privately or publicly owned." ^
We maintain that enterprises which provide public services should 
always aim to run at a proftt and build up reserves, and the reserves In turn, 
should be used for their own expansion. Prices should not be artificially 
held down by subsidising the public sector products, because when a good 
Ts subsidised It does not help the poor Tn whose Interests the policy Is 
adopted as the benefit of the subsidy goes to all consumers Irrespective 
of size of Income.
5 . The White Paper on the Nationalised Industries, H .M .S .O .,  
(1978), page 22.
6 . The Economist, March 1978, page 11.
However, Tt Ts very clear from Mrs. Gandhi's statement that
the publTc sector undertakings occupy a pivotal role Tn India's economic 
strategy:
I think we can say with justifi­
able pride that the sinews of 
our strength, though Tt may be 
modest by the standards of the 
advanced countries, lie largely 
In our public enterprises. We 
have to create a new atmosphere 
Tn the country to give acertaln 
feeling to our people that all 
those who are Involved Tn the 
public enterprises are deeply 
Involved and deeply committed.
This Ts the sort of atmosphere 
which has to be created Tn our 
public enterprises. 7
On the other hand, President Nyerere of Tanzania Ts no less 
enthusiastic than Mrs. Gandhi to establish a Socialist society through 
Socialist policies. He Ts a believer Tn Socialism. He stated: "At
Independence we achieved political control, now Ts the appropriate time
g
for us to secure the control of our economy".
Nyerere believes that:
7 . A  Hand Book of Information on Public Enterprises (1970), (Ministry 
of Finance), Delhi, page X I .
8 . J .K . Nyerere: Freedom & Socialism, page 262.
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to buTld and maintain socialism,
It Is essential that all the major 
means of production and exchange 
In the nation are controlled and 
owned by the peasants through^ 
the Government machinery.
This statement suggests the willingness and the readiness of the government 
to participate In the management of Its own economy so as to ensure that 
the people of the country are able to decide development plans as well as 
obtain a large portion of the profits.
Nyerere has stressed that:
the Government has also as Its 
principal alms to participate 
directly In the economic devel­
opment of the country whenever 
possible, to exercise effective 
control over the principal means 
of production, to expedite col­
lective ownership of a ll natural 
resources, to prevent exploita­
tion of one person by another or 
one group by another, to pre­
vent the accumulation of wealth 
which Is Inconsistent with the ^  
existence of a classless society.
Thus, Tanzania's decision to use public enterprise was considered 
an effective Instrument for economic development and as a key In the
9 . J .K . Nyerere: Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism, page 116.
10. Ib id ., page 14.
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transition to SocTaltsm. It Is significant, however, that Tanzanians 
public enterprises have not achieved the same good record as Indla*s 
public enterprises have.
The Economist has made quite pertinent comments: ’The cost
of Socialism has been Tn chronic Inefficiency Tn both trade and Industry 
and Tn the growth of an army of bureaucrats manning the plethora of State- 
CorporatTons -  known In Tanzania as parastatals” . ^
The >rate of growth has fallen more sharply as a whole; from
an average of 6 .8  per cent a year Tn 1964-67, It has dropped to 4 .0  per
12cent Tn 1967-75. In 1974, Tt was actually negative.
Nyerere also admitted:
Almost a ll our Industrial 
plants are running well below 
capacity; sometimes less than 
50 per cent of what Tlcoutd be 
produced with existing mach­
inery Ts actually being manu­
factured and put on to the 
market. Even Tanzania 
Breweries was only using 68 
per cent of Its capacity In 
1975; Tegry Plastics ran 
at 46 per cent capacity; 
and the Mara M ilk Plant 
at less than 30 per cent
11. The Economist, (London), 17 March, 1978, page 11.
12. IbTd., page 112.
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capacity. Our parastatals are 
not producing suffTctent surplus 
to finance new Investment. In 
1967-74, only about 20 per 
cent of new productive Invest­
ment was financed from the re­
sources of the existing public 
owned corporations. They 
were not, Tn more common 
terms, making sufficient pro­
f it .  For profit Ts necessary 
whether an enterprise Ts pri­
vately or publicly owned.
Public ownership affects what 
happens to the profits, not 
the necessity for them. 13
The poor showing of the public enterprise Tn Tanzania could be 
attributed to many factors, for example, the dearth of capital (both foreign 
and Indigenous), acute shortage of skilled personnel or efficient managers, 
the appointment of Inefficient management, etc.
Professor GhaT has observed that:
Inquiries Into the perform­
ance of public enterprise In 
various countries show a re­
cord of Inefficiency, corrupt­
io n  and maladministration.
There Ts often a lack of sense 
of responsibility among the 
officials of public enterprises.
Public Corporations have not 
funcibned as a form to draw 
persons with Industrial and 
business expertise Into the 
management of State enter­
13. Ibid., page 11.
prises; political leaders or civil 
servants -  have been the key 
officials, and have lacked the 
necessary management skills.
If the management and nego­
tiating skills could be Improved, 
both the Internal and external ^  
defects could be ameliorated.
Our study entirely agrees with Professor Ghat's observations.
We have noted earlier that In India many ex-Ministers and ex-M .P .s  
have been appointed to the board of directors as part-time chairman and 
members, without considering their actual ab ility , efficiency and business 
acumen. In Tanzania as w e ll, tt has been pointed out by Shlvjt that a 
few principal Secretaries Tn some Government Ministries and departments, 
on average, held 13 leadership posts each Tn the parastatals. One would 
surely agree that, however efficient and able a person may be, Tt Ts physi­
cally d ifficu lt, If  not Impossible, to look Into the affairs of so many para­
statals and run them as efficiently as they should be run.
It Is relevant to mention that Tanzania Is trying to f il l  the vacuum 
Tn the field of administrative training such as administrators, accountants, 
etc. For example, Dr. Emery of the I .B .M .  Corporation (sponsored by
14. G hal, Y . P . :  ’’Control and Management of the Economy”, Research 
Perspective on Public Enterprise Tn VRU (1976), page 172.
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the Ford FoundatTon) Ts now Management Development AdvTser Tn the
General Managers OffTce of the NatTonal Development Corporation,
and hTs prTmary responsTbTlTty Ts to establTsh a system for traTnTng Tan- 
15zanTan managers. Shlvjl, however, has cast doubt as to whether 
the CapTtalTstTc system of traTnTng would help the TanzanTan managers 
to run a SocTalTst economy or whether thTs would, Tn fact, reTnforce 
the TdeologTcal tTes wTth the CapTtalTst world. In ShlvjT*s own words: 
"the traTnTng by the foreTgn partner Ts bound to leave behTnd the ethos 
of CapTtalTsm, thus reTnforcTng the TdeologTcal tTes wtth the CapTtalTst 
world". ^
The Party, under the charTsmatTc leadership of Nyerere, Ts 
still supreme today and Its Influence Ts felt at every level and Tn every 
corner of the country. Therefore, Tt Ts unthinkable at this moment of 
time that a handful of managers trained by an American expert would be 
able to destroy the basic foundation of the society which Ts so deep 
rooted and well established.
However, It Ts now expected that the economy of Tanzania 
may turn for the better as:
15. ShlvjT, I . G . :  Class Struggle Tn Tanzania (1976), page 178.
16. Ib id ., page 178.
the confidence of Aslans has 
risen sharply Tn the past year 
and domestic savings are now 
mysteriously appearing and be 
Tng Invested. For Instance, 
Tn the private sector, a new 
textile factory Tn Irlnga, 
largely financed by Aslans, 
reflects a new degree of opti­
mism among a community that 
has hitherto fe lt Insecure and 
beleaguered throughout East 
Africa, though It  was at the 
same time a major source of 
commercial sk ill, middle- 
class savings and entrepren­
eurial activity. 17
17. The Economist, (London), 17 March, 1978, page 12.
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8 .2  Forms of Organisation
The three principal organisational types, both India and Tan­
zania have used, are the Government department, the public corporation 
and the company form. Generally, the earlier types of enterprises were 
concerned with public utilities, for example, railways, postal services, 
e tc .,  and these were run by the Government departments. Certain c riti­
cisms have been levelled against this form of State participation, namely, 
that It  Is Inflexible, therefore not suitable for commercial Initiatives, that 
It Is subject to Budget, accounting and audit controls applicable to Govern­
ment activities, I .e .  It  has strict financial regulations and that Its perma­
nent staff consist of C iv il Servants, therefore, It Is too bureaucratic, and 
so on.
In order to overcome these shortcomings, public corporations were 
set up. These are created by special Acts of Parliament defining their ob­
jects, demarcating the powers, the management and the relations that w ill 
subsist between them. Each Is a body corporate and can hence sue and be
sued In Its own name. Each ensures better accountability and each Is easier 
to operate.
In India, however, there Is only one kind of corporation, which 
Is created separately by a separate Act of Parliament and Is known as a
public corporation. In Tanzania, on the other hand, there are two 
types of corporation. One Is set up by a specific Act of Parliament, 
which Is known as a statutory corporation. The second type comes 
Into existence by Presidential Order under Section 3 of the Public Cor­
porations Act of 1969. This Act was passed In order to establish cor­
porations just by the Presidential Order so that whenever a corporation 
needs to be set up for specific purposes, the Government does not have 
to go to the National Assembly. Most of the public corporations set up 
under the Public Corporations A ct, 1969, have followed a similar pattern. 
The Act has also set out the manner In which corporations might be created.
As the public sector Is expanding very fast In India, an Act simi­
lar to the Public Corporations Act would be convenient, and would save a 
lot of valuable time for M .P .s to discuss matters of national Importance. 
However, at present, the establishment of a public corporation Is an except­
ion; creation of a company Is the rule.
The company form has the advantage of much greater flexibility  
as the necessary adjustment can easily be made In the articles of associa­
tion of a company. It Is regarded as Improper , for example, by Professor 
Robson, the Rangoon Seminar on Organisation and Administration of Public 
Enterprises, e tc ., for a company to be wholly owned by the Government. 
The company form may be used where an enterprise Is to be started In
association with the pWvr«uIsector •
We strongly recommend that the wholly-owned government 
companies should be made statutory/public corporations, because parlia­
mentary control Is otherwise very much diluted by the creation of public 
enterprises by executive action, In which case Parliament has hardly any 
say whether the public funds should be Invested In a certain public enter­
prise or not.
We also advocate greater private equity participation In the 
financing of public enterprises. We think It  Is desirable that private 
equity participation In the public enterprises should be encouraged as It 
hot only diminishes the pressure on the Governments* financial resources, 
but also enables public enterprises to work under the vigil of bodies of 
shareholders.
Having suggested this, It Is also appropriate to mention what 
Professor Hanson, an eminent economist, had to say on the relative merits 
of different forms;
Practically every known type of 
public enterprise Is to be found 
working well In some circum­
stances and badly In others, and 
It Is extremely difficult to say 
what extent the performance of 
a particular enterprise has been 
affected by the form that the 
political authorities have given
Tt, as to Isolate this factor from 
all the others Is usually Impos­
sible. 18
Professor Dlmock came to the conclusion that: " If sufficient
Improvements could be made among the departments Tn the direction of
greater autonomy and flex ib ility , there could be little or not justification
19for public corporations at a l l ."
The participants of the Colombo Colloquium are of the opi­
nion that:
the choice of a particular form 
of public enterprise may not be 
significant because of other 
factors. For example, due to 
Ministerial Interference, the 
operations of a public corpora­
tion may resemble those of a 
Government department.
Nevertheless, the choice of 
a particular form should not 
be accidental or casual but 
should be preceded by a 
thorough appraisal of the 
relative advantages of using 
that form. 2 0
18. A .H . Hanson: Public Enterprise and Economic Development, 
(1959), page 337.
19. M .E . Dlmock: "Government Corporations” , American Political 
Science Review, V o l.X L III, page 1163.
20. International Legal Center: Law & Public Enterprise In Asia, 
page 13.
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However, the purpose of State partTcTpatTon Tn a Socialist 
economy Ts to enjoy the fruits of an equitable society and to bring In­
dustries under public ownership so that greater government control can 
be exercised over them. Therefore, selection of the type of 
organisational form should depend on the nature of the State.
It Ts of Interest to note that after the attainment of Independ­
ence, the Indian Companies Act of 1913 had been thoroughjy overhauled 
and Tt was eventually repealed and replaced by the new Indian Companies 
Act of 1956 to suit the Indian conditions. This Act has provided a special 
section to deal with the government companies -  the field which Is expand­
ing very fast. Whereas the Tanzanian Companies Ordinance (Cap.212), 
which was based on the English Companies Act of 1929, Is still Tn force. 
The Companies Ordinance has had to be amended a number of times to 
accommodate government companies which are widely used for public 
enterprise.
We feel, therefore, that the Companies Ordinance If  outdated 
and the time has come to pass a new Companies Act which should fu lfil 
modern requirements. For example, the provision to deal with govern­
ment companies, the treatment of directors* powers and of the duties of 
directors, appointment, qualifications and removal of Auditors, etc . 
should be Inserted Into the new Act. Alternatively, two forms of
483.
company law may be created: ( 1) prtvate company law, and (2) State 
company law. This would give State compantes a separate status than 
that of private companies. But the distinction between corporations 
and companies would remain as the former are created by Acts of Parlia­
ment or Presidential Orders whereas the latter are created and governed 
by the provisions of the Companies A ct. The Companies Acts, therefore, 
should be reviewed to develop more definite forms of public accountability, 
and a code of conduct should be set out to promote desirable social prac­
tices In Industry. The right of the Government to Inspect the accounts 
and operations would also be established. It would then be possible to 
distinguish the two types of company, and to ensure that government com­
panies were fully accountable to the Government.
It Is relevant to point out that one of the general characteristics 
of the public corporation Is that It has no shares and no shareholders, either 
private or public. However, this principle has been violated In a number 
of cases, Including the Industrial Finance Corporation (India), the State 
Bank of India and the Tanzania Investment Bank. In a ll cases some shares 
have been Issued to Institutions which, In turn, entitle such Institutions to 
elect certain members of the Boards.
It Ts Important now tbat certain Issues, for example, the rela­
tionship between the Boards and Ministers, between the Boards and Parlia­
ment, e tc .,  need to be settled In principle because there are Issues which 
are closely linked with the problems of control, accountability and 
autonomy.
8.3 Relation between Management and Ministry
One of the main reasons of bringing Tn Industry under . ' public 
ownership Is to exercise a measure of democratic control over I t .  This 
control ensures that the procedures and decisions which are adopted and 
taken by an enterprise, w ill be In the public Interest. If there Is no 
ministerial control, then public ownership becomes meaningless.
However, let us first explain the meaning of the three expressions, 
namely, Control, Accountability and Autonomy.
"Control” Is an active function, a purposeful and positive acti­
vity . It means directing, restraining, stimulating a person or organisation 
to a certain action or end. "Accountability” Is a passive function. It 
means and Involves receiving accounts reports, statistics, etc. The person 
accountable Is In the position of a trustee who has to give an account of 
how he has performed the functions of his trusteeship. Thus, the public 
enterprises are under the control of the Ministry and both of these tn their 
turn, are accountable to Parliament for their performance.
The word "autonomy” means that one should be allowed to carry 
out oneks functions without outside Interference. A ll corporations 
carry with them an e le m e ^ o f autonomy. Thus, a company may add to 
Its membership and change Its Internal regulations, for example, articles
of association^ without any specific authorisation of law. Therefore, 
the problem of striking a proper balance between these elements Is an 
exceedingly difficult and delicate one.
A public corporation Is normally set up by an Act of Parliament, 
or In Tanzania by a Presidential Order. Each public corporation has a 
collective leadership known as the "Board” , the Chairman Is usually 
appointed by the President In Tanzania, but the members are appointed 
by the responsible Minister. The Board's responsibility, however, Is 
not to an annual shareholders' meeting but to the Minister and through 
him, to Parliament and the public.
It Is recognised that the Boards require a large degree of Inde­
pendence In matters of current administration, for their efficiency as com­
mercial undertakings. A t the same time, It  should be borne In mind 
that discretionary powers may be exercised for Improper purposes, In dis­
regard of relevant considerations, or with unreasonableness. Therefore,
It Is suggested that the acts and omissions of the boards are to be subject 
to review and control by the legislature and the judiciary. The commer­
cial enterprises are expected to meet their working expenses, to pay Inter­
est on capital, to provide for the loss of capital due to wear and tear and 
obsolescence, etc . These considerations make a strong case for a high 
degree of Independence of boards from Government control. However,
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Tt cannot be dented that the public enterprises, In view of their size and 
dimension, and because their expansion programme, Investment and employ­
ment policies, etc. usually affect the whole structure of the economy. 
Therefore, the nation must have some final power of control over them.
Hence, It can be seen that a ll statutes dealing with statutory 
and public corporations Tn India and Tanzania grant exclusive controlling 
powers to the Ministers. With the expansion of the public sector economy, 
Tt was considered desirable to arm the competent Ministers with necessary 
powers. The corporation^ programmes often have to be geared Into the 
operations of the rest of the economic structure of the country.
Ministerial control may be conducted through various devices.
In addition to the power of appointment and removal, the statutes creating 
public corporations Tn India, gave the responsible Ministers powers to give 
the corporations directions of a general nature on matters appearing to 
them to affect the public Interest (S .21 of the L . I .C .  Act, 1956), whereas 
Tn Tanzania, the Acts establishing statutory corporations empowered the 
relevant Ministers to give directions which are usually of a general charac­
te r  but Tn the case of the public corporations, the President has the
power to Issue directions Tn regard to specific matters as w ell, (S . 6  of the 
Public Corporations Act, 1969),
It ts appropriate to mention here that the British White paper 
on the Nationalised Industries has pointed out that:
In the absence of powers to give 
specific directions, governments 
have had to rely on a process of 
persuasion. Because this has 
been Informal, accountability 
for decisions has on occasions 
beBn blurred and this has caused 
friction and resentment. The 
Government considers that this 
situation should be avoided, and 
that It Is wrong In principle that 
a Minister cannot statutorily 
Intervene In specific matters 
of major Importance subject to 
the approval of Parliament.
The Government proposes that 
the present powers should be 
extended to remedy this defi­
ciency by enabling the M in i­
ster to give a board either 
general or specific directions 
on matters which appeared to 
him to affect the national 
Interest. 21
It remains to be seen what course of action India and Tanzania 
would take In respect of their statutory corporations.
However, It  must also be emphasised that the autonomy granted 
by the statute should not be Infringed. If Interference Ts allowed, then 
the very object of establishing statutory corporations as autonomous bodies 
w ill be defeated.
21 . The White Paper on the Nationalised Industries, (1978), page 11.
With regard to the relationship of the board of directors with 
the Ministers, we suggest that day-to-day administration should be Inde­
pendent of the executive. In matters of general policy, the boards must 
be subject to adequate ministerial control. The relevant Minister must 
take responsibility and be prepared to face up to responsibilities which 
he has assumed. He must be frank and realistic In his approach. This 
would be In the best and the ultimate Interest of the nation he represents.
8.4 Parliamentary Control
The central feature of public accountability Is often described 
as parliamentary control. This Ts based on the assumption that Parliament 
Ts the real representative of public opinion, that It Is sovereign and has 
the final say Tn a ll matters. It Ts expected that Tn a parliamentary form 
of democracy which exists both In India and Tanzania, members of Parlia­
ment are entitled to know a ll about the public enterprises (not only how 
they are run, but also how the funds are utilised for the benefit of people 
at large. In other words, the public must have the last word Tn the con­
trol of the Industries Tt owns). The Legislature as a body of elected 
representatives of the public Ts capable of being entrusted with this task.
Parliament uses three main Instruments to exerctse control over 
the public enterprise: (a) Questions, (b) Debates, and (c) Committee.
In India, an analysis of the 
parliamentary questions at the 
central level revealed that a l­
most half the questions were 
devoted to operational prob­
lems, with about a third de­
voted to questions of appoint­
ments, more particularly the 
recruitment of various ethnic 
groups. The quality of dis­
cussions In State legislatures 
was even worse. 2 2
22. International Legal Center,: Law and Public Enterprise In Asia, page 28.
We would like to suggest to Indian parliamentarians to be 
more active to seek more Information relating to public enterprise by 
pressing questions.
We w ill now comment on the working of the Comihlttee bn 
Public Undertakings and Standing Committee on Parastatal Organisations 
as an agency of parliamentary control over public enterprises. As noted 
earlie r, there Is no doubt that both the Institutions, Tn India and Tanzania 
respectively, have done good work and contributed extensively to public 
knowledge on matters to which neither the Public nor Parliament has any 
access. It Ts pleasing to add that although the status of these committees 
Ts advisory, both the Governments consider seriously the recommendations 
of these Committees. These Institutions should be given more powers, 
e .g . power to send for persons, papers and records, power to make special 
reports on any matter that comes to them In the course of Its work, e tc ., 
and their recommendations deserve prompt action. Members either 
selected or elected must know a ll about the Industry or Industrial manage­
ment so that the public can have respect for and confidence In them.
In Tanzania, a new body ( I .e .  the Inspectorate) has been esta­
blished In accordance with the Parastatal Organisations (Finance, Super- 
vlslon and Control) A ct, 1975. The functions of the Inspectorate are:
(I) to examine the expenditure of parastatal funds;
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(Tt) to Investigate the conduct and performance of officers who 
have access to the funds.
(Ill) to make recommendations and submit proposals to the Minister 
for ways and means of minimising unproductive expenditure of 
the funds, etc.
In India, the Bureau of Public Enterprises was set up Tn 1965 within 
the Ministry of Finance. The functions of the Bureau, Inter a lia , are:
(I) to provide central point of reference, consultation and 
advice on Important aspects of management of Public 
Enterprises.
(II) to explore a ll avenues of economy Tn the capital costs 
of the project;
(HI) to devise steps to Improve productivity and profitability 
of the enterprises.
"The Minister of Finance exercises his control through Its Bureau,
which Ts concerned Tn a coordinating capacity with a ll Issues affecting all 
23
public enterprises".
If these Institutions work effectively, they can exercise a great 
deal of control over the public enterprises.
23. Ibid., page 26.
In our opinion, Tt does not matter much by which parliamentary 
committee the activities of a public enterprise are examined and scruti­
nised. What matters Ts how such an agency functions Tn actual practice. 
Both Parliaments must examine more closely what type of parliamentary 
control would be more appropriate under their own conditions.
8.5 . Other InstTtuttons
We would tnvtte the Government of Indta to consider setting up 
an Institution like the National Development Corporation of Tanzania, 
which has started as a joint venture, and now controls 1 0 0  companies and 
Ts considered as a key Instrument of Government policy, and the National 
Enterprise Board of the United Kingdom, The National Enterprise Board 
Ts described as an Instrument Intended to secure, where necessary, large- 
scale sustained Investment. It w ill hold a ll existing government shares 
Tn joint public-private firms, such as British Petroleum, as well as In com­
panies which are wholly Government-owned, as^the case of Rolls-Royce. 
India has an Institution which might appear to be similar, known as the 
National Industrial Development Corporation, which was set up In October, 
1954, with the object of financing Industries and promoting Industrial 
development. However, It does not buy or hold any shares of any com­
panies. The main functions of the National Industrial Development Cor­
poration are to (l) provide consultancy services through Its Technological 
Consultancy Bureau, and (IT) formulate and execute projects for setting up 
new Industries or developing new lines of production.
In another field (so far as the Office of the Parliamentary Com­
missioner for Administration Is concerned)^ India Is lagging far behind 
Tanzania, and the United Kingdom. The Permanent Commission of
Enquiry Is providing a valuable service to the people of Tanzania. It Is 
eastlly accessible and less expensive than going to Courts. It deals 
with complaints of any nature against any Institution. The striking 
difference between the Ombudsman Tn the United Kingdom and the 
Permanent Commission of Enquiry Is this: that an Individual Tn Tanzania 
can make a complaint direct to the Permanent Commission of Enquiry, 
whereas Tn the United Kingdom, an Individual has to go through his own 
Member of Parliament. At present, the Ombudsman Tn the United King 
dom only dea)s with the complaint made against any Government depart­
ment. India has also established the Office of the Lokpal, which Is 
equivalent to the Office of the Ombudsman. But It  has a long way to 
go to establish Its popularity and credibility.
8.6. Judtctal Control
As corporate bodies, a ll statutory/pub lie corporations and 
government companies are subject to the ultra-vires doctrine. Hence, 
the Courts can ensure that an enterprise restricts Its activities which It 
Ts authorised to do. The Courts have legal power to Intervene If  Tt ex­
ceeds Its limits. However, judicial control Ts possible only where cor­
porate powers are accurately defined.
For example, the objects of A ir India are defined as follows:
the Corporation, Tn particular, 
have power -
(a) to operate air transport-serlve, 
or any flight by aircraft for a 
commercial service or other pur­
pose, and to carry out a ll forms 
of aerial work;
(b) to provide for the Instruction and 
training Tn matters connected with 
air craft or flight by aircraft of 
persons employed, or desirous of 
being employed, either by the 
Corporation or by any other per­
son;
(c) to acquire, hold or dispose of 
any property, whether movable 
or Immovable, or any air trans­
port undertaking;
(d) to enter Into and perform all 
such contracts as are calculated 
to further the efficient perform­
ance of Its duties and the exer­
cise of Its powers under this Act;
(e) to take such steps as are calcu­
lated to extend the atr transport 
services provtded by the Corpor­
ation, whether within or without 
India, Includtng the development 
of feeder servtces and the Improve­
ment of the types of aircraft used 
In air transport services;
(f) to take such steps as are calcu­
lated to promote the Interests of 
the Corporation or to Improve the 
services the Corporation may pro­
vide, Including provision of cater­
ing, rest-rooms, goods-sheds, 
warehouses, and transport by land 
or water Tn connection with any 
atr transport servtce or any other 
amenity or facility;
(g) to take all such steps as may be 
necessary or convenTent for, or 
may be TncTdenta! to, the exer- 
ctse of any power, or the dis­
charge of any function or duty 
conferred or Tm posed on It  by 
this A c t. 24
This provision can be given a very wtde Interpretation, and Its construction 
Ts so subjective that the Courts might be hesttant to Intervene. It Is 
suggested, therefore, that some restrictions or qualifications ought to be 
placed on the "general powers" clause. In the absence of this, there 
w ill be very little and limited scope for judicial action.
24. S.7(2)(1), A ir Corporations Act, 1953. See also S .4 (2 )(l) of the
National Bank of Commerce A ct, 1967.
8 .7 . Legal Services
An Important Innovation In the legal field Is the creation of the 
Tanzania Legal Corporation set up under the Tanzania Legal Corporation 
{Establishment) Order of 1971. The Corporation was entrusted with the 
duty of providing legal services to ‘parastatal organizations1. Such a type 
of Institution does not exist In India. Professor G hal has made the follow­
ing pertinent remarks about the Institution:
In Tanzania the establishing of 
the Legal Corporation to which 
all legal work of public enter­
prises has to be referred, has re­
sulted In a gross reduction of 
business for the private bar, 
and has led to some form of 
socialisation of the legal pro­
fession. It has also forced a 
reconsideration of the question 
of the entire organisation of 
the legal profession, especially 
as the shrinking of the private 
bar also posed problems for the 
provision of defence counsel 
In criminal prosecutions. As 
for the effect on the enterprises, 
one may argue that when legal 
services are decentralised, 
whether through the private 
bar or Tn the TndtvTdual enter­
prises, legal advice and Inter­
pretation tend to favour the 
Interests of the enterprise and 
to justify Its plans, and thus 
Eentral control becomes d iffi­
cu lt. On the other hand, If  
the legal services are central­
ised Tn an Institution which Is
subject to Government control, 
the lawyers do not Identify them­
selves so closely with Individual 
enterprises, and show more fidelity  
to central policy directives and 
laws, thus facllltatlngcontrol of 
the enterprises by centra I agencies.
It Is also possible that such an 
arrangement reinforces the Image 
of the lawyer as a technician and 
reduces his role to putting Into 
"legal shape" decisions which 
have alreac^ been made. It 
Ts questionable whether this 
does not ultimately reduce fidel­
ity to law. 25
Professor G hal‘s balanced and critical analysis of the Institution 
leaves little room to add any further comment except that the existence of 
such an Institution w ill try to bring to an end any dispute between enter­
prises as quickly as possible, and thus ensure that the economic develop­
ment Ts not any way hampered. Legal decisions through the Courts w ill 
unnecessarily delay progress and this Ts surely detrimental to the national 
Interest. India may be tempted to establish an Institution of this kind as 
the public sector Is growing larger and larger.
The merits of establishing centralised legal service units were 
discussed by the Colombo Colloquium and reference was made Tn the dis­
cussion to the Tanzania Legal Corporation, which provides legal services
25. G hal, Y: "Control and Management of the Economy: Research Per­
spectives In Public Enterprise", Tn VRU (1976), page 183.
to a ll public enterprises. The Colloquium has noted the following 
for the establishment of the Corporation:
(l) It was more economical for 
the government than the pay­
ment of large consultancy fees 
to private practitioners;
(IT) Tt was felt that the private 
sector was not effectively pro­
viding adequate legal services 
to the public enterprises;
(ITT) the private legal profession was 
large ly non-African;
(Tv) the legal Corporation was viewed 
as a means of bringing about a 
measure of control over the work 
of public corporations;
(v) Tt was felt that while lawyers 
Identified with a Corporation 
are likely to serve primarily 
that enterprise, an external 
group Ts likely to be more faith­
ful to the dictates of national 
law and policy.
They have also pointed out that 
the Service (Legal) had a strong 
Impact on the structure of the 
legal profession. Many private 
law firms Tn Tanzania collapsed 
as a result of the withdrawal of 
corporation work. 26
The Government of India has not taken any decision yet either way.
26 . Law and Public Enterprise Tn Asia, page 35.
0 .8 . Workers* Participation Tn Management
The acceptance of the tdea of workers1 partTctpatton Tn manage­
ment Tn TanzanTa has perhaps a slTghtly better chance of success than Tn 
IndTa.
The party Ts everythTng Tn Tan­
zanTa, and Ts becomTng every­
thTng plus. Its Tnfluence Ts 
felt at every level, Tn every 
corner of the country: Tn v ll-  
lage councTls, Tn secondary 
school selectTon commTttee,
Tn factory workshop, as well 
as Tn Parliament, over whTch 
the new ConstTtutTon makes 
Tt supreme. One would ex­
pect, therefore, that the Tdeo- 2 7  
logTes would be Tn the ascendant.
As TanzanTa Ts constTtutTonally a sTngle-party State, the Tnter- 
unTon rivalry Ts non-exTstent. The Presidential Circular has made Tt com­
pulsory to set up the Workers* CommTttee and the Workers* Council Tn every
Ts
public corporation, enterprise, firm or parastatal organisation. It/isually  
expected that under a one-party State, the attitude of the management to­
wards worker-directors would be sympathetic and the board officials would 
work together with a common goal, as most of the members belong to the 
same party*
27. The Economist (London), 17 March, 1978.
However, Shlvjl has pointed out that:
the Workers* Councils and exe­
cutive Committees, Institutions 
established officially to effect 
workers* participation, are com­
posed Tn such a way that they 
are effectively controlled by 
members of the *bureaucratic 
bourgeolse*. The membership 
of the Workers* Committees 
which are officially establish­
ed as organs for disciplining 
workers and not participation,
Is exclusively confined to the 
workers. 28
On this view, there Ts a deep-rooted class struggle Tn Tanzania. 
As long as Tt w ill continue to be so, even the one-party State still w ill be 
unable to pave the way for a successful workers* participation. This un­
happy situation was confirmed by M r. Mwanjlsl, the Principal Secretary 
Tn the Ministry of Labour and Social W elfare, who vigorously complained 
against this:
Following . . .  uneasiness In 
Industrial/elatlons, the Govern­
ment would very soon redesign 
the roles of the Workers* Com­
mittees, Workers* Councils and 
TANU branches based In Indus­
trial premises. The Workers*
28 . ShlvjT, I . :  Class Struggles In TanzanTa, (1976), page 132.
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Committees were ortglnally set up 
to handle disciplinary problems 
but they are now sacking mana­
gers, he said. The Workers1 
Councils, Intended to be boards 
of governors from the Inside, 
were now handling disciplinary 
matters. They should, he went 
on, confine themselves to over^^  
all planning and management.
As noted earlier, Tt Is difficult to paint a rosy picture for India 
with respect to workers1 participation In management. Firstly, Tn under­
takings In the public sector, a bureaucratic frame of mind has often stood 
Tn the way of development of worker participation schemes. Secondly, as 
far as workers are concerned, the main problems are (I) Inter,-’union rivalry;
(II) absence of a strong but responsible trade union movement, and (TIT) 
lack of education. Thirdly, as far as the Government and employers are 
c oncerned, they must take positive steps to (l) reduce the ^present ab­
normal disparity In earnings between those at the top and those at the 
bottom; (II) help the growth of a strong and responsible trade union move­
ment, and (ill) encourage collective bargaining on a much larger scale than 
at present. However, a special responsibility rests on the more enlightened 
managements of the country. In time, workers* participation, to be really 
meaningful, must start at the lowest level. In view of the facts stated 
above, It Is predictable however that India has a long way to go before
29. Ibid., page 133
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she can really and truly establtsh purposeful and effectTve boards Tn asso- 
ctatTon wTth the workers of the country.
It Ts of Tnterest to note that durTng the course of theTr discussion 
on the questTon of workers1 partTcTpatTon Tn management, the Colombo 
ColloquTum has made reference to the TanzanTan PrestdentTal Circular, 1970, 
whTch dTrected that a ll parastatal organTsatTons should establTsh Workers1 
CouncTls to provTde for worker representatTon and partTcTpatTon Tn theTr 
executTve commTttees and boards of dTrectors. The ColloquTum have 
observed:
In TanzanTa, worker partTcTpa­
tTon has not proved to be very 
effectTve eTther from the poTnt 
of vTew of SoctalTst TdeologTsts 
or that of the hTgher manage­
ment. One of the prTncTpal 
goals of worker partTcTpatTon 
Ts to ensure Socialist solutions 
to problems of economic develop­
ment and resolve the continuing 
contradictions between the work­
ing class and the managers. A l­
though there have been some 
positive steps, such participa­
tion, on the whole, has not 
achieved the broader Ideologi­
cal goals that they were designed 
to achieve. The reason for this 
failure was largely due to lack 
of political consciousness among 
workers and party cadres Tn pub­
lic enterprises. From the point 
of view of higher management,
workers have not yet had suffl 
ctent educatTon or acqutred 
enough competence to assume 
the managerial roles. 30
30 . International Law Center: Law and Public Enterprise Tn Asia, 
page 32.
8.9 . Conclusions
Since Independence, the growth of public enterprises has been 
rapid Tn India as well as In TanzanTa. The purposes for which they have 
been created Include, Inter a lia , such Important matters as social security, 
development of river valley projects and nationalised road transport, civil 
aviation, Insurance and banking, etc. Both countries have committed to 
Socialism and the public enterprise has emerged as an Important Instrument 
for achieving that end.
The role of public sector In India and TanzanTa Ts large and ex­
panding. Therefore, a central controlling Institution Is needed to ensure 
that an enterprisers policy decisions are consistent with the general economic 
policy of the government. Otherwise, decisions taken by an Individual 
enterprise may be detrimental to the national Interest.
James and Llgunya have observed:
there Ts an Inherent tendency for 
each corporation to serve Its own 
Interests before those of the nation, 
for management to enhance Its real 
Impact by the often greater psycho­
logical Impact of such features as 
prestigious headquarter buildings 
and Intensive advertising campaign; 
for the commercial profit motive to 
derogate from that of full benefits 
to the nation for which the enter­
prise Ts created. A t the lefltfel of
specifics, there are Instances of 
decisions unfavourable to the 
national Interest but favourable 
to the supra-national partner.
Many building and management 
agreements concluded by para- 
statals fa ll Into this category.
More recently, a number of 
parastatals have given way to 
sectoral Interests, e .g . ,  that 
of their workers. Instances of 
the latter are the recent decisions 
of N .B .C . ,  B .A .T . and Tanzania 
BBewerles to distribute their pro­
fits to their employees as bonuses, 
proportionate to the workers* 
gross national Income. 31
To remedy this situation, the Idea of a ‘Ministry of Public Enter
32prises* was put forward by some authorities. In the United Kingdom,
the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries had recommended to esta-
33
bllsh a Ministry of Nationalised Industries In 1968.
The Government replied that:
31 . James & Llgunya: Organisational Relationships and the Control of 
Parastatals In TaznaTanzanla, In E .A .L .R . (1972), page 60.
32 . Ib id ., page 61. They have discussed In the above article the 
countries which have adopted the centralisation of control through 
central agency.
33. For a detailed discussion, see L. Tlvey (Ed.): Nationalisation In 
British Industry (1973).
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they do not believe that the esta­
blishment of a Ministry of Nation­
alised Industries responsible for 
the efficiency of those Industries, 
but not for sector policy, would 
reduce Intervention In the manage­
ment of the Industries, as the Se­
lect Committee hope and expect 
They, however, take the view 
that a department responsible 
for a ll nationalised Industries 
and a ll relevant sectors would 
be too diverse and too large.
If the choice between the two 
methods of organisation has 
therefore to be made, the govern­
ment consider that organisation 
by sectors Is to be preferred. 34
With regard to the Idea of a Ministry of Nationalised Industries, 
Professor Hanson had this to say:
The most generally accepted 
pattern of ministerial responsi­
b ility  for public enterprise Is 
that which gives each enter­
prise to the Minister within 
whose sphere of jurisdiction 
It  naturally lies. Thus, the 
Minister of Industry Is respon­
sible for a ll Industrial enter­
prises, the Minister of Agri­
culture for a ll agricultural 
enterprises, the Minister of 
Finance for a ll State banks, 
etc. Obviously, there are
34. Ibid., page 238.
possibilities of conflict here and 
In marginal cases It  may not be 
easy to say whether Minister A  
or Minister B should be given the 
responsibility. Such problems 
can be solved by putting a ll pub­
lic enterprises under one Minister, 
but as a permanent arrangement 
this Is hopeless, particularly as 
the public sector becomes fairly  
extensive. Significantly, most 
of the countries that once adopted 
It  have now abandoned I t .  35
We also believe that as the public sector In India and Tanzania 
Is vast and complex, the establishment of a ‘Ministry of Public Enterprises* 
would not be very effective. It Is appropriate to mention that the Colombo 
Colloquium did not even take any Interest to put this subject on the agenda 
for discussion.
There are other areas where we feel the statutes should be more 
specific and precise In order to avoid any tensions or misunderstanding.
James and Llngunya have pointed out that:
Ex post controls ( i .e .  super­
vision exercised by the parent 
ministry, the President, Parlia­
ment, etc J cause tensions be­
tween the parastatal organs and 
the controlling agencies with
35. Quoted from James and Llngunya*s article, page 61.
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possible erosion of the auto­
nomy of the parastatal which 
Is the very raison d ‘etre o ^  
this organisational form.
It Is suggested, therefore, that the relevant statute should 
state as clearly as possible the legal relationship that w ill exist between 
the boards and the Ministers and the Legislatures.
Expressions such as ”to act on business principles” and 
"national Interest” are found In the L . I .C .  A ct, 1956, S .6(3), (India), 
the l .F .C .  Act, 1948, $ .6 (2 ), (India), e tc .,  should be defined as simply 
as possible. The statutes must state clearly who Is reponslble to Interpret 
the ‘national* tnterest. If the Intention Is that the judgment of the M in i­
ster should ultimately prevail over the commercial judgment of the boards, 
then the statutes should specifically mention this In order to clear the air 
of uncertainty.
It Is also desirable to suggest that public enterprises ought to 
Improve their annual reports In both countries. To the public and Parlia­
ment, the annual reports provide Information on a continuous basis, which 
helps In judging the enterprisers performance. But the annual reports are 
hardly Impressive. Essential Information with regard to the sufficiency 
and quality of output, the cost of production, the rate of that production
36. Ibid., page 63.
and the rate of that reduction of the cost of production, etc . should be 
provided. They should also provide adequate comparisons with past 
years so as to revea I long-term trends.
We would like to draw the attention of leaderships of both 
countries to the proposals set out In the British White paper on the 
Nationalised Industries for their considerations.
It sets out proposals designed 
to reconcile the purposes of 
public ownership with the Inde­
pendence needed for vigorous 
and enterprising managements 
and to ensure that the nation­
alised Industries employ re­
sources efficiently to the benq^ 
fit of the whole community.
Finally, we recommend that the Board of Directors should con 
slst of men of competence, Integrity and general wisdom.
37 . The White Paper on the Nationalised Industries, (1978), page 5 .
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